Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Coblentz, a law firm partner, died in 2010. Coblentz served for many years as a trustee for the McClatchy Trust before resigning in 2009. In 2012, one of the Trust’s beneficiaries filed a Petition for Relief from Breach of Trust under Probate Code 17200(a), seeking damages for alleged asset mismanagement. The petition included an allegation that “Petitioner is ignorant of the true names and capacities of the Respondents named herein as Does 1 through 20, inclusive, and therefore names these Respondents by such fictitious names." An amended petition, attempting to add the Firm as a named defendant, alleged that after reading an SEC filing dated 2004, plaintiff became aware that Coblentz‘s actions as trustee had been undertaken in his capacity as a partner in the Firm, making the Firm vicariously liable. The Firm argued the beneficiary was not entitled to use the Doe defendant procedure because he had known the Firm‘s identity and the facts allegedly giving rise to its liability when the original petition was filed and that the claims were time-barred. The trial court quashed service, reasoning that plaintiff knew all the relevant facts before filing the original petition. The court of appeal affirmed. View "McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP" on Justia Law

In 2004, Brown obtained a $450,000 loan secured by a deed of trust recorded against her Oakland property, identifying Washington Mutual as the lender and beneficiary and CRC as the trustee. Washington Mutual failed in 2008. The FDIC was appointed its receiver and sold Chase many of the assets and liabilities (P&A Agreement). In 2011, CRC recorded a notice of default as trustee for Chase, claiming that Brown was in arrears by $60,984.42. Chase then assigned the deed of trust to Deutsche Bank; CRC remained as the trustee and recorded a notice of sale. In 2012, Brown filed the first of three lawsuits challenging the foreclosure. In 2013, CRC executed a third notice of sale. Two days later, Brown filed her third lawsuit, alleging that the assignment to Deutsche Bank was invalid and the foreclosure proceedings were initiated without authority. The trial court granted a request for judicial notice, which covered foreclosure-related documents, filings from the earlier lawsuits, and the P&A Agreement, then dismissed without leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed. Brown‟s contention that Deutsche Bank and CRC lacked authority to enforce the deed of trust was contradicted by matters subject to judicial notice. View "Brown v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, the Sonoma County project’s owner sued Hearn, the general contractor, Second Generation, the roofer, and other subcontractors for design and construction defects. Hearn cross-complained against Second Generation and others. In 2009, Hearn assigned its interests under its subcontracts to two insurers, North American and RSUI. Hearn then settled with the owner and all but two subcontractors, one of which was Second Generation. Hearn filed an amended cross-complaint, purportedly in the name of the insurers, against those subcontractors, adding breach of a contractual obligation to obtain insurance and seeking equitable contribution for Hearn’s defense costs premised on a breach of that duty. In 2013, the court dismissed the cross-complaint against Second Generation on procedural grounds, awarded $30,256.79 in costs and granted prevailing party attorney fees of $179,119. Second Generation moved to amend the orders to name North American as a judgment debtor owing the amounts awarded against Hearn. The trial court denied the motion, stating: Hearn remains the only proper party and that the subcontractor’s exclusive remedy was to pursue a separate action against Hearn’s insurers. The court of appeal reversed, finding that, after the assignment, Hearn was “out of this case.” View "Hearn Pac. Corp. v. Second Generation Roofing, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant filed a personal injury suit after she was hurt in a hay bale accident. In this case, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the complaint for personal injuries during jury trial as a sanction for repeated violations of its orders excluding hearsay and opinion testimony. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the terminating sanction and erred when it granted respondents' motions in limine. Because the orders in limine did not have the effect of granting a nonsuit or judgment on the pleadings, the court determined that the abuse of discretion standard of review applies. In this case, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it made orders excluding evidence that were tantamount to a nonsuit and when it granted the terminating sanction where appellant could not, and did not, demonstrate her opinions about the appearance of hay bales had any rational basis. The trial court also correctly granted respondents' Motion in Limine No. 4, to exclude hearsay regarding the source of the hay bales. The trial court also correctly excluded appellant's proffered testimony that she saw Todd's delivery person with a delivery "ticket" or receipt identifying Berrington as the source of the hay bale. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in issuing the terminating sanction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Osborne v. Todd Farm Serv." on Justia Law

