Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Association sought to impose fines and related fees of $19,979.97 on the Carsons for alleged rule violations related to the Carsons’ use of their properties as short-term vacation rentals. The Carsons cross-complained for breach of contract, private nuisance, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The Carsons had engaged in short-term rental for many years and believed that they were exempt from new regulations and enforcement efforts. The court ruled against the Carsons on their cross-complaint but also rejected many of the fines as unreasonable. The court upheld fines pertaining to the use of Almanor’s boat slips and ordered the Carsons to pay $6,620.00 in damages. The court determined Almanor to be the prevailing party and awarded $101,803.15 in attorney’s fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the award of attorney’s fees, compared to the “overall relief obtained” by Almanor, was not so disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of discretion. View "Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Ass'n. v. Carson" on Justia Law

The child's ("Isabella G.") father and paternal grandparents appealed the denial of the grandparents' petition for placement of the child. The father also appealed the termination of his parental rights. This case involved repeated requests by the child's grandparents for placement of the child, starting when the child was first detained in protective custody. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) did not conduct an assessment of the grandparents' home as required under Welf. & Inst. Code section 361.3, governing relative placement. Instead, the Agency placed the child in the home of a nonrelative extended family member and secured the cooperation of the grandparents and other relatives by representing that the Agency could not change the child's placement for a year. After a year, the grandparents again requested placement. The Agency did not conduct an assessment of their home as required. After reunification services were terminated, the Agency disregarded the grandparents' new request for placement. The grandparents retained counsel and filed a section 388 petition. Only then did the Agency complete a relative home assessment, approving the placement in less than three weeks. At the hearing on the petition, the juvenile court denied the grandparents' request to proceed under section 361.3, instead applying the caregiver adoption preference under section 366.26, subdivision (k). The Agency conceded the juvenile court erred in applying the adoption preference prior to terminating parental rights. The Agency maintained, however, that section 361.3 did not apply because the grandparents' request for placement was made after the reunification period ended and no new placement was necessary. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that when a relative requested placement of the child prior to the dispositional hearing, and the Agency does not timely complete a relative home assessment as required by law, the relative requesting placement was entitled to a hearing under section 361.3 without having to file a section 388 petition. Consequently, the Court reversed the juvenile court's orders denying the grandparent's request for placement under section 366.26, subdivision (k), necessarily reversed the orders terminating parental rights, and remanded for a relative placement hearing under section 361.3. View "In re Isabella G." on Justia Law

Appellant C. Tucker Cheadle, as administrator of the estate of Robert F. Obarr, appealed an order denying his motion to disqualify counsel for respondent DP Pham LLC. Pham made three loans to Obarr totaling nearly $3 million, and Obarr secured each loan by granting Pham a lien on a mobilehome park he owned in Westminster (Property). This action arose when Obarr allegedly agreed to sell the Property to two different buyers. In March 2013, Obarr allegedly contracted to sell the Property to S.C.D. Enterprises (SCD). SCD promptly assigned the purchase agreement to Westminster MHP Associates, LP (Westminster), which allegedly opened escrow on the Property with Obarr. According to Westminster, it satisfied all contingencies for the sale within 10 days of opening escrow. In April 2013, Westminster filed suit alleging contract claims against Obarr. Obarr died unexpectedly in August. The trial court appointed Cheadle as a special administrator for Obarr’s estate and in that capacity substituted Cheadle for Obarr as a party to this action. Cheadle then filed a cross-complaint alleging an interpleader claim against both Westminster and Pham concerning the Property. Based on Pham’s loans to Obarr, Cheadle also alleged claims against Pham for usury, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, money had and received, unjust enrichment, reformation, and violation of the unfair competition law. Cheadle contended disqualification was required because Pham’s counsel improperly obtained copies of privileged communications between Obarr and his attorney, and used those communications to oppose another party’s summary judgment motion in this case. The trial court denied the disqualification motion because it concluded the communications were not privileged. The Court of Appeal reversed. After reviewing copies of the communications, the trial court concluded they were not privileged based on their content. "A court, however, may not review the contents of a communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects that communication. The attorney-client privilege is an absolute privilege that prevents disclosure, no matter how necessary or relevant to the lawsuit. The privilege attaches to all confidential communications between an attorney and a client regardless of whether the information communicated is in fact privileged. Accordingly, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to review a communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects it." View "DP Pham v. Cheadle" on Justia Law

