Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Rosa Elena Munoz appealed the dismissal of her personal injury action against the City of Tracy for failure to bring the action to trial within five years, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 et seq. She argued on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing her case because the parties had executed a written stipulation extending the time for trial to a date certain beyond the five-year deadline. After review of the stipulation, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed. View "Munoz v. City of Tracy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against HCP, alleging causes of action for violation of the unfair competition law (UCL), Bus. & Prof. Code, 7200 et seq.; common law fraudulent concealment; and violation of the false advertising law (FAL), Bus. & Prof. Code, 17500. Plaintiff argued that, although HCP does not fall within the literal definition of a “health care service plan” as defined in Health and Safety Code section 1345, subdivision (f)(1), due to the level of risk it assumed, HCP operated as a health care service plan without obtaining the license required by the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975, Health and Safety Code section 1340 et seq., and without meeting the regulatory mandates required of health care service plans. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrers filed by HCP and entered a judgment of dismissal. The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in invoking the abstention doctrine as to the statutory causes of action but not as to the common law cause of action for fraudulent concealment. However, the court found that plaintiff failed to plead a claim for fraudulent concealment, and that she has failed to demonstrate how she could amend the operative complaint to cure the defect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Med. Grp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the hospital, alleging wage and labor claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for the hospital based on the ground that her claims were time-barred. The trial court rejected plaintiff's argument that the filing of a prior class action tolled her limitations periods, under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah. American Pipe held that, under certain circumstances, the filing of a class action tolls a limitations period for class members who file subsequent actions. The court found that American Pipe tolling applied to some of plaintiff's claims but not to others. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Falk v. Children's Hospital" on Justia Law

The Wongs bought a hillside home in San Carlos for $2.35 million from the Stolers. Several months after they moved in, the Wongs discovered that they and 12 of their neighbors were connected to a private sewer system and were not directly serviced by the city’s public system. Believing they had been deceived, they sued the Stolers and the real estate agents who brokered the sale alleging various claims, including rescission. After the Wongs settled their dispute with the real estate agents for $200,000, a trial was held on the rescission claim only. Although the court found that the Stolers, with reckless disregard, made negligent misrepresentations to the Wongs, it declined to effectuate a rescission , but ordered the Stolers to be, for a limited time, indemnifiers to the Wongs for sewer maintenance and repair costs exceeding the $200,000 they obtained in their settlement with the agents. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the trial court declined to effectuate a rescission of the contract based on incorrect justifications and that its alternative remedy failed to provide the Wongs with the complete relief to which they were entitled. View "Wong v. Stoler" on Justia Law

OEpic and ALi agreed to cooperate in developing a power amplifier for use in wireless networking devices and entered into a nondisclosure agreement. Wong signed the agreement on Ali’s behalf. Later, Wong formed Richwave. OEpic continued to transfer intellectual property to Wong’s team based upon assurances that Ali’s rights and obligations under the agreement had been or would be assumed by Richwave. Richwave subsequently disclaimed any need for OEpic’s services; ALi disclaimed any further obligation to OEpic. Epic was formed, became successor to all of OEpic’s interest, and sued ALi, Richwave, and Wong, alleging that ALi had transferred certain of Epic’s intellectual property to Wong and Richwave in violation of the agreements between OEpic and ALi.. The trial court granted Wong and Richwave summary judgment on the ground that a settlement agreement with ALi barred remaining causes of action. The court of appeal reversed, noting that several other provisions of the settlement agreement containing the disputed release clause are not easily reconciled its seemingly broad language. The subsequent conduct of the contracting parties also appears inconsistent with intent to extend the release to unaffiliated third parties. View "Epic Commc'ns, Inc. v. Richwave Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Miriam Navarrete and her minor children Bryan, Stephanie, and Steven Navarette (collectively Navarrete) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-respondent Hayley Meyer on plaintiffs' claims for violation of Vehicle Code section 21701 and civil conspiracy arising from allegations that Meyer, as passenger in a vehicle, told the driver to drive at an unsafe speed over a road Meyer knew had unusual conditions that would cause the car to become airborne, resulting in a fatal accident. In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled there was no evidence to suggest Meyer's act of telling the driver to drive faster affected his control over the vehicle, and therefore no triable issues of material fact as to either cause of action. Navarrete argued on appeal that the evidence raised triable issues for a jury as to whether to impose joint liability on Meyer for her conduct on the night in question on a theory of concert of action or conspiracy, and also as to whether she unreasonably interfered with the safe operation of a vehicle within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 21701 to support a cause of action. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Navarrete v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Before trial, defendant Eisenhower Medical Center (EMC) served plaintiff David Litt a $15,000 settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which Litt did not accept. Litt subsequently added Compass Group USA, Inc. as a defendant in the suit. Compass did not serve a section 998 offer on Litt. A jury returned a verdict for Litt and against defendants jointly and severally for $3,000. After trial, EMC and Compass jointly requested costs and expert fees and Litt requested costs. The court found that Litt was the prevailing party as to Compass and EMC was the prevailing party as to Litt, but declined to award EMC its post-section 998 offer expert fees that were incurred and/or paid by Compass pursuant to an indemnity agreement between them. EMC and Compass argued on appeal that the court should have treated them "as one" for purposes of recovering costs and expert fees and, in any event, it should have awarded EMC its post-section 998 offer expert fees paid by Compass. The Court of Appeal concluded