Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Sharp Memorial Hospital (dba Sharp Rehabilitation Center) appealed the trial court's order granting plaintiff-respondent's Berthe Kabran's motion for new trial following a special verdict on a cause of action for medical malpractice in which the jury found Sharp was negligent in the care and treatment of plaintiff's predecessor, Dr. Eke Wokocha, but that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm. Sharp argued on appeal that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by granting a new trial because the motion was untimely, rendering the order void. It further argued the court abused its discretion because the evidence proffered by plaintiff in support of the new trial motion was cumulative and consistent with defense expert trial testimony, and thus would not change the outcome of the trial. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that no jurisdictional defect appeared in the court's new trial order and, as a result, Sharp could not raise its appellate contentions as to the motion's timeliness for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the new evidence and ruling on the record that plaintiff should have been granted a new trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order. View "Kabran v. Sharp Memorial" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's denial of her request for expert witness fees and prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3291. For purposes of determining whether a defendant failed to obtain a more favorable judgment under Code Civ. Proc. 998, the court concluded that any negotiated rate differential included in a jury’s verdict should be subtracted from the judgment or award before it is compared to the offer to compromise “for the simple reason that the injured plaintiff did not suffer any economic loss in that amount.” In this case, the trial court correctly reduced the jury verdict by the negotiated rate differential before making the section 998 comparison and concluding that the judgment obtained by defendants was more favorable than the offer to compromise for $1 million. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lee v. Silveira" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Marshalls, alleging claims under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Lab. Code 2698-2699.5. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion to compel discovery in part, compelling Marshalls to produce contact information for the employees only at its Costa Mesa store and denied production of the contact information of employees at Marshalls' other 128 stores statewide. The court concluded that discovery of Marshalls' employees' contact information statewide is premature; employee privacy interests outweigh plaintiff's need for disclosure at this time; and, therefore, the court denied the writ of mandate. View "Williams V. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a malicious prosecution action against the Bank after he was acquitted of violating Penal Code section 422, making a criminal threat. In the court's prior opinion, it reversed a judgment in favor of defendants that was entered after their successful anti-SLAPP motion to strike plaintiff's action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 426.16. On remand, defendants brought a summary judgment motion on the ground of the collateral estoppel effect of the magistrate’s finding of probable cause based on a credibility determination at plaintiff’s preliminary hearing in his criminal proceeding. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendants, holding that the doctrine of law of the case does not preclude consideration of the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the determination of probable cause by the magistrate in plaintiff’s criminal proceeding, when the issue of plaintiff’s credibility had been raised before the magistrate, defeats, as a matter of law, plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. View "Greene v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition, alleging that four minors were at risk of physical harm and emotional damage due to their mother’s conduct. The petition stated that mother had regularly complained (or prompted others to complain) that father physically or sexually abused the children, that these complaints were false, and that mother’s conduct subjected the children to repeated sexual assault examinations and law enforcement interviews, all of which had severe negative consequences on the children: All four had expressed suicidal thoughts; two were placed in involuntary mental health holds; one had gained 40 pounds; and all four were chronically absent from, or tardy to, school. Mother moved to dismiss the petition because she and father are already litigating custody in family court. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, stating that to rob the Department of its chance to prove its allegations is to elevate judicial economy above the protection of children, in contravention of the Legislature’s express declaration that dependency jurisdiction be construed broadly. View "In re Nicholas E." on Justia Law

In 2010, Debra Hackett was seriously injured in an accident in Sacramento County in which a tractor and trailer owned by Silva Trucking, Inc. and driven by Elaine McDonold jackknifed and collided with the vehicle being driven by Hackett. In 2012, the Hacketts filed a personal injury action in Sacramento County against Silva Trucking and McDonold. The jury awarded the Hacketts $34.9 million in damages. Silva Trucking was insured by Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (CCIC), who retained the law firm Cholakian & Associates to provide a defense. Silva Trucking had an excess liability insurance policy with Lexington Insurance Company (LIC), who retained the law firm Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP (Lewis Brisbois) as counsel. In 2014, Silva Trucking and McDonold brought suit in Sacramento County against LIC, CCIC, Cholakian & Associates and individual attorneys Kevin Cholakian and Jennifer Kung (collectively Cholakian), and Lewis Brisbois and individual attorney Ralph Zappala (collectively Lewis Brisbois). As to LIC and CCIC, the complaint alleged bad faith and breach of contract. As to the law firms and attorneys, the complaint alleged legal malpractice. The gravamen of the complaint was that the insurers unreasonably refused to accept the policy limit demand when the insured’s liability was clear and damages were known to be in excess of the policy limit. The attorneys failed to advise their insurer clients to accept the demand and the consequences of failing to do so, and failed to advise Silva Trucking and McDonold of their need for personal counsel. LIC and CCIC responded with demurrers. Lewis Brisbois answered with a general denial and asserted 22 affirmative defenses. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 396b, subdivision (a), where an action has been filed in the “wrong venue,” a defendant may move to transfer the case to the “proper court for the trial thereof.” In such a case, “if an answer is filed,” the court may consider opposition to the motion to transfer and may retain the action in the county where filed to promote the convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice. The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether, in a multi-defendant case, an answer must be filed by all defendants before the court may consider opposition to the motion to transfer venue. The Court concluded the answer was yes. In this case, the trial court considered opposition to the motion before all defendants had answered the complaint. Accordingly, the Court issued a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to transfer and to issue a new order granting the motion. View "Cholakian & Assoc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were allegations of a wrongful foreclosure and related causes of action. Plaintiff John Miles appealed a judgment dismissing his breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation causes of action pursuant to a sustained demurrer, and a summary judgment in favor of defendants banks on the wrongful foreclosure cause of action. With respect to the demurred causes of action, the Court of Appeal reversed: after review of the record, the Court found no explanation for the trial court's ruling. Based on its independent review of the complaint, the Court of Appeal concluded plaintiff adequately stated his claims. With respect to the wrongful foreclosure cause of action, the Court also reversed: the trial court granted summary judgment on the sole basis that plaintiff could not prove damages because he did not have any equity in the home when it was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale. "Wrongful foreclosure is a tort, however, and thus plaintiff may recover any damages proximately caused by defendants’ wrongdoing. Plaintiff offered evidence that he lost rental income and suffered emotional distress as a result of the foreclosure. This is disputed, of course, but it is sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion." View "Miles v. Deutsche Bank" on Justia Law

PegaStaff, an agency that provides temporary staffing, provides staffing to Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), through a staffing agency with which PG&E directly contracted, initially Corestaff and later Agile. The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) adopted General Order 156 to implement Public Utilities Code Article 5, the purpose of which is to encourage and develop the use of women, minority and disabled veteran-owned business enterprises (WMDVBEs) within the public utility sector. PegaStaff is not a WMDVBE and after PG&E adopted a program to increase the utilization of WMDVBEs, its provision of staff to PG&E was substantially reduced. PegaStaff filed suit against the CPUC, PG&E, Corestaff and Agile, challenging the constitutionality of Article 5 and General Order 156. The trial court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, entered judgment in favor of the CPUC, and denied PegaStaff’s motion to transfer its claims. The court of appeal affirmed. PegaStaff was required to first exhaust its administrative remedies and it has not done so. View "PegaStaff v. Cal. Pub.Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Attorney Novak represented Kelly between 2007 and 2012. The two executed a contingency attorney fee agreement that granted Novak lien rights over any settlement Kelly received. In 2011, Novak filed a probate petition which alleged Kelly was a pretermitted spouse of Teitler and negotiated a considerable settlement. The probate court approved the settlement which awarded Kelly a substantial interest in the Dana Teitler Trust. Kelly died. Novak filed suit to enforce the attorney lien in the 2007 fee agreement. The probate court denied the petition, holding that the proper procedure to recover fees was by claim against Kelly’s estate under section 9000; plaintiff was required to file a creditor’s claim within one year of Kelly’s death; the statute of limitations barred the claim; and section 5000(a), which provides a nonprobate transfer, was inapplicable. The court of appeal reversed. Novak had not forfeited a claim under section 9391, that he was an equitable lienholder and did not need to file a creditor’s claim in probate. An assignment provision in the settlement agreement in the event of Kelly’s death did not destroy Novak’s pre-existing attorney fee lien rights. View "Novak v. Fay" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed as an agricultural inspector aid by the County of Los Angeles Department of Agricultural Commissioner/Weights and Measures. Plaintiff was terminated from his position on February 18, 2010. Plaintiff appealed his discharge to the Civil Service Commission. Following a hearing that took place over a period of days, the hearing officer issued his decision recommending that the discharge be upheld. On December 14, 2011, the Commission issued its final order and decision adopting that recommendation. On March 13, 2012, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1094.5 and 1094.6 contesting the order and seeking reinstatement and back-pay. On January 16, 2013, plaintiff died while the writ proceeding was still pending. Plaintiff’s widow moved, under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.31, for an order deeming her plaintiff’s legal successor in interest and allowing her to maintain the writ proceeding through to completion. The court denied the motion on the grounds the Commission lacked jurisdiction to enforce any order the superior court could issue. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Monsivaiz v. Los Angeles Cnty. Civil Service Comm'n" on Justia Law