Jose Lopez sued the national Jehovah's Witnesses organization, Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (Watchtower), alleging his Bible instructor sexually abused him in 1986 when he was a child. Lopez asserted several legal theories, including failure to warn, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring/retention. After contentious discovery disputes, the court issued two discovery orders against Watchtower: (1) compelling the deposition of an individual (Gerrit Losch) whom the court found was a "managing agent" of Watchtower; and (2) ordering the production of documents in Watchtower's files pertaining to other perpetrators of child sexual abuse. When Watchtower failed to comply with these orders, the court granted Lopez's motion for monetary and terminating sanctions, struck Watchtower's answer, and entered Watchtower's default. Watchtower appealed, challenging the validity of the discovery orders and an abuse of discretion in failing to impose lesser sanctions. After review, the Court of Appeal rejecte Watchtower's challenges to the production order, but concluded the court erred in ordering Watchtower to produce Losch for deposition and the subsequent sanctions. The Court remanded for the trial court to consider the appropriate sanctions for Watchtower's violation of the document production order. "The initial measure should be a remedy that is less onerous than a terminating sanction." View "Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society" on Justia Law

In 2005, Crossroads Investors, L.P. borrowed $9 million subject to a promissory note. The note was secured by a deed of trust recorded against an apartment building Crossroads owned in Woodland. Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was the beneficiary of the deed. The note imposed on Crossroads a prepayment premium should Crossroads pay the unpaid principal before the note’s maturity date or should Crossroads default and Fannie Mae accelerate the loan. Crossroads defaulted on the note in late 2010. Fannie Mae served Crossroads with a notice of default, and accelerated the loan. In February 2011, Fannie Mae initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. In April 2011, Crossroads entered into a contract to sell the property to Ezralow Company, LLC (Ezralow) for $10.95 million. A few weeks later, Crossroads and Ezralow proposed to Fannie Mae that Ezralow would assume Crossroads’ obligations and pay off the loan on Fannie Mae’s agreeing to waive the prepayment premium. Fannie Mae refused to waive the prepayment premium and rejected the proposal. By June, Fannie Mae recorded a notice of trustee’s sale against the property, stating the total unpaid amount of Crossroad’s obligations was estimated at more than $10.5 million. The day before the property was scheduled to be sold, Crossroads filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to protect its interest in the property. In its petition, Crossroads asserted it owed Fannie Mae $8.7 million. Fannie Mae sold the property after it was granted relief from the bankruptcy stay. Crossroads then sued Fannie Mae for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, fraud, and other tort and contract actions. Fannie Mae filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending the actions on which Crossroads based its complaint were Fannie Mae’s statements in its papers filed in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. This appeal challenged the trial court’s denial of Fannie Mae's special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. "The principal thrust of Crossroads’ action was to recover for violations of state nonjudicial foreclosure law, not for any exercise of speech or petition rights by Fannie Mae. Even if protected activity was not merely incidental to the unprotected activity, Crossroads established a prima facie case showing it was likely to succeed on its causes of action." View "Crossroads Investors v. Federal National Mortgage Assn." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of SunTrust on her complaint for wrongful foreclosure. The trial court ruled that the action was barred by a South Carolina judicial foreclosure judgment. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in taking judicial notice of the South Carolina judgment and the service of process finding. The doctrine of res judicata/collateral estoppel bars relitigation of a factual dispute even when the factual dispute was erroneously decided in favor of a party who did not testify. The court concluded that allowing plaintiff to proceed in this action would frustrate the purpose of the full faith and credit provisions, res judicata, and collateral estoppel rules. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hawkins v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law

USC found that John Doe violated USC's student conduct code as a result of his participation in a group sexual encounter at a fraternity party. Another student (Jane) alleged that she had been sexually assaulted by a group of men at the party. She reported that her sexual contact with John was consensual, but certain contact with the other men was not. USC's office of Student Judicial Affairs and Community Standards (SJACS) found that John violated nine sections of the student conduct code, including the section prohibiting sexual assault. The Appeals Panel found that there was insufficient evidence of any sexual assault, but held that John violated two sections of the student conduct code. John petitioned for a writ of mandate. The trial court rejected John's fair hearing challenge and held that there was substantial evidence to support the Appeals Panel's finding that John violated Student Conduct Code section 11.44C by encouraging and permitting the other students' behavior, but that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that John violated section 11.32 by endangering Jane. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that John was denied a fair hearing because USC failed to provide John fair notice of the allegations that resulted in suspension, or an adequate hearing on those allegations. The court also concluded that the evidence does not support the Appeals Panel's findings as to either Student Conduct Code violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Doe v. Univ. of Southern California" on Justia Law

