Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After purchasing a home with wooded acreage in Santa Cruz, the buyers discovered issues they believed the sellers had failed to disclose, including matters related to the septic system, property condition, and logging operations. The real estate transaction was governed by a standard form agreement that required the parties to attempt mediation before resorting to litigation or arbitration, and provided that the prevailing party in any dispute would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, except as limited by the mediation provision.Following the sale, the buyers sued the sellers for breach of contract and fraud. The sellers filed a cross-complaint. After a three-day bench trial in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, the court found in favor of the sellers on all claims and on their cross-complaint, determining that the sellers were the prevailing parties and entitled to recover attorney fees and costs, with the amount to be determined in post-trial proceedings. The sellers then moved for attorney fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion for attorney fees, concluding that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate the dispute, as required by the contract, barred them from recovering attorney fees, even though they later expressed willingness to mediate before the buyers filed suit. The court also denied the motion for costs without prejudice due to procedural deficiencies.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the trial court’s initial statement regarding entitlement to attorney fees was interlocutory and not a final judgment on the issue. The appellate court further held that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate did not automatically preclude them from recovering attorney fees if they later agreed to mediate before litigation commenced. The court reversed the postjudgment order denying attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the sellers effectively retracted their refusal to mediate before the lawsuit was filed. The denial of costs was affirmed due to the sellers’ failure to file a proper costs memorandum. View "Evleshin v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC is the developer of a mixed-use condominium project in San Francisco known as GS Heritage Place, which includes both timeshare and whole residential units. Stephen Schneider owns a timeshare interest in one of the fractional units and has voting rights in the homeowners association. In 2018, Schneider filed a class action lawsuit against Cocoa and others, alleging improper management practices, including the use of fractional units as hotel rooms and misallocation of expenses. The parties settled that lawsuit in 2020, with Schneider agreeing not to disparage Cocoa or solicit further claims against it, and to cooperate constructively in future dealings.In 2022, Schneider initiated another lawsuit against Cocoa. In response, Cocoa filed a cross-complaint against Schneider, alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract (the settlement agreement), unjust enrichment, and defamation. Cocoa claimed Schneider engaged in a campaign to prevent the sale of unsold units as whole units, formed unofficial owner groups, made disparaging statements, and threatened litigation, all of which allegedly violated the prior settlement agreement and harmed Cocoa’s economic interests.Schneider moved to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that Cocoa’s claims arose from his protected activities—namely, petitioning the courts and speaking on matters of public interest related to association management. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted Schneider’s motion, finding that all claims in the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Cocoa failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Cocoa’s claims were based on Schneider’s protected litigation and association management activities, and that Cocoa did not establish a likelihood of success on any of its claims. View "Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider" on Justia Law

The case centers on a long-standing dispute involving three churches over ownership and sale of real property in Los Angeles. Attorney Steven C. Kim represented one of the churches, Central Korean Evangelical Church, which granted him a deed of trust on the property to secure payment of attorney fees. Central Korean had contracted to sell the property to New Life Oasis Church but later reneged, leading to litigation. The trial court ordered Central Korean to honor the sale and expunged Kim’s deed of trust, which was obstructing the transaction. Kim’s client appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of standing, and Kim did not pursue his own appeal. The judgment became final in 2018.Following the final judgment, Kim filed a new lawsuit against New Life Oasis Church and Bank of Hope, seeking a declaration that his deed of trust was still valid and challenging the prior expungement order. New Life and Bank of Hope moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that issue preclusion barred Kim from relitigating the validity of his lien. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County agreed and entered judgment against Kim. Additionally, New Life filed a cross-complaint alleging that Kim’s recording of a lis pendens constituted slander of title and abuse of process. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of New Life, awarding damages and not addressing Kim’s defense based on the litigation privilege.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s application of issue preclusion, holding that Kim could not relitigate the validity of his deed of trust. However, it reversed the judgment on the cross-complaint, holding that the litigation privilege protected Kim’s recording of the lis pendens from claims of slander of title and abuse of process. The case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with these holdings. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

