Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Phil Hagey appealed a judgment of dismissal entered following the sustaining of a demurrer to his second amended complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff owned a home with a solar energy system (the system). At the time he purchased the home, the prior homeowner was party to a contract with a company, Kilowatt Systems, LLC (Kilowatt), which owned the system (the solar agreement). Among other terms, the solar agreement required the prior homeowner to purchase the energy produced by the system through monthly payments to Kilowatt. In the event of a sale of the house, the solar agreement afforded the prior homeowner three options. The prior homeowner and plaintiff agreed to an option which allowed prepayment of all remaining monthly payments and a transfer of all solar agreement rights and obligations to plaintiff, except for the monthly payment responsibility. In conjunction with the sale of the house, prepayment occurred and the parties entered into the requisite transfer agreement. At some later point in time, defendant Solar Service Experts, LLC began sending plaintiff monthly bills on Kilowatt’s behalf, demanding payments pursuant to the solar agreement. After receiving a bill, plaintiff spoke to a representative of defendant who told him he should not have received the bill and the issue would be resolved. Plaintiff received additional bills and at least one late payment notice which identified defendant as a debt collector. Plaintiff communicated with defendant’s representatives about the errors by phone and email, all to no avail. Plaintiff thereafter filed a class action lawsuit against defendant. The trial court concluded plaintiff did not, and could not, allege facts sufficient to constitute a consumer credit transaction, as statutorily defined. Plaintiff argued the court erroneously focused on the undisputed fact he did not owe the debt which defendant sought to collect and, in doing so, failed to recognize the Rosenthal Act applied to debt alleged to be due or owing by reason of a consumer credit transaction. To this the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. View "Hagey v. Solar Service Experts" on Justia Law

Piplack and Taylor are lead plaintiffs in Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Labor Code 2698) representative actions in Orange and Los Angeles Counties against In-N-Out. Upon learning of settlement negotiations in a subsequent, overlapping PAGA action brought by Accurso against In-N-Out in Sonoma County, Piplack and Taylor filed a proposed complaint in intervention in the Sonoma County action, and moved to intervene under Code of Civil Procedure section 387 and 2 for a stay. The trial court denied the motions.The court of appeal vacated. Non-party PAGA claimants who seek to intervene in overlapping PAGA cases must have a “significantly protectable interest” that meets the threshold requirements of section 387. A personal interest is not required. The court upheld the denial of mandatory intervention; although Piplack and Taylor have significantly protectable interests, they failed to prove inadequate representation or potential impairment of their protectable interests. The court remanded the issue of permissive intervention for a “discretionary weighing of whether Piplack and Taylor propose to add anything to this case, the importance of which outweighs any objections Accurso and In-N-Out may have to the court hearing it.” View "Accurso v. In-N-Out Burgers" on Justia Law

LaCour, a former Marshalls employee, filed suit under the Labor Code’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Labor Code 2698) in January 2021. Marshalls argued that LaCour, having left Marshalls in May 2019, had only a year and 65 days to bring a claim and missed that deadline. Marshalls also argued that all allegations of violations pre-dating November 17, 2020, must be stricken because PAGA claims against Marshalls through that date were released in the settlement of an earlier class and PAGA action (Rodriguez).The court held that California Rules of Court emergency rule 9, put into effect during the pandemic, validly extended the limitations period by six months and that LaCour could pursue claims for violations occurring after the Rodriguez settlement's effective date. The court rejected LaCour’s argument that the Rodriguez plaintiff had no authority to settle claims encompassed by LaCour’s notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA); the Rodriguez LWDA notice letter listed several Labor Code provisions, including section 2802—which provided the legal basis for LaCour’s PAGA claims, even though, factually, the notices alleged different policies. The court then dismissed because LaCour was not a Marshalls's employee after November 17, 2019, and was not an “aggrieved employee” under PAGA and had no standing to sue.The court of appeal vacated. LaCour’s PAGA complaint was timely filed but the trial court erred in giving claim preclusive effect to a federal court judgment in a prior PAGA case. View "LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC" on Justia Law

