Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case pertains to an appeal by the City of Los Angeles and real parties in interest, TTLC Los Angeles – El Sereno, LLC and The True Life Companies, LLC against a petition filed by Delia Guerrero and Coyotl + Macehualli Citizens (Objectors). The Objectors alleged that the city's approval of a real estate development project violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The city and the developers had argued that the petition was untimely, but the trial court granted the Objectors’ petition, directing the city to vacate project approvals and prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) evaluating the project's environmental impacts. On appeal by the city and developers, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the Objectors’ petition was untimely, as it was filed more than a year after the city's notice of determination, which triggered the statute of limitations for challenges under the CEQA. The court concluded that the city's initial approval of the project represented its earliest firm commitment to approving the project, and hence constituted project approval under CEQA. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the city and the developers and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Objectors' petition. View "Guerrero v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an arbitration agreement between an employee and her employer. The employee, Aljarice Hasty, was employed by the American Automobile Association of Northern California, Nevada & Utah (Association). After her employment ended, Hasty sued the Association for race discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, harassment, wrongful discharge, and retaliation. The Association sought to compel arbitration per an agreement in Hasty's employment contract, but the trial court found the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and declined to sever the unconscionable terms. The Association appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court found the arbitration agreement to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability was found due to the adhesive nature of the agreement, the lack of negotiation, and the hidden nature of the unconscionable provision within the complex document. Substantive unconscionability was found due to the agreement's one-sided nature, the overly broad confidentiality provision, and the waiver of the employee's right to bring representative actions under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the unconscionable terms, as the arbitration agreement was permeated with unconscionability. View "Hasty v. American Automobile Assn. of Northern Cal., Nev. & Utah" on Justia Law

In a domestic violence dispute that led to dueling restraining orders, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, affirmed the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees to Peter Henri Dragones III, the prevailing party. Both Dragones and his opponent, Kerry Calkins, had sought restraining orders against each other in 2022. The trial court granted Dragones's request and denied Calkins's. Subsequently, Dragones moved for attorney's fees under Family Code section 6344. While the case was pending, the legislature repealed the prior version of section 6344 and enacted a new one, which made it easier for a prevailing petitioner to obtain fees. Both parties contended that the prior version of section 6344 should apply. However, the appellate court held that the current version of section 6344 applies retroactively to all cases pending on its effective date, including this case. This decision was based on California's general rule of retroactivity for amendments to the Family Code and the established principle that newly enacted attorney fee statutes apply to cases pending on their effective date. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under the new statute. View "Dragones v. Calkins" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, John GM Roe, a childhood sexual assault victim, filed an action against three "Doe" defendants, including his former Boy Scout leader. The Superior Court of Fresno County dismissed his complaint with prejudice, citing failure to timely file certificates of merit as required by California's Code of Civil Procedure, section 340.1, subdivisions (f) and (g). The court also claimed that the statute of limitations had expired by the time Roe filed compliant certificates.Roe appealed, arguing that Emergency rule 9, enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, tolled the statute of limitations governing his claims. This rule, he contended, meant that when the court dismissed his complaint, the limitations period had not yet expired. Therefore, he insisted that the dismissal should have been without prejudice so he could refile his complaint and certificates of merit before the limitations period ended.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District agreed with Roe. The court ruled that section 340.1, subdivision (q), which created a three-year revival period for all civil claims arising from childhood sexual assault that were barred as of January 1, 2020, is part of a statute of limitations. Consequently, Emergency rule 9, which tolled statutes of limitations for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days, also tolled section 340.1, subdivision (q)’s three-year revival period. This interpretation extended the deadline to file childhood sexual assault claims to June 27, 2023. As such, the court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing Roe's claims with prejudice, allowing him to refile his complaint and certificates of merit. View "Roe v. Doe 1" on Justia Law

In this case, Maria Ruiz Perez and minor children of the deceased, Hector Evangelista and Giselle Evangelista, filed a lawsuit against the Oakdale Irrigation District (OID) after a tragic accident resulted in the deaths of Hector and Giselle. The accident occurred when their vehicle overturned and landed in a drain, leading to their drowning. The plaintiffs contended that the water level in the drain, which was a public property managed by the OID, was a dangerous condition that led to the fatalities. However, the Superior Court of Stanislaus County granted summary judgment in favor of OID, citing "canal immunity" under Government Code, § 831.8, subd. (b), which immunizes the state or an irrigation district from liability for injuries caused by the condition of canals, conduits, or drains if the injured party was using the property for a purpose other than its intended use.The plaintiffs appealed this decision, arguing that canal immunity should apply only when the injured party intentionally used the public property in a manner not intended by the government. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District rejected this interpretation. Instead, the appellate court held that canal immunity applies when the injured person interacts with the canal, conduit, or drain in a manner not intended by the government, regardless of whether that interaction was intentional or involuntary. The court based this interpretation on the legislative intent behind the statute, which was to define the scope of immunity in terms of how foreseeable the injury was to the government, rather than the degree of responsibility assumed by the injured party. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of OID. View "Perez v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an easement across a property, Lot 4, in Sausalito, California. The property was part of a larger estate that once belonged to Alan Patterson. Patterson had sold a neighboring property, Lot 3, to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of a limited liability company, Green Tree Headlands LLC.The purchase agreement between Patterson and McArthur included an addendum (the "Rider") stating that a 15-foot driveway easement across Lot 4 for access to Lot 3 would "remain in existence." However, a subsequent document, the "Declaration of Restrictions," stated that the easement would expire after Patterson moved out of his residence on Lot 3.After Patterson's death, Tara Crawford, the trustee of a trust holding his assets, took over the management of Lot 4. Crawford relied on the Declaration of Restrictions to assert that the driveway easement had expired. McArthur disagreed, citing the Rider.Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, but later voluntarily dismissed her action. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. In response, Crawford and Graves filed a motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four held that Crawford and Graves' motion should have been granted. The court reasoned that while the underlying purchase agreement and subsequent documents were in conflict, Crawford had a reasonable basis to seek judicial resolution of that conflict. As such, McArthur could not show that Crawford's lawsuit was completely without merit, a necessary element for a malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In this case, consumers brought tort claims against a mattress retailer and manufacturer, alleging injuries suffered while sleeping on a defective mattress. The plaintiffs settled with the retailer and later dismissed their claims against the manufacturer, Tempur-Pedic North America, LLC, before filing a new lawsuit. The manufacturer then moved for costs as the prevailing party in the dismissed lawsuit. The trial court awarded some costs to the manufacturer, including costs for depositions that were noticed but did not occur. The consumers appealed this decision, arguing it was improper to award costs for depositions that did not occur.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two disagreed with the consumers and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that there is no blanket exception to awarding costs for depositions that were noticed but did not occur. The court explained that the proper analysis focuses on whether costs were reasonably necessary to litigating a case when incurred, not whether the costs could have been avoided in retrospect. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the costs were reasonably necessary. View "Garcia v. Tempur-Pedic North America, LLC" on Justia Law

