Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a pro se suit against a prison warden and others, alleging, among other things, that defendants entered plaintiff's prison cell on several occasions and confiscated or damaged his personal property without cause. The trial court granted defendants' motion under the provisions of the vexatious litigant law, Code Civ. Proc., 391-319.8. The court concluded that the trial court erred in determining that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant where unfiled lawsuits do not constitute "litigation" under the relevant statutory provision of California's vexatious litigant law. With regard to the five cases the government referred to where plaintiff applied for permission to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), the IFP applications were denied and the complaints were never filed. Therefore, no action or proceeding ever commenced and those matters did not qualify as litigations within the meaning of section 391, subdivision (a). Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's orders.View "Garcia v. Lacey" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed an order requiring her to obtain approval for leave to file under the vexatious litigant statutes, Code Civ. Proc., 391-391.7, before continuing with her two related appeals from the judgment in favor of her landlord in an unlawful detainer action. The appellate division dismissed the appeal after reviewing petitioner's request to file new litigation by a vexatious litigant and found that she failed to demonstrate the appeals had merit and were not filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. Section 391.7's requirement for obtaining leave to file unquestionably applies to an appeal by a self-represented plaintiff who has previously been declared a vexatious litigant and made subject to a prefiling order. At issue was whether it similarly applied to a vexatious litigant defendant's appeal from an adverse judgment. Because it disregards section 391.7's express reference to actions by a plaintiff and would impede a self-represented defendant's right of access to the appellate courts without significantly advancing the underlying purpose of the vexatious litigant statutes, the court rejected this construction of section 391.7. Therefore, the court granted petitioner's petition for a writ of mandate and ordered the appellate division to vacate its order dismissing petitioner's appeal and to decide the appeal on the merits.View "John v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Synergy filed suit against defendant, alleging that defendant converted the assets of Synergy's assignor by submitting false expense reports resulting in the misappropriation of assets belonging to Synergy's assignor and committed fraud by submitting false expense reports to Synergy's assignor with the intent to deceive Synergy. The trial court subsequently denied defendant's Code of Civil Procedure 473, subdivision (d), motion to set aside the entry of default and any subsequent default judgment in favor of Synergy. The court concluded that service by publication was proper where substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant could not with reasonable diligence be served personally or by mail. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Giorgio v. Synergy Management Group" on Justia Law

In 2006, several borrowers sued their lender, CashCall, Inc., alleging CashCall monitored their telephone conversations without their knowledge or consent. Over CashCall's objections, the trial court certified a class on one of the claims, an alleged violation of Penal Code section 632, which imposes liability on a "person" who intentionally "eavesdrops upon or records [a] confidential communication" and engages in this conduct "without the consent of all parties." After class certification, CashCall successfully moved for summary adjudication on the section 632 claim. The trial court found as a matter of law a corporation does not violate the statute when one of its supervisory employees secretly monitors a conversation between a customer and another corporate employee, reasoning that two employees are a single "person" within the meaning of the statute. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute applies even if the unannounced listener is employed by the same corporate entity as the known recipient of the conversation, concluding the trial court's statutory interpretation was inconsistent with section 632's language and purpose. The Court also rejected CashCall's alternative argument that summary adjudication was proper because the undisputed facts established the telephone conversations were not "confidential communication[s]." On remand, CashCall moved to decertify the class on grounds that the issue whether any particular class member could satisfy a reasonable-expectation test (as the Court discussed in its earlier opinion) required an assessment of numerous individual factors (including those identified in the earlier opinion) and these individual issues predominate over any remaining common issues, making a continued class action unmanageable. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing CashCall did not meet its burden to establish changed circumstances necessary for class decertification and, alternatively, common issues continued to predominate in the case. The court granted the decertification motion. Plaintiffs appealed the decertification, but finding no error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed.View "Kight v. CashCall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that defendant invaded his privacy by commercial appropriation of his name, image, and website. Defendant demurred to all of plaintiff's claims and the trial court subsequently dismissed the action. The court concluded that plaintiff properly stated a claim for breach of contract where plaintiff pleaded all the elements of a breach of contract in his Second Amended Complaint, and that the demurrer to that cause of action was erroneously sustained. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court noted its concern about the due process implications of a proceeding in which the court, aware that no record will be made, incorporates within its ruling reasons that are not documented for the litigants or the reviewing courts.View "Maxwell v. Dolezal" on Justia Law

