Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued against him at the request of his former spouse, Plaintiff. He contended the trial court abused its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s request for a DVRO because the record does not demonstrate he engaged in conduct rising to the level of abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). Defendant also asserted the trial court erred by ordering him to change the beneficiary of the $4 million insurance policy he owns on Plaintiff’s life from himself to a charity of her choice. Lastly, Defendant argued that the trial court’s order awarding $200,000 in attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff as the prevailing party under section 6344 must also be reversed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s request for a DVRO. In addition, the court rejected contentions regarding the life insurance policy. Thus, the court found that it has no reason to reverse the order awarding attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff. The court also concluded reversal is not required based on the denial of Defendant’s requests for a statement of decision. The court explained that Defendant has not shown that courts must apply an objective, reasonable person standard when deciding whether a person has “disturbed the peace of the other party” within the meaning of section 6320. Instead, the relevant inquiry is simply whether the person against whom the DVRO is sought engaged in “conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroyed the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” View "Parris J. v. Christopher U." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant both members of the State Bar, represent opposing parties in a dissolution/annulment proceeding pending in Los Angeles Superior Court. Following an incident at Plaintiff’s office relating to the canceled deposition of Defendant’s client, Plaintiff obtained a three-year civil harassment restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 protecting her, as well as her paralegal and office receptionist, from further harassment by Defendant.   On appeal Defendant argued, in part, that all of the conduct upon which the trial court based its findings of harassment was constitutionally protected activity and there was insufficient evidence his actions, to the extent not constitutionally protected, were directed at Plaintiff, caused Plaintiff substantial emotional distress, or would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress as required to support issuance of the restraining order. Defendant also argued that the court erred in including in the order members of Plaintiff’s office staff as protected individuals.   The Second Appellate District reversed and directed the trial court to enter a new order denying Plaintiff’s request for a restraining order. The court explained that Defendant’s Emails regarding his client’s deposition constituted constitutionally protected activity. The court explained that because the emails were constitutionally protected, it was an error for the trial court to conclude they were properly considered part of a course of conduct of harassment. Further, the court found that the evidence of Defendant’s nonprotected conduct did not support the court’s findings of a willful or knowing course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person and did cause Plaintiff substantial emotional distress. View "Hansen v. Volkov" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Defendant for breach of contract in connection with their rental of Defendant’s home. Defendant failed to file an answer, and the trial court entered a default judgment for $59,191. The judgment included $1,000 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to a provision in the parties’ lease agreement authorizing attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party not to exceed $1,000. Defendant appealed, and the Second Appellate District affirmed. While the appeal was pending, the trial court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080, subdivision (a), for an order allowing their costs of enforcing the judgment. The trial court awarded $27,721 in attorneys’ fees under section 685.040, which allows as an award of costs attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing a judgment “if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney’s fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5.” Section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A), in turn, provides that attorneys’ fees may be awarded as costs where authorized by contract. In this appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in awarding over $1,000 in attorneys’ fees for enforcing the judgment because the lease authorized attorneys’ fees “not to exceed $1,000.”   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that once the judgment was entered, the terms of the lease, including the $1,000 limitation on fees, were merged into and extinguished by the judgment. Because the judgment included an award of attorneys’ fees authorized by contract, section 685.040 allowed an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing the judgment. View "Nash v. Aprea" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from a post-judgment order awarding Respondent attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.4.1 Appellant argued that the trial court erred by not reducing the fee award in accordance with the percentage of Respondent’s comparative fault, that the court abused its discretion by awarding fees that were not supported by sufficient documentation, that the hourly rate awarded for a first-year attorney was unreasonable, and that the court applied an excessive multiplier to the lodestar amount.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court was not required to reduce Respondent’s attorney fee award in accordance with his comparative fault. Further, the court held that Appellant failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. The court explained that the record indicates the trial court considered Respondent’s comparative fault. Further, the fee award was supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, the court wrote that the use of a blended $450 hourly rate for Respondent’s counsel was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court noted that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a 2.0 multiplier. View "Isom v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tina and David Glynn, parents of decedent Nicholas Glynn (Nicholas), appealed the grant of summary judgment against them and in favor of defendants Orange Circle Lounge Inc., Lounge Group, Inc., and Mario Marovic, owners and operators of the District Lounge, a bar. Plaintiffs argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the physical and temporal distance between defendants’ bar (at which a fight took place between Nicholas and some assailants) and the subsequent fight a block away and nearly an hour later that resulted in Nicholas’s death. "In the absence of ongoing or imminent criminal conduct, we cannot find defendants owed a duty to Nicholas to protect him from the assailants during the final altercation. Once Nicholas, J.D., and the assailants left defendants’ bar peaceably and in separate directions, the bar’s duty ended." The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. View "Glynn v. Orange Circle Lounge Inc." on Justia Law

