Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kathy Seacrist and her son, John McDonald sued Southern California Edison (Edison); the City of Palm Desert; J.R. Roberts; and Does 5 through 100. Seacrist owned a home near an Edison substation. Plaintiffs Seacrist and McDonald alleged stray electrical currents from the substation were causing them to suffer various medical issues. The Fourth Amended Complaint included seven causes of action against Edison: (a) negligence; (b) nuisance; (c) trespass; (d) strict liability/products liability; (e) strict liability/implied warranty of fitness; (f) strict liability/ultra hazardous activity; and (g) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court sustained Edison’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding “Plaintiffs claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the California Public Utilities Commission,” and thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the dispute with Edison. The Court of Appeal held previously that the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) did not have exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving injuries resulting from stray electrical currents from a substation. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court erred by sustaining Edison’s demurrer because the PUC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims related to injuries from stray electrical currents. Edison asserts, among other things, that controlling case law was wrongly decided. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Seacrist v. So. Cal. Edison" on Justia Law

On March 28, 2014, real party in interest PCH Enterprises, Inc. sued defendants Sallie Cribley-Cole and Anna Gonzalez for breach of contract, specific performance, and declaratory relief. It alleged defendants failed to perform on a written agreement to sell a certain parcel of real property to PCH. PCH recorded a lis pendens on the same day it filed the complaint. No proof of service accompanied the lis pendens. Petitioner Rey Sanchez Investments sought to intervene, claiming it was the true owner of the property pursuant to a grant deed recorded April 2, 2014. Petitioner moved to expunge the lis pendens on grounds that there were technical defects in the service. PCH offered a proof of service that the lis pendens was personally served on Cribley-Cole in November 2014. The trial court denied the motion to expunge. On appeal, petitioner argued the lis pendens was completely void and subject to expungement because service was improper. The Court of Appeal agreed service was improper and reversed the trial court's judgment by way of a writ of mandate. View "Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

According to plaintiff-appellant Randall Blackwell, as he was at the top of a ladder installing rain gutters at an investment property owned by defendant-respondent Ray Vasilas, Blackwell stepped on scaffolding that another contractor had erected at the job site, and the scaffolding collapsed. The collapse caused Blackwell to fall, and he suffered injuries when he landed on a pile of bricks approximately 10 feet below. Blackwell sued Vasilas for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Vasilas. After review of the arguments made on appeal, the Court of Appeal found that as the moving party, Vasilas did not meet his initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Vasilas's motion, and the resulting judgment was reversed. View "Blackwell v. Vasilas" on Justia Law

On May 8, 2014, petitioner City of San Diego (City) denied the application of Jeri Dines, the real party in interest, for leave to file a late claim filed pursuant to the California Government Claims Act. Dines did not file a petition with the trial court for an order relieving her from the claims presentation requirements until November 13, 2014 (i.e., more than six months after the City denied her application). Dines alleged former City Mayor Bob Filner inappropriately touched her. However, citing section 915.2, subdivision (b) of the Act that extends by five days the period for a recipient of a mailed notice to respond to the notice, the trial court granted her petition, concluding section 915.2, subdivision (b), gave her an additional five days to file her section 946.6 petition. The City filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court's order. The City argued section 915.2, subdivision (b), was inapplicable to, and did not extend, the Act's section 946.6's six-month limitations period for filing a petition with the court. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City and granted the requested relief. View "City of San Diego v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed suit against defendants, alleging claims for failure to pay regular and overtime wages, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to furnish accurate wage statements, failure to pay wages upon termination or discharge, and unfair competition in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute within five years. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the parties’ participation in private mediation during the final months of the five-year period triggered Code of Civil Procedure section 1775.7, subdivision (b), which contains an automatic tolling provision. The court concluded that section 1775.7 only applies to mediation conducted in a court-annexed alternative dispute resolution program. The court also concluded that plaintiff did not show it was impossible, impracticable or futile to bring his case to trial within five years. Finally, the court concluded that equitable estoppel does not apply in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Castillo v. DHL Express" on Justia Law

