Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

John PD Doe was a Boy Scout who attended the Mataguay Scout Ranch, which was owned and operated by San Diego-Imperial Council (formerly Desert Pacific Council) and Boys Scouts of America (together Respondents). Glenn Jordan was an employee at the Mataguay Scout Ranch. Around August 1998, when Doe was 14 years old, and continuing until around 2000, Jordan repeatedly and continuously sexually abused him. Respondents knew Jordan had a propensity to molest children, but failed to warn Doe, Doe's parents or other camp attendees of Jordan's dangerous propensities. In 2003, when Doe was about 19 and 20 years old, Respondents provided him counseling for the abuse he suffered. Through this counseling process, Doe began to realize that the earlier sexual abuse he had suffered caused the emotional and psychological problems he had been experiencing. Doe retained counsel in November 2012. On January 9, 2013, Doe filed this action against Respondents alleging various causes of action. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the interaction of the statute of limitations and certificate of merit requirement set forth in section Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 with the tolling provision of Insurance Code section 11583. Specifically, Doe contended that Insurance Code section 11583 tolled the statute of limitation for his claims; thus, although he was chronologically 29 years old when he filed his lawsuit, he was not required to file a certificate of merit because he was actually 20 years old at the time he filed his complaint based on the tolling provisions of Insurance Code section 11583. The Court disagreed and concluded the trial court properly dismissed Doe's complaint after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. View "Doe v. San Diego Imperial Council" on Justia Law

The class action complaint at the heart of this case alleged violations of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971 based on Dick’s alleged practice of requesting personal information from consumers during credit card transactions. The litigants reached a settlement providing for class members to receive vouchers for discounts off any merchandise purchases. The initial complaint listed Plaintiff’s counsel of record as California attorney Sean Reis of the law firm of Edelson McGuire, LLP, and several out-of-state attorneys with the notation “[p]ro hac vice admittance to be sought.” The out-of-state attorneys included Joseph Siprut of Siprut PC in Chicago, Illinois. Reis signed the complaint and signed an amended complaint filed in June 2011. While accepting responsibility for monitoring the pro hac vice application, Reis was not aware the application had been denied and assumed the application had been granted. Once the proposed class action settlement had been reached, the parties set a hearing date for an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. While preparing for this hearing, Siprut and his staff reviewed the file and were unable to locate an order granting the pro hac vice application. After learning of the status of the pro hac vice application, Reis filed a new application to admit Siprut pro hac vice. The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying the second pro hac vice application. Citing rule 9.40(b) of the California Rules of Court, the court stated that application would be denied due to the “great number of pro hac vice applications” that Joseph Siprut had made during the past year. Siprut appeared at a December 2012 hearing along with Todd Atkins, an attorney from Siprut PC, who was a member of the California State Bar. Reis did not appear. The court, affirming the tentative ruling, denied the pro hac vice application on the ground that Siprut had made 12 pro hac vice applications in the prior 11 months and there were no special circumstances under rule 9.40(b) of the California Rules of Court which would support granting the application. Reis ultimately filed a consent to associate Atkins as counsel of record for plaintiff. Upon settlement of the class, plaintiff's counsel moved for fees. The trial court found that two of a class of 232,000 submitted claims for the merchandise credit. The court could find “absolutely no benefit really to anybody based on your claims record” and noted that most of the attorney fees sought were incurred by two out-of-state attorneys who had never been admitted pro hac vice. Final approval was granted to the settlement. In a supplemental briefing, plaintiff's counsel suggested the court grant Sirput's pro has vice application for admission nunc pro tunc to the date of first application. Counsel's application for fees was ultimately denied, and on appeal, argued the trial court erred in denying the total amount ($210,000) of fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of $11,000. The Court further affirmed the trial court's decision to reduct the amount of the plaintiff incentive award. View "Golba v. Dick's Sporting Goods" on Justia Law

The parties married in 1993 and separated in 2007. Their divorce was “contentious” and “highly litigated.” In 2008, both parties signed a purported marital settlement agreement, which set forth terms determining child custody, spousal and child support, and division of community assets, obligations, property rights, and other financial rights. In 2009, husband moved to enter judgment based on the Agreement. Wife argued that the parties “never fully agreed to the terms of the proposed settlement agreement.” In 2010, Judge Morse denied husband’s motion, ruling that there was never a “meeting of the minds.” Later, the case was transferred to Judge Siegel. After a 15-day trial Judge Siegel indicated that he was going to reconsider Judge Morse’s ruling and allowed the parties to brief the issue. The court stated that the prior ruling denying the motion was “improvident and erroneous … not supported by … any evidence. No witnesses testified and no exhibits were offered.” The court found insufficient evidence to support wife’s claim that she was under duress, coercion, fraud, or undue influence. The court entered the judgment of dissolution, incorporating the Agreement into the judgment. The court of appeal reversed, finding the ruling erroneous and prejudicial to wife. View "In re Marriage of Oliverez" on Justia Law

