Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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Johnson was at an Open Door clinics on November 3, 2011, to review test results with a nurse-practitioner. Before she entered the treatment room, her vital signs were taken and she was weighed on a scale located against the wall in the hallway outside of the treatment room. After the consult, Johnson left the treatment room and headed toward the exit, needing no further treatment. On her way out of the treatment room, she tripped on the scale, which she alleges was moved during the consult and was partially obstructing the path from the room to the hall. Johnson fell and suffered serious injuries. Almost two years later, Johnson filed a personal injury lawsuit. The trial court dismissed, citing the one-year limitations period for a “negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services,” Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, Code Civ. Proc., 340.5. The court reversed, finding that the general, two-year statute of limitations for personal injury applied. The injury had no connection to the provision of medical services or the manner in which they were provided. View "Johnson v. Open Door Community Health Centers" on Justia Law

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The California Correctional Peace Officers Association (the Association) brought a grievance on behalf of correctional officer Sammie Gardner, alleging a violation of his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). The grievance proceeded through the four-step process set forth in the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Association and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Corrections). At the fourth step, a hearing before the Department of Personnel Administration (Department), the Department granted the grievance. When Corrections refused to comply with the Department’s decision, the Association petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel compliance, the enforcement provided for in the MOU. The trial court denied the petition, adopting Correction’s position, first raised in the trial court, that the Department lacked jurisdiction to decide the grievance because the State Personnel Board (SPB) had exclusive jurisdiction over appointments and the employment status of civil service employees and the foundation of the Department’s decision was the finding that Gardner was an employee of Corrections in November 2001. The Association appealed, arguing the grievance at issue was not under the exclusive jurisdiction of the SPB because it was not a merit-based grievance. After its review, the Court of Appeal agreed: the grievance at issue did not implicate the merit principle, set forth in the California Constitution, and therefore the SPB did not have exclusive jurisdiction. The MOU expressly provided that a grievance based on a reemployment USERRA claim, the claim actually decided, be appealed to the Department. Further, by acquiescing in the grievance procedure used, Corrections forfeited any claim that it was the wrong procedure. View "CA Correctional Peace Officers Assn v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

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San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. (SLRR) appealed the denial of its petition for mandamus relief. SLRR wanted the superior court to overturn certain orders of the California Horse Racing Board (CHRB) regarding the management of a fund established and governed by Business and Professions Code sections 19607 and 19607.1. The superior court determined SLRR did not have standing because it did not have a direct interest in the disbursement of the fund and denied SLRR's petition. The Court of Appeal agreed SLRR did not have standing and affirmed the judgment. View "San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Board" on Justia Law

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In 2013, plaintiff Direct Capital Corporation (DCC) leased computer equipment to a since-disbarred Kansas attorney (Mary Brooks, with many aliases, hereafter Mary) who practiced immigration law in Stockton. After Mary did not pay, DCC sued her and obtained a judgment for nearly $40,000. DCC later moved to garnish the wages of her husband, attorney Grant Brooks (Grant). DCC alleged that when the debt was incurred, the marriage was intact, and the judgment thereon was a community obligation. At the hearing on DCC’s motion, Grant’s attorney specially appeared and represented to the court that Grant had filed for divorce the day before, and claimed this deprived the trial court of “jurisdiction” to garnish Grant’s wages. After a hearing, the trial court found the debt was a community property obligation, and “there is evidence that the Computers were for necessities of life as it went to the wage earnings for the community.” The court denied the motion to dismiss, and issued a garnishment order. The Court of Appeal determined this appeal turned on the distinction between “necessaries of life” and “common necessaries of life” as those phrases are used in different parts of Family Code section 914, and which of the two governs when a person is or is not liable for a debt incurred by a spouse. Here, the trial court found that a debt incurred by an attorney-spouse for office computer equipment was for the necessaries of life for that particular marriage, in part because that spouse’s law practice generated community property income. The Court of Appeal upheld this finding. View "Direct Capital Corporation v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order setting aside a planned development permit (PDP) issued by the City. The court held that issues regarding the legal status of the individual lots under the Subdivision Map Act were not ripe for judicial review. In this case, the approval of the PDP in Phase 1 of the Project involved only the development of an infrastructure for the land involved, and the SMA was not implicated in Phase 1. View "Save Laurel Way v. City of Redwood City" on Justia Law

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In Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479, the court held that under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq., a party alleging that a discriminatory act led to the termination of his or her employment has until one year from the date the employment terminated to file an administrative claim. In light of Romano, the Court of Appeal held that the one year limitations period for plaintiff to file a timely Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) complaint began to run from the last day of his employment. Because he filed his DFEH complaint within that period, his claim was timely. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of the third amended complaint. View "Aviles-Rodriguez v. Los Angeles Community College District" on Justia Law

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Paternal great-grandparents Ed and Yvonne H. appealed an order denying their request for joinder and petition to seek visitation with their great-grandchildren. Ed and Yvonne's argued the court erred in finding they lacked standing to join as parties seeking visitation. Specifically, they argued the court erred by determining that Family Code sections 3103 and 3104, which allow a court to grant visitation rights to grandparents if certain conditions are met, did not permit great-grandparent visitation. Alternatively, Ed and Yvonne contend the court erred by not considering that their grandson, the father of the great-grandchildren, consented to and joined in their request for visitation, and by not considering whether they had standing as psychological or de facto parents. The Court of Appeal concluded the Legislature did not intend section 3104 of the grandparent visitation statutes to authorize great-grandparents to petition for visitation, and thus the court did not err by concluding Ed and Yvonne lacked legal standing to seek visitation. View "Ed H. v. Ashley C." on Justia Law

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Riddell filed suit against Insurers, alleging that they owed Riddell a defense and indemnity in third party actions by former professional football players claiming that they suffered personal injuries resulting from Riddell's helmets. Insurers subsequently moved to compel further discovery seeking information related to prior claims against Riddell. The trial court granted the motions to compel and denied the motion for a protective order. The Court of Appeal granted Riddell's petition for a writ of mandate, holding that the discovery at issue was logically related to factual issues in the third party actions and that a stay of that discovery was thus appropriate. However, Riddell must provide privilege logs of documents withheld in document productions that have already occurred. Accordingly, the court directed the trial court to vacate its order on Insurers' motions to compel and enter a new order granting the motions as to the privilege logs only. The court directed the trial court to grant Riddell's request for a stay of the discovery at issue. View "Riddell, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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Plaintiffs Amber Retzloff, James Franklin, and Nancy Stewart sued defendant Moulton Parkway Residents’ Association No. One (the association), twice for alleged violations of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act. The first suit was dismissed without prejudice by plaintiffs; the trial court sustained the association’s demurrer to the second suit without leave to amend. The court further concluded that plaintiffs’ second action was frivolous and awarded the association costs and attorney fees under Civil Code section 52351(c). Plaintiffs appealed the award. Finding no abuse of discretion in dismissed the second action as frivolous, thereby making the association entitled to fees, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Retzloff v. Moulton Parkway Residents' Assn." on Justia Law

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In 1990, appellant Matthew Albert Parker and respondent Mary Katherine Parker divorced. Mary and Matthew shared two children. In 2014, Matthew sought an order (1) requiring respondent San Bernardino County Department of Child Support Services (the Department) to prepare an accounting of the child support arrears owed by Matthew; and (2) discharging the child support arrears for the period in which the children resided with Matthew (Trainotti credits). The family court denied Matthew’s requested order. Matthew appealed, arguing: (1) res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar an award of Trainotti credits; and (2) the family court erred by not applying the doctrine of laches to discharge the arrears owed to the Department. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Marriage of Parker" on Justia Law