After an elementary school teacher grabbed and twisted A.S.’s arm, his mother (and guardian ad litem) filed a complaint form with the Palmdale School District (District) on his behalf. They then filed a lawsuit for damages against the District, its superintendent, the assistant superintendent, the elementary school principal, and the teacher. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer to Appellant’s third amended complaint on the ground Appellant failed to file a claim with the District in compliance with Government Code section 910.2 Appellant appealed from the subsequent judgment of dismissal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Appellant specified several administrative actions that he wanted the District to take but did not state he was seeking monetary damages and made no attempt at all to estimate, even roughly, an amount of damages or state whether or not the claim would be a limited civil case. Accordingly, the court held that the complaint form does not substantially comply with section 910. Further, the court explained that even if it assumes that all of the elements of equitable estoppel were initially present, the law recognizes that circumstances may change and render estoppel no longer appropriate. Here, Appellant’s counsel is charged with the knowledge that Appellant needed to file a claim for damages with the District and with the knowledge of what was required for such a claim. Given that counsel possessed the relevant facts about the incident, had the original complaint form, and was actually aware of the statutory requirements for suing a governmental entity, this was ample time. View "A.S. v. Palmdale Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Housing Authority of the City of Calexico (the Housing Authority) and AMG & Associates, LLC (collectively, the plaintiffs) appealed a superior court confirming an arbitration award, declining to undertake a review of the award on the merits for errors of fact or law (review on the merits) and declining to grant their petition to partially reverse or vacate the award. They contended the superior court should have undertaken a review on the merits because the parties had agreed to such a review. They further contended that, had the superior court undertaken such a review, it would have concluded that no substantial evidence supported the award and that the award was contrary to law. Additionally, plaintiffs contended that, in denying their motion to partially reverse or vacate the award, the superior court left in place a finding by the arbitrator that not only exceeded the arbitrator’s powers but worked as a forfeiture against the Housing Authority. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the superior court erred in declining to undertake a review on the merits. "[I]n instances in which the parties have agreed that an arbitration award may be subjected to judicial review, it is the superior court and not the Court of Appeal that has original jurisdiction to undertake that review in the first instance, that the superior court is without power to yield that original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal, and that the superior court should thus have performed the review." View "Housing Auth City of Calexico v. Multi-Housing Tax Credit Partners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was placed on unpaid administrative leave and then terminated from her employment with defendant Sequoia Union Elementary School District (the School District) after refusing to either provide verification of her COVID-19 vaccination status or undergo weekly testing as required by a then-operative order of the State Public Health Officer.Plaintiff brought suit under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act against defendants the School District; Sequoia Union Elementary School (the School); and the School principal and superintendent, alleging (1) discrimination due to her refusal to authorize release of her medical information and (2) unauthorized use of her medical information.The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding each claim failed as a matter of law due to certain statutory exceptions.Without any factual allegations that defendants received any “medical information,” such as medical records, a medical certification, or other information in “electronic or physical form... derived from a provider of health care” (section 56.05, subd.(i)), the Fifth Appellate District found that the complaint fails to state a cause of action for unauthorized use of such information under section 56.20(c). View "Rossi v. Sequoia Union Elementary School" on Justia Law

Appellants LNSU #1 and LNSU #2, two homeowners in a common interest development managed by the Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Association (the Association), appealed a judgment entered against them in their action against the Association for violations of the Common Interest Development Open Meeting Act (OMA). The court rejected appellants’ claims that: (1) the Association violated the OMA when its board of directors took action in an executive session that it should have taken in a meeting open to all members; (2) the board failed to prepare minutes concerning a second executive session; and (3) certain directors discussed items of Association business via e-mails without giving all Association members notice and opportunity to participate in the discussions and without preparing related minutes. Appellants also appealed postjudgment orders denying their motion to strike or tax costs and granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error with respect to appellants' OMA violation claims. The Court determined the trial court incorrectly awarded costs under a provision of the OMA authorizing such an award to a prevailing homeowners association in an action the court finds “to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” but that the Association was not entitled to attorney fees or costs: "appellants’ action does not meet that description, the Association is not entitled to costs." The judgment is affirmed. The order denying appellants’ motion to strike or tax costs is reversed. The order granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions: (1) to vacate the order denying appellants’ motion to strike or tax costs, and to enter a new order granting the motion and denying all costs; (2) to vacate the order granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees, and to enter a new order denying the motion; and (3) to strike the amended judgment. View "LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn." on Justia Law

