Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McCready's husband sold his business, Billy Bags, to Whorf before he died. Whorf failed to make payments. McCready sued and obtained a judgment of $134,927.36 that provided, "McCready is awarded an equitable lien on the assets and profits of [Billy Bags]." Whorf filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, showing an average net monthly income of $10,487.72 from Billy Bags. Whorf named McCready as a creditor. Personal liability on Whorf's debts was discharged in bankruptcy. The lien, however, remained on the assets and profits of Billy Bags. McCready sued for money had and received, claiming that Whorf had been receiving $10,487.72 per month profit from Billy Bags; that McCready has a lien against those profits; and that profits received from the filing of the bankruptcy petition to the time of trial were monies belonging to McCready. The complaint sought $134,927.36. The court ruled in favor of for Whorf, stating: "[McCready's] remedy, if any, was to seek to enforce the judgment that created the lien through the use of laws applicable to the enforcement of judgments.” The court of appeal reversed. A separate action on a judgment is expressly authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 683.050. View "McCready v. Whorf" on Justia Law

The Boyces signed a $1.155 million promissory note payable to Pacific Mortgage, secured by a deed of trust on their Santa Barbara house. Pacific Mortgage endorsed the note to Option One, which endorsed the note in blank and put it in a mortgage investment pool, of which Wells Fargo was trustee. Pacific Mortgage assigned the deed of trust to Option One. The trust deed was later assigned to Wells Fargo. Boyces stopped making payments and filed an emergency bankruptcy petition to stay foreclosure. Wells Fargo moved for relief from the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court inspected the note and allonges; found a valid "chain of control and title of the note,” rejecting a claim that the assignment was invalid; and granted relief from the stay. The district court affirmed. Wells Fargo purchased the property at the trustee's sale and filed suit to evict the Boyces. The court rejected claims that the mortgage was invalid and that Wells Fargo did not perfect title and granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo, which sold the property. The Boyces filed claims for wrongful foreclosure, violation of the Unfair Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200), and quiet title. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, citing res judicata and collateral estoppel. View "Boyce v. T.D. Serv. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Hyundai Motor Company petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to stay a scheduled judgment debtor examination of its president and chief executive officer over a dispute regarding an attempt by real-party-in-interest to collect supposed postjudgment interest of $462.50 on an attorney fee award of $42,203. Hyundai promptly paid the entire fee award, but refused to pay any additional sums for interest. Rosen accepted the tendered amount but deducted $462.50 as an interest payment, allegedly leaving part of the principal balance unpaid. From this initial $462.50, Rosen claimed that Hyundai owed more than $13,000 for additional interest and attorney fees in less than a six-month period, "one of the best growth investments we have seen." The Court of Appeal granted Hyundai's request: "[t]here is a short answer to Rosen’s claim for postjudgment interest: the attorney fee order was filed months before the entry of the final judgment in this matter. By law, postjudgment interest accrues in lemon-law cases at the time the final judgment is entered. When respondent court filed and entered its final judgment on November 21, 2014, Rosen’s attorney fee award had long been paid. As a result, Rosen is not entitled to postjudgment interest of $462.50, or in any amount." View "Hyundai Motor America v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Trilogy at Glenn Ivy Maintenance Association and various homeowners filed suit against defendant Shea Homes, Inc., and others alleging, inter alia, that Shea improperly diverted revenues from a contract that should have been paid to Association. After Shea sought and obtained judgment on the pleadings, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, and Shea responded by moving to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP, strategic lawsuit against public participation, statute). The trial court denied the motion and Shea appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly found Shea had not satisfied its initial burden of showing plaintiffs' claims arose from protected activity and therefore correctly denied Shea's motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP law. View "Trilogy at Glen Ivy v. Shea Homes" on Justia Law

