Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This action represents Metabyte’s fourth attempt to hold Technicolor liable for Technicolor’s allegedly improper auction of a patent portfolio in 2009. After the French courts ruled they lacked jurisdiction in the criminal action, Metabyte brought an action in district court alleging a federal RICO claim and several state law causes of action. After the district court ruled that equitable tolling did not apply to its RICO claim as a matter of federal law, Metabyte dismissed the federal action and brought its state law claims in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The trial court granted Technicolor’s demurrer without leave to amend. Metabyte contends the trial court erred in finding equitable estoppel applies only where a plaintiff invokes remedies designed to lessen the extent of a plaintiff’s injuries or damages, with the result that Article 145 proceeding in France could not support equitable tolling because it did not provide such a remedy. Technicolor defends the trial court’s ruling but devotes more of its energies to its contentions that even if equitable tolling did apply, the order should be affirmed by applying the doctrines of issue preclusion and judicial estoppel.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the demurrer on the alternate ground that Metabyte failed to adequately plead facts showing that its decision to proceed in France was objectively reasonable and subjectively in good faith. However, the court granted Metabyte leave to amend. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Metabyte v. Technicolor S.A." on Justia Law

Petitioners Infinity Select Insurance Company and Infinity Property and Casualty Corporation (collectively, Infinity) are named Defendants in a pending action (the instant lawsuit). The instant lawsuit stems from an earlier 2013 case (the prior action) in which plaintiffs sued Infinity’s insured for negligence and wrongful death in connection with a three-vehicle collision (the collision). In August 2022, the court issued its ruling. The primary effect of the ruling was to reform the Infinity policy to provide greater bodily injury policy limits of $750,000. Per its terms, the ruling “establishes the policy limits for the jury’s consideration in the upcoming jury trial on the remaining causes of action” including plaintiffs’ cause of action against Infinity for bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing due to Infinity’s rejection of plaintiffs’ Code of Civil Procedure section 998 demand of $750,000. Infinity filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the subject ruling.   The Fifth Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred in reforming the Infinity policy. The court held that the motor carrier of property—not the insurer—bears ultimate responsibility for meeting the requirements necessary to obtain a motor carrier permit. Moreover, even where an insurer intends to issue and certify a policy under section 34631.5, it is not obligated to issue the policy in the full amount of $750,000. Additionally, the court wrote evidence of insurance is not the only means of complying with the MCPPA financial responsibility requirements and infinity was under no duty to determine whether the insured had otherwise complied with MCPPA requirements. View "Infinity Select Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gene Moran, who was a patient at Huntington Beach Hospital (the Hospital) three times in 2013, sued defendants Prime Healthcare Management, Inc., Prime Healthcare Huntington Beach, LLC, Prime Healthcare Services, Inc., and Prime Healthcare Foundation, Inc. (collectively defendants) under various theories in 2013. In a prior opinion, the Court of Appeal found that while most of Moran’s claims lacked merit, he had sufficiently alleged facts supporting standing to claim the amount that self-pay patients were charged was unconscionable, and reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the case. Moran’s sixth amended complaint included both the allegations regarding unconscionability and a new theory of the case: defendants had violated the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) by failing to disclose Evaluation and Management (EMS) fees charged in the emergency room through signage or other methods. The complaint sought relief under both the old and new theories for violations of the UCL, CLRA, and for declaratory relief. Defendants moved to strike the allegations regarding EMS fees, arguing their disclosure obligations were defined by statute. The trial court agreed and struck the allegations from the sixth amended complaint. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Moran v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff HNHPC, Inc., appealed a judgment entered in favor of Defendants the Department of Cannabis Control (the Department) and Nicole Elliott. The complaint alleged the Department failed to perform its mandatory duties and/or failed to properly perform discretionary duties under the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MAUCRSA). Plaintiff contended the court erred by taking judicial notice of certain documents and by sustaining defendants' demurrer. In sustaining defendants’ demurrer, the court took judicial notice of two government contracts with a contractor to design the track and trace system and the Department’s budget request for the 2021-2022 fiscal year. Relying on these documents, the court found the Department had complied with its ministerial duties under Bus. & Prof. Code section 26067. Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court properly took judicial notice of the documents, the Court of Appeal found the complaint still stated a claim for a writ of mandate and injunctive relief because the judicially noticed documents did not contradict the complaint's allegations. Because the complaint adequately pleaded facts to state a cause of action for a writ of mandate and for injunctive relief, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. View "HNHPC v. Dept. of Cannabis Control" on Justia Law

