Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Shauna Willis appealed an order granting her request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-husband, Respondent Ricky Willis. She contended the family court erred under Family Code section 3044(a) because the court maintained joint physical custody by keeping in place a visitation order which had granted each approximately equal custody time with their child, T.W. The issue presented by this appeal was whether the rebuttable presumption of section 3044(a) arose in a proceeding for issuance of a DVRO when neither party was seeking custody or a modification of a custody or visitation order. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded the presumption of section 3044(a) did not arise in that situation. "Our conclusion is based on the plain language of section 3044(a), which by its terms applies only when a party is seeking custody of the child and is reinforced by other statutory provisions." Because the presumption of section 3044(a) did not arise, the family court erred by awarding Appellant sole legal and physical custody of T.W. Although Respondent did not appeal, the Court reversed that part of the order in the interest of justice. View "Marriage of Willis v. Costa-Willis" on Justia Law

This appeal was the second relating to a suit brought by the City of Hesperia (the City) against respondents Lake Arrowhead Community Services District and the Board of Directors of Lake Arrowhead Community Services District (jointly, the District) regarding a proposed 0.96-megawatt solar photovoltaic project (the Solar Project) that the District had been planning to develop on six acres of a 350-acre property it owned, known as the Hesperia Farms Property. The Hesperia Farms Property was located within the City’s municipal boundary and was generally subject to the City’s zoning regulations. The District first approved its Solar Project in December 2015, after determining that the project was either absolutely exempt from the City’s zoning regulations under Government Code section 53091, or qualifiedly exempt under Government Code section 53096. The City sought a writ of mandate prohibiting the District from further pursuing the Solar Project. In Hesperia I, the Court of Appeal determined the District’s Solar Project was not exempt from the City’s zoning regulations under Government Code section 53091’s absolute exemption, or under Government Code section 53096’s qualified exemption. The Court concluded, however, that Government Code section 52096’s qualified exemption did not apply to the District’s approval of the Solar Project only because the District had failed to provide substantial evidence to support its conclusion that there was no other feasible alternative to its proposed location for the Solar Project. This result left open the possibility that the District could undertake further analyses and show that there was no feasible alternative to the Solar Project’s proposed location in order to avoid application of the City’s zoning ordinances. A few months after the District made its second no-feasible-alternative determination with respect to the Solar Project, the City filed a second petition for writ of mandate and complaint challenging the Solar Project. The trial court ultimately denied the City’s second petition. When the City appealed, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in rejecting the City’s petition for writ of mandate. View "City of Hesperia v. Lake Arrowhead Community Services Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Greenville Rancheria (Greenville) was a sovereign Indian tribe that owned administrative and medical offices (property) in the City of Red Bluff. Following a contested election, defendant Angela Martin was elected as Greenville’s chairperson, which included the authority to act as Greenville’s chief executive officer. After her election, Martin, along with approximately 20 people, including defendants Andrea Cazares-Diego, Andrew Gonzales, Hallie Hugo, Elijah Martin, and Adrian Hugo, entered the property and refused to leave despite the remaining members of the tribal council ordering them to leave and removing Martin’s authority as chairperson under Greenville’s constitution. Because of defendants’ failure to vacate the property, Greenville filed a verified emergency complaint for trespass and injunctive relief. The trial court granted Greenville a temporary restraining order, but later granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Greenville appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed: defendants did not point to any authority demonstrating the federal government’s intent to preempt state law or deprive state courts of subject matter jurisdiction in property disputes between tribal members occurring on lands outside tribal trust lands. "To conclude we lack jurisdiction over property disputes between tribal members on nontribal lands would limit tribal members’ access to state court, especially considering California courts have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280 over property disputes between tribal members on tribal trust lands. (Section 1360.) Consequently, the state court has jurisdiction to hear Greenville’s dispute against defendants regarding land it owns in fee simple that is not held in trust by the federal government." View "Rancheria v. Martin" on Justia Law

Rosenberg-Wohl had a State Farm homeowners insurance policy, covering her San Francisco home. The policy required lawsuits to be “started within one year after the date of loss or damage.” In late 2018 or early 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl noticed that an elderly neighbor twice stumbled on Rosenberg-Wohl’s outside staircase and learned that the pitch of the stairs had changed. The staircase needed to be replaced. In April 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl authorized the work and contacted State Farm. On August 9, she submitted a claim for the money she had spent. On August 26, State Farm denied the claim. Rosenberg-Wohl’s husband, an attorney, later contacted State Farm “to see if anything could be done.” In August 2020 a State Farm adjuster said it had reopened the claim. Days later, it was denied.In October 2020, Rosenberg-Wohl filed suit, alleging breach of the policy and bad faith. That lawsuit was removed to federal court and was dismissed based on the one-year limitation provision. It is currently on appeal. Another action alleges a violation of California’s unfair competition law. The California court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of that suit, rejecting arguments that the one-year limitation provision does not apply to the unfair competition claim, and that State Farm waived the limitation provision. View "Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Avco Corporation, a manufacturer of airplane components, appealed the denial of its summary judgment motion, which was based on the statute of repose enacted by Congress as part of the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA). Defendant contended a denial of summary judgment in this context constituted an appealable collateral order under California’s collateral order doctrine. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded it did not and dismissed the appeal. View "Longobardo v. Avco Corporation" on Justia Law

