Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Respondent-trustee Bonnie Katzenstein, representing the Feinberg Family Trust (dated October 30, 1984), filed a petition after Rober Feinberg had passed away. Mr. Feinberg was the cosettlor and former cotrustee of the Trust and the named insured in two life insurance policies. In the Petition, the Trustee sought: (1) a determination that the Trust is the beneficiary of, and therefore entitled to the proceeds from, one of the insurance policies; and (2) damages against Chabad of Poway (Chabad) for interfering with the payment of that policy's benefits to the Trust. Chabad responded by filing a document entitled "Claimant's Objection and Counter Claim [sic] to Petition filed by Trustee to Determine Ownership of Life Insurance Policy Proceeds" (Objection and Counterclaim). In an unsigned minute order following summary judgment proceedings initiated by Trustee, the court sua sponte struck Chabad's Objection and Counterclaim on the basis that the Code of Civil Procedure precluded a party from seeking affirmative relief in an answer. Chabad appealed. The Court of Appeal found that the unsigned minute order was not an appealable order under either the Code of Civil Procedure or the Probate Code. As such, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Chabad's appeal, and dismissed it. View "Katzenstein v. Chabad of Poway" on Justia Law

In 2012, new legislation imposed specific limitations regarding the nonjudicial foreclosure of owner-occupied residential real property. Among other things, the statutory scheme provided that a court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the "prevailing borrower:" "A borrower shall be deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this subdivision if the borrower obtained injunctive relief or was awarded damages pursuant to this section." Petitioners Michael Monterossa and Cheranne Nobis filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and request for issuance of an order to show cause regarding a preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the trustee's sale of their residence, then scheduled for April 21, 2014. The superior court issued an order on May 8, 2014, granting petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the trustee’s sale of petitioners' home, with conditions. Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for attorney fees and costs. After a hearing, the superior court denied the motion, reasoning the language of the applicable statute was consistent with the award of attorney fees at the conclusion of the action; statutory attorney fees were awardable only at the end of the case; and the statute did not specifically provide for an interim award of attorney fees upon the granting of provisional relief such as a preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an order to direct the superior court to grant their motion for attorney fees and costs. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the superior court erred in concluding that petitioners were not prevailing borrowers because they obtained only a preliminary rather than permanent injunction. "[A] borrower who obtains a preliminary injunction enjoining, pursuant to section 2924.12, the trustee’s sale of his or her home is a 'prevailing borrower' within the meaning of the statute." The case was remanded for consideration on the merits, and costs were awarded on this writ proceeding. View "Monterossa v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a products liability suit, alleging that defendants are liable for the their injuries after using the medical device known as Infuse. At issue was whether the presence of a so-called “nominal defendant” can prevent the remaining defendants from obtaining a forum non conveniens dismissal when, in the absence of the nominal defendant, the action can and should be pursued in alternative forums. The court concluded that the presence of a nominal defendant cannot defeat a forum non conveniens dismissal which should otherwise be granted. In this case, the trial court correctly granted the forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of all other defendants, but erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ action against the nominal defendant. Instead, the court should have severed the action against the nominal defendant and allowed it to proceed in California. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "David v. Medtronic, Inc." on Justia Law

After Chan’s mother died from internal hemorrhaging related to Coumadin use following heart surgery, Chan successfully sued Curran for medical malpractice. Chan challenged the trial court’s post-verdict reduction of the $1 million noneconomic damages award to $250,000, as required by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), Civ. Code 3333.2. Chan challenged the MICRA cap as violating equal protection, due process and the right to jury trial, based on her assertion she is entitled to seek noneconomic damages sufficient to cover attorney fees. The court of appeal rejected Chan’s claims, stating that the legitimate debate over the wisdom of MICRA’s noneconomic damages cap remains a matter for the Legislature and state electorate. View "Chan v. Curran" on Justia Law

In this appeal, which stemmed from an automobile accident, the issue was whether service of notice of entry of judgment by the party moving for new trial triggers the statutes’ jurisdictional deadlines. The court held that it does not. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to rule, but its order conditionally granting a new trial was a nullity with no legal effect. Further, because the trial court did not file a valid order ruling on the new trial motion before its jurisdiction expired, the motion was denied by operation of law. Though the court may review a denial by operation of law on an appeal from the judgment, plaintiff has not supplied an adequate record to establish grounds for reversal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed defendants' appeal. View "Maroney v. Iacobsohn" on Justia Law

Oregel filed a class action against his former employer, PacPizza, alleging that PacPizza failed to fully reimburse delivery drivers for necessary expenses associated with using their personal vehicles to deliver pizza on PacPizza’s behalf. Seventeen months and more than 1,300 attorney hours later, PacPizza petitioned to compel arbitration. The agreement to arbitrate appeared, in a very small font, on the employment application. There is no evidence that Oregel was given a copy of the application or saw it at any point after he submitted it. The trial court denied the petition, finding PacPizza waived its right to enforce a purported arbitration agreement. The court of appeal affirmed. Although the trial court made no express finding of bad faith, the tone of its ruling is suggestive of such a finding and, had it been made, sufficient evidence would have supported the finding. While California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration, that goal was frustrated by defendant’s conduct.” View "Oregel v. PacPizza, LLC" on Justia Law

