Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal granted Michele Clark's motion to dismiss this appeal of a post-judgment award for attorney fees and costs as frivolous. In this case, appellant has been declared a vexatious litigant in the Los Angeles Superior Court, this court, and the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In an effort to prevent appellant from abusing the judicial process, the court imposed an expanded prefiling order, requiring appellant to obtain leave of the presiding judge before filing new litigation. Finally, the court imposed monetary sanctions on appellant for filing a frivolous appeal. View "Kinney v. Clark" on Justia Law

Substantively, in three somewhat interconnected claims, Joe and Yvette Hardesty (collectively, Hardesty) attacked State Mining and Geology Board (Board) findings, contending the trial court misunderstood the legal force of his 19th century federal mining patents. He asserted he had a vested right to surface mine after the passage of SMARA without the need to prove he was surface mining on SMARA’s operative date of January 1, 1976. He argued the Board and trial court misapplied the law of nonconforming uses in finding Hardesty had no vested right, and separately misapplied the law in finding that his predecessors abandoned any right to mine. These contentions turned on legal disputes about the SMARA grandfather clause and the force of federal mining patents. Procedurally, Hardesty alleged the Board’s findings did not “bridge the gap” between the raw evidence and the administrative findings. Hardesty also challenged the fairness of the administrative process itself, alleging that purported ex parte communications by the Board’s executive director, Stephen Testa, tainted the proceedings. The Court of Appeal reviewed the facts, and found they undermined Hardesty’s claims: the fact that mines were worked on the property years ago does not necessarily mean any surface or other mining existed when SMARA took effect, such that any right to surface mine was grandfathered. However, the Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusions that, on this record, neither of these procedural claims proved persuasive. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment denying the mandamus petition. View "Hardesty v. State Mining & Geology Board" on Justia Law

Temporary staffing company Real Time Staffing Services, LLC doing business as Select Staffing (Real Time) hired Garcia in 2011 as an hourly employee. Real Time then assigned Garcia to work for Pexco, LLC. As part of the hiring process with Real Time, Garcia filled out an employment application which included an arbitration agreement between Garica and Real Time. Pexco was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement. Garcia filed suit against Real Time, Pexco, and Aerotek, Inc. for violations of the Labor Code and unfair business practices pertaining to payment of wages during his assignment with Pexco. The operative complaint alleged “each and every one of the acts and omissions alleged herein was performed by, and/or attributable to, all DEFENDANTS, each acting as agents and/or employees, and/or under the direction and control of each of the other DEFENDANTS, and that said acts and failures to act were within the course and scope of said agency, employment and/or direction and control.” Each cause of action in the operative complaint was alleged against “All Defendants” and no distinction was made between Real Time or Pexco. Real Time and Pexco moved to compel individual arbitration of Garcia’s claims. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration. Garcia appealed the order granting Pexco’s motion to compel individual arbitration. The Court of Appeal found Garcia was equitably estopped from denying Pexco’s right to arbitrate and the agency exception applied. View "Garcia v. Pexco, LLC" on Justia Law

As part of marital dissolution proceedings, appellant Valerie Grissom sought a domestic violence restraining order against her husband, respondent Louis Grissom. The trial court denied the request. On appeal, Valerie contended the court erred by concluding that because her injuries were suffered during and as a result of physical confrontations she instigated, they did not constitute " 'abuse' " within the meaning of Family Code section 6203. The Court of Appeal found that although section 6203 defined abuse to include an intentionally or recklessly caused bodily injury to the complainant, a finding of abuse was not mandated merely because the complainant shows he or she suffered an injury caused by the other party. The Court concluded the trial court properly recognized that a person who responded reasonably to an aggressor in this way did not commit abuse within the meaning of section 6203. View "Marriage of Grissom" on Justia Law

Whether a contract provision is an illegal penalty or enforceable liquidated damage clause is a question for the trial court; on review, appellate deference to that court’s factual findings is required.In 2005, Brother and Sister entered a contract under which Brother, a licensed real estate agent, would develop Sister’s Pebble Beach property through funding from investors and then sell the developed property, with Brother and Sister to split the profits after paying $1.5 million to Sister, reflecting her equity, and $30,000 to Brother as a fee. Brother obtained investors. Sister obtained loans totaling $1,008,000.00, secured by first and second deeds of trust. Brother did not use the money for its intended purposes. The property was sold at foreclosure. The investors and Sister sued Brother. Brother filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court granted relief from the automatic stay for Sister’s state claims for “Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Conversion, Fraud, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.” In 2014, after mediation, Brother and Sister signed a settlement, under which Sister was awarded a stipulated judgment of $850,000. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Brother’s “fact-based” argument that the amount included an unenforceable liquidated damages penalty of $250,000.00 (Civil Code 1671), which he had not raised in the trial court. View "Krechuniak v. Noorzoy" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal granted a writ petition to vacate the trial court's order denying Ford's petition for coordination of add-on cases pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 404.1, concluding that a trial judge's order declining to add cases to a coordination proceeding, like the coordination motion judge's original order, was subject to the Court of Appeal's independent review. In these cases where plaintiffs alleged that Ford breached warranties with respect to cars equipped with the DPS6 transmission, the trial court erred in refusing to add 467 substantively indistinguishable cases in the same counties to the original 470 cases filed. The trial court identified no distinguishing feature in the add-on cases that would support its analysis of the section 404.1 coordination standards, and such analysis was erroneous. View "Ford Motor Warranty Cases" on Justia Law

