Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff James Reed appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants James Gallagher and Gallagher For Assembly 2014 (together, Gallagher) after the trial court granted Gallagher’s special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute (strategic lawsuits against public participation). Reed and Gallagher were rival candidates for the California Assembly. During the final weeks of the campaign, Gallagher ran a 30-second television ad characterizing Reed as an “unscrupulous lawyer.” After losing the election, Reed sued Gallagher for defamation based on statements made in the ad. Gallagher responded with a demurrer and special motion to strike under section 425.16. The trial court sustained the demurrer and granted the special motion to strike finding, with respect to the latter motion, that the allegedly defamatory statements arose from protected activity and Reed failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claim. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Reed v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

Harris is the principal at Peterson Middle School in the Santa Clara Unified School District. Stampolis, a district board member, has a son who attends Peterson. In October 2014, Harris obtained a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., 527.6) against Stampolis after he became aggressive toward her when she confronted him about how he was regularly late to pick up his son after school. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that sufficient evidence supported conclusions that Stampolis made a credible threat of violence toward Harris on August 27, 2014; that it is reasonably probable that unlawful harassment may occur in the future absent a restraining order; and that the harassment caused Harris emotional distress. View "Harris v. Stampolis" on Justia Law

The Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) appealed a judgment entered in favor of Erna Parth, in connection with actions she took while simultaneously serving as president of the Association and on its Board of Directors (Board). The court granted Parth's motion for summary judgment as to the Association's claim for breach of fiduciary duty on the basis of the business judgment rule and an exculpatory provision contained in the Association's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The court had previously sustained Parth's demurrer to the Association's claim for breach of governing documents without leave to amend, finding that the Association failed to allege a cognizable breach. On appeal, the Association argued that the trial court erred in its application of the business judgment rule and that there remained material issues of fact in dispute regarding whether Parth exercised reasonable diligence. After review of the matter, the Court of Appeal agreed that the record contained triable issues of fact that should not have been resolved on summary judgment. Therefore the Court reversed the judgment in favor of Parth. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Palm Springs Villas II HOA v. Parth" on Justia Law

U.S., the presumed father of five-year-old Robert S. and three-year-old Miguel S., and J.V., Robert’s biological father, each appealed the termination of their respective parental rights to the children. U.S. and J.V. argued insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply in this case, and further argued the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to comply with its obligations under ICWA. U.S. and J.V. also argued the juvenile court erred by finding the children adoptable and terminating parental rights while a child abuse report investigation was pending. The Court of Appeal granted SSA’s unopposed motion to take additional evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 909, which shows the juvenile court concluded the child abuse report was unfounded and the home study for Miguel and Robert’s prospective adoptive parents was completed and approved by SSA. That evidence mooted U.S.’s and J.V.’s challenges to the order terminating parental rights based on the pendency of the child abuse report investigation at the time of the permanency hearing. As for U.S.’s and J.V.’s ICWA challenges, although SSA was informed the children were both eligible to enroll in two different Chippewa tribes, the record did not show that any further efforts on the part of SSA or the juvenile court were made before SSA proposed that the court find that ICWA did not apply and the juvenile court made that finding. The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the order terminating parental rights for the limited purpose of allowing SSA to make active efforts necessary to secure tribal membership for the children, in compliance with rules 5.482(c) and 5.484(c)(2) of the California Rules of Court. View "In re Miguel S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff 569 East County Boulevard, LLC, and others filed an action against numerous entities and individuals. Plaintiffs' complaint named Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (BAD) as a defendant and alleged a single cause of action against BAD for unlawful interference with prospective economic advantage. BAD moved to strike the action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, (the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute). After BAD's anti-SLAPP motion was granted, it sought attorney fees and costs in a total amount of $152,529.15 pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). Plaintiffs did not contest defendant's entitlement to a fees and costs award, but argued the amount sought was exorbitant. The court found BAD was entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred for the successful anti-SLAPP motion, but awarded a reduced amount of $30,752.86. BAD appealed that order, arguing the reduced award was an abuse of discretion. Finding no such abuse, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "569 East County Boulevard, LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG) submitted a public records request to City of San Diego for all e-mail communications pertaining to City's official business sent to or from the San Diego City Attorney Jan Goldsmith's personal e-mail account during certain time periods. City refused to produce any e-mail communications, stating they did not qualify as public records. SDOG filed this verified action after confirming City would not produce any responsive records. The operative pleading claimed a violation of the California Public Records Act and sought declaratory relief against defendants to compel disclosure of the e-mails. SDOG also alleged a cause of action under section Government Code 526a for taxpayer waste. SDOG ultimately dismissed the waste cause of action with prejudice. The trial court issued a judgment in favor of SDOG on its claim under the Act and granted SDOG declaratory relief against City. Third party, League of California Cities, subsequently petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate under the Act challenging the trial court's order. The Court of Appeal granted the petition and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court determined SDOG to be the prevailing party under the Act and awarded it attorney fees and costs. The court also denied City's request for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. City timely appealed both orders. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the current version of section 128.5 applied to any case pending as of its effective date; a party filing a sanctions motion under section 128.5 did not need to comply with section 128.7, subdivision (c)(1) (the safe harbor waiting period); and (3) the legal standard in evaluating a request for sanctions under section 128.5 was whether the challenged conduct was objectively unreasonable. The Court reversed the trial court's order denying sanctions and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court's order finding plaintiff to be the prevailing party and awarding it attorney fees and costs. View "San Diegans for Open Govt. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

