Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Kamiya Perry appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) after a jury found in favor of Kia in her automobile defect trial. On appeal, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury that Kia had concealed evidence (certain engineering documents) during discovery; (2) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Kia’s paralegal who verified discovery requests relevant to the engineering documents; and (3) she was not given a fair trial because the jurors were required to deliberate in a small room, which, in the midst of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, incentivized the jury to complete their deliberations quickly. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Perry v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a $425,562 jury verdict in his favor on his claim that the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (the Department) retaliated against him for filing an internal complaint with its Equal Opportunity Office (EEO). The Department appealed, contending that four erroneous evidentiary rulings by the trial court deprived it of a fair trial.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court agreed that the trial court erred in admitting evidence about activity that occurred before the filing of his EEO complaints. The court also concluded that admission of the first EEO complaint and supplement was prejudicial and prevented the Department from receiving a fair trial. The court explained that there is no doubt that the fact that Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint for age and race discrimination is highly relevant. It is the protected activity needed for his claim; more colloquially, it provides a motive for the retaliation. The details of the discrimination are not relevant. This was not a trial about whether Plaintiff’s co-worker engaged in race or age discrimination; Plaintiff waived those claims in the prior settlement agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court wrote that it need not and does not reach the Department’s other claims of error. View "Kourounian v. Cal. Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration" on Justia Law

EBMUD, a municipal utility, provides water and wastewater services to the residents of Alameda and Contra Costa counties. The plaintiffs have paid for EBMUD water service since before July 2018. In 2017, EBMUD adopted the water rates for fiscal years 2018 and 2019; in July 2019, EBUMD adopted the rates for fiscal years 2020 and 2021. The plaintiffs alleged EBMUD determines the cost of service based on the volume of water used. There are three tiers of water usage; each successive tier is charged a higher rate than the previous tier. They allege that this rate structure violates the requirement of the California Constitution article XIII D, 6(b)(3) that the amount charged for water service shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel.In July 2019, plaintiffs mailed EBMUD a claim under the Government Claims Act, seeking a refund of service charges collected in violation of section 6(b) since July 17, 2018. In January 2020, after the statutory time period for response had lapsed, plaintiffs filed suit. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal without leave to amend, citing the 120-day statute of limitations (Public Utilities Code section 14402). Plaintiffs cannot avoid the statute of limitations by characterizing their claim as merely seeking a refund of excess fees. The complaint frames a challenge to the “disproportionate rate structure.” Any time requirements imposed by the Government Claims Act did not extend the limitations period. View "Campana v. East Bay Municipal Utility District" on Justia Law

In this labor dispute, Petitioner, the employer, filed a statement of disqualification seeking to remove the trial judge based on comments made during oral argument. However, Petitioner waited one year after the judge's comments to file the statement. The trial court determined that Petitioner waived the right to file a statement of disqualification.Finding the order striking Petitioner's statement of disqualification was flawed in several respects, the Fifth Appellate District vacated the trial court's order and provided the judge three days from the date the statement of disqualification is reinstated to respond before being deemed to have consented to disqualification by operation of time. View "North American Title Company v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In this case involving the proposed redevelopment of the Redondo Beach waterfront, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous order awarding attorney's fees to Defendant. After the court initially awarded attorney's feed to Defendant, Plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court, which held that a Defendant is only entitled to attorney's fees if the plaintiff brought or maintained an action without foundation.Revisiting the issue, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous decision in light of the Supreme Court's holding. Plaintiffs' claims "marshaled a foundation for their suit" sufficient to avoid paying attorney's fees. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

In 2010, Stephen Clevenger committed suicide in an Orange County jail. Lesley Feliz, guardian ad litem for Clevenger’s daughter, then engaged in years of unsuccessful litigation in federal court against the County of Orange and Orange County Sheriff Sandra Hutchens (the County), in which she asserted both federal claims and a supplemental state law claim for wrongful death. After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of her claims, rather than timely refile her state law claim in state court, Feliz endeavored to vacate the judgment under rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In December 2018, after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of her rule 60(b)(6) motion, Feliz filed this action in state court, asserting wrongful death and related claims against the County. The trial court dismissed Feliz’s claims after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, concluding they were time-barred, among other grounds. On appeal, Feliz invoked section 1367(d) of title 28 of the United States Code (section 1367(d)), which tolled the running of state statutes of limitations while supplemental state law claims remain pending in federal court, and argued its tolling period extended to the rule 60(b)(6) proceedings. Alternatively, she contended her claims were timely under the equitable tolling doctrine. The California Court of Appeal held section 1367(d)’s tolling provision covered only Feliz’s appeal of the district court’s judgment and did not extend to the rule 60(b)(6) proceeding. The Court also concluded Feliz did not establish entitlement to equitable tolling. View "Feliz v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