Western Albuquerque Land Holdings, LLC was the judgment creditor of a $47 million judgment against SCC Acquisitions, Inc. As part of its efforts to enforce the judgment, Western propounded requests for production of documents, and later brought a motion to compel SCC to respond further to those requests. The trial court granted Western’s motion to compel as to requests Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 37. SCC appealed the order granting Western’s motion to compel. Western then moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground the order granting its motion to compel was not an appealable postjudgment order under section Code of Civil Procedure 904.1, subdivision (a)(2). The Court of Appeal treated the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate and denied it. The trial court did not err by granting Western’s motion to compel. The Court concluded the trial court had authority under section Code of Civil Procedure 708.030 to compel SCC to produce documents in its possession or control regarding third parties, and the Court rejected SCC’s contentions that requests Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 37 violated the privacy rights of third parties and that requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37 were overbroad. View "SCC Acquisitions v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Kirk King sustained a back injury while at work for CompPartners, Inc. In July 2011, King suffered anxiety and depression due to chronic back pain resulting from the back injury. In 2011, King was prescribed a psychotropic medication known as Klonopin. The Klonopin was provided to King through Workers’ Compensation. In July 2013, a Workers’ Compensation utilization review was conducted to determine if the Klonopin was medically necessary. Naresh Sharma, an anesthesiologist, conducted the utilization review. Sharma determined the drug was unnecessary and decertified it. As a result, King was required to immediately cease taking the Klonopin. Typically, a person withdraws from Klonopin gradually by slowly reducing the dosage. Due to the sudden cessation of Klonopin, King suffered four seizures, resulting in additional physical injuries. In September 2013, someone requested King again be permitted to take Klonopin. In October 2013, Mohammed Ashraf Ali, a psychiatrist, conducted a second utilization review. Ali also determined Klonopin was medically unnecessary. Neither Sharma nor Ali examined King in-person, and neither warned King of the dangers of an abrupt withdrawal from Klonopin. King sued CompPartners and Sharma for: (1) professional negligence; (2) negligence; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. King's wife, Sara, sued CompPartners and Sharma for loss of consortium. The Kings sought general, special, exemplary, and punitive damages. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. The Kings raised three issues on appeal to the Court of Appeal: (1) their claims were not preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA); (2) defendants owed them a duty of care; and (3) the trial court erred by denying them leave to amend. The Court affirmed the sustaining of the demurrer but reversed the denial of leave to amend. View "King v. CompPartners" on Justia Law

In 2013, M’Guinness sued fellow shareholder, Johnson, for claims arising out of the operation of a small construction firm, TLC. M’Guinness also sought involuntary dissolution and appointment of a receiver. Johnson cross-complained against M’Guinness, TLC, and the third TLC shareholder. Johnson was represented by the Casas law firm. The other parties moved to disqualify the firm, claiming it had been retained by TLC as its counsel in 2006, TLC never discharged the firm; the firm never withdrew as counsel. The court denied the motion, finding the evidence insufficient to warrant automatic disqualification based upon a concurrent representation conflict and rejecting a claim of subsequent representation conflict of interest. The court of appeal reversed. The firm continued to represent TLC through the time the lawsuit was instituted. If a party moving to disqualify an attorney establishes concurrent representation, the court is required, “in all but a few instances,” to automatically disqualify the attorney without regard to whether the subject matter of the representation of one client relates to the representation of the second client. While disqualification is a drastic measure and motions to disqualify are sometimes brought for improper tactical reasons, disqualification is not “generally disfavored,” and, in this situation, was required. View "M'Guinness v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Nora Garibotti appealed an order granting Bruce Hinkle’s motion to vacate a default judgment and the revised judgment the trial court entered based on that order. Garibotti was comedian Joey Bishop’s girlfriend for over 20 years. Bishop died in October 2007, and Garibotti was one of his estate’s major beneficiaries. During his lifetime, Bishop had hired Hinkle to perform construction projects at the Lido Island residence Bishop and Garibotti shared, based on Hinkle’s claim he was a skilled and licensed contractor. Hinkle was neither. He often failed to appear at the job site during projects and the work he performed did not comply with the Uniform Building Code or other industry standards. After Bishop’s death, Hinkle convinced the Trust’s trustee that he was Bishop’s good friend and a licensed contractor who could help renovate the Lido Island residence and prepare it for sale. The trustee hired Hinkle to pack the residence’s furnishings and other contents, move those items to a storage facility, and perform construction work at the residence. Hinkle’s construction work again failed to comply with the Uniform Building Code and other industry standards. Hinkle also stole many of the items he was supposed to move to storage, vandalized other pieces of personal property, and damaged or lost many of the items during transport and storage. In October 2009, Garibotti sued Hinkle to recover the items he stole and also damages for his unlicensed and substandard construction work. After several unsuccessful attempts to prove up her claims and damages, Garibotti obtained a default judgment against Hinkle in January 2013. Hinkle challenged that default judgment, and the trial court granted his motion in part. In July 2013, the court entered a revised judgment against Hinkle, awarding Garibotti various amounts for the value of the missing personal property, prejudgment interest and costs. Garibotti timely appealed the trial court’s order granting Hinkle’s motion and the revised judgment. Hinkle cross-appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in granting Hinkle's motion, thereby voiding the revised judgment. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Garibotti v. Hinkle" on Justia Law

Goldstone and Lanz are Santa Rosa attorneys. Lanz represented Garcia-Bolio in a “Marvin” action and had a contingency fee agreement. The suit settled on the third day of trial. There was a dispute as to the value of the settlement and Lanz’s fee. Lanz sued Bolio, who failed to respond, and her default was taken. Goldstone became Bolio’s lawyer and, following relief from default, filed an answer and a cross-complaint, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and several ethical violations by Lanz, including that he acted with “moral turpitude.” Lanz defeated Bolio’s cross-claims, leaving only Lanz’s claim against Bolio. Lanz obtained a complete victory at trial, in a decision highly critical of Bolio’s conduct. Lanz then sued Goldstone for malicious prosecution. Goldstone filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to dismiss. The court of appeal affirmed denial, concluding that Lanz met his burden under prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis, demonstrating a probability of success on all three elements of malicious prosecution. View "Lanz v. Goldstone" on Justia Law