Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fleets applied to have their Bank of America (BofA) home loan modified in 2009 under the Making Homes Affordable Act. The result of multiple telephone calls and letters to various BofA-related personnel, the Fleets were either (a) assured the Fleets that everything was proceeding smoothly or (b) told BofA had no knowledge of any loan modification application. Finally, in November 2011, BofA informed the Fleets they had been approved for a trial period plan under a Fannie Mae modification program. All they had to do, was to make three monthly payments starting on December 1, 2011. If they made the payments, then they would move to the next step (verification of financial hardship); if they passed that test, their loan would be permanently modified. The Fleets made the first two payments, for December 2011 and January 2012, which BofA acknowledged receiving, and therefore foreclosure proceedings had been suspended. Toward the end of January 2012, their house was sold at a trustee’s sale. Two days after the sale, a representative of the buyer showed up at the house with a notice to quit. The Fleets informed him that the house had significant structural problems, and he said he was going to rescind the sale. The Fleets continued to try to communicate with BofA regarding the property. A BofA representative left voice mail messages to the effect that BofA wanted to discuss a solution to the dispute, but otherwise it appeared that productive conversation between the Fleets and BofA and between the Fleets and the buyer had ceased. In light of this silence (which they interpreted to mean the buyer was trying to rescind the sale), the Fleets spent $15,000 to repair a broken sewer main, which was leaking sewage onto the front lawn. They were evicted in August 2012. In June 2012, the Fleets sued BofA, the trustee under their deed of trust, BofA officers and some of the employees who had been involved in handling their loan modification, and the buyer of the property and its representative. BofA’s demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action promissory estoppel, breach of contract, fraud, and accounting. All of the BofA defendants were dismissed. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Although the Fleets’ amended complaint spreads the fraud allegations over three causes of action and contains a great deal of extraneous information, it also alleges the requisite elements of promissory fraud. [. . .] This cause of action may or may not be provable; what it definitely is not is demurrable." The Court sustained the demurrer to the Fleets' action for promissory estoppel, and affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleet v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

"This writ petition demonstrates the importance of the disposition in an appellate opinion in determining the form of judicial relief, particularly when the disposition reverses a judgment and remands for retrial. The disposition articulates what the trial court should do, with clear and understandable instructions, and whether and how the trial court should exercise its discretion upon remand." The Superior Court of Orange County court issued an opinion on an appeal from two plaintiffs who were both nonsuited at trial. The two plaintiffs were represented by the same counsel and presented a unified theory of recovery. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of nonsuit as to the second plaintiff but reversed the judgment "in all other respects," and remanded the case for a retrial for the first plaintiff. The first plaintiffs’ claims were left intact, holding they properly were pursued in their entirety (the second plaintiff being superfluous for purposes of recovery). The Court awarded no costs on appeal. No party filed a petition for rehearing. The question on rehearing of this matter for the Court of Appeal was whether real parties (defendants below) were automatically entitled to recover all their trial costs as prevailing parties from petitioner (the second plaintiff below) without any further review. If yes, real parties will succeed in recovering very substantial trial costs even though their adversaries yet may achieve all their litigation objectives. The Court of Appeal applied the plain words of the disposition to preclude such an irrational outcome: "[b]ecause we reversed the judgment 'in all other respects,' our disposition reversed not only the judgment of nonsuit as to the first plaintiff, but also that portion of the judgment which awarded costs to real parties. In accordance with our prior notification to the parties, we issue a peremptory writ in the first instance to effectuate the clear meaning of our disposition."View "Ducoing Management v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

This case centered on a July 2008 motor vehicle accident. The vehicle occupied by plaintiffs Leo Pope and Judi Nightingale was hit by a vehicle driven by Debbie Sert (who was no longer a party). Plaintiffs proceeded to trial against Thomas Stanley, who they argued made a negligent lane change and caused Sert to hit plaintiffs’ car, and Matthew Babick, the vehicle’s owner. The jury found defendants not liable. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing: (1) there was not substantial evidence to support the verdict; and (2) misconduct of Babick’s attorney, Gregory Kane, was so egregious the court should have granted plaintiffs’ request for a mistrial or motion for a new trial. Kane directly violated a court order by eliciting causation evidence from a California Highway Patrol officer who responded to the scene. Kane was subsequently sanctioned $500 and the jury was given a curative instruction. The Court of Appeal completely rejected plaintiffs' first contention. While it found Kane’s behavior unacceptable from an officer of the court, the Court did not find the single question and answer on this subject was so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial or new trial. The Court therefore affirmed. View "Pope v. Babick" on Justia Law

Trustees of the Western Asbestos Settlement Trust, charged with paying bodily injury claims against companies that distributed asbestos-containing building materials, sought coverage under the companies’ insurance policies. In 2004, after the insurer was declared insolvent, the trust sought declaratory relief against the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA). CIGA filed an answer denying any obligation to pay claims against the insolvent insurer. The proceedings remained dormant for six years. In 2011, the Western Trust dismissed its complaint without prejudice. The present declaratory relief action by the Western Trust against CIGA was filed in 2013. The trial court dismissed, citing the three-year statute of limitations. Western Trust argued that the limitations period does not begin to run until CIGA denies a specific claim for payment and that no such claim has yet been submitted. The appeals court reversed, holding that a cause of action against CIGA for breach of statutory duties does not accrue until all of the events necessary to create a covered claim have occurred, giving rise to the insured’s right to demand payment from CIGA. The complaint alleged no facts indicating that all those events occurred more than three years before the complaint was filed, if they have occurred. View "Snyder v. CA Ins. Guar. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged, in a council form complaint, causes for negligence and a dangerous condition on public property. The Council sought to compel summary judgment, arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff failed to present a government claim to the Secretariat of the Judicial Council. The court issued a writ of mandate directing that the Council's summary judgment motion be granted because there was no proper presentation of plaintiff's government claim.View "Judicial Council v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The purported class action against Apple alleged: violations of Business and Professions Code sections 17200, 17500; breach of express warranty; violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code 1792); negligence; negligent misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment. The complaint alleges that Apple falsely represented the iPhone 3G to be “twice as fast” as the previous version of the iPhone and that the problems with the iPhone 3G are not related to the ATTM network, but with the device itself.” The lawsuit was preceded by federal litigation, raising similar but not identical claims. In 2009, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) transferred the actions to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court dismissed, for failure to join AT&T Mobility—the cellular network carrier for the iPhone 3G—as a necessary party under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a). Based on that decision, the California trial court dismissed. The appeals court reversed, finding that ATTM is not a necessary party.View "Van Zant v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