The Center for Scientific Integrity (CSI) was an organization that reported on academic retractions and accountability. CSI wrote an article about plaintiff-respondent Constance Iloh, a professor at the University of California, Irvine (UCI), after several academic journals retracted articles Iloh had written due to concerns about possible plagiarism or inaccurate citation references. In a follow-up to that article, CSI sent UCI a records request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) requesting Iloh’s postpublication communications with the journals and UCI. Iloh petitioned for a writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief against UCI to prevent disclosure of her communications, and later added CSI as a real party in interest. She then filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prevent disclosure. Meanwhile, CSI filed a motion to strike Iloh’s petition under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The Court of Appeal’s first opinion in this case concerned Iloh’s motion for preliminary injunction. The trial court denied that motion on the grounds that Iloh had not established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and the Court affirmed that order. In this case, the Court considered CSI’s anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that although protected activity may have led to the petition, it was not the “basis” for the petition. To this, the Court disagreed: in issuing the CPRA request, CSI was engaging in newsgathering so it could report on matters of public interest, such as how a public university funded largely by taxpayer dollars resolved quality or integrity problems in its professors’ publications. CSI was therefore engaged in protected activity when it issued the CPRA request. Iloh filed her petition for mandamus relief to prevent UCI from complying with the CPRA request. “This is the type of lawsuit the anti-SLAPP statute is designed to address, and it should be stricken if Iloh cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her petition.” The Court of Appeal found the trial court had not performed the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Therefore, the Court reversed the order denying CSI’s anti-SLAPP motion and remanded this case with directions that the trial court consider prong two of the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Iloh v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

North Coast Village Condominium Association (the Association) filed a workplace violence restraining order in support of its board president, Neil Anderson, and 46 other employees and board members seeking to restrain resident, defendant-appellant Nancy Phillips. At the conclusion of a three-day hearing, the trial court denied the Association’s request. It then sua sponte and absent a request to amend the pleadings by either party, awarded Anderson a civil harassment restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 against Phillips “in the interest of judicial efficiency and conforming pleadings to proof.” In so doing, it impliedly amended the pleadings to add Anderson as a party. Phillips appealed, requesting that the Court of Appeal reverse the order granting the civil harassment restraining order and enter judgment dismissing all restraining orders with prejudice. The Association filed a cross-appeal seeking reversal of the order denying the workplace violence restraining order. It also requested that the Court reverse and remand with instructions to enter a restraining order that included stay-away orders. The Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte amending the cause of action and petitioning party without adequate notice. Regarding the cross-appeal, the Court further concluded the trial court erred in interpreting and applying section 527.8. The order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "North Coast Village Condominium Assn. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Geringer Capital, Inc., Roger Geringer and Tricycle Entertainment, LLC (collectively Geringer parties) moved to preclude Jeffrey Konvitz, Blue Rider Finance, Inc.’s counsel of record, from testifying at trial in support of Blue Rider’s claim that the Geringer parties fraudulently induced Blue Rider to enter into a settlement agreement that did not accurately reflect the terms negotiated by the parties. The Geringer parties subsequently clarified that their motion should be considered, in the alternative, a motion to disqualify Konvitz. The court granted the motion and disqualified Konvitz, finding the integrity of the judicial process would be impaired if Konvitz served in dual roles. On appeal, Blue Rider contends the court should have denied the motion due to the Geringer parties’ excessive delay in raising the issue.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the general rule is that an attorney may serve as both advocate and witness, testifying at trial concerning disputed issues, if the client has provided its informed written consent. Disqualification of counsel, when consent has been given, must be based on a convincing showing of prejudice to the opposing party or the potential for palpable injury to the judicial process. Here, the court wrote that the record is devoid of the evidence necessary to support the disqualification of Blue Rider’s chosen counsel. Further, the court explained that disqualification is not justified absent a convincing demonstration by the moving party of a potential for injury to the integrity of the judicial process. The showing must be based on an adequate factual record, not overarching statements of policy or conclusory allegations by the party seeking disqualification. Accordingly, the court found that it was an error for the trial court not to resolve the Geringer parties’ motion in favor of allowing Blue Rider to be represented by Konvitz, its counsel of choice. View "Geringer v. Blue Rider Finance" on Justia Law