Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Movants-appellants Ali Fadavi, Shadi Ghazi, Pamela Bacha, Mary Roll, Jenna Pearce, Joe Pearce, Michael Ehsani, Robert Glass, and Rocheda Reid appealed an order denying their motion to intervene in the underlying lawsuit on the grounds it was not timely. Brookfield Ziani LLC (Brookfield) constructed a condominium development in Newport Coast. In July 2012, Ziani Homeowners Association (HOA) sued Brookfield and others, alleging construction defects, including plumbing defects. Movants were owners of individual units within the Condominium Development and were HOA members. The plumbing defect claims were the largest item (by cost of repair) in the lawsuit. The HOA complaint was brought in the name of the HOA. From the outset, the HOA board of directors and its attorney, Mr. Kaneda, represented to the individual unit owners, including Movants, that the HOA was pursuing the plumbing defect claims and would not settle unless and until it obtained full recovery to pay for the necessary repairs to the common areas and to the individual units. The HOA board and Mr. Kaneda told the individual unit owners they could file their own lawsuits, but discouraged them from doing so, because, they promised, the HOA and its counsel were bearing the expenses of the litigation and were vigorously pursuing all of the plumbing defect claims. The HOA eventually agreed to settle the lawsuit with Brookfield. At the one HOA board meeting, the individual unit owners were informed of the existence of the settlement, but not its terms. The HOA and its counsel refused to answer questions about the settlement, including questions about the plumbing defect claims. One HOA board member resigned in protest over the settlement. At a subsequent board meeting, Mr. Kaneda disclosed more terms of the settlement, which allegedly showed the settlement would leave the individual unit owners with some combination of out-of-pocket expenses for the plumbing repairs, a special HOA assessment, and depleted HOA reserves. In May 2014, Movants filed a motion to intervene (Motion) in the suit. Among the things Movants argued was that the HOA board and its counsel were no longer adequately representing Movants' interests due to the trickle of information they received about the settlement. Movants contended the trial court erred as a matter of law by ruling their Motion was untimely, based on the finding that almost two years had elapsed from the date “[t]he individual homeowners knew or should have known about this litigation on or about the date the complaint was filed, 7/13/12.” Movants argued the court should have determined the timeliness issue, based on the date they knew or should have known their interests in the litigation were not being adequately represented. The Court of Appeal agreed with Movants, and reversed the trial court's decision denying their Motion to intervene. View "Ziani Homeowners Ass'n v. Brookfield Ziani LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for personal injury and property damage allegedly suffered in an automobile accident. Plaintiff seeks to vacate the trial court's order granting defendant's motion in limine. The trial court's order excluded the testimony of three of plaintiff's proposed witnesses and was imposed as an evidence sanction for plaintiff's alleged failure to respond completely to an interrogatory. The court concluded that the Superior Court committed an abuse of discretion and that issuance of an alternative writ and oral argument would not measurably contribute to the court's consideration of the issue and would cause undue delay. In this case, even if interrogatory No. 12.1 could be construed as a request for the identity of witnesses who would testify to post-accident physical disabilities and difficulties, there was no evidence that plaintiff’s failure to identify the witnesses was willful or that plaintiff contravened a court order to provide discovery. Accordingly, it was error to impose an evidence sanction based on plaintiff’s failure to divulge the names of the three witnesses in response to interrogatory No. 12.1 or to defendant’s general request for supplemental responses to interrogatories. The court vacated the order. View "Mitchell v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A suit was filed on behalf of a minor, Jonnie, alleging that Jonnie, while a kindergartner at in the Hollister School District, was sexually molested at school by another male kindergartener on two occasions. The District sought an order compelling Jonnie to submit to an independent mental examination, which would include personal interviews of Jonnie and his parents by Dr. Kuo, a psychiatrist, and psychological testing of Jonnie by Dr. Hall, a psychologist. The superior court granted the motion. After imposing a stay, the court of appeal vacated the order insofar as it authorized collateral interviews of Jonnie’s parents. The court exceeded its authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.020.1 View "Roe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Six years after a San Jose police officer testified falsely against plaintiff during a preliminary hearing, the city agreed to pay plaintiff $150,000 and not to oppose any motion plaintiff might bring for a declaration of factual innocence of the criminal charges brought against him. The parties agreed that plaintiff’s counsel could seek an award of costs incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988. Plaintiff sought $1,448,397 in attorney fees and $75,255 in costs, based on “2,419.9 compensable attorney hours … utilizing reasonable hourly billing rates roughly 20% below established market rates[,] i.e[.,] ranging from $425 to $650 per hour,” plus $102,998.75, added for “fees-on-fees work.” Plaintiff also requested a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount “to account for the significant risk counsel has taken in litigating this hotly[ ]contested matter on a wholly contingent basis, with little prospect of settlement until the eve of trial.” The court awarded compensation of $436,807.50, declined to apply the 1.5 multiplier, and awarded costs of $23,935.07. The court of appeals remanded, finding the lower court’s reasoning inadequate. View "Kerkeles v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment in favor of defendants after the trial court found plaintiff had not provided required documentation and failed to carry his burden of proof with regard to entry of a default judgment on his complaint for unpaid rent and damages to the rental property. The court concluded that, despite repeated attempts, plaintiff failed to submit the documents required for entry of a default judgment pursuant to the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 585. The court further concluded that the cause is properly returned to the trial court to permit plaintiff to file a request for entry of a default judgment based on an accurate statement of the required documentation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to allow plaintiff to submit a new form CIV-100 with supporting declarations. View "Holloway v. Quetel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Adam Prue appealed a judgment in favor of defendant Brady Company/San Diego, Inc. (Brady) after the trial court granted Brady's motion for summary judgment in Prue's action against it for wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy. On appeal, Prue argued the court erred by: (1) granting the motion for summary judgment because his complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and that cause of action was not barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations; and (2) denying him leave to amend his complaint to more fully allege facts in support of that cause of action and/or by not continuing the hearing on the motion. Because the Court of Appeal concluded Prue's complaint adequately alleged facts apprising Brady of his cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and was timely filed, the trial court erred by granting Brady's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court erred by denying Prue leave to amend his complaint. View "Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc." on Justia Law

