Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner represented real parties in the purchase of two Florida golf clubs. In the underlying action, real parties filed suit alleging that petitioner failed in its duty to ensure proper disclosures were made to real parties. This proceeding concerns real parties' efforts to revive their case in the superior court. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its order granting real parties' motion to vacate their voluntary dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) on the ground that the dismissal was void. The court concluded that, since the real parties' tactical decision to voluntarily dismiss the underlying case without prejudice was not a void judgment or order, the trial court had no authority to set aside the dismissal as void. Accordingly, the alternative writ is discharged and the court granted the writ of mandate.View "Nixon Peabody v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Jason H. (father) appealed the juvenile court’s determination to deny him reunification services with the minors, now 16-year-old D.H. and seven-year-old T.H. The trial court found two reunification bypass provisions applied: (1) father had previously had reunification services and his parental rights terminated to the minors’ half siblings and father had not made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the half siblings; and (2) father was incarcerated and the provision of services would be detrimental to the children. Father argued these bypass provisions did not apply as he had made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the half siblings and reunification services were in the minors’ best interest; and, it would not be detrimental to the minors for him to be provided reunification services. Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed with father that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that he had not made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the half siblings, because the record revealed that the problems that led to the removal of the half siblings (unsafe and unhealthy conditions) were different from those presented in this case (alcohol abuse, anger management problems and domestic violence); nor did the record establish any connection between the two sets of problems or even that father received services in the prior case for the problems manifest in the present case. However, the Court found sufficient evidence to support the finding that father was incarcerated and it would be detrimental to the minors to provide services. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the juvenile court.View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

The Meisters were preferred shareholders in Sesame, a now-dissolved software company. Mensinger was Sesame’s chief financial officer and Koppel was its chief executive officer. Sesame experienced financial difficulties, and its assets were sold to ExtraView, which was formed and owned by Mensinger. Sesame then dissolved, rendering the Meisters’ preferred shares valueless. The Meisters sued, alleging Mensinger and Koppel colluded to secure a preferential sale of Sesame’s assets and business to ExtraView, violating their fiduciary duties to the Meisters. The trial court found that Mensinger and Koppel had breached their fiduciary duties to the Meisters, but that the Meisters had failed to prove damages. The appeals court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to frame an appropriate remedy and in conducting an in camera post-trial review of ExtraView’s electronic financial records, rather than ordering an accounting of ExtraView’s net worth and profit/loss status,View "Meister v. Mensinger" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether a plaintiff's claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress were based on a health care provider's professional negligence and therefore subject to the one-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. Plaintiff-appellant Wayne Larson alleged defendant-respondent Richard Shuman, M.D., served as the anesthesiologist on Larson's kidney stone surgery performed at defendant and respondent UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc.'s hospital. In performing a preoperative checkup and administering the anesthesia, Larson alleged Shuman committed a battery and intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress by grabbing and twisting Larson's arm, prying open his mouth, and lifting, pulling, and pushing on his face and head. The trial court sustained Shuman's and UHS's demurrers without leave to amend on the ground section 340.5's one-year limitation period applied and barred his claims. On appeal, Larson argued the two-year limitations period generally applicable to personal injury claims governs because he alleged intentional tort claims, not claims for professional negligence. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Larson's contention and affirmed the trial court's judgment: "we must look past the labels Larson uses and examine the specific conduct Larson alleged to determine which limitations period applies. Larson bases his lawsuit on Shuman's conduct in providing professional health care by performing a preoperative checkup and administering anesthesia. Larson does not allege any other purpose for the challenged conduct. Because his claims constitute a challenge to how Shuman performed his professional services, Larson's claims are based on professional negligence and barred by section 340.5's one-year limitations period." View "Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs" on Justia Law

"[A]ll too often attorney fees become the tail that wags the dog in litigation." Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties LLC challenged an award of $14,553.50 in attorney fees to Ellis Law Group LLP (ELG) as the prevailing party on a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motion). Sugar Loaf argued the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees for work on the anti-SLAPP motion performed by attorney Joseph Major because Major was a member of ELG on whose behalf the motion was filed. Relying on case law holding self-represented law firms may not be awarded attorney fees for an anti-SLAPP motion, Sugar Loaf argued the fee award must be reversed. ELG contended that Major acted as an independent contractor to the firm because he had no billable hour requirements, did not accrue vacation time, received no health care benefits, and was paid by the hour without deduction for taxes. The trial court agreed with ELG that Major's status as an independent contractor to ELG allowed the law firm to receive attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in awarding fees to ELG under the anti-SLAPP statute: Major was listed as a member of ELG in the caption of documents filed in support of ELG's anti-SLAPP motion; Major signed documents for ELG's anti-SLAPP motion as an attorney with ELG; Major did not file a notice of association or substitution to indicate he was acting as outside counsel to ELG; and when Major contacted opposing counsel regarding the filing of a document concerning the anti-SLAPP motion, he used an e-mail address and signature that identified him as a member of ELG. "The possibility that Major was paid in a manner different than a regular 'employee' of ELG may render him an independent contractor for taxation purposes, but does not make him separate counsel for ELG for purposes of attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute."View "Ellis Law Group v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Prop." on Justia Law

