Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and a related corporation filed claims arising from a foreclosure sale against several defendants, including respondent T.D. Service (the underlying action). Respondent subsequently filed a motion for relief from the default and default judgment, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court erred in setting aside the default and default judgment. Under the doctrine of extrinsic mistake, relief from a default and default judgment is potentially available when the clerk or trial court erred in entering them. The court found no error in the trial court’s decision to set aside the default and default judgment where the record supports relief on the basis of extrinsic mistake under the three-part test set forth in Rappleyea v. Campbell. In this case, respondent demonstrated a meritorious defense to the claims asserted in the complaints; respondent demonstrated a satisfactory excuse for not presenting its defense, namely, the mistaken entry of a default and default judgment; and respondent also established that it acted diligently to set aside the default and default judgment after discovering them. In sum, the trial court did not err in setting aside the default and default judgment and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bae v. T.D. Service Co." on Justia Law

When Mother was about one-month pregnant, she and N.S.’s father were arrested for illegally growing and possessing marijuana for sale in their Hayward home. About two weeks after N.S. was born, they were again arrested for possessing marijuana for sale in their home. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a dependency petition alleging that N.S. faced a substantial risk of harm (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)). N.S. was placed with a maternal relative who lived in a two-unit building in Union City. Mother moved into the other unit. Visits between Mother and N.S. went well. Mother regularly attended a support group, participated in therapy, repeatedly tested negative for drugs, had no contact with Father, and moved out of the Hayward home, listing it for sale. N.S. had no medical issues and was not alleged to have suffered any physical harm in her parents’ care. The Agency nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction because Mother had been arrested twice for serious charges. The court sustained the dependency petition, concluding that there was a current risk of harm. While appeal was pending, the juvenile court dismissed dependency jurisdiction, awarding custody to Mother, with supervised visits for Father. The court of appeal dismissed an appeal, noting that Mother suffered no harm as a result of the jurisdictional findings below. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

Raul and Ingrid married in 1978 in Santa Cruz County. In 1993, the family moved to Chile, where Ingrid had been born. The couple separated in 1995. Since 2010, Raul has resided in New York. In 2012, Ingrid filed a dissolution petition in Santa Cruz, seeking attorney fees and spousal support. Raul signed a receipt for papers mailed to New York, but did not appear. The court ordered him to pay support plus attorney fees. Later, the court garnished Raul’s wages. In 2013, Ingrid sought an order determining Raul’s arrearages. Raul appeared on his own behalf. The court ruled that the support order was valid and awarded arrearages. Months later Raul moved to quash service for lack of jurisdiction and to set aside the 2013 orders and garnishment. Raul asserted that Ingrid “has lived and continues to live in Chile since . . . 2000 or 2001.” Ingrid introduced evidence showing her presence in the county for at least part of the six months prior to her filing. The court found that Raul had submitted to jurisdiction and later entered default. The court of appeal reversed. While Raul’s appearance constituted a general submission to jurisdiction and he forfeited his objection to an untimely hearing notice, the court erred by entering default while Raul’s court of appeal petition was pending. View "In re: Marriage of Obrecht" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a petition against their stepfather, to recover property belonging to their mother’s estate and sought damages of double the value of the property, based on Probate Code 859: “If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of property belonging to ... an elder, ... or the estate of a decedent, or has taken, concealed, or disposed of the property by the use of undue influence in bad faith or through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse … the person shall be liable for twice the value of the property recovered [and] in the court’s discretion ... for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Staggers died. His son was substituted in as the respondent in the probate proceeding. The court held that double damages and attorney fees under section 859 were punitive in nature and not available against the son, based on Code of Civil Procedure 377.42, which excepts from recovery against a successor “damages recoverable under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other punitive or exemplary damages.” The court of appeal vacated, reasoning that section 859 damages may be punitive in nature, but are not punitive damages. View "Hill v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendants Chaim Woolf and Steven Camhi were attorneys who represented plaintiffs in a prior civil action. They appealed an order granting plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal of a legal malpractice action. The court dismissed the case after plaintiffs Michael Younessi and Alea Investments, LLC failed to timely file an amended complaint in response to an order sustaining demurrers to the original complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed motions to dismiss the appeal, for relief from default in failing to file a respondents' brief, and for judicial notice. The Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs' motions. But the Court "reluctantly" affirmed the trial court's order vacating the dismissal: while the evidence did