The lawsuit giving rise to this appeal was brought by Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Corrales, on behalf of himself, against the California Gambling Control Commission (the Commission) and the two competing factions of the California Valley Miwok Tribe (the Tribe), including his former client, the "Burley faction." In the Court of Appeals' preceding opinion, CVMT 2020, the Court affirmed, on res judicata grounds, the dismissal of a lawsuit filed by attorney Corrales against the Commission on behalf of the Burley faction. Through this lawsuit, Corrales sought to ensure that he received payment from the Tribe for the attorney fees that he claims he was due under a fee agreement he entered into with the Burley faction in 2007. Specifically, even though the Tribe’s leadership dispute was still not resolved, Corrales sought either (1) an order requiring the Commission to make immediate payment to him from the Tribe’s RSTF money, or (2) an order that when the Commission eventually decides to release the Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) money to the Tribe, his attorney fees had to be paid directly to him by the Commission before the remainder of the funds were released to the Tribe. The trial court dismissed Corrales’s lawsuit because the question of whether Burley represented the Tribe in 2007 for the purpose of entering into a binding fee agreement with Corrales on behalf of the Tribe required the resolution of an internal tribal leadership and membership dispute, over which the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. After judgment was entered, Corrales brought a motion for a new trial and a motion for relief from default. Among other things, Corrales argued that the trial court should have stayed his lawsuit rather than dismissing it. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's dismissal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Corrales v. Cal. Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Steve Ahn was a sales executive for a title insurer who claimed his sales figures were adversely affected when his employer barred him from using a particular sales pitch to solicit customers from a competitor who was also a proposed corporate merger partner. Ahn’s pitch told prospective clients that after the proposed merger was finalized, they would have no choice but to comply with his company’s higher-cost, less flexible underwriting standards. He attempted to use this pitch to convince these clients to abandon the competitor before the merger. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' consideration was whether Ahn had standing under the California antitrust statute, known as the Cartwright Act, to assert a cause of action. To this, the Court found that Ahn did not claim injury from the alleged anticompetitive aspects of the proposed merging entities' agreement, but rather from conduct that emphasized their competitive differences. "A complaint that he could not lure customers with a pitch about their restricted postmerger options does not constitute an antitrust injury, meaning Ahn lacks standing to sue under the Cartwright Act." The Court's conclusion that Ahn could not demonstrate an antitrust violation affected his derivative economic relations tort claims, both of which required independently wrongful conduct. Concluding the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment, the appellate court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Ahn v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co." on Justia Law

On August 31, 2012, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He was placed on three years formal probation. Shortly after being placed on probation, Appellant was deported. He later illegally reentered the country. In 2014, his probation was reinstated, and on June 25, 2015, the sentencing court transferred probation supervision and jurisdiction from San Bernardino County to Los Angeles County, where Appellant permanently resided, pursuant to section 1203.9. On April 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate his plea pursuant to section 1473.7. By then, he had already completed his probationary sentence. On August 23, 2021, the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s motion and directed him to refile the motion in San Bernardino County Superior Court.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellant should have filed his motion to withdraw his plea in the county where he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. The question was whether the phrase “full jurisdiction” is meant to remove the authority of the original sentencing court from everything associated with the case or whether “full jurisdiction” refers only to matters relating to the probationary sentence. The court held that section 1203.9 was enacted solely to effectuate more streamlined and effective supervision of probationers statewide by ensuring that the court of their county of residence is empowered to supervise and adjudicate issues arising as a result of the probationary grant. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a partition action by Plaintiff against her former significant other, Defendant.  The trial court entered default and a default judgment against Defendant. Nearly two years later, Defendant moved to vacate the default and resulting judgment, alleging he was never effectively served with the summons and complaint. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the trial court should not have granted Defendant set aside relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). She argued her personal service of the summons and complaint on Defendant was proper, and section 473, subdivision (b) applies instead, rendering Defendant’s motion “untimely.” Plaintiff also argued the trial court abused its discretion in not considering the estoppel doctrine when making its ruling.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendant’s motion to set aside the default and default judgment. On the record, the trial court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over Defendant due to improper service of the summons and complaint. Defendant was “under no duty to act upon a defectively served summons.” (Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466.) Because the court had no jurisdiction in light of defective service, the court did not address Plaintiff’s remaining argument regarding equitable estoppel. View "Braugh v. Dow" on Justia Law

After sustaining a knee injury during a mandatory eighth-grade physical education class’s touch football unit, Plaintiff sued, among others, defendants Burbank Unified School District (the District) and his physical education teacher. A jury returned verdicts in Plaintiff’s favor against Defendants, finding that the District breached a mandatory duty under the Education Code, the teacher was negligent, and Plaintiff suffered resulting harm. Defendants appealed from the judgment, contending: there was insufficient evidence that the District’s breach of a mandatory duty proximately caused Plaintiff’s injury; the special verdict form was fatally defective because it failed to specify whether the District’s breach of a mandatory duty or the teacher’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries; the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the primary assumption of risk doctrine; and the court erred by not allowing the jury to apportion fault to the student who ran into Plaintiff (the Student), thus precluding Defendants from reducing liability for noneconomic damages.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the District and to hold a new trial limited to the issue of apportionment of fault between the teacher and student. The court explained that the Student’s act of intentionally running into Plaintiff was a substantial causative factor in Plaintiff’s injury and the teacher, therefore, should have been entitled to seek allocation of fault pursuant to Civil Code section 1431.2.11 Because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on comparative fault principles, the court remanded for retrial on the apportionment of fault. View "Nigel B. v. Burbank Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law