San Diego County approved a "Remedial Action Plan" (RAP) for a remediation project at the former Otay Skeet and Trap Shooting Range (Project) in Chula Vista, and adopted a "Final Mitigated Negative Declaration" (MND). The Project involved "investigation and remediation of surface and subsurface areas impacted from historic shooting range activities" and included "remediation of soil impacted by lead and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), removal of 'White Material['], as well as the removal of target debris and wood debris from the site." The Otay Ranch, Sky Communities, and Sky Vista (collectively, Otay Ranch parties) were the former owners of the shooting range. They filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging the County: (1) did not comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it approved and adopted the MND and RAP without preparing an environmental impact report; and (2) did not comply with Health and Safety Code in approving the RAP. The Otay Ranch parties also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Real party in interest, Flat Rock Land Company, LLC was the current owner of the shooting range property and project applicant, which undertook voluntary remediation of the site before future development. The central issue in this appeal was whether, after a voluntary dismissal of a petition for writ of mandate, the trial court erred by allowing the County to recover actual labor costs incurred for an attorney and paralegals to prepare an administrative record. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order and judgment. Preliminarily, however, the Court dismissed the appeals of The Otay Ranch (a cancelled limited partnership), and Sky Communities, Inc. (a suspended corporation), for lack of capacity. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismissed the appeal of the remaining appellant, Sky Vista, Inc. (Sky Vista), which was an active corporation. View "Otay Ranch, L.P. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Sallie Mae, real party in interest, appealed an order awarding plaintiffs attorney fees and costs after plaintiffs successfully opposed Sallie Mae's motion to quash a business records subpoena seeking electronically stored information regarding student loans. The court concluded that the trial court did not err by concluding that Sallie Mae lacked substantial factual justification for refusing to comply with the second subpoena. Therefore, the award of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion and the court affirmed the judgment.View "Vasquez v. CA School of Culinary Arts" on Justia Law

C.S. was involved in a family law dispute with her ex-boyfriend over the custody of their daughter. On appeal, C.S. challenged the trial court's denial of two applications for waiver of court fees and costs based on C.S.'s receipt of public benefits. The court reversed, finding that C.S. met the statutory requirements for a fee waiver and that the relevant statutes do not permit a court to deny a fee waiver to an applicant who meets such criteria.View "C.S. v. W.O." on Justia Law

Nguyen was born in 1994. She was 16 years old when she filed a complaint, alleging that her mother’s occupational exposure and her in utero exposure to hazardous and toxic chemicals at Western Digital Corporation (WDC) caused her to be born with agenesis of the corpus callosum (a birth defect affecting the structure of the brain) and other birth defects. She alleged that her parents did not know of the connection until 2008, when relatives heard on the radio that attorneys were investigating cases of birth defects caused by chemical exposures in the semiconductor industry. The trial court dismissed the action as barred by the statute of limitations for pre-birth injuries in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.4, as opposed to section 340.8, applicable to claims based on exposure to hazardous substances, which includes tolling for minority and mental incapacity. She also claimed equitable estoppel, arguing that WDC knew the chemicals it used caused reproductive harm and concealed the connection to her injuries. The appeals court reversed, holding that the claims were subject to section 340.8; that even though section 340.8 did not take effect until 10 years after Nguyen was born, it applies in this case because the allegations supported a claim of delayed accrual until December 1998; and that Nguyen is also entitled to tolling for minority. View "Nguyen v. Western Digital Corp." on Justia Law

The Fleets applied to have their Bank of America (BofA) home loan modified in 2009 under the Making Homes Affordable Act. The result of multiple telephone calls and letters to various BofA-related personnel, the Fleets were either (a) assured the Fleets that everything was proceeding smoothly or (b) told BofA had no knowledge of any loan modification application. Finally, in November 2011, BofA informed the Fleets they had been approved for a trial period plan under a Fannie Mae modification program. All they had to do, was to make three monthly payments starting on December 1, 2011. If they made the payments, then they would move to the next step (verification of financial hardship); if they passed that test, their loan would be permanently modified. The Fleets made the first two payments, for December 2011 and January 2012, which BofA acknowledged receiving, and therefore foreclosure proceedings had been suspended. Toward the end of January 2012, their house was sold at a trustee’s sale. Two days after the sale, a representative of the buyer showed up at the house with a notice to quit. The Fleets informed him that the house had significant structural problems, and he said he was going to rescind the sale. The Fleets continued to try to communicate with BofA regarding the property. A BofA representative left voice mail messages to the effect that BofA wanted to discuss a solution to the dispute, but otherwise it appeared that productive conversation between the Fleets and BofA and between the Fleets and the buyer had ceased. In light of this silence (which they interpreted to mean the buyer was trying to rescind the sale), the Fleets spent $15,000 to repair a broken sewer main, which was leaking sewage onto the front lawn. They were evicted in August 2012. In June 2012, the Fleets sued BofA, the trustee under their deed of trust, BofA officers and some of the employees who had been involved in handling their loan modification, and the buyer of the property and its representative. BofA’s demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action promissory estoppel, breach of contract, fraud, and accounting. All of the BofA defendants were dismissed. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Although the Fleets’ amended complaint spreads the fraud allegations over three causes of action and contains a great deal of extraneous information, it also alleges the requisite elements of promissory fraud. [. . .] This cause of action may or may not be provable; what it definitely is not is demurrable." The Court sustained the demurrer to the Fleets' action for promissory estoppel, and affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleet v. Bank of America" on Justia Law