Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging 13 contract and fraud-based causes of action. On appeal, defendant challenged an order granting a motion to vacate and set aside a default judgment filed by defendant. The court concluded that, because plaintiff’s complaint did not specify the amount of damages sought, the default judgment was void and subject to collateral attack at any time. The court rejected plaintiff’s contention that he met the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure, section 5801 by serving defendant with a statement of damages under section 425.11 or 425.115, when the underlying claims did not involve personal injury or wrongful death, and the default judgment was for compensatory damages only. Further, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the default judgment is merely voidable, rather than void. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order setting aside default judgment. View "Dhawan v. Biring" on Justia Law

The small claims court dispute at issue here stems from a condominium lease, which contained a prevailing party attorney fee provision. After the superior court heard the small claims appeal, it entered judgment in favor of the tenants, Jeffrey and Rebekah Crosier, against the landlord, Michael Dorsey as trustee of the Dorsey Trust, in the principal amount of $1,560. After judgment, Crosier sought $11,497.50 in attorney fees as the prevailing parties under the attorney fee provision in the lease. Dorsey opposed the motion, asserting section 116.780(c) trumped the contractual attorney fees provision, limiting any award to $150. The superior court awarded Crosier $10,373. The issue in this case of first impression was whether Code Civ. Proc. section 116.780(c) expressly, or the policy of the statute implicitly, overrode the freedom to contract for a different amount of attorney fees. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate to command the superior court to vacate its order. “Crosier sought out the small claims court procedure which is quick, inexpensive, and efficient. Having elected to utilize the advantages of the small claims procedure, Crosier must accept its disadvantages. . . . Small claims court exists so people with meritorious claims for small amounts may have those claims adjudicated without spending more on attorney fees than the claims are worth. Section 116.780(c) reflects a legislative determination that a small claims appeal should require no more than minimal attorney time. The small claims appeal procedure was intended to be integral to the legislative scheme for expeditious and cost-effective resolution of small claims. Therefore, … section 116.780(c) must be construed to override contractual attorney fee provisions and limit the attorney fee award here to $150.” View "Dorsey v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant S.H. (mother) was the biological mother of C.G. (born in 2013), the child at issue here, and B.H. (born in 2011), who was C.G.’s half sibling. Both children were removed from mother’s custody, and her parental rights were eventually terminated. On appeal, mother argued that the order terminating her parental rights as to C.G. should have been reversed for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian and Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). After review of the specific facts entered into the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed and remanded. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

Behm claimed that she was persuaded by the false representations of CVT's officers and directors to invest $200,000 in the company. CVT claimed to be developing a product that would measure pours of alcohol with such precision that it would save large sums of money for purveyors of adult beverages. CVT had financial difficulties. Behm discovered the product did not have the viability she had been assured. She filed suit against CVT and its officers and directors seeking compensatory damages exceeding $200,000. During the litigation, CVT failed to produce discovery and to comply with court orders. Behm obtained terminating sanctions. A default was entered against CVT. Behm procured a default judgment for $1,264,668.83, including $924,000 in punitive damages. CVT moved to vacate the default and the judgment, arguing that it did not have sufficient notice of the amount of punitive damages under Code of Civil Procedure 425.115, 2(f) and that it was entitled to mandatory relief from default under section 473(b) because the default was incurred due to the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect of its prior attorney. The appeal court affirmed the trial court order, vacating the default judgment after finding the notice of damages was insufficient, and denying CVT’s request to be relieved from the underlying default. View "Behm v. Clear View Techs." on Justia Law

Behm asserts that she was persuaded by the false representations to invest $200,000 in CVT, which claimed to be developing a product that would measure pours of alcohol with such precision that it would save large sums of money for liquor purveyors. When CVT had financial difficulties and Behm discovered the product was not viable, she filed suit. During the litigation, CVT failed to produce discovery and to comply with court orders. Behm obtained terminating sanctions. Default judgment entered in the amount of $1,264,668.83, including $924,000 in punitive damages. CVT moved to vacate, arguing that it did not have sufficient notice of the amount of punitive damages under Code of Civil Procedure 425.115(f)1 and that it was entitled to mandatory relief because the default was incurred due to the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect of its prior attorney. The trial court vacated the default judgment after finding the notice of damages was insufficient, but denied CVT’s request to be relieved from the underlying default. The court of appeal affirmed. Due process requires that when a plaintiff seeks discovery terminating sanctions with punitive damages, a statement must be served, sufficient to afford defendant the opportunity to fairly appraise the full amount of damages sought by the time needed to respond. View "Behm v. Clear View Techs." on Justia Law

Michael B., a presumed father of infant Emma B., appealed a juvenile court order denying his motion for paternity testing. He argued the trial court had an obligation to order such a test because biological paternity was a relevant fact and in denying his motion, the court prevented him from rebutting his presumed father status under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (a). After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed that a biological paternity determination was an essential or relevant issue in the underlying proceedings and affirmed the order. View "In re Emma B." on Justia Law