This case centered two policy issues that are often viewed as controversial: (1) racial, ethnic, and gender preferences; and (2) the decennial redistricting process. In 2008 and 2010, the People of California, exercising their reserved initiative powers, changed the way California's State Senate, State Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization voting districts are adjusted after each national census, assigning the corresponding duties to the California Citizens Redistricting Commission. Plaintiffs Ward Connerly and the American Civil Rights Foundation (collectively, Connerly) sued defendants State of California (State), the State Auditor, and the Commission, alleging the method of selecting members of the Commission violated Proposition 209 (Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 31), in that it gave improper preferences based on race, ethnicity, and gender. Connerly then filed an amended complaint, again asserting the selection process for the last six commissioners violated Proposition 209, but adding that the "Applicant Review Panel" also improperly considered race, ethnicity, and gender. These were characterized as “facial” challenges to Government Code section 8252, subdivision (g) based on Proposition 209, for which various remedies were sought. The State and State Auditor demurred in part on the grounds that Proposition 209 did not apply to the selection of public officers, only to public employees. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on this ground. Connerly appealed. Connerly effectively abandoned his amended complaint, and proposed a new legal theory on appeal--but no new facts--in his opening brief, explicitly citing the authority of Code Civ. Proc. section 472c, subdivision (a). Both the State and State Auditor contended it was unfair for Connerly to raise this theory on appeal because they did not get a chance to disprove it factually. They almost entirely ignored section 472c, which allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal. "Connerly has not strayed from his central factual claim that the composition of the Commission was infected by invidious discrimination. There is no reason to deviate from the well-established rule that section 472c allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. [. . .] The fact that the instant complaint was found wanting raises precisely the circumstance section 472c was designed to address--to give the plaintiff a final opportunity to propose new facts or legal theories to establish a cause of action. Thus, from the parties' briefing, it appears Connerly can plead at least a prima facie case of equal protection violations. The answer is to apply section 472c, subdivision (a), allow Connerly to amend the complaint again to clarify his new theories, and give respondents the chance to defend the Commission's selection provisions to try to show they comport with federal equal protection principles." View "Connerly v. California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the "private attorney general" attorney fee statute and the trial court denied his application. The court concluded that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff enforced an important right affecting the public interest, satisfying the first prong of the statute. The court concluded, however, that the court erred in concluding that the second and third prongs were not satisfied. The trial court erroneously concluded that the benefit plaintiff's lawsuit conferred on others "may not prove to be significant." The trial court also erred when it concluded that because plaintiff sought recovery of a large amount of money paid as tax on investment gains, and therefore had "significant assets," he did not need the incentive of the private attorney general statute to bring his lawsuit. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying attorney fees and remanded for a determination of the fees to be awarded.View "Cutler v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

Eddie Yau filed a complaint against his former employer, Santa Margarita Ford, alleging he was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy. Yau alleged he was terminated after complaining to Santa Margarita Ford's management about fraudulent warranty repair claims being submitted to Ford Motor Company. Yau also alleged an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against individual defendants who were his coworkers and supervisors, and the owner of Santa Margarita Ford. The trial court sustained demurrers without leave to amend and dismissed the action, entering separate judgments for Santa Margarita Ford and the individual defendants. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Yau adequately pleaded his wrongful termination cause of action and therefore the judgment in favor of Santa Margarita Ford was granted in error. The Court concluded that the trial court correctly dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, and the judgment in favor of the individual defendants was affirmed. View "Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford" on Justia Law

J.P. appealed an order denying her request for a hearing to suspend visitation with her father and/or terminate his reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, subdivisions (a) and (c). Specifically, she argued the juvenile court erred when it ruled that: (1) the statutory framework of the dependency system as well as principles of due process required the juvenile court to hold a six-month status review hearing to determine whether reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent before it could consider a request to terminate reunification services under section 388, subdivision (c); and (2) the allegations in the child's section 388 petition did not state a prima facie case to show that the action or inaction of the parent created a substantial likelihood family reunification would not occur, or that a modification of the prior visitation order was in the child's best interests. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court misinterpreted section 388, subdivision (c) when it denied J.P.'s request for a hearing to terminate her father's reunification services: "section 388 (c) requires a reasonable services finding, the juvenile court is not required to hold a six-month review hearing to determine whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to a parent before it holds a hearing on a petition to terminate reunification services." In addition, the juvenile court erred when it found that J.P.'s petition to terminate her father's reunification services and/or suspend visitation did not state a prima facie case. The Court nevertheless concluded reversal was not necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice. In view of the lack of any challenge on appeal to the juvenile court's findings at the six-month review hearing that visitation was not detrimental to the child, and the father was making progress with his case plan and it was likely that reunification would occur by the next review hearing, any error in not granting a hearing on the section 388 petition was harmless. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "In re J.P. CA/41" on Justia Law