that the court correctly considered EMC and Compass separately for purposes of its prevailing party determination, but that it erred in denying EMC recovery of expert witness fees that were paid by Compass. Accordingly, the Court reversed the orders in that regard and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Litt v. Eisenhower Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from an order granting the motion of Arent Fox to strike the first and second causes of action of plaintiff's complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In this case, the order entered by the trial court in this action granted an anti-SLAPP motion as to two SLAPPback causes of action; Arent Fox gave plaintiff notice of entry of this order; and the sole remedy provided for review of that order was for plaintiff as the aggrieved party to petition an appropriate reviewing court for a peremptory writ within 20 days of service of written notice of the order. Because plaintiff took no action to seek appellate review until she filed her Notice of Appeal, she failed to seek review by peremptory writ within 20 days of notice of entry of the order of which she seeks review. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "West v. Arent Fox LLP" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jane J. (Mother) and real party Christopher J. (Father) were the parents of two boys, an older son, born in the fall of 2002, and a younger boy, born in January 2006. The couple separated in 2006 and divorced in October 2009. At the time of the divorce, Mother lived in Wisconsin, with the two children. Father was an active duty pilot in the military, stationed in Hawaii. Mother and Father agreed to a marital settlement, which was approved by a Wisconsin family court commissioner. The parents agreed to joint legal custody, but because of the family's "unique" situation, Mother was given 92 percent primary physical custody, with Father having 8 percent physical custody. In 2012, Mother and the children moved from Wisconsin to Orange County, where Mother was living with her fiance. The Wisconsin court held a hearing and approved Mother's move-away. Father returned to the United States and received transfer orders to Fort Rucker in Alabama. Newly remarried, he relocated there in December 2013. In January 2014, Father registered the October 2009 Wisconsin custody order in California. In April 2014, he filed a request for order (RFO) to modify the 2009 Wisconsin custody order, either to increase visitation, or to give him primary physical custody over the boys. He also sought to modify the support amounts. Mother opposed Father's RFO. She highlighted her "serious disagreements" with him concerning the children's future medical treatment and exact custody schedule, but asserted that she "[did] not have an issue working with [Father] regarding child custody and visitation." At the conclusion of the subsequent hearing, the respondent court expressed its doubts about Mother's willingness to facilitate Father's visitation with the children. The court determined that the 2009 Wisconsin custody order "wasn't a final order[] in any event." As a result, the court concluded that Father did not have to establish changed circumstances. The court granted the Father's request, acknowledging that its order would require the children to immediately change school in the middle of the school year. The court declined Mother counsel's request to defer the timing of any order until the end of the school year, and directed that its order take effect in four days, by February 16, 2015. The court made no orders regarding Mother's visitation rights other than a visitation over the children's second spring break in April 2015, with Father to pay for the children's visitation expenses "for this occasion only." The court stayed immediate removal of the children from California to Alabama; Mother then filed a timely petition for writ of mandate and a request for an immediate stay of respondent court's move-away order. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that because "petitioner's entitlement to the relief requested is so obvious that no purpose could be served by plenary consideration of the issue," and issued a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance. "Prompt disposition under the accelerated Palma procedure will enable respondent court to exercise its reasoned discretion to fashion appropriate visitation and custody orders under correct legal principles, and considering all the pertinent factors." View "Jane J. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A homeowner sued a general contractor for allegedly shoddy and incomplete work in connection with a major home remodeling contract. The homeowner’s complaint also contained a cause of action against the general contractor’s license bond company, seeking to recover for the contractor’s having “grossly deviated” from the plans and specifications for the job. To support his action, the homeowner explicitly alleged in the complaint that the contractor was licensed at all times. The contractor cross-complained against the homeowner for unpaid work. The cross-complaint included a copy of their written contract which showed the contractor’s license number. To that, the homeowner simply filed a general denial of all allegations. When the case came to trial, the homeowner (contrary to the applicable local rule requiring plaintiffs to identify all controverted issues) did not identify licensure as a controverted issue. The contractor’s attorney did not obtain a verified certificate from the Contractors’ State License Board showing the contractor was licensed at all times during his performance. But when the contractor was about to rest his case on the cross-complaint, the homeowner’s attorney made a motion for nonsuit based on the absence of such a verified certificate as required under Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (d). The trial judge deferred immediate ruling on the homeowner’s nonsuit motion. "As the contractor learned to his chagrin, it [...] takes at least six days to obtain a verified certificate from the License Board even if one drives overnight to Sacramento to pick it up in person." While the contractor was eventually able to obtain a verified certificate of licensure from the License Board, he could not do so until after the close of the trial, in which he prevailed on his claim for unpaid work from the homeowner. Because no certificate of licensure could be produced, the trial judge reluctantly granted the homeowner’s nonsuit motion, by judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). This appeal followed. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed that judgment in favor of the homeowner, with instructions to the trial judge to grant judgment in favor of the general contractor as against the homeowner. "We conclude this is one of those relatively rare cases where a party can be bound by a judicial admission made in an unverified complaint. Here, the judicial admission that the general contractor was licensed, compounded by the homeowner’s failure to comply with the local rule requiring identification of all controverted issues, rendered the question of licensure assuredly uncontroverted for purposes of section 7031. Because of the judicial admission, the rule of 'Advantec Group, Inc. v. Edwin’s Plumbing Co., Inc.' (153 Cal.App.4th 621 (2007)) does not apply." View "Womack v. Lovell" on Justia Law