Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Westlands Water District (Westlands) appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered in a validation action filed pursuant to, inter alia, Code of Civil Procedure section 860 et seq. The subject matter was an anticipated contract between Westlands and the United States concerning the ongoing delivery of federal reclamation project water and repayment of certain financial obligations. The superior court declined to grant relief and ultimately dismissed Westlands’ validation action for multiple reasons. Most pertinently, the draft was found to be materially deficient in its failure to specify Westlands’ financial obligations under the anticipated contract.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The court explained that the “Repayment Obligation” cannot be determined without knowing the “Existing Capital Obligation” and/or the contents of exhibit D. The “Existing Capital Obligation” cannot be determined without knowing the contents of exhibit D. In the absence of exhibit D, both terms are useless for purposes of determining Westlands’ financial obligations, i.e., “the scope of the duty and the limits of performance.” Moreover, as Westlands admitted during the motion proceedings, exhibit D was not merely omitted from the draft attached to the complaint. Despite being expressly incorporated into the contract by reference, exhibit D did not exist when the complaint and the December 2019 motion were filed. Even when the motion was heard, there was only meager parol evidence of estimates ranging from $200 million to $362 million. Given the circumstances, the court agreed the contract presented for validation was missing an essential term and, therefore uncertain, i.e., not sufficiently definite to be binding and enforceable. View "Westlands Water Dist. v. All Persons Interested" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a residence and obtained a $1 million loan, memorialized by a note secured by a deed of trust. Years later, the property was sold through a nonjudicial foreclosure. Plaintiffs, after two prior federal suits were dismissed without prejudice, filed this state lawsuit for wrongful foreclosure, against the Buyers, and Lenders. Lenders successfully argued the action was barred by res judicata (claim preclusion), based on those dismissals; under Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(B), the “two dismissal rule,” the dismissal of the second federal suit was “an adjudication on the merits.”The court of appeal concluded the voluntary dismissal of the second federal lawsuit was not a final “adjudication on the merits” that barred the filing of this case in state court. The two-dismissal rule of Rule 41(a)(1)(B) applies when there is a voluntary dismissal in state or federal court, a second voluntary dismissal in federal court, and the subsequent filing of an action in the same federal court where the second suit was dismissed. Under California law, a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a prior action is not a final judgment on the merits that bars a subsequent suit. California does not prohibit a plaintiff from filing dismissals without prejudice in successive actions. The rule is inapplicable to this state court lawsuit alleging only state-law claims. The court nonetheless affirmed, concluding that the challenges to the foreclosure lack merit. View "Gray v. La Salle Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Phil Hagey appealed a judgment of dismissal entered following the sustaining of a demurrer to his second amended complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff owned a home with a solar energy system (the system). At the time he purchased the home, the prior homeowner was party to a contract with a company, Kilowatt Systems, LLC (Kilowatt), which owned the system (the solar agreement). Among other terms, the solar agreement required the prior homeowner to purchase the energy produced by the system through monthly payments to Kilowatt. In the event of a sale of the house, the solar agreement afforded the prior homeowner three options. The prior homeowner and plaintiff agreed to an option which allowed prepayment of all remaining monthly payments and a transfer of all solar agreement rights and obligations to plaintiff, except for the monthly payment responsibility. In conjunction with the sale of the house, prepayment occurred and the parties entered into the requisite transfer agreement. At some later point in time, defendant Solar Service Experts, LLC began sending plaintiff monthly bills on Kilowatt’s behalf, demanding payments pursuant to the solar agreement. After receiving a bill, plaintiff spoke to a representative of defendant who told him he should not have received the bill and the issue would be resolved. Plaintiff received additional bills and at least one late payment notice which identified defendant as a debt collector. Plaintiff communicated with defendant’s representatives about the errors by phone and email, all to no avail. Plaintiff thereafter filed a class action lawsuit against defendant. The trial court concluded plaintiff did not, and could not, allege facts sufficient to constitute a consumer credit transaction, as statutorily defined. Plaintiff argued the court erroneously focused on the undisputed fact he did not owe the debt which defendant sought to collect and, in doing so, failed to recognize the Rosenthal Act applied to debt alleged to be due or owing by reason of a consumer credit transaction. To this the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. View "Hagey v. Solar Service Experts" on Justia Law

