Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007, the California Department of Transportation sought to condemn part of the Hansen parcel for a highway interchange. The Hansens operated a truck stop and sought additional compensation for impairment of highway access and the loss of goodwill. A jury awarded $525,122 for land and improvements, $300,000 for loss of goodwill, $8,000 for vegetation easement, and $1.7 million in damages to the remainder of the property: $2,533,122. The Hansens sought to recover $345,306 in litigation expenses, arguing that their final demand of $2.99 million was reasonable and the state’s final offer, $784,000, was unreasonable. The state argued that only the Hansens’ first demand, $5 million, could be considered because the second demand was filed after trial began. The court concluded that precedent required it to use the first demand when evaluating reasonableness, although it believed the “better result” would be that any final offers or demands made 20 days prior to a trial on issues of compensation (the trial had been bifurcated) should be considered. The court found the first demand to be unreasonable, and denied litigation expenses. The court of appeal vacated, finding that the statute does not restrict the court to considering only the offer and demand made prior to the first date set for trial. View "Cal. Dep;t of Transp. v . Hansen's Truck Stop, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Connie Anderson alleged that deputies from the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department, Steve Geist and Daniel Shelton, unlawfully entered her residence on two occasions, attempting to arrest her daughter pursuant to a bench warrant that had been recalled, and in the process made defamatory statements about her and her family to her neighbors. The deputies appealed the trial court's denial of their special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion), arguing that they met their burden of showing plaintiff's causes of action arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Furthermore, the deputies argued that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing a probability she would prevail on the merits. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was one of first impression: whether a peace officer's execution of a warrant is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court answered that question in the negative, at least under the circumstances of this case. The Court therefore agreed with the trial court that the deputies did not meet their burden on the first part of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Anderson v. Geist" on Justia Law

Santana was charged with assault with a deadly weapon. After FC posted a $50,000 bail bond, Santana did not appear for arraignment. The court clerk mailed notice of forfeiture, stating that the obligation to pay the bond would become absolute on the 186th day following the date of mailing unless Santana was surrendered or FC moved to vacate the forfeiture. Before expiration of the 186-day period, FC moved to vacate the forfeiture, citing permanent disability under Penal Code 1305(d), claiming Santana had been deported to Mexico. The county did not oppose the motion. The motion was called for a hearing on February 22, 2013. FC did not appear. On March 25, the court entered summary judgment on the forfeiture. In April, FC moved to set aside the summary judgment due to its attorney’s (Singer) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect (Code Civ. Proc., 473(b)). Singer submitted a declaration stating that on February 22 he checked in and was told by the clerk that the court had granted the requested order. The court denied the motion as not within 30 days of the 186-day appearance period. The court of appeal reversed, finding that FC established surprise and excusable neglect due to misinformation from a court clerk. View "County of Los Angeles v. Fin. Cas. & Sur., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a provider of credit repair software and services to credit repair organizations (CROs), sued for breach of contract, fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, and interference with contract. Defendants work directly for CROs handling administrative tasks. Plaintiff provided defendants its confidential list of CROs and other proprietary information, and entered into agreements for defendants to act as a licensed reseller of plaintiff’s software. Those agreements identify Florida as the venue for dispute resolution and provide for awards of costs and fees. The court granted a temporary restraining order barring defendants from transferring any customers referred to them by plaintiff to any entity that did not use plaintiff’s software and barring defendants from making commercial use of plaintiff’s software. Defendants moved to dismiss based on the forum-selection clauses. The trial court stayed the case for 60 days and extended the preliminary injunction so that plaintiff could seek relief in Florida. After plaintiff refiled in Florida, the California trial court dismissed and dissolved the preliminary injunction. Defendants sought attorney fees of $84,640, as the prevailing parties on the motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal agreed, stating that there has been no final resolution of the contract claims. View "DisputeSuite.com, LLC, v. Scoreinc.com" on Justia Law

