Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion in an appeal from two plaintiffs, represented by the same counsel, who were both nonsuited at trial. The Court affirmed the judgment of nonsuit as to the first plaintiff, but reversed the judgment "in all other respects," and remanded the matter for a retrial by the second plaintiff. Essentially, the Court left plaintiffs' claims intact, holding they properly were pursued in their entirety by the second plaintiff (the first plaintiff being superfluous for purposes of recovery). No costs on appeal were awarded. No party filed a petition for rehearing. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether defendants were automatically entitled to recover all their trial costs as prevailing parties from the first plaintiff, without further review by the trial court following the appellate judgment. If yes, defendants would succeed in recovering their very substantial trial costs from the first trial even though all plaintiffs' original litigation objectives yet may be achieved by and through the one remaining plaintiff at the second trial. The Court of Appeal applied the plain words of its prior disposition to preclude such an irrational outcome. Because the Court reversed the judgment "in all other respects," its disposition reversed not only the judgment of nonsuit as to the second plaintiff, but also that portion of the judgment which assessed unapportioned costs against both. View "Ducoing Management v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew V. (Father) filed a petition for writ of mandate / prohibition and a request for an immediate stay of respondent court’s “temporary” move-away order of January 14, 2015. Jessica V. (Mother) opposed the petition and stay request, and already had moved out-of-state with the minor children. Father and Mother were married in 2003 and have two children, a girl, born in December 2002, and a boy, born in November 2005. They permanently separated in 2006 and a judgment of dissolution was finalized in June 2008. The judgment of dissolution provided for Father and Mother to share joint legal and physical custody. In July 2014, Mother filed a request for an order allowing her to move away with the two minor children to the State of Washington due to a job transfer and promotion. Father opposed the move-away request. According to the transcript and minute order, the child custody investigator was not available to testify at the January 14, 2015 hearing. Respondent court recognized that Father’s counsel had a right to cross-examine the child custody investigator, and the court further acknowledged that Father’s counsel was physically unable to represent Father at the hearing because of counsel’s illness. As a result, respondent court continued the hearing on Mother’s move-away request until March 4, 2015. Despite this, respondent court issued a “temporary” move-away order allowing Mother to relocate with the minor children to the State of Washington based upon the written recommendations of the child custody investigator. The Court of Appeal concluded that the superior court erred in construing California law to allow for a "'temporary' move-away first and hearing later." The Father's request for a stay of the temporary move-away order was granted. The children were ordered to return to California; the superior court's order was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Andrew V. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Todd McNair, a former assistant football coach at the University of Southern California, sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association. The NCAA specially moved to strike plaintiff’s complaint on the ground the action was a strategic lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16) and moved the court to seal certain records. Although the court denied the motion to seal, it conditionally sealed the documents pending appellate review. In connection with appeal from the denial of its special motion to strike, NCAA moved the court of appeal to seal the same documents lodged as part of the appellate record. The court denied the motion, noting the public’s First Amendment right of access to documents used at trial or as a basis of adjudication and a presumption of openness of substantive court proceedings in ordinary cases. To seal records, courts must find that there is an overriding interest supporting sealing records; there is a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced absent sealing; the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and there is no less restrictive means of achieving that interest. NCAA failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that its interest in the confidentiality of its enforcement proceedings overrides the constitutional right of access and the presumption of openness, or how that interest would be prejudiced if the documents were disclosed. View "McNair v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass'n" on Justia Law

Baral and Schnitt owned a company, IQ. Baral accused Schnitt of fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty, seizing control and secretly negotiating the sale of IQ to his advantage, while excluding Baral’s membership interest and co-management powers. His complaint alleged slander and libel and that Schnitt unilaterally retained Moss Adams to investigate IQ after Schnitt discovered misappropriation and gave false information to discredit Baral. Moss Adams concluded that Baral had engaged in unauthorized transactions; Schnitt refused to correct allegedly false information in the report, which was published to the potential purchaser and others. The trial court determined that the defamation claims should be struck under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute). Because those claims were based exclusively on communications made in a prelitigation fraud investigation, the court concluded that the absolute litigation privilege (Civil Code 47(b) applied. Baral filed amended complaints. Schnitt filed another anti-SLAPP motion, seeking to strike all references to the audit in breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and declaratory relief causes of action. The trial court denied the motion. Without expressly deciding whether the complaint contained allegations of protected activity, the court concluded: “[The] Anti-SLAPP motion still applies to causes of action or to an entire complaint, not allegations…. if a cause of action contains portions that are subject to anti-SLAPP and portions that are not, the defendant can move to strike those portions that are subject …. No case allows striking allegations per se under [section] 425.16; that is within the province of a regular motion to strike.” The court of appeal affirmed. View "Baral v. Schnitt" on Justia Law

