Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fresno County Assessor audited the partnership regarding personal property for tax years 1994-2001, which resulted in assessment of additional taxes for farm equipment. In 2007, the partnership attempted to apply for changed assessment to cancel the assessment under Revenue and Taxation Code section 4986 on the ground that it did not own that personal property. The Assessment Appeals Board returned the applications as untimely. In 2010, the partnership sought a declaratory judgment that the subject properties did not exist and the assessments should be cancelled. The trial court dismissed on the ground that it was seeking to enjoin the collection of property taxes in violation of the California Constitution. The court concluded that the partnership was required to first pay the tax and then seek a refund. By checks in 2011-2012, the partnership paid the disputed taxes in full, with penalties and interest. The partnership’s refund claims were rejected, so it filed suit. The trial court concluded that the partnership was required to seek reduction of the assessment and that the action was barred for failure to do so. The court of appeal reversed, noting the partnership’s argument that it did not own the assessed property on the applicable dates, so that the assessments were “nullities.” View "Williams & Fickett v. Cnty. of Fresno" on Justia Law

Montano filed a putative class action against Wet Seal, alleging that it failed to offer all required meal and rest periods to its California non-exempt retail employees; failed to provide all regular and overtime pay when due or when employment terminated; and failed to provide accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements, in violation of the Labor and Business and Professions Codes, Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 7, and Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. She included a representative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act. Montano propounded discovery requests and Wet Seal responded with objections but no substantive information. Montano moved to compel discovery responses. Before the hearing, Wet Seal moved to compel arbitration of Montano’s individual claims and to stay the action pending completion of arbitration, based on a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims." The trial court ultimately denied the motion for arbitration and granted the discovery motion. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Montano v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc." on Justia Law

Sarun, uninsured when he received emergency services from a hospital owned by Dignity Health, signed an agreement to pay the "full charges, unless other discounts apply.” The agreement explained uninsured patients might qualify for government aid or financial assistance from Dignity. After receiving an invoice for $23,487.90, which reflected a $7,871 “uninsured discount,” and without applying for any other discount or financial assistance, Sarun filed a putative class action, asserting unfair or deceptive business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200) and violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, 1750). The complaint alleged that: Dignity failed to disclose uninsured patients would be required to pay several times more than others receiving the same services, the charges on the invoice were not readily discernable from the agreement, and the charges exceeded the reasonable value of the services. The trial court dismissed, finding that Sarun had not adequately alleged “actual injury.” The court of appeal reversed. Dignity’s argument Sarun was required to apply for financial assistance to allege injury in fact would be akin to requiring Sarun to mitigate damages as a precondition to suit. Mitigation might diminish recovery, butt does not diminish the party’s interest in proving entitlement to recovery. View "Sarun v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Bower was hired by Inter-Con in 2007 and executed an arbitration agreement, covering claims for compensation and wages. In 2008, Bower executed a second arbitration agreement that added clauses prohibiting claims on behalf of a class or in a representative capacity and covering claims for breaks and rest periods. After his 2011 termination, Bower filed a putative class action, claiming failure to: provide meal and rest periods, pay wages, provide accurate itemized wage statements, pay wages upon termination, with claims under the Unfair Competition Act and the Private Attorneys General Act. Instead of moving to compel arbitration, Inter-Con answered, asserting, as an affirmative defense, that Bower’s claims were subject to arbitration. Inter-Con responded to discovery, but objected based on the arbitration agreement, and agreed to provide responses only to Bower in his individual capacity. Inter-Con did respond to an interrogatory concerning the number of class members employed during the class period and propounded its own discovery. Bower moved for leave to file an amended complaint to allege a broader class and additional theories and to compel further discovery responses. Inter-Con then moved to compel arbitration. The court held that “Defendant waived the right to arbitrate by propounding and responding to class discovery.” The court of appeal affirmed. View "Bower v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Before accepting a job with DMC, Satyadi , who holds board certifications in clinical laboratory science, was told the laboratory she would manage had no material deficiencies in staff and equipment performance and accreditation. Within days of starting the position, Satyadi received a list of deficiencies; she was directed to reduce overtime and to “clean up problem personnel.” Her initial performance was praised. Satyadi subsequently informed executives about practices she believed violated state and federal laws. Satyadi refused to engage in those activities. During labor negotiations, an executive made derogatory comments about Satyadi in front of her subordinates. Her complaint was not addressed. An attorney was hired to investigate allegations by other employees, but DMC withheld information. Satyadi was terminated and told that no further administrative appeals process existed. Satyadi sued, claiming retaliation (Labor Code 1102.5.1). The trial court dismissed, holding that Satyadi was required to first to seek relief from the Labor Commissioner. While appeal was pending, the Labor Code was amended to specify that employees need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, unless the specific code provision expressly requires exhaustion. The court of appeal held that the amendments apply and reversed. View "Satyadi v. West Contra Costa Healthcare Dist." on Justia Law

