Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff seeks to set aside the county's decision to allow a development. The court concluded, among other things, that the developer, an indispensable party, may assert the statute of limitations even though it did not comply with the so-called fictitious name statute, Business and Professions Code section 17900. Plaintiff filed a petition for mandate and administrative mandate attacking the county's decision approving a subdivision application, but failed to serve the real party in interest within 90 days pursuant to Government Code section 66499.37. The trial court sustained the county's and the real party in interest's demurrers without leave to amend. Because the court affirmed the judgment on the merits, the court need not consider defendants' motion to dismiss based on defects in plaintiffs' opening brief. The court denied plaintiffs' request for judicial notice. View "Templeton Action Com. v. County of San Luis Obispo" on Justia Law

Seven years after appellant Marjorie L. was appointed guardian of her two granddaughters, A.L. and E.L., the trial court granted a petition to terminate the guardianship filed by the minors’ parents, respondents Jennifer L. and Richard L., after a hearing that took only minutes at which no evidence was introduced, no witness testimony was taken, and no arguments from counsel were heard. The Court of Appeal concluded that this truncated process deprived the guardian of any meaningful hearing or opportunity to object to the petition, and prevented the court from fully considering whether termination was in the best interests of the minors. The Court therefore reversed the order terminating the guardianship and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing before a different judge to consider whether termination is in the minors’ best interests. View "Guardianship of A.L." on Justia Law

After the jury awarded damages to plaintiffs for their injuries resulting from a tractor-trailer accident, both parties appealed the trial court's orders. The court concluded that defendants' motion for a new trial and motion notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) were premature because they were filed before the case was fully decided. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order as to those rulings. Further, the trial court's order striking the awards of noneconomic damages is nonappealable and defendants' appeal from the judgment is of no effect and must be dismissed because there is no judgment. The court also concluded that unpaid medical bills are not evidence of the reasonable value of the services provided, and no expert witness declaration is required for a treating physician offering an opinion based on facts acquired in the physician-patient relationship or otherwise acquired independently of the litigation, including, to the extent it is otherwise admissible, an opinion on reasonable value. View "Ochoa v. Dorado" on Justia Law