A law firm sought to recover over $1.7 million in fees and costs for representing the Los Angeles County Sheriff, Alex Villanueva, and the Sheriff’s Department in litigation initiated by the County of Los Angeles. Due to a conflict of interest, the County’s Board of Supervisors offered Villanueva independent counsel, allowing him to select his attorney but reserving discretion over compensation. Villanueva chose the law firm, which entered into an engagement agreement with him. The County, however, sent its own retainer agreement to the firm, which the firm refused to sign. The firm continued its representation but was never paid. After the firm demanded arbitration under its engagement agreement, the County and related plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed and an injunction against the arbitration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted a preliminary injunction, then summary judgment for the County plaintiffs, finding the Sheriff lacked authority to enter into the engagement agreement. The court denied the law firm’s post-judgment motion for leave to file a cross-complaint, citing both untimeliness and bad faith. The firm then filed a separate lawsuit against the County and related defendants, asserting breach of contract and related claims. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer, dismissing the complaint with prejudice on grounds that the claims were compulsory cross-claims in the earlier action and for failure to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed both the judgment in the County’s action and the dismissal of the law firm’s separate lawsuit. The court held that the Sheriff did not have authority to retain counsel on his own; only the Board of Supervisors could contract for legal services. The law firm’s claims were barred as compulsory cross-claims and for failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. View "County of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, S.C., filed a civil action in September 2022 against Doe 1, alleging that she was sexually assaulted by her foster father while in foster care under Doe 1’s custody, care, and control, “in approximately 1981.” S.C. complied with the statutory requirement to file certificates of merit, which were approved by the Tulare County Superior Court. Later, upon receiving her juvenile case records, S.C. discovered she was not placed in foster care by Doe 1 until March 1984, and thus sought to amend her complaint to reflect that the alleged abuse occurred between 1984 and 1986.The Tulare County Superior Court denied S.C.’s motion for leave to amend her complaint, reasoning that the certificate of merit requirement under former section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not allow for amendments to the complaint or certificates of merit after filing. The court subsequently granted Doe 1’s motion for summary judgment, finding that S.C. was not in Doe 1’s custody in 1981, as alleged in the original complaint, and therefore Doe 1 could not have owed or breached any duty to S.C. at that time.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed both the summary judgment and the orders denying S.C.’s motion for leave to amend. The court held that former section 340.1 does not prohibit amendments to the complaint under section 473, subdivision (a)(1), and that the certificates of merit may be amended in accordance with the relation-back doctrine. The appellate court directed the superior court to allow S.C. to amend her complaint to allege the abuse occurred between 1984 and 1986 and to permit the filing of amended certificates of merit. Costs on appeal were awarded to S.C. View "S.C. v. Doe 1" on Justia Law

Elena Kouvabina and Jacob Veltman, both attorneys, were married in 2010, had a child in 2012, and separated in 2017. Since their separation, Kouvabina, acting as a self-represented litigant, initiated a series of contentious legal proceedings related to their dissolution, custody, support, and related family law matters. Over a five-year period, she commenced, prosecuted, or maintained eleven appeals and writs in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three. Of these, nine—comprising five appeals and four writ petitions—were finally determined adversely to her, including repeated unsuccessful efforts to disqualify trial judges and appeals from orders on spousal support, child support, custody, visitation, and attorney fees.The San Mateo County Superior Court previously handled the underlying family law proceedings, issuing various orders and judgments that Kouvabina challenged through appeals and writs. In each instance, the appellate court either affirmed the lower court’s decisions or summarily denied her writ petitions. These adverse outcomes formed the basis for the appellate court’s review of her litigation conduct.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, on its own motion, reviewed whether Kouvabina met the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1). The court found that she had, within the preceding seven years, while self-represented, commenced at least five litigations that were finally determined adversely to her. The court rejected her arguments that appeals do not constitute “litigation” under the statute and that family law matters should be treated differently. The court declared Kouvabina a vexatious litigant and imposed a prefiling order prohibiting her from filing new litigation in California courts while self-represented without first obtaining leave from the presiding judge or justice. No costs were awarded. View "in re Marriage of Kouvabina" on Justia Law

