Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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The case revolves around plaintiff Rynold Dwayne Jackson, who alleged malicious prosecution and unfair business practices after an altercation at a hotel lounge. Jackson was refused service on the basis of intoxication. Following a dispute, Jackson and the hotel's director of security, Mario Lara, had physical contact leading to Jackson's prosecution for battery. After being found not guilty, Jackson filed a civil complaint against Lara and DT Management, LLC, the company managing the hotel and lounge.Jackson alleged malicious prosecution against Lara, claiming the criminal prosecution was based on a false assault accusation. He also alleged DT Management violated the Unfair Competition Law by denying equal access, permitting discriminatory behavior by employees, and selectively deleting incident footage.The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the lower court granted. The court considered Jackson's failure to appear at the motion hearing as a submission on the tentative ruling. Jackson appealed this judgment.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, State of California, affirmed the lower court's judgment. They cited the interim adverse judgment rule, which establishes that a trial court judgment in favor of the plaintiff or prosecutor, unless obtained fraudulently, forms probable cause to bring the underlying action. The court found this rule applicable as Jackson's motion for acquittal in his criminal trial was denied, thus establishing probable cause for Lara's accusation.As for the unfair business practices claim, Jackson failed to substantiate his allegations with legal authority or argument, resulting in the dismissal of his claim. Furthermore, a new theory he proposed on appeal was disregarded as it was raised for the first time and not considered in the trial court. View "Jackson v. Lara" on Justia Law

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The case involves an appeal by a student, Matthew Boermeester, who was expelled from the University of Southern California (USC) for intimate partner violence. Following his expulsion, Boermeester filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, which was denied. He then appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which initially ruled in his favor, concluding that Boermeester had a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. However, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that Boermeester did not have such a right.After the case was remanded back to the Court of Appeal, Boermeester argued that USC's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that USC's use of a combined investigator-adjudicator procedure denied him fair process. The Court of Appeal disagreed and found that substantial evidence supported USC's decision and there was no denial of fair process in USC's use of an investigator-adjudicator or in its appeals process.The court also noted that Boermeester's claims of investigator bias were unsupported and that he was provided a substantial amount of process, including multiple layers of review. Boermeester's argument that the investigator's conduct of phone interviews contravened USC's policy was also rejected. The court concluded that there was nothing inherently unfair about USC's combined investigator-adjudicator model or the specific procedures followed in this case. Therefore, the denial of the writ was affirmed. View "Boermeester v. Carry" on Justia Law

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The case involves a father, J.L., who appealed against orders that declared his children, P.L and L.L, to be dependents of the juvenile court and placed them with their mother, H.T. J.L. also contested the condition of his visitation rights, arguing that the court improperly delegated its visitation authority to the children. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency maintained that J.L. forfeited the issue by not raising it at the lower court level.The parents had a child welfare history dating back to 2019, with multiple referrals regarding J.L. physically or emotionally abusing the children. The parents divorced in 2023, and shared custody until an incident occurred where J.L. allegedly punched P.L. The Agency then obtained protective custody warrants for the children. The court placed the children with their mother and ordered liberal supervised visitation for J.L., considering the children's wishes on whether visits would go forward. This order was not objected to by J.L's counsel.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California concurred with the Agency and affirmed the lower court's orders. It held that J.L. forfeited his right to contest the visitation orders by failing to raise the issue at the lower court level. Furthermore, even if the issue was not forfeited, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the lower court in allowing the children to decline visiting J.L. The court explained that it was J.L.’s responsibility to request a specific change to the visitation order if he was unhappy with the children's refusal to visit him. View "In re P.L." on Justia Law

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This case is an appeal from the Superior Court of Placer County, California. The appellant, J.S., challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss his juvenile wardship petition and seal all related records under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. The court had determined that J.S. was ineligible for such relief because he had a new finding of wardship during his probation period, interpreting the statute as categorically precluding relief in such a situation.The case hinged on the interpretation of section 786, subdivision (c)(1), which stipulates that satisfactory completion of probation occurs if the person has no new findings of wardship or conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. J.S. argued that this provision should only preclude relief if the new finding of wardship was for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. The court agreed with J.S.'s interpretation.The court concluded that the juvenile court had erred in its interpretation of the statute by denying J.S.'s motion based on any new finding of wardship during the probation period. The court found that the statutory language and legislative history supported J.S.'s argument that relief under section 786 is not categorically precluded when there is a new finding of wardship during the period of probation that was not based on a felony offense or a misdemeanor offense involving moral turpitude.The case was remanded for further proceedings for the juvenile court to reconsider J.S.'s motion under the correct interpretation of the statute. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

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In this case, the dispute originated from a presidential election for the organization Yeong Wo Association, a private cultural and charitable association. The plaintiff, Hee Shen Cemetery and Benevolent Association, is one of the 12 member organizations of Yeong Wo. The controversy arose when Hee Shen recommended two candidates for the presidential election, but Yeong Wo allowed other candidates from Hee Shen to participate in the election as well. The trial court found in favor of Hee Shen, voiding the election and ordering a new one.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two ruled that the trial court's finding was not supported by substantial evidence and that the remedy it ordered was inappropriate as a matter of law. The appellate court noted that under California law, courts only intervene sparingly in disputes involving how private associations govern themselves. The court determined that the bylaws of Yeong Wo were ambiguous at best and did not unambiguously limit the organization's election to only those candidates recommended by Hee Shen. It concluded that the trial court should not have intervened under the first step of the California Dental framework, and reversed the judgment. View "Hee Shen Cemetery and Benevolent Assn. v. Yeong Wo Assn." on Justia Law