Williamsburg executed a $200,000 bail bond for the release of a criminal defendant. Following his release, the defendant was scheduled to appear in court on July 20, 2012. The defendant failed to appear, and the court ordered the bond forfeited. On July 23, the court clerk mailed a bail forfeiture notice to Williamsburg. Under the notice and Penal Code, section 1305,1 Williamsburg had until January 24, 2013 to surrender the defendant to custody or move to set aside the forfeiture. Williamsburg moved to extend the exoneration period on January 22, 2013. On February 1, 2013, the court heard the motion and ordered the exoneration period extended 169 days to Saturday, July 20, 2013. On July 22, the first court day following July 20, Williamsburg filed its second motion to extend the exoneration period. It noticed the motion to be heard on August 27. Williamsburg filed the declaration of Investigator Smalls, describing his investigation into the defendant’s whereabouts and stating he was confident that defendant was still in Los Angeles County. The court denied the motion, without a hearing, and entered summary judgment on the forfeited bond. The court of appeal reversed. Williamsburg had a statutory right to an oral hearing. View "Cnty of Los Angeles. v. Williamsburg Nat'l Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Blaine Carian appeals a postjudgment order denying his motion for attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In or about 1975, the Fish and Game Commission adopted a regulation that designated Magnesia Spring Ecological Reserve (Reserve) in Riverside County as an ecological reserve. In or about 1976, the Department apparently adopted a wildlife management plan for the Reserve, which provided that "[e]nforcement of laws pertaining to [the Reserve] should be the responsibility of the Department." In or about 2007, the Department apparently adopted a multi-species habitat conservation plan, which stated that "[u]se of trails on [the Department's] land is subject to [California Code of Regulations] Title 14." It also contemplated that the "Bump and Grind" portion (Trail) of the Mirage Trail would be decommissioned and removed by the Department in the future. In January 2012, Assembly Bill No. 284 was introduced to enact a statute allowing access to the Trail. That bill apparently expired, or "died," pursuant to the California Constitution for lack of timely passage. In March 2012, a new bill, Assembly Bill No. 880, was introduced that contained the same language as the prior bill to enact a statute allowing access to the Trail. Carian filed the underlying lawsuit against defendants the California Department of Fish and Wildlife and Kimberly Nichol (a department manager), alleging causes of action for a writ of mandate directing the Department to reopen the Trail, taxpayer relief, quiet title to public easement, and declaratory relief. Assembly Bill No. 880 was ultimately passed, enacting former Fish and Game Code section 1587, effective as of January 2013, and the Governor signed the Bill. At the October 15 hearing on Defendants' demurrer, Carian conceded the new statute made his lawsuit moot. The court sustained Defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. In January 2013, Carian filed a motion for attorney fees under section 1021.5. In seeking an award of $100,000 in attorney fees against Defendants, Carian argued that his lawsuit was necessary to enforce an important right affecting the public interest and conferred a significant benefit on the general public by causing the State to open the Trail. The trial court found Carian did not, as required by 1021.5, make a reasonable attempt to settle his dispute before filing suit against defendants. On appeal, Carian argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for attorney fees because he gave the Department notice before filing his action, any attempt to settle the dispute would have been futile, and he satisfied all of the other requirements for an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5. The Court of Appeal confirmed the trial court's finding that Carian did not make a reasonable attempt to settle the dispute prior to filing his action against defendants. Therefore, Carian did not meet the requirement for an award of section 1021.5 attorney fees. View "Carian v. Dept. Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

Robert filed a petition to dissolve his marriage to Isabel, an attorney in 2009. The court entered judgment on March 11, 2013. A second judgment was entered on March 18, 2013; it made handwritten changes to a single paragraph of the original. On May 15, 2013, the court issued an order directing the clerk to make additional modifications to the judgment. On May 17, 2013, Isabel filed her notice of appeal, listing and attaching only the second, March 18, judgment. The court of appeal dismissed: Isabel’s time to appeal ran from the original judgment entered on March 11, so that her appeal is untimely. View "Ellis v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were represented by defendant attorneys in an action against State Farm arising out of the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Court-appointed retired judges presided over a 1997 aggregate settlement. In 2012, one of the plaintiffs conducted a random sampling of other plaintiffs’ awards in the action, which, they claimed, revealed that the defendants had not properly disbursed or accounted for the settlement funds and had concealed this conduct from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sought damages for failure to obtain their informed consent to an aggregate settlement and misappropriation of and failure to account for the settlement funds. The trial court dismissed, finding the claims based on speculation and barred by the statute of limitations. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the statute of limitations had not run under Probate Code section 16460 because they had no notice of wrongdoing and that actions for violations of Business and Professions Code section 6091 in failing to provide an accounting are not barred because their action was filed within one year of failure to comply with the statute. Where there are facts sufficient to put one on inquiry notice, the fraud statute of limitations starts running even when the defendant is a fiduciary. View "Britton v. Girardi" on Justia Law

Simplon Ballpark, LLC sued John Scull for breach of fiduciary duty. After a bench trial, the court issued a statement of decision and entered a judgment in favor of Simplon. On June 21, 2012, the court clerk served by mail the statement of decision and judgment. Scull filed a series of posttrial motions, including for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Thereafter, Simplon objected to and moved to strike Scull's posttrial motions on the ground they were untimely filed and served. Specifically, Simplon's counsel noted the court's register of actions indicated a filing date of July 9 and although the proof of service for the posttrial motions stated the motions were served by mail on July 6, the envelope containing the posttrial motions was postmarked July 9. Simplon argued in objections and requests to strike that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the posttrial motions based on the untimely filing and service. In its opposition points and authorities, Simplon withdrew its objection to the extent it claimed the motions had been untimely filed, but argued the motions were still untimely "because the facts show that Scull did not serve [them] until three days later on July 9 . . . and the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this Motion. See, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1013(a)." Scull argued that his motions were timely filed and served on July 6. Code of Civil Procedure section 1013(a) sets forth three methods for a party to prove service by mail. Service under subdivision (3) is presumed invalid if the postmark is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing contained in the proof of service declaration. The Court of Appeal held that the presumption set forth in subdivision (3) is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence that must be affirmatively invoked by the party seeking to invalidate the service. The Court concluded the party seeking to invalidate the service did not affirmatively invoke the issue in this case. Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument presented by Simplon and affirmed the judgment. View "Simplon Ballpark, LLC v. Scull" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that decedent died from malignant pleural mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos at BNSF’s Wichita dismantling facility and roundhouse, where decedent worked. BNSF moved to quash service of the summons for lack of personal jurisdiction because conduct alleged against it did not arise from its in-state activities; it is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. California houses approximately 8.1 percent of BNSF’s total workforce (3,520 employees), accounts for approximately six percent of its revenue, and contains less than five percent of its total track mileage (1,149 miles). Plaintiffs asserted that BNSF had minimum contacts that were sufficiently “substantial . . . continuous and systematic” to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion to quash, citing BNSF’s “systematic and continuous business in California,” its status as an American company, and its role as a “perpetrator” of the alleged wrongdoing. The court of appeal found that general jurisdiction was lacking. BNSF’s relationship with the state is not enough to render it “at home” in California such that the exercise of general jurisdiction over actions unrelated to its forum activities is warranted. View "BNSF Ry. Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law