Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pulte Homes Corporation sued Williams Mechanical, Inc. for defective performance of a plumbing subcontract. Even before the action was filed, however, Williams was defunct; first, it was suspended by the Secretary of State, and thereafter, it dissolved voluntarily. Pulte served Williams though an attorney whom Williams had designated as its agent for service of process. The attorney, however, did not notify Williams of the action; he also did not identify or notify Williams’s liability insurer. Williams failed to respond to the complaint, and Pulte obtained a default judgment. Pulte then notified Williams’s liability insurer of the default judgment. About four and a half months later, the insurer retained counsel to represent Williams, and Williams’ counsel filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The trial court granted the motion. Pulte appealed, arguing (1) Williams lacked the capacity to defend this action because it had been suspended; and (2) Williams failed to establish that it was entitled to relief from the default and default judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal held the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Williams was entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Court did not address whether Williams had the capacity to defend. View "Pulte Homes Corp. v. Williams Mechanical" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and four of her neighbors appealed an order dismissing as an anti-SLAPP, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, action their complaint against the city council of Culver City and five of its council members for allegedly violating the state’s open meeting laws, Gov. Code, 54950 et seq. (the Brown Act). In this case, plaintiffs sought personal relief in the form of a halt to any attempts by the church to undo the long-standing parking restrictions. Therefore, the court concluded that the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP provisions does not apply. The court further concluded that plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing plaintiffs' action. View "Cruz v. City of Culver City" on Justia Law

JAMS, Inc. provided private alternative dispute resolution services by promoting, arranging and handling the hiring of neutral individuals, such as retired judges, to assist with resolution of disputes. This action arose out of representations made on the JAMS Web site regarding the background of the Honorable Sheila Prell Sonenshine (Retired), and JAMS's operations in offering alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services. Kevin Kinsella alleged he relied upon certain representations made on the Web site when he agreed to stipulate to hire Sonenshine as a privately compensated judge to resolve issues related to his marital dissolution case and later discovered the representations were either untrue or misleading. JAMS and Sonenshine filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Kinsella's complaint. The court found the action exempt from the anti-SLAPP procedure under the commercial speech exemption of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, subdivision (c). JAMS and Sonenshine filed a petition for writ of mandate or other relief. The Court of Appeal stayed the proceedings and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted to allow the Court an opportunity to consider the issues raised in the petition related to the scope of the commercial speech exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c). After consideration of the matter, the Court of Appeal agreed the commercial speech exemption applied and precluded the use of the anti-SLAPP procedure in this case. The petition was accordingly denied. View "JAMS, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner Ernest Cox was incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison. He filed a civil complaint against real parties in interest, officials and employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), seeking monetary damages. Simultaneously, he filed a petition for relief from the government claims filing requirement. "The complaint is not a model of clarity, but in general alleges claims of sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of due process." Respondent superior court deemed the civil complaint to be a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the court then denied. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, asserting respondent superior court erred in deeming the civil complaint to be a habeas corpus petition and that the court had to consider his petition for relief from the government claims filing requirement on its merits. Real parties in interest conceded respondent superior court erred. The Court of Appeal agreed, and ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate. View "Cox v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) determined that its approval for a Richmond rail-to-truck facility to transload crude oil instead of ethanol was “ministerial” and exempt from California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review. Transloading of crude oil began in September 2013. The trial court dismissed a challenge filed in March 2014 as time-barred under Public Resources Code 21167(d), because it was filed more than 180 days after “the date of the public agency’s decision to carry out or approve the project,” the Authority to Construct issued in July 2013. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the action was timely under the discovery rule, which postpones the accrual of an action from the date an injury occurs until the date the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice of the facts constituting the injury. The plaintiffs claimed they could not have learned about BAAQMD’s determination any earlier, as BAAQMD gave no “public notice” and “the project itself [was] hidden from the public eye.” An action to challenge such a determination accrues on one of three alternative dates listed in section 21167(d). A plaintiff is deemed to have constructive notice of a potential CEQA violation on all three alternative dates of accrual under section 21167(d). View "Communities for a Better Env't v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff petitioned the superior court for a writ directing the then-serving members of the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) to cease publishing his name on the FTB's list of the state's "Top 500" income tax debtors. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer. Because plaintiff did not seek leave to amend his petition, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. The trial court also found the action to be “frivolous and groundless,” and sanctioned petitioner in the amount of $5,000. The court held that the petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata where plaintiff previously sought redress in federal court for having his name placed on the List; because that issue is determinative, the court need not and did not reach the issue of whether plaintiff's petition stated a claim for violation of his privacy rights; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning petitioner. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Franceschi v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