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In the case, a group of students from the University of San Francisco (USF) sued the university for breach of contract, alleging that the university did not deliver on its promise to provide in-person instruction and should refund a portion of their tuition fees due to the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision, which granted USF's motion for summary adjudication, concluding that the students failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether USF promised to provide exclusively in-person instruction.The court determined that there was an implied-in-fact contract between USF and the student appellants, established through matriculation and the payment of tuition. However, the court found that the contract did not explicitly promise exclusively in-person instruction. The court also distinguished between general expectations of in-person classes and enforceable contractual promises for exclusively in-person instruction. The court held that the students failed to establish a breach of contract based on the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.The court further held that the students could not pursue quasi-contract claims, as a valid and enforceable contract existed between the students and USF. The students' promissory estoppel claim also failed, as they did not establish any clear and unequivocal promises from USF for in-person instruction. The court stated that the record did not reflect any such promise.The court dismissed the students' claims relating to the Fall 2020 and Spring 2021 semesters, as they were aware these semesters would be conducted either entirely remotely or in a hybrid format prior to enrolling or paying tuition for those semesters. Thus, the students could not reasonably have believed USF contractually promised to provide in-person education for these semesters. View "Berlanga v. University of San Francisco" on Justia Law

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The case involves Magnus Sundholm, a former member of the Hollywood Foreign Press Association (HFPA), who sued the HFPA for breach of contract and other claims after his expulsion from the organization. The HFPA moved to disqualify Sundholm's attorneys from the case, asserting that they had reviewed privileged documents that belonged to the HFPA. The trial court granted the motion, leading to Sundholm's appeal.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, found that while Sundholm's attorney had improperly refused to produce documents in response to a subpoena from the HFPA, disqualification of the attorney was not the appropriate remedy. This is because disqualification affects a party's right to counsel of choice and should not be used to punish an attorney for improper conduct. The court further found that there was no evidence that the possession of the HFPA's documents by Sundholm's attorney would prejudice the HFPA in the proceeding.Thus, the court reversed the trial court's order disqualifying Sundholm's attorneys. The summary of this case is based on the court's opinion and does not include any additional information or interpretation. View "Sundholm v. Hollywood Foreign Press Assn." on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Dana Hohenshelt, filed a lawsuit against his former employer, Golden State Foods Corp., alleging retaliation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, failure to prevent retaliation, and violations of the California Labor Code. Golden State moved to compel arbitration in accordance with their arbitration agreement, and the trial court granted the motion, staying court proceedings. Arbitration began, but Golden State failed to pay the required arbitration fees within the 30-day deadline. Hohenshelt then sought to withdraw his claims from arbitration and proceed in court, citing Golden State's failure to pay as a material breach of the arbitration agreement under California's Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. The trial court denied this motion, deeming Golden State's payment, which was made after the deadline but within a new due date set by the arbitrator, as timely.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with the trial court's decision. It held that the trial court had ignored the clear language of section 1281.98, which states any extension of time for the due date must be agreed upon by all parties. Golden State's late payment constituted a material breach of the arbitration agreement, regardless of the new due date set by the arbitrator. The court also rejected Golden State's argument that section 1281.98 is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, following precedent from other courts that held these state laws are not preempted because they further the objectives of the Federal Arbitration Act. Therefore, the court granted Hohenshelt's petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to lift the stay of litigation. View "Hohenshelt v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two, a woman, T.B., was found to be gravely disabled and was appointed a conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. T.B. appealed, arguing that her trial did not commence within 10 days of her demanding one, violating section 5350, subdivision (d)(2) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and denying her due process. This statute was amended in January 1, 2023, to state that the failure to commence the trial within the time period is grounds for dismissal. The court concluded that the time limit for commencing trials is directory, not mandatory, and that dismissal for the failure to comply with the time limit is discretionary. The court found that the trial court did abuse its discretion in denying T.B.’s motions to dismiss the proceedings, but no reversal was required because T.B. did not demonstrate prejudice. The court also found that T.B. did not demonstrate a violation of her due process rights by the delay. Therefore, the court affirmed the conservatorship order. View "Conservatorship of T.B." on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiff Jacob Ayers purchased a new Jeep Grand Cherokee manufactured by the defendant, FCA US, LLC (FCA). After experiencing numerous problems with the vehicle, he asked FCA to repurchase it, but FCA refused. Ayers then sued FCA under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, also known as the lemon law. During the course of litigation, FCA made multiple offers to settle the case. However, Ayers rejected these offers and continued to litigate. Later, Ayers traded in the Jeep for a new vehicle, receiving a credit of $13,000.In 2020, a court decision (Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC) held that the Song-Beverly restitution remedy does not include amounts a plaintiff has already recovered by trading in the vehicle at issue. This decision effectively reduced Ayers' maximum potential recovery by three times the amount of the trade-in. In January 2021, Ayers served FCA with a section 998 offer for $125,000 plus costs, expenses, and attorney fees, which FCA accepted.The dispute then centered on how much FCA should pay Ayers in attorney fees and costs. FCA argued that its earlier offer to settle the case (made under section 998 of the California Code of Civil Procedure) cut off Ayers' right to attorney fees incurred after the date of that offer. The trial court rejected this argument, and FCA appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that section 998 does apply to a case that is resolved by a pretrial settlement. It also held that an intervening change in law that reduced the maximum amount a plaintiff could recover at trial does not exempt the plaintiff from the consequences of section 998. The court concluded that FCA's earlier settlement offer was valid and that it cut off Ayers' right to attorney fees incurred after the date of that offer.The court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter a new judgment excluding any costs incurred by Ayers after the date of FCA's earlier offer. FCA was also awarded costs on appeal. View "Ayers v. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law