Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a long and contentious child custody dispute, during which Father made multiple accusations against Mother, the family court issued an order declaring Father a vexatious litigant and prohibiting him from filing any new litigation in propria persona without first obtaining leave of court, and ordered him to pay some of Mother’s attorney fees. Father later unsuccessfully applied to vacate the prefiling order and remove his name from the Judicial Council’s list of vexatious litigants. The court of appeal held that Father’s challenges were untimely because they should have been raised in an appeal from the September 2012 prefiling order, rather than from the later order denying his application to vacate that order. The court noted that it would rejected Father’s arguments that the prefiling order was improper because Mother failed to show Father had no reasonable probability of prevailing in the custody case; that in concluding he was a vexatious litigant, the family court improperly took into consideration applications he had made to hold Mother in contempt; and that the family court erred in awarding attorney fees to Mother. View "In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty" on Justia Law

The Fresno County Department of Social Services took custody of Cindy’s children, ages 14, 9, and 2, in 2010, after Cindy was arrested for being under the influence of PCP and for child endangerment. She had been using PCP for 30 years. The juvenile court denied Cindy reunification services and the department placed the children in the home of their maternal uncle, Frank. The court found it would be detrimental to the children to terminate Cindy’s parental rights, ordered them into permanent kinship guardianship with Frank, and terminated its dependency jurisdiction. In 2013 Cindy sought to modify the order under Welfare and Institutions Code 3881. She stated that she completed substance abuse treatment and parenting classes, maintained sobriety for three years and attended Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous meetings. She had liberal visitation with the children. The children expressed desire to return to Cindy and her home was found to be suitable. The juvenile court ruled that section 388 did not authorize termination of the guardianship. The court of appeal reversed. Although kinship guardianship is a permanent plan and there is no need for ongoing court and social services supervision, the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction over the child and can vacate its order, sections 366.3(a) & (b); 366.4. View "In re Priscilla D." on Justia Law

The 22-acre Shuler ranch in Soma is below 1000 acres owned by Sunshine Agriculture. After agricultural operations expanded up the hillside, it collapsed onto the Shuler property. The Shulers sued, alleging: "Defendants . . . were responsible for the removal of historic watercourses and stable ground cover and also for unreasonable grading, irrigation, planting and maintenance of the hillside slope. . . . acted negligently in failing to take steps to prevent the land from collapsing. . . . [T]he harm was foreseeable because of the steepness of the slope and nature of its soil." The Shuler's engineering expert found that the slope was unsuitable for development and that the alteration of the water courses and the introduction of irrigation for 1000 trees were the most significant factors responsible for the foreseeable slope failure. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party: Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS), a division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which prepared engineering drawings and calculations in support of the erosion control plan approved by the Ventura County Resource Conservation District. The trial court found that NRCS was a necessary, indispensable party and a federal agency not amenable to suit in state court. The Shulers filed a federal action, naming the same defendants, with the government as an additional defendant. The California Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal of the state suit. View "Dreamweaver Andalusians, LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Eva Mies sought class action certification in order to sue her former employer, Sephora U.S.A., Inc. (Sephora), on behalf of employees who, like her, worked as "Specialists" in Sephora’s California retail stores. Mies claims Sephora misclassified Specialists as exempt from certain provisions of California labor law and, as a result, failed to pay overtime wages and failed to compensate them for missed meal periods. However, after crediting evidence that all Specialists did not engage in the same tasks to the same extent, the trial court denied class certification, concluding individualized issues, not common ones, would predominate the determination of liability. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court used proper legal criteria in assessing class certification and substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings. The Court also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Mies v. Sephora U.S.A." on Justia Law

Father and mother divorced in 2004. They had two children. With regard to child support, the judgment of dissolution incorporated the parties' marital settlement agreement, which provided: "A. So long as both parties are gainfully employed, the goal is for [father and mother] to share equally the children's day care expense, health insurance, clothing and food, and other necessaries until the children turn age 18. [. . .] It is understood that, at this time, [mother] is making a steady income from professional employment; and that [father] is currently unemployed and has no income. [Father] expects to return to work next month, in a self-employed capacity, [. . .] For these reasons, the parties wish to provide for an increase in the amount of [father's] child expense contributions over a period of time." The Court of Appeal, in review of the dispute the parties presented in the enforcement of the judgment of dissolution, assessed the central issue to this case as "a harsh reminder of the severe consequences that may result from a judicial officer's failure to properly handle a statement of disqualification filed under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c)(1)." Father appealed a series of post-judgment orders over the accounting of child support and related fees. As to a October 25 order, father contended the court abused its discretion in awarding the fees because of mother's superior financial condition and higher percentage of parenting time. The Court concluded father did not meet his burden of establishing a clear abuse of discretion and affirmed this order. Father argued that November 22 orders were invalid because, among other reasons, the commissioner who made it was disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c)(4). Here, the Court of Appeal agreed and, reversed these orders and remanded the matter to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Marriage of M.A. and M.A." on Justia Law