This case arose when petitioner challenged his conviction for failing to stop at a red light by arguing that the city failed to comply with the Vehicle Code. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion seeking attorney's fees which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division dismissed petitioner's appeal. Petitioner now seeks review of the dismissal and denial of his alternative request to treat his defective appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. The court denied the petition and agreed with the Appellate Division's determination that the order of the trial court denying petitioner's request for attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (the private attorney general statute) is not appealable under Penal Code section 1466, subdivision (b)(2), because the order does not affect petitioner's substantial rights. The court also concluded that petitioner fails to establish that any exceptional circumstances required the Appellate Division to treat his appeal as a petition for extraordinary relief. View "Gray v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

222 plaintiffs, homeowners, in 22 related mass actions against various financial institutions and mortgage loan servicers, appeal from an order dismissing those actions after the trial court sustained without leave to amend defendants' demurrers to an “omnibus” third amended complaint. Each mass action involves numerous plaintiffs whose loans originated with and/or were serviced by a single defendant or related affiliates. The omnibus complaint asserted seven causes of action. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge only the trial court's denial of their request for leave to amend their unfair business practices cause of action (the UCL claim) to add factual allegations to support an entirely different theory that was suggested in seven sentences of the 29-page complaint. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint because they failed to show that their proposed additional facts are sufficient to state a UCL claim. Moreover, even if their proposed additional facts were sufficient, they clearly demonstrate that the claim could not be prosecuted as a mass action because the 222 plaintiffs' claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 378. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Aghaji v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

It was undisputed defendant-respondent Diane Harkey met Code of Civil Procedure section 1032’s definition of a prevailing party. Plaintiffs-appellants however, contended the trial court erred in awarding Harkey her costs because she was united in interest and shared costs with other defendants who did not satisfy the statutory definition. In support, Plaintiffs relied on cases applying the so-called unity of interest exception, which provided a trial court with discretion to deny prevailing party status to a defendant who otherwise would be entitled to recover costs as a matter of right when that defendant is united in interest with, and asserted the same defenses in the same answer as, other defendants who did not prevail and are not entitled to recover their costs. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that these cases were no longer controlling, and therefore affirmed the trial court’s determination Harkey was a prevailing party entitled to recover costs as a matter of right. View "Charton v. Harkey" on Justia Law

In this action for wrongful foreclosure, the homeowner, Monica Sciarratta, alleged that as a result of a void assignment of her promissory note and deed of trust, the entity that conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale on her home had no interest in either the underlying debt or the subject property. In Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp., (62 Cal.4th 919 (2016)), the California Supreme Court held that the homeowner has standing to sue for wrongful foreclosure. However, Yvanova did not address "any of the substantive elements of the wrongful foreclosure tort," and in particular did not address "prejudice . . . as an element of wrongful foreclosure." The issue this case presented was the question of "prejudice" left open in Yvanova: The Court of Appeal found that policy considerations that drove the standing analysis in Yvanova compelled a similar result in this case. "[A] homeowner who has been foreclosed on by one with no right to do so -by those facts alone- sustains prejudice or harm sufficient to constitute a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure. When a non-debtholder forecloses, a homeowner is harmed by losing her home to an entity with no legal right to take it. Therefore under those circumstances, the void assignment is the proximate cause of actual injury and all that is required to be alleged to satisfy the element of prejudice or harm in a wrongful foreclosure cause of action." The opposite rule, urged by defendants in this case, would allow an entity to foreclose with impunity on homes that were worth less than the amount of the debt, even if there were no legal justification whatsoever for the foreclosure. "The potential consequences of wrongfully evicting homeowners are too severe to allow such a result." The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court erroneously sustained a demurrer to Sciarratta's first amended complaint without leave to amend, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sciarratta v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law