Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Currency loaned money at high interest rates to elderly artists who owned rights to receive royalty payments from music rights management companies. Wertheim persuaded artists to assign their royalty rights and any causes of action they might have against Currency. After Wertheim’s judgment against Currency had been vacated, the superior court in the interpleader proceedings released all deposited funds to Currency. Currency then moved to recoup from Wertheim the $238,615.45 in attorney fees that had been paid to the royalty payors, contending all or most of those entities’ fees were incurred as a result of Wertheim’s litigation tactics. In opposition to the motion, Wertheim contended the fees were incurred as a result of Currency’s litigation tactics. The superior court found no merit to either side's argument. Currency appeals the order denying its motion for attorney fees. The court concluded that equity does not require that Wertheim pay at least some of the fees where Wertheim had a colorable claim on the interpleaded funds in the form of a judgment, and Currency could have avoided the interpleader action by paying the judgment. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding it “proper” for Currency to pay the attorney fees and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wertheim LLC v. Omidvar" on Justia Law

In the underlying action, petitioner filed a complaint against real party in interest Poulet Nikolay, alleging that Nikolay violated Civil Code section 1708.85 by distributing, and threatening to distribute to petitioner's employer, electronic and/or physical copies of photographs, film, videotape, recordings, depicting petitioner's exposed intimate body parts or showing petitioner engaging in an act of intercourse, oral copulation, sodomy, or other act of sexual penetration. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate vacating the superior court's order directing that all future proceedings in the underlying action be filed with his true name. In this case, the superior court, after receiving Confidential Information Form MC-125 from petitioner, stated that because the form was posted online to the court’s publicly accessible Website, it obviated the need to refer to petitioner by the pseudonym, and ordered the parties to thereafter refer to petitioner by his real name. The court concluded that this is not a circumstance in which a party waived a right to keep information confidential or sealed by inadvertently disclosing it. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and ordered respondent court to vacate its April 8, 2016 minute order. Respondent court is ordered to treat information filed on Confidential Information Form MC-125 as confidential. View "Doe v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The trial court found respondent Hugo H. committed an act of domestic violence against appellant Celia S., and therefore awarded her sole legal and physical custody of the couple’s two children because Hugo presented no evidence showing an award of custody to him was in the children’s best interest. Nonetheless, the court also awarded Hugo “visitation” consistent with the “50/50 timeshare” arrangement to which Celia and Hugo agreed nearly a year earlier. Under that arrangement, the children alternated living with Celia for one week and then Hugo for a week. Family Code section 3044 established a rebuttable presumption that prevents a trial court from awarding sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a parent who commits an act of domestic violence against the other parent, unless the offending parent establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that an award of custody to that parent is in the child’s best interest. Celia appealed the visitation order, arguing that the trial court could not circumvent section 3044 by characterizing its order granting physical custody as visitation. The Court of Appeals agreed: "The nature of any order must be determined based on the order’s legal effect, not the label the trial court attaches." The trial court therefore abused its discretion awarding Hugo equal time with the children without requiring him to establish that arrangement was in the children's best interest. That portion of the trial court's order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Celia S. v. Hugo H." on Justia Law

In Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist., the court held that a plaintiff may allege compliance with the claims presentation requirement in the Government Claims Act, Gov. Code 910 et seq., by including a general allegation that he or she timely complied with the claims statute. Applying the rule adopted in Perez, the court concluded that the plaintiff in this case adequately alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act and the demurrer should have been overruled. The court published this decision to confirm the holding of Perez and set forth the court's interpretation of the California Supreme Court’s decision in DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara. The court does not read DiCampli, a summary judgment case that did not address the adequacy of the pleadings, as impliedly disapproving Perez or the rule allowing plaintiffs to plead compliance with the claims statutes using a general allegation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hosp." on Justia Law

Peymaneh Rothstein and Mark Rothstein instituted proceedings in January 2014 to dissolve their marriage. Judge Byrd made findings and orders in the Family Law Case and entered a judgment upon stipulation of the parties that terminated Peymaneh and Mark’s married status. Additional proceedings ensued, and about a month after Judge Byrd granted a motion to impose sanctions against Peymaneh, Real Party in Interest Precious Time, a Virginia limited liability company, filed a civil suit against Mark, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Mark filed a notice with the superior court that identified the Family Law Case and the Civil Case as related. Both cases were ordered related - not consolidated - and the Civil Case was transferred to Judge Byrd, the judge before whom the Family Law Case was then pending. At issue is whether Precious Time's Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge in the related civil action requires transfer of both cases to a new judge. The court held that a section 170.6 challenge filed in a case that is related to (not consolidated with) an earlier-filed case in which the assigned judge has resolved a disputed factual issue relating to the merits requires transfer of only the later-filed case to another judge. In this case, the peremptory challenge Precious Time filed in the Civil Case does not disqualify Judge Byrd in the Family Law Case for the most fundamental of reasons: the cases are merely related, not consolidated, and there has been no challenge filed against Judge Byrd in the Family Law Case. Therefore, the court issued a writ of mandate ordering respondent superior court to vacate its June 1, 2016, order transferring the Family Law Case and the Civil Case to a new judge and to enter a new order transferring only the Civil Case to a new judge. View "Rothstein v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Allstate filed a qui tam action on behalf of itself and the State against defendants under the California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act, Insurance Code 1871.7. Following entry of the qui tam judgment, Allstate began efforts to collect it. During its investigation, Allstate learned of a series of real estate transactions conducted by defendants designed to transfer away their assets. Allstate, on behalf of the State, filed an action to set aside the fraudulent transfers of real and personal property. Allstate subsequently obtained a stay of the fraudulent conveyance action and returned to the qui tam court where it filed a motion for an order allocating the qui tam judgment proceeds. The motion was based on a stipulation entered into between the People and Allstate allocating to Allstate 50 percent of the civil penalties and assessments, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs. The trial court granted Allstate's allocation motion and entered the stipulation as judgment. Defendants appealed. The court held that judgment-debtor defendants in qui tam insurance fraud actions are not aggrieved by such allocation orders under section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A), with the result that they do not have standing to appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dahan" on Justia Law

