Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants-respondents Stella Stephens, Timothy Young, and Melissa Young purchased homes from plaintiff and appellant Lennar Homes of California, Inc. The agreements between Lennar and Stephens and between Lennar and the Youngs contained identical indemnity clauses. Lennar sought to enforce those indemnity clauses, seeking to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in defending a class action lawsuit, brought initially by Stephens, and later joined by Timothy Young (but not Melissa) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Lennar appealed the trial court’s order granting defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). Lennar argued on appeal that the trial court’s ruling that the indemnity clause at issue was unenforceable under California law, precluding Lennar from demonstrating a probability of success on the merits. Lennar also disagreed with the trial court’s finding that Lennar’s claim against Melissa Young arose from activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Lennar Homes of Cal. v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Danko practiced law with the firm of O’Reilly & Collins, until, in 2009, Danko sued O’Reilly, as an individual, and O’Reilly & Collins, for unpaid wages. Before trial, O’Reilly, as an individual, obtained directed verdict. In 2012, judgment was entered in favor of Danko for more than $2,000,000. Danko filed moved to amend the judgment and the costs and fee order “to include Terry O’Reilly as a judgment debtor for all amounts owed to Michael Danko” on the ground that O’Reilly knew that the firm owed Danko more than $2 million, but drew out all the firm’s available funds without reserving any amounts to satisfy the debt he knew was owed to Danko, telling Danko “you will not be able to execute on any judgment.” The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s amendment of the judgment, citing Code Civ. Proc., 187. The court rejected arguments that the amendment was entered in violation of a stay in the bankruptcy of the firm; the amendment was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata; and the amendment was contrary to the principles governing collateral estoppel. View "Danko v. O'Reilly" on Justia Law

Nijjar hired Judge as a resident property manager. Nijjar terminated her employment. Judge filed claims for unpaid compensation, meal and rest period premiums, waiting time penalties, and wrongful termination. Under the Private Attorney General Act, Judge alleged similar claims on behalf of other employees. Judge also filed a class action, alleging similar claims on behalf of herself and class members. The trial court determined that the actions were related cases and designated the individual/PAGA action as the lead case, but denied Judge’s subsequent application to consolidate the cases. Based on an arbitration agreement that Judge had signed as an employee, the trial court granted a petition to compel arbitration and stay proceedings on the individual and PAGA claims. The court concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act governed the agreement and that Judge’s employment-related claims and individual PAGA claims were covered. The arbitrator issued a clause construction award, finding that the agreement permitted arbitration of class and representative claims. The trial court granted the defendants’ petition to vacate the n award. The court of appeal dismissed, stating that because the arbitrator has not ruled on any substantive issues, the order did not vacate a final arbitration award and is not appealable. View "Judge v. Nijjar Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Wells Fargo Bank filed a declaratory and injunctive relief complaint. The defendant sent plaintiff a demand for mediation and arbitration pursuant to a dispute resolution provision in a February 27, 2008 servicing agreement between the parties. On October 9, 2013, plaintiff rejected defendant’s mediation and arbitration demand. On October 24, defendant moved to stay the action pending compliance with the arbitration demand. No petition or motion to compel arbitration was filed. No petition to compel compliance with the mediation provision of the parties’ servicing agreement was filed. The defendant stressed the stay motion was not a petition to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion to stay. The court of appeal dismissed the appeal because the trial court’s denial of the stay motion unaccompanied by any motion or petition to compel arbitration or a pending arbitration is not an appealable order. