Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Laura Saterbak appealed the dismissal of her first amended complaint (FAC) after the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. Saterbak claimed the assignment of the deed of trust (DOT) to her home by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) to Structured Asset Mortgage Investment II Trust 2007-AR7 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates 2007-AR7 was invalid. Arguing the assignment occurred after the closing date for the 2007-AR7 trust, and that the signature on the instrument was forged or robo-signed, she sought to cancel the assignment and obtain declaratory relief. At the time of the foreclosure, Saterbak owed approximately $1.6 million. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Saterbak lacked standing and affirm the judgment. View "Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the minority shareholder of Omega, filed suit against majority shareholder Kent Constable, his wife Karen, and Omega, alleging direct and derivative claims arising from a dispute over management of Omega and its assets. Counsel represented all defendants in the litigation. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion to disqualify Counsel from representing any of the defendants. The court concluded that the trial court did not err by disqualifying Counsel as to Omega because Counsel concurrently represented defendants in the same action where an actual conflict existed between them, and Kent alone did not have authority to consent to the conflicting representation on Omega's behalf. The court concluded that the trial court erred by disqualifying Counsel as to the Constables where Counsel's continued representation of the Constables poses no threat to Counsel's continuing duty of confidentiality to Omega. Finally, the trial court did not err by concluding defendants did not meet their burden of showing plaintiff waived his right to seek to disqualify Counsel where plaintiff's 16-month delay was not unreasonable because prejudice to defendants was not extreme. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Ontiveros v. Constable" on Justia Law

Class representatives filed suit alleging that RHI committed numerous violations of Civil Code section 1747.08, also known as the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The trial court found RHI was liable for as many as 1,213,745 violations of that statute and set a penalty recovery in the amount of $30 per violation, subject to RHI's right to dispute any specific claim. Francesca Muller, a class member and the person prosecuting the appeal, requested the court order notice of the attorney fee motion be sent to all class members. The trial court denied the request, granted the attorney fee motion, and entered judgment in the action. Muller appealed. Michael Hernandez, class representative, contests each of Muller's claims of error. The court concluded that, under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, the court must adhere to Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. and dismiss the appeal. Even if the court were free to disregard Eggert, adhering to Eggert's approach would not leave nonparty class members without protection or appellate recourse. Under California law, where class members are given the option of opting out, they are not bound by the judgment in the class action but instead may pursue their own action. Intervention would have the effect of giving Muller a clear avenue from which to challenge the attorney fee award. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law

This suit was brought on behalf of twin minors. They alleged Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation knew or should have known physicians prescribed its asthma medication to pregnant women for the off-label purpose of preventing or inhibiting preterm labor. They alleged studies available to Novartis before it sold the rights to its brand-name product in 2001 showed the drug was not effective for tocolysis (inhibiting preterm labor), it could cross the placenta, and it could interfere with fetal development. The twins allegedly sustained neurological injuries in utero as a result of their mother having been prescribed the medication. The minors contended on appeal to the Court of Appeal that despite Novartis having sold its interested in the medication six years after the medication was prescribed, Novartis had a duty to revise the label warnings while it still owned the drug to indicate a risk to fetal development and its failure to do so contributed to their injuries years later. The Court of Appeal concluded the minors demonstrated the could amend their complaint to state a claim under California law for negligent failure to warn and negligent misrepresentation based on acts or omissions by Novartis prior to 2001, which allegedly caused the twins' injuries in 2007. The Court reversed the trial court which held to the contrary and remanded for further proceedings. View "T.H v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