Marcos J., biological father of two-year-old Reed H., appealed orders dispensing with his consent to adoption and terminating his parental rights. Adoptive parents K.M. and E.M., filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. To resolve the issue, the Court of Appeal first examined the statutory authorization to appeal the order dispensing with father's consent, to determine the proper rule to apply in assessing the timeliness of the notice of appeal and then resolved the question of whether the notice of appeal was timely filed. The Court determined that where the trial court takes the matter under submission and issues a written order which is both filed and served on the parties, the time for filing a notice of appeal runs from the date of service of the written order or other notice to the parties of the ruling. Here, the trial court took the case under submission awaiting written closing arguments. The parties were fully aware that the court would issue a written ruling. The court issued its written ruling, which was filed and served on December 24, 2015. Time for filing a notice of appeal expired on February 22, 2016, 60 days later. Marcos J. did not file his notice of appeal until February 26, 2016. The notice of appeal was untimely. "Appellate jurisdiction depends upon a timely notice of appeal." (In re Elizabeth G. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1331.) The motion to dismiss was granted. All other pending motions were deemed moot. View "Adoption of Reed H." on Justia Law

Riding in a non-competitive charity bicycling event, Minick fell while descending a hill in Petaluma. Erwin, riding behind Minick, saw him lose control of his bicycle after hitting a large pothole. Minick exhausted his administrative remedies, and then, represented by Watson, brought suit under Government Code section 835. The city moved for summary judgment, arguing that Minick, who had no recollection of the accident, had no proof of any dangerous condition on public property. Watson opposed the motion, attaching grainy, low-resolution black-and-white photographs of the alleged site, a copy of a police report containing Erwin's statement that he saw a pothole where Minick fell; and an engineer's expert declaration that a defect in the street caused the fall. The court issued a tentative ruling denying the motion. At the hearing, Watson appeared, but showed signs of physical distress and was taken to a hospital by ambulance. The day before a continued hearing, the court again tentatively denied the motion. After hearing arguments, the court granted the motion, referring to Watson’s arguments as “ludicrous.” The court later granted relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), accepting Watson’s explanation that he had been suffering from a serious illness for which he was under heavy medication. The court of appeal affirmed., When a court finds a wholesale disintegration of the attorney’s professional capacity because of a medical crisis, the availability of relief for excusable neglect is within the court’s sound discretion. View "Minick v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

Aguirre sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) for failing to comply with the Public Records Act (PRA), Government Code sections 6250-6276.48 The complaint alleged that the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was closed after it leaked radiation in 2012; that costs of the shutdown and loss due to the shutdown exceeded $4 billion; and that CPUC approved the owner assigning $3.3 billion of these costs to utility ratepayers during an ex parte meeting in Warsaw, Poland. Aguirre made PRA requests seeking the production of emails and other documents related to the CPUC’s investigation of the shutdown and the settlement and meetings. The superior court rejected CPUC’s motion to dismiss. The court of appeal agreed with CPUC. Public Utilities Code section 1759 bars the superior court from exercising jurisdiction over the suit. The duty to comply with the PRA is an “official duty” of the CPUC. A “writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction” is one of the statutory means available to enforce the PRA (Gov. Code 6258), and a “writ of mandamus” may be brought against the CPUC in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal in appropriate cases under section 1759(b). View "Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In late August 2015, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a dependency petition regarding minor, who was about one month shy of his third birthday. While at the emergency room for a cut on his finger, child was observed to have red sores and pustules around his genitals and buttocks. Also, mother reported that she had not taken minor for any well checks since he was one month old, and that minor had not received any vaccinations. The petition alleged that mother had unresolved anger management issues. In 2013 mother was convicted for domestic violence arising from an incident in which she had struck her ex-husband in the head five times and struck his vehicle repeatedly with a metal stick. The petition also alleged that mother had an unresolved substance abuse problem; a history of methamphetamine use. She reportedly had last used methamphetamine approximately two weeks prior to the incident in which minor cut his finger. Mother’s probation officer reported that mother was not enrolled in a drug treatment program, had multiple positive drug tests, and was not attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Being sent to jail marked a significant turning point for mother. The child was placed with his maternal aunt and uncle. The aunt and uncle indicated a desire to adopt minor if reunification with mother were to fail. Mother contested the recommendation, and an evidentiary hearing was held. Ultimately, the court sided with SSA, terminated reunification services, and set a hearing. The court described mother’s progress while out of custody as “minimal” and “hollow.” The court described mother’s visitation as “strikingly sporadic.” The court noted, however, that while in custody, “mother has taken advantage of every service . . . available to her, and that certainly is to be commended.” The court also “emphathize[d] with mother for a variety of reasons, her youth, the loss that she has suffered in her life.” Nonetheless, the court felt “constrained by an evaluation of the . . . statutory and case law . . . .” Mother’s petition for writ of mandate arose from the trial court’s order terminating reunification services and the “.26 hearing.” After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s finding regarding mother’s actions towards reunification was not supported by substantial evidence. As such, the Court issued the requested writ of mandate. View "J.F. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law