Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California decided on a matter concerning an automobile insurance policy. The plaintiffs, Silvia Escarcega and Alberto Molinar, who are the parents of Tania Molinar, filed a lawsuit against 21st Century Insurance Company (defendant) for refusal to defend or indemnify their daughter in a lawsuit brought against her following a car accident she caused. The insurer denied coverage on the grounds that the policy had been cancelled due to nonpayment of premiums prior to the accident. The plaintiffs argued that the insurer had a duty to give advance notice of cancellation not only to them as policyholders but also to their adult daughter who was named as an insured driver on their policy and whose vehicle was also insured under the policy.The court held that under Insurance Code section 662, subdivision (a), the insurer was required to give advance notice of cancellation to the adult daughter. Because the insurer did not give notice to the adult daughter, the policy was still legally in effect when she got into the accident driving her covered vehicle without knowledge of the purported cancellation. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the insurer on claims arising out of its refusal to defend or indemnify the daughter. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Molinar v. 21st Century Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, SanJuana Andrade, filed a lawsuit against the Western Riverside Council of Governments (Council) on the basis that she had been fraudulently enrolled in a Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program. She claimed that her signature was forged on the PACE loan agreements, resulting in a lien on her home and increased property tax assessments that she had not agreed to. Following an investigation by the state Department of Financial Protection and Innovation, which confirmed the contractors’ fraud, the Council released its assessment and the lien on Andrade’s home. In January 2022, Andrade filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs under Civil Code section 1717, which provides for attorney’s fees in any action on a contract where the contract specifically provides for such fees. The trial court denied Andrade’s motion, concluding that the contractual fee provisions were limited in scope and did not entitle Andrade to attorney’s fees because they concerned fees for “a judicial foreclosure action.”On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court's decision. It held that under section 1717, a fee provision must be construed as applying to the entire contract unless each party was represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact of that representation is specified in the contract. The Court found that limiting the fee provisions to foreclosure proceedings would be the precise kind of lopsided arrangement that section 1717 prohibits. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether Andrade is “the party prevailing on the contract” and therefore entitled to attorney's fees. View "Andrade v. Western Riverside Council of Governments" on Justia Law

In this case, a father, Robert D., appealed a final custody order claiming that the court had abused its discretion by not granting a continuance after his attorney withdrew from the case on the day before the trial. Robert argued that this action deprived him of the ability to retain new trial counsel. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, State of California, found that the trial court had indeed abused its discretion by refusing to assess how long a continuance might be required for Robert to obtain a new lawyer and balance that against other pertinent circumstances. However, the appellate court also found that Robert failed to demonstrate that the court’s error resulted in a “miscarriage of justice,” thus the court affirmed the final custody order. The court noted that while the trial court should have performed the necessary inquiry about the length of the continuance being sought, the error did not necessarily lead to a fundamentally unfair trial. The appellate court, therefore, maintained the trial court's decision awarding Tara sole legal custody and both parents equal physical custody of their children. View "Marriage of Tara and Robert D." on Justia Law

In this case, a father, Robert D., appealed a final custody order following a divorce, arguing that the court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a continuance after his attorney withdrew from the case the day before the trial was set to begin. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District in California agreed that when a court allows a lawyer to withdraw on the eve of trial, it has a responsibility to assess the length of a continuance that would be required for the affected party to obtain a new lawyer and balance that against other pertinent circumstances. The court determined that the trial court failed to make this assessment, constituting an abuse of discretion. However, the Court of Appeal found that Robert D. had not demonstrated that the court's error resulted in a "miscarriage of justice." As such, the custody order was affirmed. View "Marriage of Tara and Robert D." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Ty Whitehead, participated in a training ride for the AIDS LifeCycle fundraiser in March 2017. During the ride, Whitehead hit a pothole on a road maintained by the defendant, the City of Oakland, causing him to flip over his bicycle handlebars, hit his head on the pavement, and suffer injury. Prior to the ride, Whitehead had signed a release agreement which exempted the “owners/lessors of the course or facilities used in the Event” from future liability. Whitehead sued the City of Oakland for injuries he suffered due to the pothole. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, concluding the release was enforceable. Whitehead appealed, arguing the release was invalid because it concerned a matter of public interest, and that the court erred by not addressing whether there was a triable issue of fact as to the City's gross negligence.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that the release was valid and enforceable because the cycling event was a nonessential, recreational activity that did not affect the public interest within the meaning of Civil Code section 1668. The court also found that Whitehead failed to adequately raise and support a claim of gross negligence. View "Whitehead v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