Thompson filed a complaint, alleging that he operates a business and pays property taxes in Petaluma, seeking to enjoin the police from using taxpayer funds to order 30-day impoundment of vehicles pursuant to Vehicle Code 14602.6 when the driver has operated the vehicle without a valid driver’s license, but with consent of the vehicle’s owner. He alleged that section 14602.6’s notice provisions are insufficient to provide the owner with the factual grounds for the traffic stop or impound, the statutory basis for the driver’s license suspension or revocation, and the grounds for releasing the vehicle. The trial dismissed, finding that Thompson lacked standing because a taxpayer has no standing under section 526a in a matter that involves the city’s exercise of executive discretion. The court also rejected claims that the use of police officers to enforce sectionc14602.6 results in illegal government action or waste of taxpayer funds and that procedures implementing the statute violate procedural due process. The court of appeal remanded with directions to allow Thompson leave to amend his complaint. Assuming Thompson can allege facts showing the city’s actions violate the law, there is a reasonable possibility that the defects in his complaint can be cured by amendment.View "Thompson v. Petaluma Police Dep't" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on a water retention basin that was dug in 2004 as part of an expansion project for ski resort Northstar Village. The resort was owned by CNL Income Northstar LLC and operated by Trimont Land Company. Downhill from the retention basin are 180 condominium units owned by Aspen Grove Condominium Association. Water from the retention basin began to overflow and seep onto Aspen Grove’s property starting in December 2004 despite remediation efforts. After several years of attempts to solve the water problems with the retention basin, CNL communicated to Aspen Grove in 2008 that it would not perform any further remedial modification or remove the retention basin. Aspen Grove responded by suing various entities involved in the Northstar Village expansion project, including CNL. The first phase of the bifurcated trial resulted in the trial court’s granting a permanent injunction that required CNL to remove the retention basin. The Court of Appeal addressed only the first phase of the bifurcated trial, in which CNL challenged the mandatory injunction, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of damage to the trees on Aspen Grove’s property; (2) the trial court should have excluded evidence gathered after the discovery cutoff date; (3) Aspen Grove was not entitled to a mandatory injunction because it has an adequate remedy at law in the form of monetary damages and the option of building a trench on its own property to divert the water overflowing from the retention basin; and (4) the mandatory injunction was overbroad in requiring removal of the retention basin. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded CNL did not preserve its evidentiary arguments because CNL did not include them as issues for appeal when designating a partial reporter’s transcript. The trial court did not err in concluding Aspen Grove had no adequate remedy at law because only removal of the retention basin would alleviate the continuing damage to Aspen Grove’s property. "To hold otherwise would grant a private property owner the right to condemn his or her neighbor’s property by limiting the legal remedy for continuing trespass to monetary compensation. The trial court’s injunctive relief, rather than being overbroad, rests on credible evidence that removal of the retention basin would prevent irreparable harm to Aspen Grove’s property. As a result, we affirm."View "Aspen Grove Condo. Assn. v. CNL Income Northstar" on Justia Law

Sweeney issued a subpoena for bank records in the course of divorce proceedings with his wife, Evilsizor. The subpoena sought records from his wife’s accounts, but the records included financial information about her father. Her father, John, moved to quash the subpoena. Sweeney responded by agreeing to amend the subpoena to exclude information about John’s account activities. John then withdrew his motion to quash, but did so belatedly. The trial court sanctioned him by ordering him to pay a portion of the attorney fees Sweeney incurred in responding to the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. A trial court may impose sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 against a litigant for pursuing a motion to quash that, even though legitimately filed, was rendered unnecessary by a subsequent amendment or withdrawal of the subpoena.View "Evilsizor v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a plastic surgeon, for medical malpractice. Defendant failed to answer the complaint but notified plaintiff that he filed a bankruptcy proceeding. Plaintiff then obtained an order from the bankruptcy court granting her relief from the automatic stay of proceedings against debtor. In this appeal, defendant challenged the subsequent default judgment entered against him. Defendant argued that plaintiff's failure to serve him with a statement of damages prior to entry of his default denied him a last opportunity to plead the complaint and avoid a default. The court found no error in the trial court's proceedings where, under these circumstances, service of the statement of damages on defendant was not necessary or permitted by the bankruptcy stay, would have served no useful purpose, and did not open up the default and allow defendant to answer the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Weakly-Hoyt v. Foster" on Justia Law

Navalimpianti, suing its former officers and employees (including Negro) in Florida, sought to obtain copies of e-mail messages stored by Google in California. Navalimpianti caused a subpoena to be served on Google, which Negro moved to quash. The California trial court ordered Google to produce the e-mails, based on its conclusion that Negro had consented, or was deemed to have consented, to their production. The court of appeal held that, at the time it was entered the order constituted an abuse of discretion. Since then, however, Negro has been ordered by a Florida court to give his express consent to disclosure, and he has complied with that order by e-mailing Google; the express consent takes the contemplated production outside of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2702 and permits Google to make the requested disclosure.View "Negro v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law