This case centered on a dispute over the administration of a family trust and the interpretation of trust documents. After a bench trial, the court decided in favor of plaintiff Adam Blumberg, the step-grandson of defendant Gloria Minthorne. Gloria was ordered by the court to file an accounting and quitclaim certain property to Adam. Gloria appealed. She quitclaimed that property to her daughter and failed to file the accounting. Adam moved to dismiss the appeal, citing the disentitlement doctrine. The Court of Appeal agreed with Adam that this was one of the rare cases where applying this doctrine was appropriate due to Gloria’s flagrant violation of the court’s orders. The appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Blumberg v. Minthorne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Investors Equity Life Holding Company appealed a judgment dismissing this case on the ground of forum non conveniens. Plaintiff filed its complaint in 2009, and the trial court originally ordered the action stayed on the ground of forum non conveniens. Plaintiff appealed that order and the Court of Appeal affirmed. In 2012, defendants “renewed” their motions, seeking an order dismissing, rather than merely staying, the action. In their renewed motions, defendants seized on statements in the Court's opinion, in particular our rejection of plaintiff’s claim of California residency, claiming those statements were law of the case, and reflected a material change in circumstance that warranted an outright dismissal of this case. The trial court agreed. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s order reflected an abuse of its discretion and reversed. View "Investors Equity v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Daer filed a personal injury suit, alleging material and design defects in a tire manufactured by Yokohama and sold by Costco. Costco settled for $5.5 million and Yokohama for $1.1 million. National, as excess insurer of Costco, sued Yokohama and its insurers (Tokio) to recover the costs of defending plus money paid on behalf of Costco to settle that lawsuit. National, as subrogee of Costco, sought recovery based on an express indemnity provision in the supplier agreement between Costco and Yokohama, and alleged breach of Yokohama’s contractual insurance obligations. It sued Tokio for indemnity and contribution. The court ruled in limine that National’s proof of a tire defect would be limited to the opinions of Daer’s expert in the underlying case. After National made its opening statement in a proceeding to determine whether a tire defect was a cause of Daer’s accident, the court dismissed the express indemnity claim. Having determined that the tire was not defective, the court granted summary adjudication as to claims based on refusal to defend and Yokohama’s breach of insurance obligations. The court awarded Yokohama $863,706.75 in fees as the prevailing party on the indemnity claim. The court of appeal reversed in part, holding that the court erred in excluding relevant, material expert evidence on a matter properly subject to expert opinion. View "Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Velasquez worked at a company that made food flavorings, moving diacetyl, in closed and open containers. He breathed ambient diacetyl particles while mixing liquid and dry flavorings. Material safety data sheets attached to the containers warned that diacetyl was “harmful by inhalation,” but, consistent with industry practices at the time, did not warn of specific risks. The California Division of Occupational Safety and Health did not issue exposure limits until years later. During a 2005 incident, Velasquez inhaled fumes from a concentration that included acetaldehyde, but not diacetyl. He experienced trouble breathing and sought medical attention. Velasquez returned to the hospital twice in the next two months. In 2005, Velasquez’s supervisor took him to a clinic where a “company doctor” told him he could not continue working for the company in his condition. In 2006 Velasquez was diagnosed with bronchiolitis obliterans, a rare lung disease which is usually progressive and fatal. He filed suit. After finding the issue relevant to Velasquez’s ability to receive a lung transplant, the judge advised prospective jurors that Velasquez is an undocumented immigrant. The court entered judgment on the jury’s special verdict, including findings that the supplier’s acts were not a substantial factor in causing Velasquez’s harm. The court of appeal reversed, based on the error in disclosing Velasquez’s status to jurors. View "Velasquez v. Centrome, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996 Ritzhoff was injured while working as a banquet server. He sustained permanent injuries to his ankle and injured his hand and back. His treating psychiatrist initially evaluated Ritzhoff in 2001 and noted that Ritzhoff demonstrated diminished cognitive functioning, had severe depression, suicidal ideation, severe anxiety, and total neuroticism. The doctor found Ritzhoff temporarily totally disabled on a psychiatric basis and in need of emotional treatment. His employer made temporary disability payments until 2006. Ritzhoff admitted working from time-to-time since his injury. At a third hearing in 2013, Ritzhoff refused to respond to cross-examination. The workers’ compensation judge found Ritzhoff totally permanently disabled on a psychiatric basis, originating in the orthopedic injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. The court of appeal annulled the determination. That the decision was supported by substantial evidence is beside the point. The appeals board exceeded its powers when it adopted a decision as its own that was flawed by a denial of due process with respect to cross-examination. View "Ogden Entm't Servs. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Gray1 CPB, LLC (Gray1), obtained a judgment against defendants SCC Acquisitions and Bruce Elieff. Almost two years later, defendants paid the amount of the outstanding judgment and accrued interest with a cashier's check. In the interim, Gray1 allegedly incurred more than $3 million in attorney fees in an effort to enforce its judgment. The fees were largely incurred in litigating a separate action against Elieff in an effort to untangle what Gray1 asserted were a number of fraudulent transactions resulting in the placement of fraudulent liens on Elieff's real property as part of a scheme to insulate Elieff's properties from the judgment. According to Gray1, it was only when it appeared the separate action was imminently headed toward resolution in Gray1's favor that defendants gave Gray1 the cashier's check to pay the judgment. Gray1 did not immediately cash the check. It held onto the check long enough for its attorneys to file a motion for postjudgment costs, including attorney fees. Once deposited, the issuing bank honored the check. A motion for postjudgment costs (including attorney fees) must "be made before the judgment is satisfied in full." The trial court denied Gray1's motion for postjudgment costs, finding the motion was made after the judgment had been fully satisfied. Gray1 appealed. The issue for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the judgment paid with a cashier's check was deemed satisfied. Because Gray1's motion for attorney fees incurred in a separate action to enforce its judgment in the underlying matter was not filed before defendants paid Gray1 with a certified cashier's check accepted by Gray1 and in an amount in excess of the full judgment (including awarded attorney fees and accrued interest), Gray1's motion was untimely and properly denied by the superior court. View "Gray1 CPB, LLC v. SCC Acquisitions, Inc." on Justia Law