The underlying lawsuit in this case, "Retailers’ Credit Association of Grass Valley, Inc. v. Leonard," was filed by real party in interest Retailers’ Credit Association of Grass Valley, Inc., and alleged petitioner Kathleen Leonard breached a contract by failing to pay $2,340.41 for medical services provided by additional real party in interest, Dignity Health, which was doing business as Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital. Retailers’ Credit Association was the local collection agency providing collection services for Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital. Leonard filed a pro. per. cross-complaint against Retailers’ Credit Association, alleging a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 by negligent disclosure of private medical information (i.e. “date of medical visits, medical record number, [and] account numbers”). On the front page of her cross-complaint, Leonard checked the box on the form that stated, “ACTION IS A LIMITED CIVIL CASE ($25,000 or less).” In the complaint itself, Leonard checked the box requesting “compensatory damages” for “limited civil cases.” She also requested injunctive relief in the form of a court order requiring Retailers’ Credit Association to remove the allegedly private information from its complaint. Leonard later filed a pro. per. motion to amend her cross-complaint. In the caption of the motion, she stated the amendment was to “NAME SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AS A CROSS-DEFENDANT and TO REMOVE THIS CASE TO A COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION.” The memorandum of points and authorities alleged that the documents attached to the complaint contained her medical record number and were not necessary for the prosecution of the collection claim and at the very least could have been redacted to protect her privacy. When she reviewed the complaint, she “noticed the attachment to the complaint contained [her] medical records and medical record number” and that the complaint with the attachment had been filed publically at the courthouse. The trial court denied Leonard’s motion to amend the cross-complaint and “[t]ransfer to [u]nlimited [j]urisdiction” without prejudice. Leonard “failed to attach the proposed [a]mended [c]ross-[c]omplaint to the motion” and as a result, the court was “unable to determine what the proposed changes include.” The court was “unable to determine if an additional [c]ross-[d]efendant [wa]s sought to be named or if damages sought exceed $25,000. Thus, th[e] Court [w]as unable to determine if [Leonard] [wa]s entitled to the relief sought.” This case involves how a limited civil case (here a cross-complaint) gets reclassified as an unlimited civil case. After review, the Court of Appeal held that where Leonard filed, through counsel, an amended cross-complaint that added a cross-defendant and added causes of action that increased the amount in controversy to over $25,000 and tried twice to pay the court clerk the reclassification fee, the trial court was required to reclassify the case. Here, the trial court refused to reclassify the case and went on to deny Leonard’s later-filed motion for reclassification, a motion that was unnecessary because the trial court should have already reclassified the case (and in any event, the motion was the inappropriate vehicle by which to change the classification here). The Court therefore granted Leonard’s petition and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to reclassify the case upon Leonard paying the reclassification fee. View "Leonard v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

This case stems from a dispute over control of certain church property. Appellants and other members of the Cho/Shin faction, with the WCP as a co-plaintiff, filed suit seeking declaratory relief, an injunction, and an audit and accounting from Rev. Bang and respondents. Bang and respondents filed a cross-complaint claiming trespass and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and seeking declaratory relief against appellants and the WCP as cross-defendants. On appeal, appellants contend that, contrary to the trial court's ruling: (1) there was no internal dispute permitting the WCP to intervene and assert control in 2013; (2) because any remaining dispute did not involve Church Property, court intervention into matters of Church membership was improper; (3) the WCP’s actions were a legal nullity because appellants’ secession vote complied with applicable procedures; and (4) the WCP lacked authority to excommunicate appellants because it violated its own procedures by acting in the absence of a petition. The court concluded that none of these contentions meet appellants' burden of demonstrating reversible error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of respondents. View "Kim v. True Church Members etc." on Justia Law

In "Hahn v. Diaz-Barba," (194 Cal.App.4th 1177 (2011)), the Court of Appeal affirmed an order, issued under the forum non conveniens doctrine, staying an action against residents of California for tortious interference with contract and related claims for the sale of an interest in a Mexican business. In this petition, the issue was whether the court erred by granting plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay on the ground Mexican courts dismissed two separate suits they filed in that country, making it an unavailable alternate forum. Defendants contended the ruling was erroneous because the evidence showed plaintiffs did not prosecute their action in Mexico in good faith. Among other things, defendants claimed they unreasonably delayed filing suit in Mexico and purposely drafted deficient complaints to ensure their rejection. Additionally, defendants argued the court prejudicially erred by denying their request to cross-examine the independent expert it appointed on Mexican law. After review, the California Court of Appeal concluded defendants' contentions lacked merit, and thus denied the petition. View "Diaz-Barba v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Leeman filed a private enforcement action under Health and Safety Code 25249.5 (Proposition 65), alleging that t Adams Extract & Spice failed to issue an adequate warning that its product contained a chemical identified on the Governor’s list “of those chemicals known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity .” A successful plaintiff in such an action is entitled to recover attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5. The parties settled shortly before trial, including a stipulated award of $72,500.00 for attorney fees and costs, incurred by Leeman. In confirming the settlement, the court modified the attorney fee amount by reducing it to $35,839.67. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court had the right to reject the settlement agreement in its entirety, and refuse to “approve the settlement” if the court determined that $72,500.00 was unfair or unreasonable, but lacked authority to modify any of the terms of the settlement agreement unilaterally, thus requiring the parties to accept a settlement to which they have not agreed. View "Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC" on Justia Law