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. The Best Service Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joyce Flannery sued defendant-respondent VW Credit, Inc. (VW), alleging VW failed to comply with provisions of California's Vehicle Leasing Act (VLA), California's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and California's Unfair Competition Law. VW filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the trial court sustained without leave to amend. On appeal, Flannery argued the court erred by applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to consumer protection laws. VW has moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismiss and reversed the dismissal. Following the trial court's ruling on its demurrer, VW sought and received entry of an order dismissing the complaint again, and provided Flannery with notice of entry of the order. However, before the time in which to appeal from the dismissal expired, VW asked the trial court to vacate the dismissal and enter a new dismissal that included VW's costs. The trial court granted VW's request and entered an order vacating the first dismissal and ordering entry of a second dismissal, which included VW's costs. VW then served Flannery with notice of entry of the second dismissal. Thereafter, Flannery filed a notice of appeal from the second dismissal. VW argued that the notice of appeal was untimely because it was not filed within 60 days after service of notice of entry of the first dismissal; VW contends that, notwithstanding the literal meaning of the trial court's order vacating the first dismissal, the Court of Appeal should interpret the order as simply amending the first judgment to add VW's costs and thereby render Flannery's notice of appeal untimely. The Court interpreted the trial court's order literall: the first dismissal was vacated by the terms of the trial court's order, and a second dismissal was entered from which Flannery filed a timely notice of appeal. With respect to the merits, the Court reversed: "[a]lthough the doctrine of substantial compliance has been employed when doing so avoids injustice and is consistent with the purposes of a particular statute, those considerations are not present here, where VW failed to provide consumers with notice of their right to an appraisal upon early termination of their automobile leases in the language prescribed by Civil Code section 2987." The Court did not reach the question of whether VW's alleged violation of the VLA would support any relief under provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Act and the Unfair Competition Law. View "Flannery v. VW Credit" on Justia Law

Flannery and Murray sued Southern California Gas Company (SCGC) for damages suffered in the 2008 Sesnon wildfire.They were jointly represented by Tepper until attorney Ardi substituted in as Murray’s counsel. Tepper represented Flannery until 2012, when attorney Daneshrad substituted in as Flannery’s counsel. Tepper filed a notice of lien. In 2013, a settlement b was approved by the court, requiring SCGC to pay confidential specific amounts to Flannery and Murray and their attorneys before March 19, 2013. Tepper sent an e-mail advising all that he was “entitled to know the amount” and asserting a 33 1/3% lien. Unable to obtain agreement from Tepper and Daneshrad, SCGC filed the Interpleader Action, identifying Tepper, Daneshrad, and Flannery as defendants, and deposited the settlement funds with the court. Once the deadline for SCGC to pay had expired, Flannery moved to enforce the settlement. SCGC moved for discharge from the interpleader action and attorney fees. Flannery filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP). The court granted the discharge and denied the Anti-SLAPP Motion. The court of appeal affirmed. SCGC met its burden of showing a probability it would prevail on the merits of its interpleader action. View "S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Flannery" on Justia Law

Pacific Corporate Group Holdings, LLC (PCGH) sued one of its former employees, Thomas Keck, seeking to collect on a promissory note. Keck defended against the action by claiming that any money that he owed PCGH was offset by monies that PCGH owed him. Keck also filed a cross-complaint against PCGH seeking damages for unpaid bonus and severance payments that he claimed were due to him pursuant to two employment agreements. In a special verdict, the jury found that PCGH owed Keck $270,547.95 under the terms of a 2006 employment agreement. PCGH filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or for new trial on the ground that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the parties entered into the 2006 Agreement. The trial court denied PCGH's motion. Keck filed a motion for additur, or in the alternative, for a new trial on damages, on the ground that the jury had awarded inadequate damages in light of the bonus and severance provisions in the 2006 Agreement. The trial court granted Keck's motion, and issued an additur and conditional order granting a new trial on damages. PCGH refused to consent to the additur, and thus, the trial court's order directing a new trial on damages became effective. Both parties filed motions for attorney fees, which the court denied. PCGH filed two appeals seeking reversal of the judgment: the trial court's order denying its motion for new trial and JNOV; and the trial court's order granting Keck's motion for additur, or, in the alternative, a new trial on damages; and the trial court's order denying its motion for attorney fees. Keck appealed the trial court's order denying his motion for attorney fees. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's order granting a new trial on damages resulted in a vacatur of the underlying judgment, and therefore, the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider PCGH's appeals, the trial court's order denying its motion for new trial, and the trial court's order denying attorney fees. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider Keck's appeal of the trial court's order denying attorney fees. The Court affirmed both the trial court's order denying PCGH's motion for JNOV and the trial court's order granting Keck's motion for additur, or in the alternative, a new trial on damages. The case was remanded back to the trial court with directions to conduct a new trial on damages and any other necessary proceedings.View "Pacific Corporate Group Holdings v. Keck" on Justia Law