A lawsuit filed primarily to chill the valid exercise of free speech is called a "SLAPP" suit and, if without merit, such an action may be dismissed early under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In this anti-SLAPP case, investigative newsource (inewsource), an independent, nonprofit journalism organization, entered into contracts with KPBS, San Diego's public radio and television station, to gather and produce news stories with and for KPBS, in exchange for the right to use KPBS offices, media equipment, and related news facilities. KPBS was a department of San Diego State University (SDSU), and inewsource and KPBS have jointly created hundreds of news stories. In February 2015 inewsource began publishing articles critical of attorney Cory Briggs. After inewsource published about a dozen more critical stories about Briggs, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), an entity inewsource reported is controlled by Briggs, sued inewsource, along with its founder, Loretta Hearn, and also SDSU, California State University (CSU), and San Diego State University Research Foundation (SDSURF), alleging the contracts between KPBS and inewsource violate statutory prohibitions on self-dealing involving public funds because Hearn was allegedly influencing both sides of the transaction - for SDSU as a faculty member, and for inewsource as its executive director. SDOG also alleged inewsource and Hearn misappropriated the names KPBS and SDSU. Asserting SDOG's lawsuit was based on the exercise of their constitutionally protected speech rights and lacked merit, Defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions. The trial court granted the motions. SDOG appealed, contending the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because: (1) its lawsuit is a public interest lawsuit, exempt from the anti-SLAPP law under section 425.17, subdivision (b); and (2) the exception to that exemption for media defendants under section 425.17, subdivision (d) was inapplicable because its lawsuit has "nothing to do with stopping news reporting" but was instead directed to stopping "self-dealing by a public employee." The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State" on Justia Law

When defendant HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC) notified plaintiff Stanley P. Berman in writing that HSBC was denying his application for a loan modification, HSBC told him he had 15 days to appeal the denial. Under the law, however, Berman actually had 30 days to appeal. Berman brought this action for injunctive relief under Civil Code section 2924.12 on the theory that “the denial letter . . . [wa]s a material violation of sub[division] (d) [of section 2923.6] in that [the letter] only provide[d] fifteen days for appeal.” The trial court sustained HSBC’s demurrer to Berman’s complaint without leave to amend based on the conclusion that Berman had not alleged a violation of section 2923.6. On Berman’s appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred: the denial letter constituted a material violation of section 2923.6 because it substantially misstated the time Berman was allowed by the law to appeal HSBC’s denial of his application for a loan modification. Moreover, the Court found no merit in any of HSBC’s alternate arguments for affirming the trial court. View "Berman v. HSBC Bank" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of mandate and concluded, among other things, that the scope of questions asked by a judgment creditor in a third party judgment debtor examination may include the location of assets no longer in the possession of the third party. Whatever the scope of the original order for examination, KGCRE and James Goveia now have more than adequate notice of the trial court's subsequent discovery order, and are required to comply fully and completely with that order. View "Yolanda's, Inc. v. Kahl & Goveia Commercial Real Estate" on Justia Law

The Sixth Appellate District directed the superior court to reconsider its denial of a motion to dismiss or stay a personal injury lawsuit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The suit was filed by a Canadian citizen and resident of British Columbia against Fox, a California corporation that manufactures bicycle parts. The plaintiff was injured while mountain biking in Canada on a custom-built bicycle that included parts manufactured by Fox. The plaintiff filed another court action in Vancouver, naming other defendants. Fox argued that British Columbia, where the Canadian case was ongoing, was a suitable forum because plaintiff was a British Columbia resident, the accident took place in British Columbia, and all relevant evidence, medical personnel, and percipient witnesses were located there. Fox believed it was at an unfair disadvantage because it had no way to compel the appearance of crucial Canadian witnesses, and that the cases should be tried together to prevent piecemeal litigation. Fox stipulated that it would subject itself to jurisdiction in British Columbia. The superior court applied the “seriously inconvenient forum” standard in denying Fox’s motion. The court of appeal stated “a foreign, noncitizen plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to less deference.” View "Fox Factory, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law