Charter was Glendale’s cable service provider. Glendale sought a temporary restraining order preventing Charter from realigning its public, educational, and government channel numbers. Charter made several cross-claims. The trial court ruled in Charter’s favor on certain issues. The court of appeal affirmed. Charter sought to recover its costs of proof under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, under which, a party to a civil action that denies a pretrial request for admission without a reasonable basis can be ordered to pay to the propounding party the reasonable expenses incurred—including attorney fees and costs— in proving the matter covered by the request. Glendale argued that the request for costs of proof was barred under the Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. 521, which limits the relief that may be obtained against local franchising authorities in actions arising from the regulation of cable service to injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court rejected Glendale’s argument and granted the motion, in part. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the federal law precluded the award. View "City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Assocs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Castaldis for stealing antiques he owned. The first phase of trial dealt with liability, compensatory damages and whether plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages. The second phase dealt with the calculation of the punitive damages. After the first phase completed, the court found both defendants jointly and severally liable for conversion. Months before the punitive damages phase began, a document entitled “judgment” was filed, setting forth $610,500 in compensatory damages plus interest and costs. The “judgment” went on to state that the court “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that both defendants Alfonse Castaldi and Theresa Castaldi have acted with malice and with oppression toward plaintiff Ken Baker warranting an award of punitive damages to be assessed at a separate trial.…” Several notices of appeal were filed. The court of appeal dismissed: the “judgment” was not a final, appealable judgment. The court acknowledged the apparent “harsh” result that defendants are prevented from obtaining review of several unusual orders now and possibly ever. View "Baker v. Castaldi" on Justia Law

Appellant, de facto parent of minor M.M., appealed a juvenile court’s order removing the minor from her home at the selection and implementation hearing. She argued on appeal she was entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the minor’s removal, and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in summarily ordering the removal. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed that appellant was entitled to notice and the opportunity to object and request a hearing prior to the minor’s removal. Furthermore, the Court agreed that the removal was an abuse of discretion, as it was unsupported by the evidence in the then-existing record. The order was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

The California State Personnel Board upheld Telish’s dismissal from his position with the California Department of Justice based on findings that he intimidated, threatened to release sexually explicit photographs of, and physically assaulted a subordinate employee with whom he had a consensual relationship. The essential issue was the admissibility of recorded telephone conversations between Telish and his former girlfriend and subordinate employee, L.D., which was received at the administrative hearing. The court of appeal affirmed denial of relief. A participant may properly record a telephone conversation at the direction of a law enforcement officer, acting within the course of his or her authority, in the course of a criminal investigation (Pen. Code 633). Section 633 does not limit the use of duly recorded communications to criminal proceedings. Although Telish contends the criminal investigation was a “sham,” the Board determined L.D. duly recorded the telephone conversations pursuant to the direction of DOJ in connection with a criminal investigation, and the Board’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. View "Telish v. Cal. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

Kathleen Strong appealed an order that denied her motion for postjudgment attorney fees incurred in enforcing a judgment for fees awarded for her successful defense of a Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP) suit. Strong argued on appeal that she was entitled to such a fee award pursuant to section 685.040, which authorized an award for enforcement of judgments not only where provided for in a contract, but also in cases where such fees are “otherwise provided by law.” The Court of Appeal, after review, agreed: "[b]oth the language of section 685.040 and binding Supreme Court precedent require this result." The order was reversed and the case remanded on Strong’s motion for attorney fees. View "York v. Strong" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dione Aguirre appealed an order denying class certification. Plaintiff sued defendants Amscan Holdings, Inc., and PA Acquisition, doing business as Party America (collectively, Party America) on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, alleging Party America violated Civil Code the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971 (Civil Code section 1747 et seq.) by routinely requesting and recording personal identification information, namely ZIP Codes, from customers using credit cards in its retail stores in California. The trial court found that plaintiff's proposed class of "[a]ll persons in California from whom Defendant requested and recorded a ZIP code in conjunction with a credit card purchase transaction from June 2, 2007 through October 13, 2010" was not an ascertainable class due to "plaintiff's inability to clearly identify, locate and notify class members through a reasonable expenditure of time and money [. . .] bars her from litigating this case as a class action." Plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred in determining the class was not ascertainable based upon the finding that each individual class member was not specifically identifiable from Party America's records (and thus, notice to the class could not be directly provided to class members.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in determining the proposed class was not ascertainable and erred in its conclusion. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law