Lucky filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the Superior Court's decision to decline to appoint a temporary judge for the purpose of ruling on motions for preliminary and final approval of a settlement. The court concluded that the California Constitution, the California Rules of Court, and public policy concerns preclude the appointment of a temporary judge for purposes of approving the settlement of a pre-certification class action. When the class had not yet been certified, the putative class representative has no authority to consent to a temporary judge on behalf of the absent putative class members. Therefore, the court denied the writ petition. View "Luckey v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 1998, the superior court established a conservatorship over G.H.’s person pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 5000. G.H. has been under continuous conservatorship since that time. In 2012, the Santa Clara County Public Guardian sought to be reappointed G.H.’s conservator, alleging that G.H remained gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder. G.H.’s counsel requested t an evidentiary hearing. On the date of the hearing G.H. was not present in court. The Public Guardian explained that G.H. had refused to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian’s doctor, and that it did not intend to transport G.H to court unless G.H. submitted to the mental examination. At a second hearing, the Public Guardian explained that G.H. had again refused to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian’s doctor. G.H. was not present at a third hearing. The court granted the reappointment petition, reasoning that G.H.’s failure to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian’s doctor authorized the court to impose an evidence sanction or a terminating sanction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.410. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the court erred in imposing a terminating, as opposed to an evidence sanction. View "Conservatorship of G.H." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Ilan Brand appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Hyundai Motor America and Allen Used Cars, LLC (Hyundai) after granting Hyundai's nonsuit motion on plaintiff's breach of implied warranty of merchantability lawsuit. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred in granting the motion on grounds that no reasonable jury could have concluded a new vehicle sunroof that spontaneously opens and closes while driving constituted a safety hazard in violation of the implied warranty. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff and reversed the judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Brand v. Hyundai" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Carlsen was severely injured from a fall from a cliff above the Sacramento River. Although he could not recall how or why he fell, he sued his two travel companions, defendants Sarah Koivumaki and Zachary Gudelunas, asserting causes of action for assault and battery, negligence, willful misconduct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He claimed defendants put him in peril by bringing him to the edge of a cliff when he was highly intoxicated, leading to his fall, and that they aggravated his injuries by waiting several hours to inform the authorities of the fall. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sarah, finding that it could not reasonably be inferred from the evidence submitted that she touched or threatened to touch plaintiff or that she breached a duty of care owed to him. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred because "[m]ultiple material issues of fact [existed] relating to [Sarah]'s role in placing [him] in peril at the bottom of the cliff," and "[Sarah] owed [him] an affirmative duty to summon aid so as to protect [him] in the face of the ongoing imminent harm, danger, and medical emergency" and "as a result of a special relationship." The Court of Appeal concluded plaintiff established triable issues of material fact as to the negligence and willful misconduct causes of action, and that on the facts tendered, a jury could have reasonably inferred Sarah had acted to put an inebriated plaintiff in peril at the edge of a cliff. The Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Sarah but affirmed the summary judgment as to the assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action. Zach failed to respond to plaintiff's complaint, and a clerk's default was entered against him. After the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Sarah, plaintiff filed a request for the entry of a default judgment against Zach. The trial court denied plaintiff's request and entered judgment in favor of Zach, finding that plaintiff "failed to prove his case against [Zach]." Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in doing so. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff, and reversed the judgment entered in Zach's favor and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a hearing to determine whether plaintiff could establish damages and, if so, to enter a default judgment for plaintiff and against Zach. View "Carlsen v. Koivumaki" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Stephen Lipworth won a judgment against Plaintiff-appellant Raj Singh, and successfully moved to amend the judgment to add certain aliases Singh used. The trial court then granted Lipworth's application for the sale of certain property that Singh transferred to his wife, who in turn transferred the property to Sunman Mehta. The trial court concluded that "Mehta" was another alias Singh adopted to avoid paying his creditors. The court set aside that series of transfers and ordered the property sold to satisfy the judgment. The order granting Lipworth's application for sale became final after various appeals were dismissed. In the case before the Court of Appeal, Singh, along with his wife Karen and "Mehta," sued Lipworth alleging he used "fraudulent representations" to persuade the trial court in the prior case that Singh was "hiding some properties from his creditors using different names such as Archana Singh and Suman Mehta." After several frivolous motions were decided against Singh, the trial court invited Lipworth to file a motion to require Singh to furnish security or have the case dismissed pursuant to the vexatious litigant statutes. Lipworth did so, and filed both a demurrer and a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court found Singh to be a vexatious litigant with no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation because the lawsuit amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final judgment and post-judgment orders. The trial court ordered "Raj Singh aka Suman Mehta" to furnish security and dismissed the lawsuit as to plaintiff when no such security was furnished. The trial court then granted the anti-SLAPP motion as to Karen Singh, and awarded attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal, and Lipworth filed a motion for sanctions against plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to section 907 and rule 8.276 for bringing a frivolous appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded sanctions were warranted in this case. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment and imposed sanctions against plaintiffs and their attorney. View "Singh v. Lipworth" on Justia Law

The Department of Fair Employment and Housing alleged that Ottovich owned or managed a Fremont apartment building. He advertised an apartment available for rent. Coleman called and expressed interest. He asked who would be living in the apartment, and she stated that she, her husband, and their young daughter would live there. Defendant responded that he would not rent the apartment to her. Coleman told him, “That’s discrimination.” He replied that he did not have to show her the apartment or rent it to her, and hung up. The Department alleged a “familial status” discrimination violation of Government Code section 19255, and sought compensatory and treble damages. Ottovich moved to dismiss the complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). The trial court denied the motion as frivolous, and awarded plaintiff $2,500. After several discovery abuses by Ottovich, followed by sanctions and warnings, the court entered a default judgment against him. The court vacated the default, but continued to treat his answer as stricken and treated the complaint’s allegations as judicially admitted. A jury assessed damages at $8,705. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court was required to reinstate his answer when it vacated the default judgment. View "Dept. of Fair Emp't & Hous. v. Ottovich" on Justia Law