Smith, a California partnership, hired attorney Moncrief to perform due diligence for its purchase of equipment from Texas Hill in Arizona. Texas Hill was represented by Clark, an Arizona attorney. Moncrief performed a UCC search, called Clark, and left a voicemail. Clark called Moncrief in response and represented that Texas Hill was the sole owner of the equipment. Afterwards Clark sent Moncrief an e-mail, stating: “I have been the attorney for Texas Hill . . . and can state unequivocally that the cooling equipment you are buying is free and clear and is owned by Texas Hill.” Based on Clark’s representations, Moncrief advised Smith to go forward with the purchase. Smith later learned that Texas Hill did not own the equipment when they completed the transaction; New York Community Bank had acquired an interest in the equipment. Smith sued Moncrief for legal malpractice. Moncrief cross-complained against Clark. Clark moved to quash service, arguing that California lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court granted the motion. Clark’s conduct and his intentional misrepresentations were required to close the sale. Clark personally availed himself of the benefits of California when he reached into California to induce Moncrief’s client to complete the purchase. Moncrief’s claims arise out of Clark’s contacts with California. lark has not demonstrated that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. View "Moncrief v. Clark" on Justia Law

Appellants Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P., Sprint Spectrum L.P., Wirelessco, L.P., Nextel of California, Inc., and Nextel Boost of California, LLC (collectively referred to as Sprint or the company) filed this action seeking a refund on taxes they paid on property assessed by respondent State Board of Equalization. The Legislature mandated that for a telephone company to file such a judicial tax-refund action it must first file a petition for reassessment with the Board stating “in the petition [that] it is intended to . . . serve [as a claim for refund].” Sprint filed a petition for reassessment but did not state in it that the petition was also intended to serve as a claim for refund. Relying on the plain language of the statute, the trial court granted summary judgment in the Board’s favor. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed: "[a]lthough requiring a telephone company to state in its reassessment petition that it is claiming a refund as a prerequisite for filing a judicial tax-refund action serves limited practical purposes, the requirement is plain and compulsory." View "Sprint Telephony v. California Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant James McKenzie appealed a trial court’s order awarding him only $28,350 of the nearly $48,000 in attorney fees he sought in this case, following the parties’ settlement of McKenzie’s claim under the automobile “lemon law” provisions of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The trial court refused to award McKenzie any of the attorney fees incurred in the wake of Ford’s initial offer because it viewed the compromise offer ultimately accepted by McKenzie as essentially identical to the offer he had initially rejected – distinguished only by his “demand that [he] be allowed to file [a fee] motion.” The court concluded McKenzie unreasonably delayed settlement for the sole purpose of ginning up his fee award. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Court found the trial court’s comparative assessment of Ford’s two settlement offers was erroneous as a matter of law. "Even Ford concedes its initial settlement offer incorporated numerous extraneous provisions – including broad releases of both Ford and nonparties, an illegal confidentiality clause characterized as 'material' to the settlement, and what amounted to an opt-out provision in Ford’s favor – all of which were excised from the offer McKenzie later accepted. These differences are significant, and thus McKenzie’s rejection of the initial offer was reasonable, requiring his counsel to continue working on the case." The Court held further that the trial court’s erroneous comparison of Ford’s initial compromise offer with the offer McKenzie later accepted fatally undermined its conclusion that the entire amount of hours billed by McKenzie’s counsel in the wake of that initial offer was unjustified. The court’s additional finding, that McKenzie’s two attorneys also engaged in instances of duplicative billing after Ford’s initial offer, did not support a complete denial of fees for that period. Consequently, the case was remanded back to the trial court with directions to reconsider the fee award. View "McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Siry filed suit against two of its former business partners for breach of fiduciary duty. After the court issued an opinion in a prior appeal in this case, but before the court's remittitur issued, the Judicial Council amended California Rules of Court, rule 8.278 to allow the prevailing party on appeal to collect the “net interest expenses incurred” in borrowing funds for an appeal bond. The court concluded that the trial court did not err by awarding such expenses to the prevailing party in the prior appeal on the basis of the newly amended rule. The court concluded that there is no impermissible retroactivity in this case because the amended version of rule 8.278 is not being applied retroactively at all. Assuming that Siry has a right to advance notice of a change in the rules governing costs on appeal, that notice was adequate. The court rejected Siry's alternative arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Siry Investments v. Farkhondehpour" on Justia Law

"This is a case of egregious attorney misconduct." Because of the cumulative effect of the attorney's misconduct, the Court of Appeal felt compelled to reverse the judgment she obtained on behalf of her client, Caltrans. "While Judge Di Cesare showed the patience of Job – usually a virtue in a judge – that patience here had the effect of favoring one side over the other. He allowed [the attorney] to emphasize irrelevant and inflammatory points concerning the plaintiff's character so often that he effectively gave CalTrans an unfair advantage." View "Martinez v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

After Ironridge filed suit against ScripsAmerica to recover a debt, the parties subsequently petitioned the trial court to enter judgment on their stipulated settlement, and to retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to enforce the settlement. When defendant failed to complete a stock transfer required by its falling stock prices, the trial court entered an order compelling defendant to issue stock to plaintiff, and prohibiting defendant from transferring stock to any third parties until the outstanding shares were transferred to plaintiff. Since entry of the order, defendant has transferred millions of shares of stock to third parties and has not issued any shares to plaintiff. The court granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal under the disentitlement doctrine because dismissal is the appropriate remedy for defendant’s flagrant disregard for the trial court's order. View "Ironridge Global IV v. ScripsAmerica" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rosa Elena Munoz appealed the dismissal of her personal injury action against the City of Tracy for failure to bring the action to trial within five years, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 et seq. She argued on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing her case because the parties had executed a written stipulation extending the time for trial to a date certain beyond the five-year deadline. After review of the stipulation, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed. View "Munoz v. City of Tracy" on Justia Law