Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wendy Randall appeals a judgment for defendant after a court trial. There was no court reporter during the trial, and the trial court denied Randall's motion for a settled statement after trial. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Randall's motion, and as a result, of her right to her appeal, but Randall failed to seek timely review of that denial. The court affirmed the judgment because the issue has been forfeited and because the record is insufficient to permit review of the judgment. View "Randall v. Mousseau" on Justia Law

Scott R. appealed the termination of his parental rights to his biological daughter, A.B., under Family Code section 7822,1 which authorizes the termination of rights of a parent who "has left the child in the care and custody of the other parent for a period of one year without any provision for the child's support, or without communication . . . with the intent . . . to abandon the child." He argued that the one-year statutory period referred only to the year immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, which precluded its application to him. Scott argued in the alternative that reversal was warranted in any event because: (1) he rebutted the presumption that he intended to abandon A.B.; (2) the termination of his rights was not in A.B.'s best interests; and (3) the juvenile court erred in determining that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply absent proof that a tribe he identified actually received notice as required under that statutory scheme. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected Scott's arguments and affirmed the order. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

Defendant Clyde Greco, Jr. was the trustee of his parents’ trust and the administrator of their estates. He used money from the trust and estates to fund litigation against his sister and others, purportedly to recover money they owed to the trust and estates. After he allegedly spent considerably more money on litigation than he could have possibly recovered, his sister, plaintiff Cara Lyn Greco, brought two lawsuits against him, one at the trial court and one at the probate court, to recover the money he spent, plus penalties. She claimed the prior litigation was a personal vendetta. Clyde Jr. responded to each lawsuit by filing separate special motions to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In each case, the special motion to strike was denied. On appeal, Clyde Jr. contended he met his burden on the first prong of section 425.16 by establishing that Cara Lyn’s claims arose from protected petitioning activity, funding litigation. He further argued that Cara Lyn could not meet her burden on the second prong of section 425.16 to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case of each claim because all her claims are barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal found the gravamen of most of Cara Lyn’s claims was the alleged wrongful taking from the trust and estates and that was not a protected activity under section 425.16. The courts properly denied Clyde Jr.’s special motion to strike as to these claims. The one exception was Cara Lyn’s claim for constructive fraud based on Clyde Jr.’s alleged misrepresentations about the underlying litigation. While Clyde Jr.’s statements about the litigation are protected activity, Clyde Jr. did not show it was covered by the litigation privilege. The Court remanded this matter back to the probate court for a determination of whether Cara Lyn met her evidentiary burden under the second prong of section 425.16 analysis. View "Greco v. Greco" on Justia Law

Appellant Danilo Sese sought to challenge an order denying his motion for interim attorney fees under Civil Code section 2924.12 after he secured a preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure sale of his residential real property. The trial court denied the motion on grounds section 2924.12, subdivision (i) did not provide for interim attorney fees. Sese argued on appeal that the order should have been reversed because section 2924.12 provided attorney fees to a borrower immediately after successfully obtaining a preliminary injunction. Respondent Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo) argued the appeal should have been dismissed because the trial court’s order was interlocutory in nature and nonappealable under the one final judgment rule. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s order was nonappealable because it was interlocutory in nature. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Sese v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

In September 2015, the Trinity County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) filed a juvenile dependency petition as to then eight-year-old S.N. The petition alleged that mother "failed to protect [S.N.] in that she drove under the influence of alcohol with [S.N.] in the vehicle, resulting in a single car collision into the embankment, causing [S.N.] to suffer serious physical and emotional harm." The petition further alleged that mother "failed to provide [S.N.] with adequate medical care in that [S.N.] had ligature marks and abrasions on her chest as a result of a vehicle accident which were not immediately treated due to the mother telling [S.N.] she was not 'hurt enough' to require medical care." C.N., mother of minor S.N., appealed the juvenile court’s orders taking jurisdiction and later terminating jurisdiction after awarding custody to father at disposition. She contended the court failed to obtain a valid waiver of her right to a contested jurisdictional hearing. Mother further contended that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the jurisdictional hearing. In the published portion of the Court of Appeal's opinion, the Court concluded the trial court failed to obtain a valid waiver. Because this error was found as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s orders nevertheless. View "In re S.N." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that, after her employment terminated, defendants failed to pay all of her final wages. She filed a putative class action under Labor Code sections 201-203, also asserting a representative Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim seeking civil penalties on behalf of plaintiff and other aggrieved employees. Defendants submitted an arbitration agreement signed by plaintiff, stating any disputes would be submitted to arbitration and that “[a]ny such claims must be submitted on an individual basis only and I hereby waive the right to bring or join any type of collective or class claim in arbitration, in any court, or in any other forum.” Defendants conceded that the agreement cannot waive the representative PAGA claim. The trial court compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration. The court of appeal concluded the order is nonappealable; the order does not appear to constitute a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs. The putative class members/aggrieved employees under PAGA because their PAGA claims remain pending. View "Young v. REMX" on Justia Law

Concrete Construction (Contractor) was sued by employees of Nibbi Concrete, who were injured after a shoring system designed by Contractor collapsed. Subsequently, Contractor sued Employer for indemnification based on a specific provision in the parties’ contract. The trial court dismissed, relying on the allegations in the underlying lawsuit that set forth claims only against Contractor and not against Employer. The court of appeal reversed, stating that the allegations in the underlying lawsuit are not determinative of Contractor’s claim for indemnity. View "Aluma Systems Concrete Constr. of Cal. v. Nibbi Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

Target appealed the superior court's ruling that invalidates a number of exceptions to a specific governing development in Hollywood and halts construction of a Target store. Target concurrently asked the Los Angeles City Council to amend the plan, which would make the invalidated exceptions unnecessary. The court concluded that the appeals and cross-appeal in this matter are dismissed as moot because the plan amendments have now been finally approved. View "La Mirada Ave. Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Susan Christ sued Dwayne Schwartz for personal injury she allegedly suffered when Schwartz's automobile collided with her vehicle. Jon Christ, Susan's husband, also sued Schwartz for loss of consortium based on Susan's injuries. Despite Schwartz's stipulation that his negligence was the sole cause of the collision, the jury awarded no damages to Susan and Jon. The Christs appealed the judgment contending that the trial court erroneously admitted photographs of the damaged vehicles and evidence of Jon's extramarital affair. They also appealed the order denying their motion for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Christ v. Schwartz" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Thomas and Lynn Hazelbaker owned a condominium in the Rancho Mirage Country Club development. Defendants made improvements to an exterior patio, which plaintiff-respondent Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Association contended were in violation of the applicable covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). The parties mediated the dispute pursuant to the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, the results of which were memorialized in a written agreement. Subsequently, the Association filed this suit alleging that defendants had failed to comply with their obligations under the mediation agreement to modify the property in certain ways. While the lawsuit was pending, defendants made modifications to the patio to the satisfaction of the Association. Nevertheless, the parties could not reach agreement regarding attorney fees, which the Association asserted it was entitled to receive as the prevailing party. The Association filed a motion for attorney fees and costs, seeking an award of $31,970 in attorney fees and $572 in costs. The trial court granted the motion in part, awarding the Association $18,991 in attorney fees and $572 in costs. Defendants argued on appeal that the trial court’s award, as well as its subsequent denial of a motion to reconsider the issue, was erroneous in various respects. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award. View "Rancho Mirage Country Club HOA v. Hazelbaker" on Justia Law