In September 2003, Christopher B. entered a plea of no contest to stalking his ex-wife's former husband, and for possessing a billy club. From 2005 through 2007, Christopher B. was found to be a mentally disordered offender and placed in a state hospital. He would not accept the diagnosis that he had a delusional disorder, and refused voluntary treatment. By February 2008, Christopher B. had been under commitment for the full length of the prison term for his offense, and the state hospital released him. Following his release, Christopher B. harassed his ex-wife and his stepdaughter, resulting in a June 2009 complaint alleging criminal threats, stalking, and being a felon in possession of a gun After a hearing, the criminal court found Christopher B. was not competent to stand trial; the criminal proceedings were suspended, and in September 2009 the court ordered his transfer to the custody of a state hospital. At the conclusion of the three-year maximum period of commitment, the state hospital found that Christopher B. could not be restored to competency because he refused voluntary treatment under his ongoing belief that he does not have any mental disorder. The state hospital recommended institution of a "Murphy conservatorship." Christopher B. appealed a probate court order granting the petition of the Placer County Public Guardian to establish a conservatorship over the his person and estate. Christopher B. argued there was insufficient evidence of a pending indictment in underlying criminal proceedings, a jurisdictional prerequisite for his “Murphy conservatorship” under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. Christopher B. also contended the evidence did not support imposition of a restriction on his right to enter into contracts. The Public Guardian cross-appealed, contending the probate court imposed an incorrect termination date for the renewed conservatorship. After review of the procedural history of this case, as well as the probate court record, the Court of Appeal vacated the order imposing the conservatorship with directions to dismiss the petition. This disposition mooted the issue of a contractual restriction and the cross-appeal. View "Conservatorship of Christopher B." on Justia Law

HKS a Texas architecture firm, provided services for a luxury hotel in Mammoth Lakes under an Agreement that contained a Texas forum selection clause, requiring mediation, and a Texas choice of law provision.The Agreement authorized HKS to hire “[c]onsultants.” Vita, a California landscape design firm, submitted to HKS a Contract incorporating the terms of the Agreement. Neither Vita or HKS signed the Contract, but Vita performed work in 2008, during the “design phase” and sent invoices to HKS. Owner began having financial problems before construction commenced, leaving HKS with unpaid bills for its own services and those provided by “consultants.” HKS obtained a judgment against Owner in 2010 in Texas for $1,617,073.70 but was unable to recover anything. In 2013, Vita sued HKS, alleging breach of contract; unjust enrichment; quantum meruit; and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, seeking $370,650.53. After answering the complaint, HKS moved to enforce the forum selection clause and dismiss. The court of appeal reversed dismissal. HKS established the existence of a contract between HKS and Vita containing a forum selection clause, but Code of Civil Procedure 410.42 prohibits enforcement of construction contract provisions requiring disputes between contractors and California subcontractors to be litigated outside California. View "Vita Planning & Landscape Architecture, Inc. v. HKS Architects, Inc." on Justia Law

Simonelli’s May 6, 2013 administrative mandamus petition challenged the city’s February 5, 2013 approval of an application to develop a vacant lot. Her petition identified Pot D’Oro as the developer, but did not name Pot D’Oro as a party; attached exhibits attached disclosed that the lot was adjacent to Simonelli’s property. The city sought dismissal, arguing that Simonelli had failed to join an indispensable party, that her petition was unverified and was “uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible,” and that Simonelli should not be granted leave to amend because the 90-day limitations period (Code of Civil Procedure 1094.6) had expired. Simonelli filed no opposition and did not appear at the hearing. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The city later moved for a judgment of dismissal. Simonelli appeared at the hearing. The court granted the city’s motion. The court of appeal reversed. The court did not err in finding Pot D’Oro to be an indispensable party, but erred in denying Simonelli leave to amend because the court erroneously found that the 90-day limitations period set forth in section 1094.61 applied. View "Simonelli v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea" on Justia Law

Defendant Cy Tapia, a teenager living with his aunt and grandmother, was driving a vehicle which crashed, inflicting severe and eventually fatal injuries on his passenger, Cory Driscoll. Before his death Driscoll and his mother filed an action for damages. The parties established that the vehicle driven by Tapia was owned by his grandfather and that Tapia was entitled to $100,000 in liability coverage under an auto policy issued to Melissa McGuire (Tapia’s sister), which listed the vehicle as an insured vehicle and listed Tapia as the driver of the vehicle. The policy was issued by petitioner-defendant 21st Century Insurance Company. 21st Century offered to settle the action for the policy limits of the McGuire policy ($100,000). However, plaintiff1 also believed that Tapia might be covered under policies issued to his aunt and grandmother, each offering $25,000 in coverage and also issued by 21st Century. Plaintiff communicated an offer to settle for $150,000 to Tapia’s counsel; 21st Century contended that it never received this offer (although there was certainly evidence to the contrary). Inferrably having realized the seriousness of its position, 21st Century affirmatively offered the “full” $150,000 to settle the case against Tapia. Plaintiff did not accept this offer, but a month later plaintiff’s counsel served a statutory offer to compromise seeking $3,000,000 for Cory Driscoll and $1,150,000 for his mother Jenny Driscoll. Shortly before the expiration of this offer, 21st Century sent Tapia a letter warning him that it would not agree to be bound if Tapia personally elected to accept the offer. Nonetheless, Tapia agreed to the entry of a stipulated judgment in the amounts demanded by plaintiff. 21st Century paid $150,000 plus interest to the plaintiff. Tapia then assigned any rights he had against 21st Century to plaintiff. This assignment and agreement included plaintiff’s promise not to execute on the judgment against Tapia so long as he complied with his obligations, e.g., to testify to certain facts concerning the original litigation and 21st Century’s actions. This bad faith action followed. Petitioner's unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, and petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to overturn the trial court's denial. Upon review, the Court of Appeal found that plaintiff’s efforts to pursue essentially a “bad faith” action as assignee of the insured was misguided. Accordingly, petitioner was entitled to summary judgment. View "21st Century Ins. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law