This is an appeal from post-judgment findings and an order determining the amount of attorney fees and sanctions payable by Appellant to ex-wife. The family court ordered Appellant to pay a total of $70,000 ($22,000 and $48,000) in attorney fees and costs in the nature of sanctions. Appellant appealed. He argued the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay “excessive” attorney fees and “an egregious amount of sanctions as a result of ex-wife’s litigation.” He contends the trial court erred because he cooperated throughout the case, produced the accounting and documents requested, and “demonstrated willingness to settle.”   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record is replete with evidence demonstrating Deric’s steadfast, continued disregard of the court’s orders and the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement and judgment. He delayed listing the Oklahoma property for sale. He delayed providing an accounting of rental income received, along with bank statements, receipts, and proof of expenditures. He delayed paying court-ordered attorney fees and costs to his ex-wife and her counsel. The court explained that this warranted an imposition of attorney fees and costs in the nature of section 271 sanctions. The court found that there is no unreasonable financial burden on Appellant, as he has approximately $26,928 as his one-half of rental income and $102,000 in sale proceeds in his possession, which can be used to pay the attorney fees and sanctions award. View "Marriage of Rangell" on Justia Law

Respondent Paramount Pictures Corporation (Paramount) sought a refund of taxes paid on its personal property for the 2011 tax year. Paramount first appealed to the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board (the Board). The property was assessed a final value of $137,397,278. Following a hearing, the Board agreed with the valuation proposed by the Assessor and found that Paramount failed to carry its burden of demonstrating additional obsolescence. Paramount appealed the Board’s decision to the trial court. The trial court found: (1) the Board committed a methodological error in excluding Paramount’s initial income approach valuation and (2) the Board issued inadequate findings regarding the significance of Paramount’s pre-lien and post-lien sales of personal property. In a separate ruling, the trial court awarded Paramount attorney fees under Revenue and Taxation Code Section 1611.6, which allows a taxpayer to recover fees for services necessary to obtain proper findings from a county board. The County timely appealed both orders.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding the Board committed neither methodological error nor issued findings that were less than adequate within the meaning of section 1611.5. First, Paramount did not challenge the validity of the cost approach relied upon by the Assessor and Board, and it did not otherwise identify any legal error in the Board’s rejection of its income approach valuation. Second, the hearing transcripts adequately disclose its rulings and findings on the pre-lien and post-sales data. The court remanded so the trial court may consider the question of whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Paramount failed to establish additional obsolescence. View "Paramount Pictures Corp. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Fitness International, LLC was operating an indoor gym and fitness center when it entered into an amended lease with KB Salt Lake III, LLC, that required Fitness International to renovate the premises. However, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted government orders that closed indoor gyms but allowed commercial construction to continue. Fitness International nevertheless stopped construction at the Chatsworth site, remained in possession of the premises, and stopped paying rent. KB Salt Lake filed an unlawful detainer action, and the trial court granted KB Salt Lake’s motion for summary judgment. Fitness International appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court explained that Fitness International argued that the lease is a “monthly installment contract” and that each month it could not operate the premises as a fitness facility, frustrated the purpose of the contract. The court wrote that neither the pandemic nor the COVID-19 closure orders, however, prevented Fitness International from reopening the gym. Thus, even if California law recognized temporary frustration of purpose, and even if the lease was an “installment contract,” Fitness International still had to make rent payments under the lease. Moreover, the court explained that Fitness International argues the purpose of section 1511 “is to excuse performance under circumstances like these,” but Fitness International cites no authority describing the purpose of section 1511, nor does Fitness International explain how the trial court’s ruling was contrary to any such purpose. View "Fitness International v. KB Salt Lake III" on Justia Law

EpicentRx, Inc. and several of its officers, employees, and affiliates (collectively, the defendants) challenged a trial court order denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff-shareholder EpiRx, L.P.’s (EpiRx) lawsuit on forum non conveniens grounds. The defendants sought dismissal of the case based on mandatory forum selection clauses in EpicentRx’s certificate of incorporation and bylaws, which designated the Delaware Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum to resolve shareholder disputes like the present case. The trial court declined to enforce the forum selection clauses after finding that litigants did not have a right to a civil jury trial in the Delaware Court of Chancery and, therefore, enforcement of the clauses would deprive EpiRx of its inviolate right to a jury trial in violation of California public policy. The California Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that enforcement of the forum selection clauses in EpicentRx’s corporate documents would operate as an implied waiver of EpiRx’s right to a jury trial, thus the Court concluded the trial court properly declined to enforce the forum selection clauses at issue, and denied the defendants’ request for writ relief. View "EpicentRx, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Decedent was hit by a pickup truck in a crosswalk at a major intersection. After the accident, the decedent, who was on a 15-minute work break, walked back to the Whole Foods Market (the store) where he worked. There, store employees gave him an ice pack, a form to fill out relating to his injury, and a ride home. He died several hours later. The decedent is survived by his wife and three children (Plaintiffs), who filed this wrongful death action against several parties, including Mrs. Gooch’s Natural Food Markets, Inc. (Mrs. Gooch’s), the parent company of the store and the decedent’s employer. Mrs. Gooch’s demurred to the operative first amended complaint because an administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board had found the decedent’s injury and death to be employment-related and, therefore within the scope of workers’ compensation. The trial court sustained the demurrer.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. Plaintiffs first argued that Mrs. Gooch’s, through its employees, acted in a dual capacity following the accident. The court explained that Plaintiffs cite no case holding that a negligent undertaking theory is viable in the circumstances of the case. Plaintiffs also argued that the fraudulent concealment exception to the exclusive remedy rule applies. The court explained that the complaint does not allege that the decedent was unaware of his injury. Moreover, according to the operative complaint, Mrs. Gooch’s was unaware of the decedent’s injury until he advised his supervisors that he had been in an accident. View "Jimenez v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc." on Justia Law