not support granting relief for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, since the dismissal resulted from plaintiffs' newly retained attorney's failure to oppose the demurrers and timely file an amended complaint, plaintiffs were entitled to relief under Code Civ. Proc. section 473, subdivision (b)'s attorney-fault provision. View "Younessi v. Woolf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Remax and Jose Garcia-Yanez, alleging 13 causes of action related to her employment. The trial court granted Remax's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the litigation in the judicial forum under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. The arbitration provider subsequently dismissed the arbitral proceeding after no arbitration costs were paid. Plaintiff then moved that the trial court lift its prior order staying the litigation and defendants filed no contemporary motion or petition seeking an order compelling resumption of the arbitration proceeding. Therefore, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and lifted the litigation stay. Defendants then appealed the order lifting the litigation stay. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that defendants are appealing from a nonappealable order. View "Gastelum v. Remax Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District and two of its employees, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of California's whistleblower statute, Lab. Code, 1102.5; discrimination based on race, gender and age in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code,12900 et seq.; and unlawful harassment in violation of FEHA. Plaintiff was denied postjudgment relief after the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that the trial court improperly denied plaintiff's request for relief from judgment on the ground that a Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b) motion must be signed under penalty or perjury where the trial court had discretion to treat her motion as a request for relief under section 473(b), Section 473(b) imposes no penalty-of-perjury requirement, and plaintiff's motion substantially complied with the requirements for a Section 473(b) request for relief. Accordingly, the court reversed. View "Austin v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The City of San Diego (City) sought to compel the San Diego City Employees Retirement System (SDCERS) to increase City employees' contributions to their retirement fund to share in covering an $800 million investment loss suffered by the fund. Four public employee labor unions ultimately intervened in the action on the employees' behalf, asserting the same or similar arguments as SDCERS to rebut the City's claims. After the case settled, the Unions moved to recover $1,785,147 in attorney fees. The court denied the motion, finding the Unions were not entitled to fees as their involvement in the lawsuit was unnecessary to the result that was achieved. The Unions appealed the court's ruling, contending: (1) they were entitled to recover their fees even if their attorneys' services were unnecessary to the result; and (2) the court abused its discretion in concluding those services were not necessary. The Court of Appeal rejected these contentions and affirmed the court's order. View "San Diego Municipal Employees Assoc. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Tinoco, employed by Express, injured Escobar by negligently operating a vehicle. Escobar received treatment at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, owned and operated by the county, at a cost of $1,249,545.38. Escobar sued Tinoco and Express and recovered a judgment for $5,689.624.87. County asserted a lien against the judgment pursuant to Government Code 23004.1. Escobar’s attorney contended that the county was not entitled to the full amount of its bill but only to some lesser amount under schedules promulgated by the Workers Compensation Appeals Board. Express delivered a $1,249,545.38 check to Escobar’s attorney payable to the county and Carcione’s firm. The county sued Express, for statutory liability; Express and Escobar for money had and received; Escobar for value of services rendered; and Escobar, for imposition of a constructive trust. The trial court dismissed, ruling that the county could no longer pursue its own action against Express, but must seek enforcement of the lien in Monterey courts. The court of appeal reversed. An adjudicated tortfeasor holding disputed funds known to be encumbered by a public hospital lien cannot avoid liability by turning control of the funds over to the injured person in a check payable to both contestants, which satisfies neither the judgment nor the lien. View "Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Escobar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Corsair for the outstanding amount owed related to a real estate project. Corsair never filed a responsive pleading and the trial court entered default against Corsair. Then Corsair moved to set aside the default and default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 473, subdivision (b). The trial court set aside the default and default judgment, finding that the default and default judgment were caused by counsel for Corsair. The court concluded that an attorney affidavit of fault under the mandatory relief provisions of section 473, subdivision (b) need not include an explanation of the reasons for the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. In this case, counsel's acknowledgment that he received plaintiff’s lawsuit filings from Corsair and did nothing with them qualifies as not giving them proper attention, and thus as neglect. The court further stated that it does not matter whether counsel’s neglect was excusable or inexcusable. Moreover, affidavits constitute substantial evidence that counsel’s neglect was the sole cause of the default and the court has no basis to disturb the trial court's factual finding regarding causation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order granting relief from default and default judgment. View "Martin Potts & Assoc. v. Corsair LLC" on Justia Law