In November 2014, 21-month-old A.A. (Child) was detained and removed from the home and care of her mother, As.A. (Mother). While in the family home, Child had been allowed to play with lit matches, exposed to heavy marijuana smoke, and surrounded by a variety of drug paraphernalia and drugs in plain sight. Mother was arrested and temporarily incarcerated. Child's father, S.S. (Father), who lived separately, had a history of substance abuse and declined to take custody of Child. Mother and Father did not contest the juvenile court's jurisdiction, and Child was placed with foster parents, the C.'s. At the C.'s, Child was reportedly healthy, happy, and enjoying visits with Mother, who wanted to regain custody of Child. At a disposition hearing approximately one month later, the Imperial County Department of Social Services reported that Child had passed away the previous day. The Department informed the court that multiple investigations were ongoing regarding the circumstances of Child's death. The Department was conducting a separate investigation for the welfare of other children who had been living in the C.'s home. The police department was conducting a criminal investigation, and other governmental agencies were investigating the C.'s for foster care and day care licensing purposes. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether a juvenile court could retain jurisdiction over a dependency case after the subject child has died, for the purpose of learning the child's cause of death and/or appointing a guardian ad litem to investigate potential tort claims for the child's estate. The juvenile court determined it must terminate its jurisdiction under the circumstances. The Court of Appeal agreed and affirmed. View "Imperial County Dept. etc. v. S.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a judgment after the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for terminating sanctions. Chase moved for terminating sanctions based on its unsuccessful attempts to depose plaintiff's brother and plaintiff's threats of physical violence. The court held that courts have the inherent authority to dismiss a case as a sanction and the authority should be exercised only in extreme situations, such as where the conduct was clear and deliberate and no lesser sanction would remedy the situation. The court concluded that, based on plaintiff's conduct, this case required a terminating sanction. The court cited plaintiff's failure to pay sanctions, harassing behavior, highly contemptuous statements made to the court, brandishing pepper spray and use of a stun gun. The court rejected plaintiff's arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Crawford v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Barry Schneer (father) appealed a family court order finding California lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to make an initial child custody determination regarding his daughter. Father filed his child custody petition on June 24, 2013. In support of the petition, father declared the child was born in June 2011 in Miami, Florida, and that the child and mother resided with father in Twentynine Palms, California, from April 2012 onward. In an attachment to a request for an emergency decree, father alleged mother took the child to Florida to visit the child's grandparents “under [the] presumption of her return following a short visit,” but mother and the child had been in Florida for more than three months “with no date of return.” In her response and in a motion to quash and dismiss the petition, defendant-respondent Alice Llaurado (mother) alleged the child lived in Miami since her birth and never resided in California. Mother declared she and the child visited California several times between August 2012 and March 2013, but she never stayed more than a few weeks at a time. Mother denied having any intent to relocate to California, and denied residing in any state other than Florida. Father argued the California family court erred by ruling California was not the child's home state for purposes of the UCCJEA because the child did not reside in California during the six-month period immediately before father filed his child custody petition. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with father's interpretation of the UCCJEA and reversed the family court's order. View "Schneer v. Llaurado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Catalina Island Yacht Club hosted social events for its members and also arranged for its members to dock their boats in Avalon Harbor. Real party in interest Timothy Beatty and petitioners Charles Boppell, V. Kelley York, Lowell Dreyfus, Tom Nix, and Dave Horst were members of the Yacht Club and its board of directors. In 2013, Beatty sued Petitioners, alleging they conspired to remove him from the board and suspend his membership in the Yacht Club. He alleged Petitioners defamed him by telling others that the Yacht Club removed him because he committed various acts that prejudiced “the best interests of the Club.” The complaint alleged claims for libel, slander, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Beatty served inspection demands on Petitioners seeking written communications and other documents relating to his removal from the Yacht Club’s board of directors and suspension of his membership. In early February 2014, Petitioners served written responses that included boilerplate objections based on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Nearly two months later, Petitioners served a privilege log identifying 17 “communications” they withheld from production based on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. For each communication, the log simply provided the date of the communication and explained it was between “counsel for Defendants and Defendants.” The ultimate issue the Court of Appeal was asked to decide centered on the privilege log: the trial court found a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine when petitioners submitted a log that failed to provide sufficient information to evaluate the claims of privilege. The trial court ordered petitioners to produce 167 e-mails identified on their privilege log because the log failed to describe the subject matter or content of the e-mails, and therefore failed to show the e-mails were protected by either the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred because it exceeded its authority. "[W]hen a privilege log fails to provide a trial court with sufficient information to rule on the merits of a privilege objection, the only relief the court may grant – other than sanctions – is an order requiring a further privilege log that provides the necessary information." View "Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law