After tripping and falling on a raised portion of sidewalk in front of a residence, the plaintiff sued the owners of the adjacent properties and the City for negligence and premises liability. The claim against one property owner, Goode, was based on the theory that a tree in the parkway in front of her house had roots extending under the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell, potentially causing the damage. The City maintained and inspected the tree and sidewalk, but the plaintiff alleged Goode’s ownership of the tree contributed to the dangerous condition.The Ventura County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Goode, finding no triable issue of material fact regarding her liability. The plaintiff did not oppose Goode’s motion for summary judgment, but the City did file an opposition and attempted to file a cross-complaint against Goode. The trial court declined to consider the City’s opposition, ruling that the City lacked standing because it had not filed a cross-complaint, and rejected the cross-complaint on procedural grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that a codefendant with an adverse interest has standing to oppose a motion for summary judgment, regardless of whether a cross-complaint has been filed. The court further found that the City’s cross-complaint was properly filed and should not have been rejected. However, after reviewing the evidence de novo, the appellate court concluded that Goode could not be held liable as a matter of law because she did not own, control, or maintain the sidewalk or tree in a manner that created the dangerous condition. The judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Goode was affirmed. View "Bean v. City of Thousand Oaks" on Justia Law

Angel Lynn Realty, Inc. (ALR) entered into a partnership agreement with Real Estate Portfolio Management, LLC (REPM) to purchase, rehabilitate, and sell properties, splitting profits equally. ALR alleged that REPM breached the agreement by failing to pay over $800,000 in profits and also breached its fiduciary duties. ALR further claimed that Steve George, REPM’s sole member, was the alter ego of REPM. After REPM failed to pay the judgment, ALR conducted a debtor’s examination and asserted that postjudgment actions by George fraudulently drained REPM’s assets to avoid payment.The Superior Court of Sacramento County held a bench trial and found in favor of ALR on the breach of partnership and fiduciary duty claims, awarding nearly $1 million in damages and interest against REPM. However, the court found that ALR had not proven George was REPM’s alter ego and entered judgment accordingly. When ALR later moved to amend the judgment to add George as a judgment debtor based on alleged postjudgment fraudulent conduct, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the alter ego issue since it had already been decided.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by applying collateral estoppel without considering whether new facts or changed circumstances had arisen since the prior decision. The appellate court clarified that collateral estoppel does not bar reconsideration of an issue if material facts have changed after the original judgment. The order denying ALR’s motion to amend the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to determine whether postjudgment events warrant a different outcome on the alter ego issue. View "Angel Lynn Realty, Inc. v. George" on Justia Law

A plaintiff alleged that, between 1965 and 1969, while he was a young child attending an elementary school in a California school district, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by the school’s principal. The complaint stated that school staff and faculty were aware or suspected the abuse, and that similar abuse occurred to other students. The plaintiff claimed ongoing psychological and emotional harm as a result. He brought four negligence-based causes of action against the school district, asserting that he was not required to present a government tort claim before filing suit due to statutory changes exempting such claims.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the school district’s demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement was fatal to his case, and concluded that legislative changes extending the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault did not alter the deadline for filing a claim against a public entity.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether Assembly Bill No. 218’s retroactive waiver of the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement for claims under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 violated the California Constitution’s gift clause. The appellate court held that the retroactive waiver did not create a new liability or cause of action, but merely removed a procedural barrier to suit. The court further found that the legislative purpose of aiding victims of childhood sexual assault served a valid public purpose and did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe R.L. v. Merced City School District" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the City and County of San Francisco, seeking $5,000,000 in damages for injuries sustained after falling from a scooter that struck a pothole. During discovery, the City sought information about the plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the incident. The plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide timely and complete responses to certain form interrogatories related to requests for admission about intoxication, despite repeated requests and meet and confer efforts by the City. Additionally, during an independent medical examination, observers chosen by the plaintiff’s attorney interfered with the process, preventing the examining doctor from completing the evaluation.The Superior Court of San Francisco City and County addressed two discovery disputes. First, it granted the City’s motion to compel responses to the interrogatories and imposed a $6,500 sanction against the plaintiff’s counsel for failing to provide timely, code-compliant responses. Second, it imposed a $1,500 sanction after finding that the plaintiff’s observers had improperly interfered with the medical examination. The parties settled the underlying action, but the plaintiff appealed the sanctions. The City moved to dismiss portions of the appeal, arguing that some orders were not appealable and that the sanctions for the medical exam were below the statutory threshold for appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, granted the City’s motion to partially dismiss the appeal, finding that the orders regarding the protective order and the $1,500 sanction were not appealable. The court affirmed the $6,500 sanction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it, as the plaintiff’s counsel lacked substantial justification for opposing the motion to compel. The appellate court also imposed $30,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff’s counsel for filing a frivolous appeal and referred the matter to the State Bar. View "Morales v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law