This lawsuit arises from a motor vehicle accident that Plaintiff alleges occurred when a tractor-trailer rear-ended the school bus she was driving. Plaintiff and a passenger on the school bus (collectively, Plaintiffs), sued the tractor-trailer driver, and his employer, Randy’s Trucking, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging personal injuries and emotional distress from the accident. Defendants filed a motion for an order compelling Plaintiff to undergo a mental examination by their neuropsychologist after. Defendants asked the trial court to prohibit the provision of raw test data, test materials, and other documents containing proprietary information to anyone other than a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. The trial court granted the motion to compel the examination, but it ordered Defendants’ neuropsychologist to transfer raw data and an audio recording of the examination to Plaintiffs’ attorney subject to a protective order (the transmission order).   The Fifth Appellate District found no abuse of discretion and denied the writ. The court explained that Defendants failed to establish that the trial court was required to (1) order the raw data and audio recording be transmitted only to a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist or (2) grant reconsideration and modify the transmission order to so provide. Consequently, “they have not demonstrated in this writ proceeding that the superior court was under a legal duty to order, or that its discretion could be legally exercised only by ordering,” transmission only to a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. Moreover, Defendants have not demonstrated there is no “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law” available to them. View "Randy's Trucking v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a resident at a residential skilled nursing facility when she sustained injuries in a fall. She sued the facility, Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC dba Capistrano Beach Care Center (CBCC), and its operator, Cambridge Healthcare Services, LLC (collectively, Defendants). Defendants petitioned to compel arbitration, claiming Plaintiff was bound by arbitration agreements purportedly signed on her behalf by her adult children. The trial court denied the petition, concluding defendants had failed to prove Plaintiff’s adult children had actual or ostensible authority to execute the arbitration agreements on Plaintiff’s behalf.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that CBCC did not meet its initial burden to make a prima facie showing that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate by submitting arbitration agreements signed by Plaintiff’s adult children. CBCC presented no evidence that the children had actual or ostensible authority to execute the arbitration agreement on Plaintiff’s behalf beyond their own representations in the agreements. The court wrote that a defendant cannot meet its burden to prove the signatory acted as the agent of a plaintiff by relying on representations of the purported agent alone. View "Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Niki-Alexander Shetty purchased a home that had been foreclosed upon by a homeowners association. The home, however, was still subject to a defaulted mortgage and deed of trust between the bank and the original borrower. Defendants, the bank and mortgage servicer, recorded a notice of default and scheduled a foreclosure sale. Shetty sought to cure the default and resume regular payments on the loan. Defendants, however, refused, insisting that, as a stranger to the loan, he was not entitled to reinstate it. Shetty sued for wrongful foreclosure, arguing he had the right to reinstate the loan pursuant to California Civil Code section 2924c. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that Shetty did not have standing under the statute. The Court of Appeal disagreed with that interpretation of the statute and reversed the judgment as to all defendants except Mortgage Electronic Registration Services, Inc. (MERS), whom Shetty conceded had no liability. View "Shetty v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer Xceed Financial Credit Union (Xceed) for wrongful termination and age discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The case was submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. The arbitrator granted summary judgment in favor of Xceed on the ground Plaintiff’s claims were barred by a release in her separation agreement. The arbitrator rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that the release violated Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits pre-dispute releases of liability in some circumstances. Plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing an illegal release. The trial court denied the motion to vacate and entered judgment confirming the arbitration award.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the arbitrator’s ruling for clear error. The arbitrator correctly ruled the release did not violate Civil Code section 1668. Plaintiff signed the separation agreement after she was informed of the decision to terminate her but before her last day on the job. At the time she signed, she already believed that the decision to terminate her was based on age discrimination and that she had a valid claim for wrongful termination. The alleged violation of FEHA had already occurred, even though the claim had not yet fully accrued. Accordingly, the release did not violate section 1668 because it was not a release of liability for future unknown claims. View "Castelo v. Xceed Financial Credit Union" on Justia Law