A taxpayer and the Los Angeles Police Protection League sought to invalidate the Los Angeles Police Department’s policy regarding impounding vehicles, “Special Order 7.” The special order seeks to implement Vehicle Code sections 14602.6, and 14607.6, which provided for impoundment of a vehicle driven by a person without a valid driver’s license (regardless of ownership), and directs officers when to use those sections and other state statutes governing impounds. The court of appeal reversed the trial court judgment in favor of the taxpayer and the League, holding that Special Order 7 is within the wide discretion of the police chief, and that neither the individual nor the League has standing to challenge the chief’s implementation of the state statutes. View "LA Police Protective League v. City of LA" on Justia Law

In July 2012, plaintiff-respondent Ernesto Ruiz filed a putative class action complaint alleging defendant-appellant Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. failed to pay Ruiz and other employees overtime and other wages for all hours worked, provide required meal and rest breaks, provide accurate and complete wage statements, reimburse business expenses, and pay final wages in a timely manner. Moss Bros. appealed an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of the employment-related and putative class action, representative, and Ruiz's individual claims. The trial court denied the petition on the ground Moss Bros. did not meet its burden of proving the parties had an agreement to arbitrate the controversy. No statement of decision was requested or issued, but the court implicitly found Moss Bros. did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that an electronic signature on its proffered arbitration agreement was "the act of Ruiz." After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded Moss Bros. did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ruiz electronically signed the 2011 agreement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order denying the petition. View "Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto" on Justia Law

After Tabarrejo left his employment as a PRH caregiver, he filed a claim with the Labor Commissioner for unpaid wages. He was awarded $131,096.77. PRH appealed to the superior court and posted the undertaking required by Labor Code 98.2.1. The trial court granted Tabarrejo’s motion to dismiss on the ground that PRH was a suspended corporation that lacked capacity to sue. PRH failed to pay within 10 days, so Tabarrejo asked the court to release the undertaking to him. PRH disputed Tabarrejo’s entitlement, primarily arguing that since PRH’s corporate powers were suspended, the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter ab initio and should never have accepted the undertaking. The court concluded that PRH did not have standing to appeal and ordered the release of the undertaking to PRH’s owner. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the issue was one of legal capacity, not standing. Although the appeal was invalid when filed because PRH lacked capacity to sue, PRH could have retroactively validated the appeal by reviving its corporate powers. That PRH elected not to do so did not retroactively deprive the court of jurisdiction. The trial court was directed to enter an order releasing the undertaking to Tabarrejo. View "Tabarrejo v. Super. Court" on Justia Law

Based on Hardy’s 2006 refinance of his Modesto residence, Hardy, acting pro se, sued ABHL for fraud, breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of California’s unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200). Hardy claimed that he was not given a copy of the loan application, that an agent inflated his assets and income on that application without his knowledge, and that he would not have consented to a negative amortization clause, had he been aware of it. In an earlier federal action, the district court declined to dismiss Hardy’s claim based on RESPA and his claims for fraud and violations of the UCL, dismissed his claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and ordered Hardy to file a second amended complaint. Hardy did not timely file and the court dismissed. In the state case, ABHL successfully moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground of collateral estoppel. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the prior federal action was not terminated by a judgment on the merits and the issues were not actually litigated. View "Hardy v. America's Best Home Loans" on Justia Law

Gilda filed for dissolution of marriage. She and former husband, Murray, agreed to resolve property and support issues through mediation, during which they purportedly exchanged financial disclosure declarations mandated by the Family Code. They executed a marital settlement agreement, which was incorporated into a stipulated judgment. Shortly after entry of judgment, Gilda learned that Murray recently sold a company he founded during the marriage. In the settlement agreement, Gilda relinquished her community share of the company for $10 million. Murray received approximately $75 million from the sale. Gilda sought to set aside the judgment on grounds of fraud and duress and served discovery on Murray requesting the financial disclosure declarations that were exchanged prior to entry of judgment. Murray refused to produce the declarations, asserting they were covered by the mediation confidentiality statutes, insofar as they constituted writings that were prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, mediation. (Evid. Code, 1119(b).) The trial court a motion to compel on mediation confidentiality grounds. The court of appeal vacated, noting the Family Code’s stated public policy to promote “full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities” in dissolution proceedings View "Lappe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law