Time Warner Cable buys content from programmers, who require it to offer their channels as part of TW’s enhanced basic cable programming tier. TW paid the Lakers $3 billion for licensing rights to televise Lakers games for 20 years. Subscription rates rose by $5 a month as result. TW paid the Dodgers $8 billion for the licensing rights to televise games for 25 years, raising monthly rates by another $4. Subscribers filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the arrangement violated the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200) because: acquisition of licensing rights to the games made TW both programmer and distributor; surveys showed that more than 60 percent of the population would not pay separately to watch the games; there were no valid reasons for bundling sports stations into the enhanced basic cable tier instead of offering them separately; TW expanded the reach of this scheme by selling its rights to the games to other providers, requiring those providers to include the channels as part of their enhanced basic tiers; and the teams knew the increased costs would be passed on to unwilling subscribers and were intended beneficiaries of these arrangements. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal: regulations implementing federal communications statutes expressly preempt the suit. View "Fischer v. Time Warner Cable Inc." on Justia Law

Brill, an attorney, and Rodriguez lived together as husband and wife for years. When they separated, Rodriguez sued, asserting that Brill promised to support her for the rest of her life and, in exchange, she gave up opportunities to obtain education to support herself. The trial court dismissed, as a sanction for Rodriguez’s failure to respond to discovery. She claimed neglect by her attorney, providing a declaration of her counsel acknowledging negligence. The court denied Rodriguez’s motion for relief from judgment. On remand, the trial court filed an order prepared by defense counsel: “Motion is denied” and ordered judgment in favor of Brill, with no findings. The court of appeal reversed. A dismissal that implements a terminating sanction for discovery abuse is a “dismissal entered,” so that Rodriguez could apply for mandatory relief. The reporter’s transcript and the written order prepared by defense counsel did not contain the required finding that the client’s negligence or willful misconduct was a contributory cause of the terminating sanction. The court concluded that Rodriguez’s conduct was not a contributing cause, so that Rodriguez was eligible for mandatory relief, given that verified discovery responses were delivered to opposing counsel before the hearing and the content of those responses substantially complied with applicable requirements. View "Rodriguez v. Brill" on Justia Law

The Unions, representing employees in five Sheriff’s Department bargaining units, entered into collective bargaining agreements with the County of Los Angeles that contained grievance procedures for resolving complaints concerning the interpretation or application of the agreements. The grievance procedures consisted of progressive steps culminating in arbitration. The Unions filed class grievances seeking overtime pay for “donning and doffing” and related activities (putting on, taking off, and maintaining their uniforms and equipment) and “off-the-clock” supervisory activities by certain employees. The county denied the grievances; the Unions filed requests for class arbitration of the grievances, which the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM) granted. The County sought a declaratory judgment that ERCOM’s order granting class or consolidated arbitration violated the parties’ agreements. The trial court refused to compel such arbitrations, ruling that Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 gave it discretion, in the interest of judicial economy, to stay the arbitration while it resolved issues between the parties that were not subject to arbitration, which resolution might make arbitrations unnecessary. The court of appeal reversed, holding that all of the issues between the parties were subject to individual arbitrations. View "Ass'n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Galstians abandoned their properties in Iran in 1978, when the family fled to Los Angeles after the overthrow of the Shah. In 1996, the Iranian government allowed the Galstians to enter Iran and begin reclaiming and selling the properties. By 2003, Minassian and Izadi held powers of attorney for the remaining properties. In 2008, Minassian and Izadi executed a general quitclaim deed transferring all remaining properties to themselves for little or no consideration. Galstian discovered the transfers in 2010, demanded that title be returned, and hired an Iranian attorney, who pressed criminal charges in Iran. The Galstians died in 2012. Their children sued Minassian and Izadi in 2013, asserting breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, and conversion. Minassian argued the Iranian civil court provides a suitable forum for an action brought by Iranian citizens against Iranian citizens and that the California court lacked power to enforce an order directing the transfer of real property in Iran. The trial court stayed the action under Code of Civil Procedure 410.30(a), finding that the interest of substantial justice would be served by having the action heard in another forum. The court of appeal reversed, finding insufficient evidence to show Iran is a suitable alternative forum. View "Aghaian v. Minassian" on Justia Law

Belasco bought a new Manhattan Beach residence in 2004 from the builder (Wells). In 2006, Belasco filed a complaint with the Contractors State License Board, alleging construction defects. Belasco and Wells settled the dispute in 2006, with Wells paying $25,000 and Belasco executing a release and a Civil Code 15241 waiver of all known or unknown claims. In 2012, Belasco sued, based on an alleged roof defect discovered in 2011. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding the action barred by the settlement. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the 2006 general release and waiver for patent construction defects is not a “reasonable release” of a subsequent claim for latent defects under section 929 and the Right to Repair Act (section 895); a reasonable release can only apply to a “particular violation” and not to a latent defect under section 945.5(f), and the 2006 settlement was too vague to be a valid; section 932 authorizes an action on “[s]ubsequently discovered claims of unmet standards;” public policy prohibits use of a general release and section 1542 waiver to bar a subsequent claim for latent residential construction defects; and a genuine issue of fact existed concerning fraud and negligence claims that would void the settlement under section 1668. View "Belasco v. Wells" on Justia Law