Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A California resident owned an apartment building in Arkansas that was insured by a Michigan insurance company under a policy the owner obtained through an insurance agent in Arkansas. That policy included commercial property coverage for the Arkansas apartment building and commercial general liability coverage for the owner's property ownership business, which he operated from California. Other than writing this policy, the insurer did no business in California. Both the commercial property coverage and the commercial general liability coverage in the policy covered some risks, losses, or damages that could have arisen in California, but the dispute at issue here arose out of two fires that damaged the building in Arkansas. Initially, the insurer agreed to treat the two fires as separate losses but later reversed its position and took the position that both incidents were subject to only a single policy limit payment. As a result, the owner sued the insurer in a California state court for breach of contract and bad faith. The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review was, under these circumstances, did the insurer have sufficient minimum contacts with California to allow the state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the company in this action? The Court concluded the answer was "no." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order granting the insurance company's motion to quash the service of summons. View "Greenwell v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In an automobile accident case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, apportioning 40 percent of the fault to Plaintiff and 60 percent to Defendant. Defendant moved to recover costs based on Plaintiff’s rejection of an offer to compromise (Code of Civil Procedure 998). Plaintiff responded with a motion to tax costs, which included a file-stamped copy of the judgment as an exhibit, and 22 days later, filed a notice of intention to move for new trial. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing Plaintiff’s notice of intention was untimely and that the trial court’s jurisdiction to rule on the new trial motion had lapsed. Defendant maintained the jurisdictional time period began to run when Plaintiff served Defendant with the file-stamped copy of the judgment as an exhibit to her motion to tax costs. The court stated it would make “a conditional order granting [the] motion for new trial.” The court of appeal dismissed an appeal. There is no statutory authorization for the court to condition the grant of a new trial motion on subsequent appellate review of the jurisdictional issue; the order was a legal nullity. View "Maroney v. Iacobsohn" on Justia Law

Bertoli was struck by a car as she walked inside a crosswalk on state Highway 116, and was rendered permanently physically and mentally disabled. Her attorney, Rouda, erved the Sebastopol Police Department with a request under the Public Records Act (Gov. Code, 6250) seeking all evidence, including photos, reports, audio logs, handwritten notes, and emails, with respect to the accident, and any surveys, traffic or pedestrian counts, and letters or complaints received with respect to the intersection, for the past 10 years. The city claims never to have received the request, but that, in response to an earlier request, had produced a copy of the collision report, notes of the investigating officer, and a report listing all accidents on Healdsburg Avenue for the past 10 years. Rouda submitted an additional PRA request, seeking 62 different categories of records. The city characterized the request as “overly extensive, overly broad and, in some cases, unlimited in time.” Ultimately, the trial court denied Rouda’s request for a writ of mandate, found the litigation “clearly frivolous” and awarded the city costs and attorneys fees. The court of appeal reversed with respect to fees and costs, reasoning that the city was not justified with respect to requested electronically stored information. View "Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol" on Justia Law

The law firm represented Raissi in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case for a year, generating fees and expenses of $329,705.12. The bankruptcy case closed. Raissi failed to pay. The firm sued for breach of contract, account stated, open book account and failure to pay for goods and services rendered.It obtained an order extending the deadline for service and allowing it to serve Raissi via publication. Publication in the San Jose PostRecord generated no response. The firm obtained a default judgment. Its “Declaration of mailing (Code Civ. Proc., 587),” stated that Raissi’s address was “unknown.” Raissi moved to set aside the default, alleging that its counsel made a mistake in changing the address for its registered agent; that the bankruptcy court retained exclusive jurisdiction; and that the request for default was defective because it was not mailed to Raissi’s “last known address.” The firm stated that it had made eight separate attempts to personally serve Raissi at the property, which appeared vacant and had a sign indicating it was available to lease. The court of appeal reversed the ruling in favor of the firm. A mailing address is not “unknown” merely because personal service could not be effected at that address. View "Murray & Murray v. Raissi Real Estate Dev,, LLC" on Justia Law

Following the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiffs Terence and Paula Kilker against defendant Frank Stillman, the trial court ordered Stillman to produce documents regarding his assets to the Kilkers. After Stillman failed to comply with that order, the trial court found Stillman in contempt and ordered that Stillman pay the Kilkers reasonable attorney fees and costs, plus interest. The underlying judgment was eventually satisfied. To collect on the attorney fees and costs award, the Kilkers served a writ of execution on Preferred Bank to levy funds in Stillman’s bank account. Stillman submitted a claim of exemption to the writ. He asserted the funds in the account were Social Security payments exempt from levy. The Kilkers opposed Stillman’s claim of exemption, arguing that under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.080, only Social Security funds directly deposited into a bank account by the government are protected by the exemption. The trial court found Stillman’s bank account at Preferred Bank solely contained Social Security payments, but, nevertheless, denied Stillman’s exemption claim. The court did so because those funds were not directly deposited into the bank account by the government. On review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s conclusion was legally erroneous because Stillman’s Social Security payments were protected by federal law from levy. View "Kilker v. Stillman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a home from Laux. Almost two years later, she sued the homebuilder, Shapell for strict liability, negligence, and fraudulent concealment, claiming Shapell built the home on unstable and uncompacted “fill” soil and with an inadequate foundation, causing “substantial differential movement” and numerous defects such as cracked floors, walls, and ceilings. The court granted Shappel summary judgment as to fraudulent concealment and later and entered judgment for Shapell on the other claims, concluding plaintiff lacked standing because her claims accrued when Laux owned the home and he did not assign the claims to plaintiff. The court of appeal reversed. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Shapell fraudulently concealed information about the property’s soil conditions. Plaintiff was entitled to have a jury determine the disputed factual issues of when and to whom the causes of action accrued. View "Stofer v. Shapell Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

