Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Surety appealed from a summary judgment entered against it on a forfeited bail bond of $25,000. Surety claimed that summary judgment was premature and therefore improper because it was entered while Surety’s motion for an extension of time under Penal Code section 1305.4 was pending. The court concluded that the trial court not only erred by entering summary judgment against Surety while the timely extension motion was pending, but it further erred by failing to set aside the summary judgment once Surety pointed out the trial court’s mistake in a timely motion for relief. The court rejected the County’s argument that the summary judgment was not premature because no further extension of time could have been granted by the trial court under section 1305.4. The court also concluded that, because a proper summary judgment was not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it first could be entered, the bond must be ordered exonerated. View "People v. United States Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Developer Defendants seek a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order approving good faith settlements between codefendants Shell and Equilon and plaintiffs, as well as the City. The settlements involved mass tort litigation arising out of an environmental investigation showing that soil beneath a housing tract was contaminated with residual petroleum hydrocarbons. The court concluded that Shell's compliance with the Remedial Action Plan (RAP), which was mandated by the Water Board pursuant to the state’s police powers, was not part of the settlement consideration, and therefore should not be included in the valuation of the good faith settlement. The court concluded that, although the trial court gave some weight to the value of the RAP remediation in approving the good faith settlements, the error was harmless. On the record presented, the $90 million monetary payment, standing alone, was well within the range of Shell’s proportionate liability. The court finally concluded that the determination of good faith settlement did not require an allocation of the $90 million settlement consideration among the 1,491 individual plaintiffs and between their economic and noneconomic damages. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Dole Food Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Pro se defendant Gerald Brooks appealed a restraining order entered against him, after a hearing, pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). Defendant argued to the Court of Appeal that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because, at the time of the commencement of this proceeding and at the time of the hearing, he lived out of state. Furthermore, defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing or declining to consider his opposition papers he sent to the court by fax on the morning of the hearing. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that, because defendant failed to properly move to quash service, he waived his challenge to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him. In addition, the Court concluded that, assuming the trial judge ever saw defendant’s untimely opposition papers, it would have been proper to disregard them because defendant attempted to file them by fax in violation of the local rules of court. View "Sabato v. Brooks" on Justia Law

LA Hillcreste filed a complaint in an unlawful detainer seeking to evict petitioner for the alleged non-payment of rent. The court subsequently ordered the case transferred from the Appellate Division under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1008. At issue is whether petitioner may bring a motion to quash service of the summons on the ground that the landlord did not properly serve the three-day notice to pay rent or quit required under the Unlawful Detainer Act, Code Civ. Proc., 1159-1179a. The court concluded that petitioner may not challenge the allegedly defective service of the three-day notice via a motion to quash service of summons because the three-day notice is an element of an unlawful detainer action. In so holding, the court disagreed with the broad language of Delta Imports, Inc. v. Municipal Court, which held that a motion to quash service is the only method to challenge whether a complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The court denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Borsuk v. Appellate Division" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a trial court's order that appellant Kierstin Smith pay $124,352 to claimant-respondent Cindy Smith, and $151,967, subject to a specified offset, to respondent Mark Smith. Kierstin argued that the trial court erred by combining cost shifting pursuant to Family Code section 2030 with sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271, making no explicit differentiation between sums awarded pursuant to each statute. She further argued that the trial court abused its discretion in making an award under either statute. Mark and Kierstin divorced in 2002, but they have remained engaged in litigation regarding child custody and support, which has expanded to involve Cindy, Mark's current wife. The most recent proceedings began in December 2008, when Mark applied for a post-judgment modification of child support, attorney fees, and sanctions, and also included consideration of Mark's January 2010 application seeking a change in child custody, and Kierstin's August 2012 application for a modification of child support. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's order, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Marriage of Smith" on Justia Law

In October 2014, the California State Lands Commission (SLC) approved the San Francisco Bay and Delta Sand Mining Project, which authorized real parties in interest Hanson Marine Operations, Inc., Morris Tug & Barge, Inc. and Suisun Associates (collectively, Hanson) to continue dredge mining sand from sovereign lands under the San Francisco Bay pursuant to 10-year mineral extraction leases. San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge the SLC’s decision to approve the project, which the trial court denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Baykeeper argued: (1) the SLC failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA); and (2) the mineral leases authorized by the SLC’s approval of the project violated the common law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeal granted the petition, finding that the SLC’s environmental review of the mining project complied with CEQA, but it failed to consider whether the sand mining leases were a proper use of public trust property. The trial court was directed to mandate that the SLC to address this issue. View "S.F. Baykeeper v. Cal. State Lands Com." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from an order renewing a civil harassment restraining order against him under section 527.6, subdivision (j), of Code of Civil Procedure. The court held that renewal under section 527.6, subdivision (j)(1) is not automatic; instead the trial court has discretion whether to renew the restraining order and the duration of the restraining order. The court reversed because the trial court incorrectly assumed it had no discretion to decide whether or not to renew the restraining order in the first place. The court declined to award attorney fees to defendant because it would be premature at this stage. View "Cooper v. Bettinger" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ramon Soto appealed an order denying his motions to: (1) vacate entry of default and default judgment; and (2) quash service of summons and dismiss. Defendant filed the motions in connection with an action brought by plaintiff-respondent Diana Buchanan to set aside a fraudulent transfer. Plaintiff claimed that defendant Maria Soto transferred certain real property to her husband Ramon as a fraudulent conveyance to prevent Buchanan from executing an anticipated judgment on the property. Plaintiff eventually obtained the underlying judgment when she sued Maria for failing to pay money owed by Maria to plaintiff in connection with Maria's purchase of plaintiff's bridal business. Defendant argued the court erred in denying his motions because, at the time of entry of default and judgment thereon, the court allegedly did not have personal jurisdiction over him and he was not properly served with process. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Buchanan v. Soto" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the landlord, filed an unlawful detainer action against Coolwaters, the commercial lessee. On appeal, Coolwaters challenged the trial court's order denying its special motion to strike the complaint and awarding plaintiff attorney fees as sanctions for the expenses of responding to the special motion to strike. The court concluded that a nonpaying tenant should not be permitted to frustrate an unlawful detainer proceeding by initiating litigation against the landlord in order to bring a special motion to strike the landlord’s subsequently filed unlawful detainer complaint, on the asserted ground that the unlawful detainer action arose out of the tenant’s protected activity in filing the initial lawsuit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying the special motion to strike and imposing monetary sanctions against Coolwaters. View "Olive Properties v. Coolwater Enter." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging 13 contract and fraud-based causes of action. On appeal, defendant challenged an order granting a motion to vacate and set aside a default judgment filed by defendant. The court concluded that, because plaintiff’s complaint did not specify the amount of damages sought, the default judgment was void and subject to collateral attack at any time. The court rejected plaintiff’s contention that he met the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure, section 5801 by serving defendant with a statement of damages under section 425.11 or 425.115, when the underlying claims did not involve personal injury or wrongful death, and the default judgment was for compensatory damages only. Further, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the default judgment is merely voidable, rather than void. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order setting aside default judgment. View "Dhawan v. Biring" on Justia Law