Piplack and Taylor are lead plaintiffs in Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Labor Code 2698) representative actions in Orange and Los Angeles Counties against In-N-Out. Upon learning of settlement negotiations in a subsequent, overlapping PAGA action brought by Accurso against In-N-Out in Sonoma County, Piplack and Taylor filed a proposed complaint in intervention in the Sonoma County action, and moved to intervene under Code of Civil Procedure section 387 and 2 for a stay. The trial court denied the motions.The court of appeal vacated. Non-party PAGA claimants who seek to intervene in overlapping PAGA cases must have a “significantly protectable interest” that meets the threshold requirements of section 387. A personal interest is not required. The court upheld the denial of mandatory intervention; although Piplack and Taylor have significantly protectable interests, they failed to prove inadequate representation or potential impairment of their protectable interests. The court remanded the issue of permissive intervention for a “discretionary weighing of whether Piplack and Taylor propose to add anything to this case, the importance of which outweighs any objections Accurso and In-N-Out may have to the court hearing it.” View "Accurso v. In-N-Out Burgers" on Justia Law

LaCour, a former Marshalls employee, filed suit under the Labor Code’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Labor Code 2698) in January 2021. Marshalls argued that LaCour, having left Marshalls in May 2019, had only a year and 65 days to bring a claim and missed that deadline. Marshalls also argued that all allegations of violations pre-dating November 17, 2020, must be stricken because PAGA claims against Marshalls through that date were released in the settlement of an earlier class and PAGA action (Rodriguez).The court held that California Rules of Court emergency rule 9, put into effect during the pandemic, validly extended the limitations period by six months and that LaCour could pursue claims for violations occurring after the Rodriguez settlement's effective date. The court rejected LaCour’s argument that the Rodriguez plaintiff had no authority to settle claims encompassed by LaCour’s notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA); the Rodriguez LWDA notice letter listed several Labor Code provisions, including section 2802—which provided the legal basis for LaCour’s PAGA claims, even though, factually, the notices alleged different policies. The court then dismissed because LaCour was not a Marshalls's employee after November 17, 2019, and was not an “aggrieved employee” under PAGA and had no standing to sue.The court of appeal vacated. LaCour’s PAGA complaint was timely filed but the trial court erred in giving claim preclusive effect to a federal court judgment in a prior PAGA case. View "LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC" on Justia Law

After an elementary school teacher grabbed and twisted A.S.’s arm, his mother (and guardian ad litem) filed a complaint form with the Palmdale School District (District) on his behalf. They then filed a lawsuit for damages against the District, its superintendent, the assistant superintendent, the elementary school principal, and the teacher. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer to Appellant’s third amended complaint on the ground Appellant failed to file a claim with the District in compliance with Government Code section 910.2 Appellant appealed from the subsequent judgment of dismissal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Appellant specified several administrative actions that he wanted the District to take but did not state he was seeking monetary damages and made no attempt at all to estimate, even roughly, an amount of damages or state whether or not the claim would be a limited civil case. Accordingly, the court held that the complaint form does not substantially comply with section 910. Further, the court explained that even if it assumes that all of the elements of equitable estoppel were initially present, the law recognizes that circumstances may change and render estoppel no longer appropriate. Here, Appellant’s counsel is charged with the knowledge that Appellant needed to file a claim for damages with the District and with the knowledge of what was required for such a claim. Given that counsel possessed the relevant facts about the incident, had the original complaint form, and was actually aware of the statutory requirements for suing a governmental entity, this was ample time. View "A.S. v. Palmdale Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Housing Authority of the City of Calexico (the Housing Authority) and AMG & Associates, LLC (collectively, the plaintiffs) appealed a superior court confirming an arbitration award, declining to undertake a review of the award on the merits for errors of fact or law (review on the merits) and declining to grant their petition to partially reverse or vacate the award. They contended the superior court should have undertaken a review on the merits because the parties had agreed to such a review. They further contended that, had the superior court undertaken such a review, it would have concluded that no substantial evidence supported the award and that the award was contrary to law. Additionally, plaintiffs contended that, in denying their motion to partially reverse or vacate the award, the superior court left in place a finding by the arbitrator that not only exceeded the arbitrator’s powers but worked as a forfeiture against the Housing Authority. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the superior court erred in declining to undertake a review on the merits. "[I]n instances in which the parties have agreed that an arbitration award may be subjected to judicial review, it is the superior court and not the Court of Appeal that has original jurisdiction to undertake that review in the first instance, that the superior court is without power to yield that original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal, and that the superior court should thus have performed the review." View "Housing Auth City of Calexico v. Multi-Housing Tax Credit Partners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was placed on unpaid administrative leave and then terminated from her employment with defendant Sequoia Union Elementary School District (the School District) after refusing to either provide verification of her COVID-19 vaccination status or undergo weekly testing as required by a then-operative order of the State Public Health Officer.Plaintiff brought suit under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act against defendants the School District; Sequoia Union Elementary School (the School); and the School principal and superintendent, alleging (1) discrimination due to her refusal to authorize release of her medical information and (2) unauthorized use of her medical information.The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding each claim failed as a matter of law due to certain statutory exceptions.Without any factual allegations that defendants received any “medical information,” such as medical records, a medical certification, or other information in “electronic or physical form... derived from a provider of health care” (section 56.05, subd.(i)), the Fifth Appellate District found that the complaint fails to state a cause of action for unauthorized use of such information under section 56.20(c). View "Rossi v. Sequoia Union Elementary School" on Justia Law