In their one-day dissolution trial, Paul was represented by his attorney. Susan was not represented by counsel. The court denied Susan’s continuance request and admitted Paul’s 22 exhibits into evidence.The court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage, declining to award spousal support to either party, dividing the couple’s property, stating that Susan waived future spousal support and that the court would not have awarded spousal support in any event because “each party was self-supporting,” and finding that Paul was entitled to a credit of $2,500 for support payments he had made to Susan in 2012 and 2013. Susan timely filed notice of appeal. Because there had been no court reporter, Susan requested a settled statement under California Rules of Court, 8.137. The court of appeal vacated; the order cannot stand because it was entered without a motion, without the required findings, and based on the false premise that Susan was responsible for the protracted nature of the proceedings on her motion. View "Mooney v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In seeking an attorney fee award in this wrongful foreclosure case, plaintiffs Calvin and Tracy Mountjoy sought a lodestar sum of $308,425 for over 760 hours of attorney and law student work billed at hourly rates ranging from $450 to $200. Concluding that “well over 70% of the billing entries” submitted in support of the attorney fee request were flawed in one or more respects, the trial court reduced the number of hours claimed by 70 percent, to 228. Thereafter, applying a “blended” billing rate of $260 per hour to the reduced number of hours, the court awarded the Mountjoys $59,334.60 in attorney fees. The Mountjoys appealed the fee award, but the Court of Appeal rejected most of their arguments. However, the Court concluded the trial court did abuse its discretion in basing the award on a 70 percent across-the-board reduction in the number of hours claimed. "Even assuming the trial court was correct in finding that well over 70 percent of the time entries underlying the fee request were flawed in one manner or another, there is no reasonable basis for concluding that the time entries the court found were flawed actually included 70 percent of the total time for which the Mountjoys sought compensation. Thus, the trial court's reduction in compensable hours was arbitrary and may have swept too broadly, denying the Mountjoys compensation for time claimed in billing entries that were not flawed." The Court reversed the order on the Mountjoys' fee motion and remanded the case back to the trial court for further consideration. View "Mountjoy v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Arbitration Certification Program (ACP) certifies the qualified dispute resolution process identified in the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code 1790, the “lemon law.” Not all automobile manufacturers must have an ACP certified program. Those manufacturers who choose to operate a certified arbitration process have limited lemon law liability. Plaintiffs bought new cars that were under the original manufacturers’ warranties when they sought declaratory relief claiming that public statements in ACP publications were illegal underground regulations not adopted in conformity with California’s Administrative Procedures Act, because the ACP states that car manufacturers may adjust the price of a defective vehicle to be repurchased from its owner as a lemon for excessive wear and tear and that it is not within an arbitrator’s purview to make such an adjustment. The court concluded plaintiffs were interested persons under Government Code 11350 and denied a motion to dismiss. The court of appeal vacated. Plaintiffs may not invoke the doctrine of public interest standing, and their individual interests in the controversy are too conjectural to confer standing to bring an action for declaratory relief. View "CA Dep't. Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Board issued an administrative investigative subpoena seeking complete, certified records of three of plaintiff's patients on the grounds that there was good cause to believe that plaintiff departed from the standard of care in connection with the treatment of those patients. Plaintiff's petitions to quash the subpoena were denied, and the Board’s petition to compel compliance was granted in part, with the limitation that the records to be provided should be limited by time period. The court concluded that the Board had pointed out specific instances of prescribing irregularities, which were sufficient for a finding of good cause; substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of good cause; and there is no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Dr. Pollak was qualified to render an expert opinion in this matter. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to convince the court that, if the evidence of medical records at issue was obtained in violation of Civil Code section 56.26, the Board was not permitted to use it in the investigation. While the trial court may not have specifically stated it was engaging in a balancing test, the long discussion of good cause shows careful consideration of the patients’ right to privacy versus the state’s interest in safeguarding its citizens from negligent medical care. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the subpoena was overbroad where the trial court did not err in failing to modify the subpoena in more ways than it already did in applying time restrictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fett v Medical Bd. of CA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and a related corporation filed claims arising from a foreclosure sale against several defendants, including respondent T.D. Service (the underlying action). Respondent subsequently filed a motion for relief from the default and default judgment, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court erred in setting aside the default and default judgment. Under the doctrine of extrinsic mistake, relief from a default and default judgment is potentially available when the clerk or trial court erred in entering them. The court found no error in the trial court’s decision to set aside the default and default judgment where the record supports relief on the basis of extrinsic mistake under the three-part test set forth in Rappleyea v. Campbell. In this case, respondent demonstrated a meritorious defense to the claims asserted in the complaints; respondent demonstrated a satisfactory excuse for not presenting its defense, namely, the mistaken entry of a default and default judgment; and respondent also established that it acted diligently to set aside the default and default judgment after discovering them. In sum, the trial court did not err in setting aside the default and default judgment and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bae v. T.D. Service Co." on Justia Law

When Mother was about one-month pregnant, she and N.S.’s father were arrested for illegally growing and possessing marijuana for sale in their Hayward home. About two weeks after N.S. was born, they were again arrested for possessing marijuana for sale in their home. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a dependency petition alleging that N.S. faced a substantial risk of harm (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)). N.S. was placed with a maternal relative who lived in a two-unit building in Union City. Mother moved into the other unit. Visits between Mother and N.S. went well. Mother regularly attended a support group, participated in therapy, repeatedly tested negative for drugs, had no contact with Father, and moved out of the Hayward home, listing it for sale. N.S. had no medical issues and was not alleged to have suffered any physical harm in her parents’ care. The Agency nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction because Mother had been arrested twice for serious charges. The court sustained the dependency petition, concluding that there was a current risk of harm. While appeal was pending, the juvenile court dismissed dependency jurisdiction, awarding custody to Mother, with supervised visits for Father. The court of appeal dismissed an appeal, noting that Mother suffered no harm as a result of the jurisdictional findings below. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law