Kimberly Kirchmeyer, as Executive Director of the Medical Board of California (the Medical Board), launched an investigation of Geoffrey Phillips, M.D., a licensed psychiatrist, based on a complaint that Phillips had carried on a sexual relationship with a patient. As part of the investigation, an investigatory subpoena duces tecum for the production of specified medical records of the patient was served on Phillips. After both he and the patient objected to the subpoena duces tecum, and he failed to produce the medical records, the Kirchmeyer filed a petition to compel their production. The trial court denied the petition and dismissed it. The Kirchmeyer appealed that dismissal. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err and affirmed: "The medical records sought by the investigatory subpoena duces tecum were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege of Evidence Code section 1014. Because the psychotherapist-patient privilege is grounded in the patient’s constitutional right of privacy, the Director had to show a compelling interest justifying production of the medical records sought. The Director failed to show a compelling interest and has not established that an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege applied to the medial records sought by the investigatory subpoena duces tecum." View "Kirchmeyer v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In 1993, Latrice Rubenstein was a high school student. That year, her cross-country and track coach (coach) began sexually molesting her. Coach was an employee of Doe 1, a public entity (defendant). In early 2012, when Rubenstein was about 34 years old, the latent memories of the sexual abuse resurfaced. She filed a claim under the Government Claims Act with defendant, but defendant denied the claim as late filed. Later that year, she filed a complaint against defendant in Imperial County without the required certificates of merit. She ultimately dismissed the action. She then filed a complaint in San Diego County against Doe 1 and Does 2 through 20. The complaint included certificates of merit as to Doe 1 and an individual not named in the complaint. She also filed a petition for relief under Government Code section 946.6 (the petition). The trial court granted Rubenstein's petition, and later granted defendant's motion to change venue to Imperial County. After the case returned to Imperial County, defendant demurred to the complaint. In lieu of opposing the demurrer, Rubenstein filed a first amended complaint. Attached to the complaint were the previously filed certificates of merit from her attorney and a psychiatrist. Defendant again demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding: (1) Rubenstein did not seek a finding of merit after an in camera review before serving the original or amended complaint; (2) the certificate of merit submitted by Rubenstein's counsel failed to articulate facts supporting his conclusion that Rubenstein's claim is meritorious; (3) the psychiatrist's letter was not executed under penalty of perjury and otherwise failed to articulate any facts supporting the conclusion that Rubenstein's claim is meritorious; and (4) no certificates of merit were filed for parties sued as Does 2 through 20. The trial court also found Rubenstein's failure to comply with the procedural hurdles of section 340.1 within 30 days of the order granting her Government Code section 946.6 petition rendered her claim against defendant fatally time barred and dismissed the action. Rubenstein appealed. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a Government Code section 946.6 petition finding that the statutory delayed discovery rule of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 applied to delay the accrual date of plaintiff's action for childhood sexual abuse. The Court found that the trial court erred in sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Rubenstein v. Doe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. (Hospital) appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Blue Cross of California, doing business as Anthem Blue Cross (Blue Cross), Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company (BC Life), and Anthem UM Services, Inc. (Anthem UM). Hospital sued Anthem, as well as Eisenhower Medical Center (Eisenhower) and Keenan & Associates (Keenan), when the defendants refused to pay approximately $1.9 million the cost of medical services that Hospital provided to an insured patient following extensive communications with Anthem over a period of approximately 50 days regarding "authorization" for the services. The defendants ultimately denied coverage for the medical services based on an exclusion in the patient's policy for injuries sustained as a result of having a blood alcohol level over the legal limit. Hospital alleged that Anthem's continuing to "authorize" medical services during the patient's stay at Hospital, even after Anthem was made aware that the patient was admitted with a blood alcohol level far exceeding the legal limit, constituted a misrepresentation as to coverage, on which Hospital relied in providing care to the patient. The trial court determined that the Hospital's third amended complaint (TAC) lacked the necessary specificity to survive a demurrer, and entered judgment for Anthem. The Court of Appeal, however, reversed, concluding the TAC alleged facts with sufficient particularity to overcome a demurrer. The Court therefore reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Tenet Healthsystem Desert v. Blue Cross of Cal." on Justia Law