The 965 plaintiffs were people who borrowed money from Countrywide in the mid-2000’s. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the permissive joinder statute (Code of Civil Procedure Section 378). Had this case been filed prior to 2005, in all probability it would have been filed as a class action (in 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)). Plaintiffs' third amended complaint alleged that in the mid-2000’s, defendant Countrywide Financial Corporation developed a two-prong business strategy to increase its profits: Countrywide would use captive real estate appraisers to provide dishonest appraisals that would inflate home prices beyond levels that would otherwise prevail in an honest market; then Countrywide would induce its borrowers to take loans Countrywide knew they couldn’t afford by misleading them as to their ability to pay their loans, including misrepresenting key terms of the loans themselves. Plaintiffs alleged Countrywide did this because it had no intention of keeping the loans on its books, but intended to bundle them into saleable tranches and sell them to investors. This appeal raised two questions of state law: (1) despite the rather staggering number of joined plaintiffs, did the third amended complaint allege, to track the statutory language of section 378, the “same . . . series of transactions” that would entail litigation of at least one common question of law or fact; and (2) whether California's procedures governing permissive joinder were up to the task of managing mass actions like this one. The Court of Appeal answered "yes" to both questions: a few years after section 378’s enactment in 1927, the California Supreme Court declared the statute’s same-series-of-transactions language is to be construed broadly in favor of joinder, and there are sufficient common questions of law and fact in this case to satisfy section 378, including whether a mortgage lender has a duty to its borrowers not to encourage “high ball,” dishonest appraisals and whether Countrywide really had a deliberate strategy of placing borrowers into loans it “knew” they couldn’t afford. While the Court reversed the judgment dismissing all but one plaintiff for misjoinder, the Court emphasized that on remand the trial court would have to consider a variety of procedural tools with which to organize this case into appropriate and manageable subclaims and subclasses. "While the irony of requiring the case to be divided into tranches has not escaped as, we are confident the trial court can handle the task."View "Petersen v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Ardon claimed that Los Angeles improperly collected a Telephone Users Tax (TUT). Ardon asserted that a 2007 amendment to the TUT was illegal because it expanded an excise tax that required approval by a majority of voters. In 2013 Ardon's counsel requested and received documents pertaining to the issue. Ardon's counsel later informed the city that she had obtained copies of two documents that appeared to be listed in a 2008 privilege log and a third document that appeared to have been prepared in response to other documents listed in the privilege log. The city responded that the documents had been inadvertently produced and demanded their return. Ardon's counsel declined, contending that the city had waived any claim of privilege. The trial court denied the city's motion to compel return of the documents and disqualify Arden’s counsel, concluding that production of the documents in response to the Public Records Act request waived any privilege. The court of appeal affirmed.View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In plaintiff-appellant Dagmar Hale's second appeal in a class action against Sharp Healthcare and Sharp Grossmont Hospital (collectively, Sharp), she argued Sharp unfairly charged her and other uninsured patients more for emergency services than the fees it accepted from patients covered by private insurance or governmental plans. In the first appeal, the Court of Appeal partially reversed a judgment of dismissal following a demurrer. The trial court thereafter certified the class. After engaging in discovery, Sharp moved to decertify the class arguing a class action was inappropriate based on lack of ascertainability and lack of predominantly common issues. The trial court considered the evidence presented and found there was no reasonable means to ascertain the members of class without individual inquiries of more than 120,000 patient records and continued class treatment was not appropriate because individualized issues, rather than common issues, predominate, particularly with respect to whether or not class members are entitled to recover damages. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order decertifying the class.View "Hale v. Sharp Healthcare" on Justia Law