Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff S.A. appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Jan Maiden and Does 1 through 50 (together Maiden), after the trial court granted her Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 anti-SLAPP motion to strike his complaint alleging causes of action against Maiden for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, he contended the trial court erred by granting Maiden's anti-SLAPP motions because he established there was a probability he would prevail on his causes of action. Wife N.A. retained attorney Jan Maiden to represent her in obtaining restraining orders against her husband, S.A. With regard to one such order, N.A. withdrew her request for a permanent restraining order against S.A. and the trial court accepted her voluntary dismissal of that request. Because N.A. had moved to Orange County and filed for legal separation, child custody, and child and spousal support in the Orange County Superior Court, she no longer believed a permanent restraining order against S.A. was necessary. S.A. filed an order to show cause (OSC) why he should not be awarded attorney fees and costs as sanctions against N.A. for her extensions of the temporary restraining order, which was based on false allegations, and her subsequent dismissal of her request for a permanent restraining order. The trial court granted the motion, finding S.A. was the prevailing party, and awarded him $3,500 in attorney fees and costs. The Court of Appeal concluded that S.A. did not, and could not, establish there was a probability he would prevail on any of the causes of action he raised. Finding no reversible error otherwise, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "S.A. v. Maiden" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit against her former employers, alleging violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 and a violation of public policy. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the denial of a jury trial. The court concluded that denial of a jury trial in this case is a proper matter for writ relief. The court also concluded that the statutory language and legislative history of section 1278.5 reflect an intent to permit a jury trial. Even apart from this evidence of legislative intent, the court concluded that a jury trial is appropriate as the gist of plaintiff's cause of action sounds in law rather than equity. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for writ of mandate. View "Shaw v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Diskeeper appealed the trial court's denial of a contract-based award of attorney fees following the confirmation of an arbitration award. The trial court denied the award because Diskeeper filed no memorandum of costs in seeking the award. The court held that a party seeking attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 need not, in addition to filing a noticed motion, file a memorandum of costs. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kaufman v. Diskeeper Corp." on Justia Law

The defendants were charged with violations of the California False Claims Act (CFCA) arising out of their alleged business practice of inflating the credit ratings of various structured finance securities. Defendants moved to strike the CFCA causes of action under section 425.16, subdivision (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. The superior court denied the motion, holding that the enforcement action was exempt from the special motion to strike procedure pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (d), which provides that “This section shall not apply to any enforcement action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor.” The court of appeal dismissed, concluding that the order is not appealable.View "People v. McGraw-Hill Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) initiated eminent domain proceedings to condemn an easement for electric transmission lines across the property of defendants Arnold and Valerie Schmidt and Luis Naranjo after the parties could not agree on an appropriate valuation for the property. Agreeing with defendants' experts that an open-pit mining operation was the "highest and best use" for the land, the jury valued the property at about $8 million. SDG&E appealed, contending the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's verdict. SDG&E also contends it was entitled to a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion: (1) in limiting the cross-examination of defendants' appraisal expert and (2) allowing the appraiser to testify in violation of Evidence Code section 819. Defendants cross-appealed, asserting the trial court erred in denying their request for litigation expenses under Code of Civil Procedure section 1250.410. The Court of Appeal rejected SDG&E's arguments and affirmed the judgment and order denying JNOV. The Court reversed the order denying defendants' motion for litigation expenses. View "San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Scott Carlton sued defendants and respondents Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., Mott’s LP, Larry Young, Caesar Vargas, and Graham Bailey alleging: (1) wrongful termination against Dr. Pepper and Mott’s; (2) sex discrimination against all defendants; and (3) breach of contract against Dr. Pepper and Mott’s. The trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrer of Dr. Pepper, Vargas, Bailey, and Mott’s. The trial court also sanctioned Carlton and his trial counsel jointly and severally in the amount of $1,360 due to Carlton’s “wholly unjustified” interrogatory responses. The only respondent on appeal was Dr. Pepper (the other defendants are not respondents in this appeal). Carlton contended the trial court erred by granting the demurrer because the demurrer was untimely. Further, Carlton argued the demurrer improperly included the breach of contract cause of action, and therefore the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer on that cause of action. Finally, Carlton contended the trial court erred by imposing sanctions. Upon review, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of discovery sanctions in this case, "discovery sanctions are not designed to punish; rather, they are designed to fix the problem created by the evasive responses. [. . .] Dr. Pepper’s late motions to compel could not have fixed Carlton’s evasive responses, because the motions to compel were untimely and therefore Dr. Pepper waived its right to seek further responses. Dr. Pepper missed its opportunity to fix the problem. [. . .] Therefore, discovery sanctions were not warranted, because the problem could no longer be fixed." The Court affirmed the trial court's decision in all other respects. View "Carlton v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were driving a 2004 Jeep Cherokee in San Joaquin County, when the vehicle rolled over and the roof collapsed. Young sustained injuries, rendering her a permanent quadriplegic. Young’s daughter allegedly suffered physical and emotional harm. They filed suit, claiming that the roof and restraint systems were defectively designed. The vehicle at issue was designed, manufactured, and distributed by DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC), a former indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Among others, the complaint named Daimler and DCC as defendants. Daimler is a German public stock company that designs and manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and has its principal place of business in Stuttgart. Before 1998, DCC was known as Chrysler Corporation. After a 1998 agreement, Chrysler Corporation became an indirect subsidiary of Daimler and changed its name to DCC. DCC was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. It ceased to be a subsidiary of Daimler in 2007, changing its name to Chrysler LLC. Daimler is not a successor-in-interest to DCC or Chrysler LLC. Plaintiffs served Daimler with the complaint in accordance with the Hague Convention. The trial court quashed service for lack of personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG. The court of appeal affirmed, relying on the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. View "Young v. Daimler AG" on Justia Law