Appellants LNSU #1 and LNSU #2, two homeowners in a common interest development managed by the Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Association (the Association), appealed a judgment entered against them in their action against the Association for violations of the Common Interest Development Open Meeting Act (OMA). The court rejected appellants’ claims that: (1) the Association violated the OMA when its board of directors took action in an executive session that it should have taken in a meeting open to all members; (2) the board failed to prepare minutes concerning a second executive session; and (3) certain directors discussed items of Association business via e-mails without giving all Association members notice and opportunity to participate in the discussions and without preparing related minutes. Appellants also appealed postjudgment orders denying their motion to strike or tax costs and granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error with respect to appellants' OMA violation claims. The Court determined the trial court incorrectly awarded costs under a provision of the OMA authorizing such an award to a prevailing homeowners association in an action the court finds “to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” but that the Association was not entitled to attorney fees or costs: "appellants’ action does not meet that description, the Association is not entitled to costs." The judgment is affirmed. The order denying appellants’ motion to strike or tax costs is reversed. The order granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions: (1) to vacate the order denying appellants’ motion to strike or tax costs, and to enter a new order granting the motion and denying all costs; (2) to vacate the order granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees, and to enter a new order denying the motion; and (3) to strike the amended judgment. View "LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn." on Justia Law

The Center for Scientific Integrity (CSI) was an organization that reported on academic retractions and accountability. CSI wrote an article about plaintiff-respondent Constance Iloh, a professor at the University of California, Irvine (UCI), after several academic journals retracted articles Iloh had written due to concerns about possible plagiarism or inaccurate citation references. In a follow-up to that article, CSI sent UCI a records request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) requesting Iloh’s postpublication communications with the journals and UCI. Iloh petitioned for a writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief against UCI to prevent disclosure of her communications, and later added CSI as a real party in interest. She then filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prevent disclosure. Meanwhile, CSI filed a motion to strike Iloh’s petition under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The Court of Appeal’s first opinion in this case concerned Iloh’s motion for preliminary injunction. The trial court denied that motion on the grounds that Iloh had not established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and the Court affirmed that order. In this case, the Court considered CSI’s anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that although protected activity may have led to the petition, it was not the “basis” for the petition. To this, the Court disagreed: in issuing the CPRA request, CSI was engaging in newsgathering so it could report on matters of public interest, such as how a public university funded largely by taxpayer dollars resolved quality or integrity problems in its professors’ publications. CSI was therefore engaged in protected activity when it issued the CPRA request. Iloh filed her petition for mandamus relief to prevent UCI from complying with the CPRA request. “This is the type of lawsuit the anti-SLAPP statute is designed to address, and it should be stricken if Iloh cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her petition.” The Court of Appeal found the trial court had not performed the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Therefore, the Court reversed the order denying CSI’s anti-SLAPP motion and remanded this case with directions that the trial court consider prong two of the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Iloh v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law