The Foundation, a non-profit corporation, acts as a conduit for tax exempt gifts to benefit UCLA. Luskin, a director, pledged $40 million to support construction of a UCLA campus conference center. Save Westwood sought to rescind the donation and to require the Regents of the University of California to pay the city taxes allegedly owing, alleging that the Foundation is “mandated by its by-laws and incorporation documents to exclusively fund charitable undertakings,” that this limitation “applies to the financing of the construction of buildings for exempt purposes,” and that the Luskin grant was applied toward activities that exceed the Foundation’s powers. The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Save Westwood argued that neither free speech rights, nor rights of petition were implicated because the claims sought enforcement of the Regents’s fiduciary duties, citing an exemption for public interest lawsuits. It voluntarily dismissed Luskin and the Foundation. The trial court granted the motion to strike. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that claims against Luskin were based on letters about the donation and constructon, which constituted an exercise of free speech on a matter of public interest. The Foundation’s pledge toward the conference center was also an exercise of free speech. Neither Luskin nor the Foundation was a governmental entity, so their actions cannot be “an illegal expenditure or waste.” They owed no mandatory duty to avoid donating funds in a manner that might jeopardize the Foundation’s tax exempt status. View "Save Westwood Vill. v. Luskin" on Justia Law

Lee was the CEO of Hyundai Securities from 1996 to 2000. Several shareholders of Hyundai brought, in Korea, a shareholders’ derivative action, alleging securities fraud by Lee. The court entered judgment in favor of Hyundai in the amount of about 24,000,000 U.S. dollars plus interest at the Korean statutory rate. Appeals in Korea were dismissed. Hyundai filed suit under California’s “Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act” (Code Civ. Proc. 1713-1724), seeking recognition of the Korean Judgment. On remand, Hyundai acknowledged it had been compensated for portions of the judgment. Lee asserted that the court could not recognize part of the judgment as it was a penalty or fine and could not award interest at the rate of 20 percent because such a rate was contrary to the law and public policy of California. The trial court granted summary judgment and awarded Hyundai the principal sum of $5,031,231, interest of $3,787,397, daily interest of $2,756 per day from May 27, 2014 until entry of judgment, and post-judgment interest at the Korean rate of 20 percent per annum. Lee appeals. The court of appeal affirmed recognition of the judgment, but reversed the imposition of a 20 percent post-judgment rate of interest. View "Hyundai Sec. Co., Inc. v. Lee" on Justia Law

Li crashed a new BMW during a test drive. Gonsalves, a salesperson for the BMW dealership, was a passenger in the vehicle. Gonsalves sued, alleging that Li drove recklessly during the test drive, causing the accident, and that Gonsalves suffered significant back injuries as a result. A jury found that Li was negligent, that Gonsalves was not comparatively negligent, and awarded Gonsalves more than $1.2 million in damages. The court of appeal remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in admission of certain evidence and that Gonsalves’s counsel committed misconduct in at least two instances, resulting in cumulative prejudice. The discovery statutes do not authorize admission at trial of denials to requests for admissions; the court erred in allowing plaintiff’s counsel to examine him about his qualified denials and in admitting the written responses. The court also erred in in allowing plaintiff’s counsel to examine Li on “substantial factor” causation and in admitting evidence of prior speeding tickets. View "Gonsalves v. Li" on Justia Law

In 2010, Blevins had knee surgery at a surgical facility. The knee later became infected by bacteria, subsequently found on a sponge manufactured by Ruhof that had been used to clean surgical equipment before the surgery. The bacteria had apparently "survived the sterilization process." The surgical center paid Blevins $4,118.23 for medical expenses he incurred in treating the infection. Blevins did not sign an agreement releasing the center from liability; he was not represented by counsel and the center did not give him written notice of the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action. More than 15 months after receiving the payment, Blevins filed suit. Ruhof settled for $100,000. The trial court, relying on Insurance Code section 11583, ruled that the one-year limitations period was tolled by the payment of medical expenses. The trial court reduced a jury’s award of damages against the surgical facility to $285,114. The court of appeal affirmed. Section 11583, which provides that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled when advance or partial payment is made to an injured and unrepresented person without notifying him of the applicable limitations period, applies to the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. View "Coastal Surgical Inst. v. Blevins" on Justia Law