In the case, Mojave Pistachios, LLC (Mojave) and other petitioners sought to challenge a replenishment fee on groundwater extractions imposed by the Indian Wells Valley Groundwater Authority (the Authority) in California. Mojave, which owns approximately 1,600 acres of land in the Mojave Desert, uses groundwater to irrigate its pistachio orchard. The Authority, created under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), determined that all groundwater extractions in the water basin where Mojave’s orchard is located would be subject to a replenishment fee, which Mojave refused to pay. The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the Authority’s demurrer to certain causes of action in Mojave's third amended complaint, finding the claims were barred by California’s “pay first, litigate later” rule which requires a taxpayer to pay a tax before commencing a court action to challenge the tax’s collection.Mojave petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three for a writ of mandate overruling the lower court's order. The appellate court concluded that the well-established “pay first” rule applies to lawsuits challenging fees imposed by a local groundwater sustainability agency under SGMA. As such, because any alleged economic harm to Mojave stems from the imposition of the replenishment fee, the “pay first” rule bars the challenged causes of action. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision and denied Mojave's petition for a writ of mandate. View "Mojave Pistachios, LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three heard an appeal from Amanda Neeble-Diamond against a postjudgment order, awarding costs exceeding $180,000 to the prevailing defendant, Hotel California By the Sea. The original lawsuit involved both statutory and nonstatutory causes of action based on Neeble-Diamond's alleged employment status with Hotel California, which was determined by the jury to be that of an independent contractor, not an employee. Following this judgment, Hotel California sought costs and attorney fees. The trial court denied attorney fees but awarded costs, which led to Neeble-Diamond's appeal.The issue at hand was whether the trial court could award costs to the defendant without finding that the plaintiff's California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims were objectively frivolous. The appellate court agreed with Neeble-Diamond, reversing the order that awarded costs to Hotel California. The court highlighted that in FEHA cases, a prevailing defendant has no automatic right to recover costs. Instead, the defendant must move the court to make a discretionary award of such costs, based in part on a specific finding that the action was frivolous.Hotel California forfeited any claim to costs by failing to file the necessary motion for costs as they did for attorney fees, rendering their cost memorandum ineffective. As a result, Neeble-Diamond had no obligation to respond to the cost memorandum, and the court erred by signing an "amended judgment" that included an award of $180,369.41 in costs to Hotel California. View "Neeble-Diamond v. Hotel California By the Sea, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between two cities, Norwalk and Cerritos, both located in California. In 1974, Cerritos enacted an ordinance restricting commercial and heavy truck traffic to certain major arteries within the city. The ordinance was amended in 2019 and 2020, resulting in the removal of one of these arteries. Consequently, Norwalk sued Cerritos, arguing that the ordinance created a public nuisance by diverting extra truck traffic through Norwalk and thus causing various "adverse effects" linked to heavier traffic flow. Cerritos claimed immunity under Civil Code section 3482, which shields a city from public nuisance liability for actions "done or maintained under the express authority of a statute". The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District found that the Vehicle Code explicitly authorized cities to regulate the use of their streets by commercial or heavy vehicles. Therefore, the court held that Cerritos was immune from liability for the public nuisance of diverting traffic into Norwalk. The court stated that the immunity conferred by Civil Code section 3482 applied not only to the specific act expressly authorized by the statute, but also to the consequences that necessarily stemmed from that act. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Cerritos. View "City of Norwalk v. City of Cerritos" on Justia Law

This case involves a person identified as Tony R., who was committed to the Reaching Into Successful Endeavors (RISE) program for a term of 11 years or until he reached the age of 25, with a baseline term of four years. This was following his involvement in serious offenses, including attempted murder and second-degree robbery. Tony appealed from the juvenile court's denial of his request to reduce his baseline term of confinement at his first six-month review hearing. He argued that the court lacked the authority to deny his request or, in the alternate, that it had abused its discretion.At the six-month review, the court evaluated Tony's progress in relation to his rehabilitation plan, which included a series of programs and treatments aimed at addressing his needs. Tony had been participating in these programs successfully and was performing well academically. Despite this, the court denied his request for a reduction in his baseline term.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The appellate court found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tony's request for a reduction in his baseline term. The appellate court noted that the law gives juvenile courts discretion to reduce the baseline term but does not require it to do so, and that the juvenile court's decision was within the bounds of reason under the applicable law and the relevant facts. View "In re Tony R." on Justia Law

The case in question involved a dispute between Epochal Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Divine Orchids, and LF Encinitas Properties, LLC and Leichtag Foundation, over a commercial lease agreement for a property containing dilapidated commercial greenhouses known to contain asbestos and lead paint. Epochal Enterprises claimed that the defendants failed to disclose the presence of these hazardous substances, which resulted in economic damage when the County of San Diego quarantined the leased premises. A jury found the defendants liable for premises liability and negligence, and awarded Epochal Enterprises damages for lost profits and other past economic loss.However, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), based on a limitation of liability clause in the lease agreement that purported to prevent Epochal Enterprises from recovering the economic damages awarded by the jury.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, reversed the trial court's judgment. It found that the jury necessarily concluded that the defendants had violated the Health and Safety Code by failing to disclose the existence of asbestos, and that this violation of law rendered the limitation of liability clause invalid under Civil Code section 1668. The court concluded that the limitation of liability clause could not bar Epochal Enterprises from recovering damages for the defendants' statutory violations.The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for partial JNOV on the issue of damages, finding that the jury had a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of lost profits. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC" on Justia Law