Li is a 78-year-old Chinese-American, with limited English and experience with the legal system. Attorney Yan became a member of the bar in 2008. Ignoring blatant conflicts of interest, beginning in 2007, Yan advised and represented Li in a matter involving a contract in which Yan was the obligor and Li was the assignee. In 2010 Li sued, alleging professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, unlawful business practices, breach of contract, and fraud. The court awarded $254,411.06, plus prejudgment interest. Following posttrial proceedings, during which the California Bar began disciplinary proceedings, the judge filed an amended judgment awarding Li $552,412.30, including $149,667.29 in prejudgment interest. After an unsuccessful appeal by Yan, Li’s new attorney began efforts to collect the judgment. During examination of Yan, as a judgment debtor, the court upheld service of a subpoena duces tecum by mail (Yan was unable to be located for personal service) and denied Yan’s claim of privilege with respect to his tax returns. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that “enough is enough” and awarding Li costs. View "Li v. Yan" on Justia Law

Rita Patel appealed the trial court’s dismissal of her case after granting terminating sanctions striking her complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. The court concluded Patel filed the complaint for an improper purpose without evidentiary or legal support because her claims were barred by res judicata based on her previous adversary action in federal court opposing Victor Ali’s bankruptcy petition. After Ali obtained his bankruptcy discharge, however, Patel did not sue him in this action for fraud and related claims, but rather his business partners, including Ana Alonso, and their company Crown Diamonds, Inc. (Crown). The Court of Appeal reversed, however, finding that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply to insulate defendants from answering for what Patel claims were their fraudulent activities. View "Patel v. Crown Diamonds, Inc." on Justia Law

The family court determined appellant Bruce Frencher, Sr., owed $11,083.84 in child support arrears. Frencher contends the family court erred in its calculation because the excess Social Security derivative benefits paid for his child should have been applied to the arrears owed by Frencher. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed there was a miscalculation and reversed the judgment. View "In re Marriage of Hall & Frencher" on Justia Law

Cummins installed asbestos containing products in California and had received hundreds of asbestos bodily injury claims, including many lawsuits, based on exposure to its asbestos containing materials. Cummins purchased 19 U.S. Fidelity insurance policies 1969-1987, and purchased four U.S. Fire policies, 1988-1992, for “primary, umbrella, and or excess insurance policies,” some of which “may be missing or only partially documented.” Cummins and its parent company (Holding, formed in 2014) sought a “declaratory judgment that defendants are obligated to defend and/or indemnify Cummins [Corp.], in full, including, without limitation, payment of the cost of investigation, defense, settlement and judgment . . . , for past, present and future Asbestos Suits under each of the Policies triggered by the Asbestos Suits.” The trial court dismissed without leave to amend, finding that Holding lacked standing. The court of appeal affirmed. Holding, the controlling shareholder of Cummins, does not have a contractual relationship with the insurers and is not otherwise interested in the insurance contracts. View "D. Cummins Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a board certified obstetrician and gynecologist who was appointed to Sierra Vista’s medical staff, was denied reappointment to her position due to alleged concerns about her fitness for practice. In this appeal, plaintiff contends that her filing of three motions attempting to relitigate the trial court's final judgment denying her petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging Sierra Vista's decision to terminate her, does not make her a vexatious litigant. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding where the trial court, after denying the second motion, admonished plaintiff that she could be declared a vexatious litigant “if similar unsubstantiated motions continue to be filed without any reasonable likelihood of success.” Because plaintiff failed to heed this admonition, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Goodrich v. Sierra Vista Reg'l Med. Center" on Justia Law

After Diagnostics obtained a judgment against plaintiff, plaintiff filed a Claim of Exemption seeking a judicial declaration that seven of his Fidelity Investments accounts were exempt from levy. The court held that the money that a person sets aside for the “qualified higher education expenses” of his children under Internal Revenue Code section 529 (so-called “section 529 savings accounts”) are not exempt from the collection efforts under the California Enforcement of Judgments Law, Code of Civil Procedure section 680.010 et seq., of a creditor who has a valid judgment against that person. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling to the contrary and reversed the trial court's finding that plaintiff's retirement accounts are fully exempt from collection because the trial court did not apply the proper legal standard in evaluating the exemption for private retirement accounts. View "O'Brien v. AMBS Diagnostics" on Justia Law