Petitioner sued directors and staff of a structured sober living facility, including a real party in interest Peter Schuster, for dependent adult abuse. The trial court found Petitioner failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 because his statement of compliance in response to Schuster’s document requests failed to identify which documents would relate to which specific requests. The court imposed sanctions against Petitioner and his attorney in the amount of $910 for misusing the discovery process. Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of mandate directing the court to reverse the sanctions order. He argued that a statement of compliance in response to a production demand need not identify which document pertains to which request; such identification need only occur when the documents are produced.   The Second Appellate District granted Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that based on the plain language of section 2031.210, a statement of compliance need not identify the specific request to which each document will pertain. Because Petitioner substantially complied with his discovery responsibilities in this regard, the court’s imposition of sanctions was an abuse of discretion. View "Pollock v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The trial court entered a default judgment against Defendant Wanu Water Inc. on June 16, 2020, and on December 7, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to set aside its default and vacate the default judgment under the mandatory attorney-fault provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)). The trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling.   The Second Appellate District vacated the default judgment. The court explained that the mandatory provision requires the court to vacate the default judgment if the application is filed “no more than six months after entry of judgment,” is “in proper form,” and is accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault unless the court finds the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. Here, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling. The record shows the filing was timely and was accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault. Thus, the only bases for denying the motion to vacate the default judgment were that the application was not “in proper form” or that the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s neglect. View "Dollase v. Wanu Water Inc." on Justia Law

In 2019, several dozen plaintiffs sued Massage Envy (a franchisor) and Massage Envy franchisees alleging that as adults they were sexually assaulted by massage therapists at California Massage Envy locations from 2003-2014. The trial court dismissed 18 claims as untimely. Just as the appellate briefing was about to be completed, the Governor approved Assembly Bill 2777, which amended section 340.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revive certain claims that relate to sexual assault provided that the claims had not been litigated to finality or compromised by a written settlement agreement before January 1, 2023.The court of appeal reversed the dismissals. The new law revives some, if not all, of the claims but the operative complaints and motions were drafted before the revival statute was enacted. Remand to the trial court is necessary to give the plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaints and to give the defendants the opportunity to make further arguments regarding the effect of the revival statute on each of the claims. View "Doe v. CFR Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

A healthcare provider contended it was underpaid for substance abuse treatment that it rendered to 29 patients. Seeking to recover the difference directly from the insurance company, the provider filed suit alleging the insurer entered into binding payment agreements during verification of benefits and authorization calls with the provider and otherwise misrepresented or concealed the amounts it would pay for treatment. The trial court entered summary judgment against the provider. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the court did not err in determining one or more elements of the provider’s causes of action could not be established. View "Aton Center v. United Healthcare Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Mother has seven children by several different fathers: the child at issue in this case—Jayden M. (born 2021). On November 19, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over Jayden on two grounds. On May 2, 2022, the juvenile court held the dispositional hearing. The court removed Jayden from Mother’s custody and also bypassed reunification services under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5. More specifically, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that bypass was proper under these provisions because (1) Mother’s reunification services or parental rights for Jayden’s older half-siblings had been terminated, and (2) Mother’s most recent four months of effort to address her drug addiction—did not eliminate the court’s “concerns” in light of her 20-year history of drug abuse problems and prior dependency cases. On appeal, Mother’s chief argument on appeal is that the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services was not supported by the record.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court held that the juvenile court’s finding is further supported by evidence that Mother has repeatedly relapsed after treatment and/or periods of sobriety in the past. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom and practical reality that short and recent periods of sobriety are often not enough to counter a longstanding pattern of use and relapse. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the effort underlying Mother’s brief period of sobriety after decades of drug abuse is not “reasonable.” View "In re Jayden M." on Justia Law

After obtaining a judgment against Defendants in a prior case, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants, their attorney, and others for fraudulent transfer, quiet title, and declaratory relief. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the entire complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. At issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling Defendants failed to meet their initial burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity and the claims for relief supported by them. Further, the issue is whether the trial court’s earlier order granting the Defendants’ attorney’s anti-SLAPP motion compels the same outcome here.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order denying Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The court explained that where a defendant moves to strike the entire complaint and fails to identify, with reasoned argument, specific claims for relief that are asserted to arise from protected activity, the defendant does not carry his or her first-step burden so long as the complaint presents at least one claim that does not arise from protected activity. Here, Defendants not only failed to identify specific claims for relief arising from protected activity, they expressly asked the court to perform the type of gravamen analysis disapproved in Bonni. At no point did the Defendants “identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” And there are obviously claims in the complaint that do not arise from anti-SLAPP protected activity. View "Park v. Nazari" on Justia Law