In California, plaintiff Jasmine Moten appealed the trial court’s decision to grant an anti-SLAPP motion filed by defendant, Transworld Systems Inc. (Transworld). Moten had taken out a student loan which she later defaulted on, leading to Transworld, a debt collection company, servicing the loan. Transworld filed a debt collection action against Moten on behalf of National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3 (NCSLT 2007-3), to whom the loan had been assigned. Moten filed a class action lawsuit against Transworld, alleging that it did not have a valid legal claim as it had manufactured documents to prove ownership of the loan by NCSLT 2007-3. She claimed that these deceptive practices violated the Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, as well as Unfair Competition and Unlawful Business Acts and Practices. The trial court granted Transworld's anti-SLAPP motion, which led to Moten's appeal. The Court of Appeal for the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court’s decision, ruling that the trial court erred in applying the litigation privilege to Moten's claims. The appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether Moten has a probability of prevailing on her claims and to consider the public interest exception of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17. View "Moten v. Transworld Systems Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between Gregory Garrabrants, the CEO of BofI Federal Bank (BofI), and Charles Matthew Erhart, a former internal auditor at BofI who acted as a whistleblower. Erhart copied, transmitted, and retained various documents he believed evidenced possible wrongdoing, some of which contained Garrabrants' personal and confidential information. Garrabrants sued Erhart for accessing, taking, and subsequently retaining his personal information. A jury awarded Garrabrants $1,502 on claims for invasion of privacy, receiving stolen property, and unauthorized access to computer data.However, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The court found that the trial court made prejudicial errors in its jury instructions. Specifically, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that bank customers have an unqualified reasonable expectation of privacy in financial documents disclosed to banks. The trial court also erred in instructing the jury that Erhart's whistleblower justification defense depended on proving at least one legally unsupported element. The instructions given for Penal Code section 496 misstated the law by defining “theft” in a manner that essentially renders receiving stolen property a strict liability offense. Furthermore, the special instruction on Penal Code section 502 erroneously removed from the jury’s consideration the foundational issue of whether Garrabrants “owned” the data about him residing in BofI’s computer systems such that he could pursue a civil action under the statute. The court concluded that, in light of the record evidence, there is a reasonable possibility a jury could have found in Erhart’s favor on each of Garrabrants’ claims absent the erroneous instructions, making them prejudicial. View "Garrabrants v. Erhart" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, a dispute arose from the marital dissolution proceedings of Daniel Gilbert-Valencia (husband) and Kate McEachen (wife). The husband argued that the family court erred in awarding 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the parties’ quasi-marital property to the wife, excluding evidence of domestic violence perpetrated by the wife, and retroactively modifying the tax deductibility of spousal support payments made by the husband.The facts of the case reveal that the husband sold the house over the wife’s objections during the dissolution proceedings, believing it was his personal property. He used the net proceeds from the sale exclusively for personal purposes. The family court decided that the wife was a putative spouse, the house was quasi-marital property, and the husband had breached his fiduciary duty to the wife by selling the house and using the proceeds for personal purposes. Consequently, the court awarded 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the house to the wife.The appellate court agreed with the husband's first two contentions. It held that the family court committed an error by awarding 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the quasi-marital property to the wife without finding oppression, fraud, or malice by the husband. This decision was an abuse of discretion because it contradicted the requirement under Family Code section 1101 for such findings to justify an unequal division of community property.The appellate court also held that the family court erred in excluding a videotape that was documented evidence of the wife’s domestic violence. In addition, it found that the family court failed to consider the husband's request for a domestic violence restraining order, admitted into evidence with the wife's consent, when deciding on spousal support. This failure was deemed a reversible error.The appellate court reversed the family court's orders and remanded the case for reconsideration of the division of quasi-marital property and spousal support, and a decision on the tax deductibility of the husband's spousal support payments. View "Marriage of Gilbert-Valencia & McEachen" on Justia Law