Steven Seapker was administratively appealing a decision by the City of Carlsbad (City) to discharge him from his position as a police officer. His defense was that the City was penalizing him more harshly than it has penalized other similarly situated police officers. This case presented the question of whether a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate challenging an evidentiary ruling of a hearing officer was an appealable final judgment or a nonappealable interlocutory judgment. The Court of Appeal published this order to clarify that a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate challenging an evidentiary ruling of a hearing officer was a nonappealable interlocutory judgment where, as here, the superior court did not deny the petition on the merits, the administrative proceedings before the hearing officer were not concluded, the hearing officer was not the final administrative decision maker, and the hearing officer's decision did not a create a substantial risk confidential information would be publicly disclosed. The Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal and denied a related motion for stay as moot. View "City of Carlsbad v. Scholtz" on Justia Law

McGibney is the CEO of ViaView, which operates the websites BullyVille, CheaterVille, and others. Retzlaff is a critic of the BullyVille and CheaterVille websites. ViaView sought a workplace violence restraining order (Code Civ. Proc. 527.8) against Retzlaff, alleging that Retzlaff had made credible threats of violence against McGibney to be carried out at his workplace. (McGibney works out of his home.) ViaView’s petition described 29 social media postings or emails allegedly authored by Retzlaff, four of which could be construed as containing threats of violence. McGibney reported the alleged threats to the San José Police Department, which recommended he seek a restraining order. Retzlaff, a resident of Texas, moved to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction and filed other motions. The trial court concluded that Retzlaff had made a general appearance when he participated in the litigation, beyond filing the motion to quash, and denied the motion to quash. The court of appeal vacated. The motion should have been granted because under section 418.10(e), a party who moves to quash may, concurrently with or after filing that motion, participate in the litigation and “no act” by the party constitutes an appearance until the proceedings on the motion to quash are finally decided adversely to that party. View "ViaView v. Retzlaff" on Justia Law

A judgment creditor obtained a judgment against a judgment debtor (individually and as trustee of the debtor's trust), but did not levy on the debtor's property until after the debtor died. A third party claimant to the property filed a third party claim, and the judgment creditor filed a petition under the Enforcement of Judgments Law (EJL), Code Civ. Proc., 680.010 et seq., to invalidate the third party claim. The trial court granted the judgment creditor's petition. The third party claimant did not appeal from that ruling. Two years later, the third party claimant filed a motion to vacate the order granting the petition, on the ground that it is void because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed under the EJL. The trial court denied the motion, and the third party claimant appealed. The court concluded that the underlying order invalidating the third party claim was voidable, not void, and became final once the time to appeal that order ran. Therefore, the court held that the trial court properly denied the third party claimant's belated motion to vacate that order. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Torjesen, v. Mansdorf" on Justia Law

Waters began working as a Petaluma firefighter and paramedic in 2008. She was the first and only woman to hold that position. She claims she was immediately subjected to harassment and discrimination based upon her sex. According to Waters, she was subjected to retaliation when she complained. The city maintains that Waters never complained. In February 2014, Waters went on leave; in May, the city received notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, that Waters had filed a charge alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. Days later, Waters voluntarily resigned. The city retained outside counsel, Oppenheimer, to investigate. Oppenheimer provided her report to the city only; every page contained an indication that it was confidential and attorney-client privileged. During discovery in Waters’ lawsuit, the court granted a motion to compel production of the report. The court of appeal reversed. The dominant purpose of Oppenheimer’s investigation was not fact-finding, but to provide legal services in anticipation of litigation. She was not required to give legal advice as to what course of action to pursue in order for the attorney-client privilege to apply. The privilege was not waived by the employer’s assertion of an avoidable consequences defense; the city does not seek to rely on the post-employment investigation as a defense, nor could it. View "City of Petaluma v. Superior Court" on Justia Law