Carl McIntyre, Destiny McIntyre (through her guardian ad litem), Theresa McIntyre, and My Jeweler, Inc. appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of The Colonies-Pacific, LLC. Colonies owns the Colonies Crossroads shopping center in Upland. The common areas of the shopping center were under Colonies's exclusive control, but maintenance expenses were chargeable to tenants on a pro rata basis. Initially, Colonies did not budget anything for security services. McIntyre owned a jewelry business called My Jeweler. In January 2006, two stores in Colonies Crossroads were robbed at gunpoint, eight days apart. In May 2006, there was a shoplifting incident at another store, which police reportedly classified as a robbery because it resulted in a physical altercation in which the perpetrator pulled out a knife. After the first two robberies, McIntyre expressed concern several times about the lack of security to Leanne Meissner, an employee of Colonies's property management company. Meissner reported the robberies to her superior, but Colonies decided not to provide security or seek anchor tenants' approval of an expense for security. Rather, Colonies asked the Upland Police Department to "step up the patrol through the center" because it believed "the police are much more capable than the . . . private security force." McIntyre took his then 14-year-old daughter, Destiny, to work with him at the Colonies Crossroads store on summer morning in 2006. Shortly after the store opened, three men entered. Despite offering his cooperation, the men severely pistol whipped McIntyre, and one of them tied up Destiny and held a gun to her head. The men shattered glass display cases and stole jewelry, cash and digital security recording equipment. After this robbery, Colonies hired a security service to provide an unarmed guard to patrol the common areas of the shopping center. The McIntyres sued Colonies for negligence and premises liability, a species of negligence. At the beginning of trial, Colonies brought a motion in limine under section 1151 to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures. The McIntyres argued section 1151 was inapplicable because they did not intend to use the evidence to show Colonies was negligent by breaching its duty of care, but rather to show the lack of a security patrol was the cause of the robbery. The McIntyres contended the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence. Alternatively, the McIntyres contended the court abused its discretion by not admitting the evidence as rebuttal to a comment Colonies's attorney made during opening statement. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment. View "McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific" on Justia Law

Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) was sued in a coordinated proceeding before the San Francisco Superior Court for alleged defects in Plavix, a drug BMS manufactures and sells throughout the country. BMS moved below to quash service of the summons regarding the complaints concerning plaintiffs who are not California residents, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied BMS’s motion, finding that California had general jurisdiction over BMS, and did not address the issue of specific jurisdiction. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) which limited the application of general jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, the California Supreme Court remanded to the court of appeals, which affirmed denial of the motion to quash. California does not have general jurisdiction over BMS in this case, but, applying the International Shoe Co. v. Washington test of “fair play and substantial justice,” the court reasoned that BMS has engaged in substantial, continuous economic activity in California, including the sale of more than a billion dollars of Plavix to Californians. That activity is substantially connected to claims by non-residents, which are based on the same alleged wrongs as those alleged by California-resident plaintiffs. BMS has not established that it would be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over it. View "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After Loren Collin was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he and his wife Verna Lee Collin sued 22 entities for negligence, strict liability, false representation, intentional tort/failure to warn, alter ego, and loss of consortium, alleging Loren was exposed to asbestos from the defendants' products or activities when he worked in various construction trades. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of four defendants: CalPortland Company, Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (J-MM), and Formosa Plastics Corporation USA, named as an alter ego of J-MM. Plaintiff argued those defendants did not show that plaintiff did not possess and could not reasonably obtain evidence of exposure to an asbestos-containing product for which defendants were responsible; but even if the burden shifted to plaintiff, the evidence was sufficient to support an inference of exposure. Plaintiff also claimed J-MM and Formosa did not establish that Loren was a sophisticated user who knew or should have known of the potential risks and dangers of using J-MM’s asbestos cement pipe. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded summary judgment was proper as to CalPortland and Kaiser Gypsum, because they met their initial burdens on summary judgment and the evidence and reasonable inferences would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding that Loren was exposed to one of their asbestos-containing products. With respect to J-MM and Formosa, however, summary judgment was not proper: the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to whether Loren was exposed to asbestos from a J-MM product. In addition, J-MM and Formosa did not establish they were entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law based on the sophisticated user defense. View "Collin v. CalPortland Co." on Justia Law