Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, doing business as The Soni Law Firm (collectively Soni), appealed from a judgment awarding attorney fees under the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (MFAA in favor of Defendants Timothy Tierney and Cartograph, Inc., formerly known as Simplelayers, Inc. (collectively Tierney). On appeal, Soni contends: he was the prevailing party for the purposes of an attorney fees award under sections 6203 and 6204; he was also the prevailing party under the parties’ contractual attorney fees provisions; he was entitled to an award of attorney fees because he was not a self-represented litigant; and even if Tierney were entitled to fees, the amount was excessive.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the statutory attorney fees provisions of sections 6203 and 6204 govern rather than the attorney fees provision of the parties’ contract. The trial court properly awarded attorney fees to Tierney as the prevailing party under sections 6203 and 6204. Further, Tierney’s attorneys worked half as many hours as Soni’s attorneys on the matters at issue, and Tierney’s attorneys billed substantially lower total fees than the charges that Soni incurred and sought to recover in his competing motion for attorney fees. The trial court examined the bills carefully and reduced the amount awarded to Tierney for duplicative work by one attorney. Accordingly, the court held that no abuse of discretion has been shown as to the amount of fees awarded. View "Soni v. Cartograph, Inc." on Justia Law

The Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) and its Committee of Credentials (Committee) (collectively, defendants) appealed the grant of mandamus relief to petitioner Russell Earnest, setting aside the Committee’s disciplinary recommendation against him and enjoining the Commission from acting on that recommendation. Defendants argued the trial court erred in finding: (1) Earnest was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies; and (2) the Committee lacked jurisdiction to conduct a formal review pursuant to Education Code1 section 44242.5 (d). They further asserted the trial court should have denied the petition under the doctrine of judicial restraint. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded all three factors outlined in Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd., 35 Cal.4th 1072 (2005) weighed in favor of excusing Earnest from exhausting his administrative remedies. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court found that although section 44242.5 (b)(3) generally provided a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence initial reviews, as discussed post, the provision was also incorporated in section 44242.5 (d)(3) to provide a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence formal reviews. It was this jurisdictional provision the Committee relied upon in commencing a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The Court thus concluded the plain language of section 44242.5(b)(3) imposed the onus on the employer to determine whether to provide a notifying statement to the Committee, and thus only the employer may determine whether an enumerated action was the “result of an allegation of misconduct,” triggering the Committee’s jurisdiction. Applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, the Court concluded the Committee did not have jurisdiction to commence a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The grant of mandamus relief was thus affirmed. View "Earnest v. Com. on Teacher Credentialing" on Justia Law

Moss Gropen brought suit against, among other defendants, Cyrus Shabrang and Michael Noud (together, Real Parties in Interest) arising out of Gropen’s treatment at a hospital. Gropen appeared at the noticed deposition with his wife Laura Gropen. Defense counsel objected to Laura’s presence at the deposition because she was a percipient witness in the action and could be deposed in the future. Gropen’s deposition did not proceed beyond the parties stating their objections on the record. Real Parties in Interest subsequently filed a motion for protective order and sanctions, asking the court to exclude Laura from Gropen’s deposition. At the hearing on the motion, for the first time, Gropen’s counsel explicitly requested under California Rules of Court, rule 1.100, that accommodations be provided to Gropen because he was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a recognized disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The court acknowledged that PTSD fell under the ADA but found Gropen’s request for an accommodation untimely. It thus granted the protective order and sanctioned Gropen. Gropen petitioned for a writ of mandate, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion in granting the protective order and erred by not considering the evidence that Gropen was diagnosed with PTSD. Gropen also maintained that his request that Laura attend his deposition was a reasonable accommodation. The Court of Appeal concluded Gropen’s request for accommodation was timely, the district court abused its discretion by failing to remand the matter to the superior court with instructions to deny the motion for a protective order and sanctions, and to properly consider Gropen’s request under Rule 1.100. View "Gropen v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA, Civil Code, 1786) mandates certain disclosures for investigative consumer reports, which are often used by landlords to make decisions regarding consumers who apply for housing. ICRAA requires the adoption of “reasonable procedures” for providing consumer information “in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer," concerning the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of their information. Any investigative consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to comply with the requirements is liable to the affected consumer for any actual damages or $10,000, whichever sum is greater. Courts of appeal disagreed about the constitutionality and enforceability of ICRAA.In 2018, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of ICRAA. Bernuy had filed one of 27 consolidated actions seeking damages against BPMC for its commission of ICRAA violations in 2017. Bernuy’s action was designated a “bellwether” case for adjudicating certain issues. The court of appeal held that the California Supreme Court’s 2018 decision did not constitute a subsequent change in the law that relieved BPMC of liability for its ICRAA violations. However, certain plaintiffs’ ICRAA claims are time-barred under the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The limitations period was not tolled by the pendency of a putative class action. View "Bernuy v. Bridge Property Management Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former driver for Defendant Lyft, Inc., filed suit against Lyft under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). He alleged that Lyft misclassified him and other drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, thereby violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Lyft moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the “Terms of Service” (TOS) that it required its drivers to accept. The trial court denied the motion, finding the PAGA waiver in the arbitration provision unenforceable under then-controlling California law. Lyft appealed, and the Second Appellate District affirmed the denial of Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration. Lyft petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court granted Lyft’s petition and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022).   The Second Appellate District reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s order. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to (1) enter an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate his individual PAGA claim and (2) conduct further proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s non-individual claims. The court explained that it is not bound by the analysis of PAGA standing set forth in Viking River. PAGA standing is a matter of state law that must be decided by California courts. The court explained that until it has guidance from the California Supreme Court, its review of PAGA and relevant state decisional authority leads the court to conclude that a plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims simply because their individual PAGA claim is compelled to arbitration. View "Seifu v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

Santa Clara Valley Water District was insured by Century. In 2000, the District notified Century that it had been advised by the federal government of potential claims for natural resource damages resulting from mercury contamination in the Guadalupe River Watershed (NRD Claim). Century requested additional information, including the status of negotiations. Century made several similar requests to the District between 2000-2002. In 2001, Century indicated that it had no duties under the primary policies because there was no lawsuit pending, had no duty to indemnify the District under the excess policies until the underlying limits of the policies had been exhausted, and was reserving its rights under the policies. The District subsequently signed a tolling agreement, was sued in federal court, and entered a Consent Decree without notifying Century.In 2008, the District notified Century of the existence of the lawsuit and the Consent Decree and stated that it had incurred $4 million in costs to comply with the Consent Decree. Century cited a No Voluntary Payment (NVP) provision. The District did not contact Century until 2014, when it completed its required Consent Decree work. In 2015, the District sued Century.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment for Century. The NVP provisions barred the District from seeking indemnification for the expenses it incurred under the Consent Decree, without notifying Century or obtaining its consent. Those provisions apply to the settlement even though it was achieved through a consent decree rather than a traditional settlement agreement. Because the NRD Claim was disposed of by that settlement, there was no “adjudication” that gave rise to an “ultimate net loss” that gave the District the right to pay and seek indemnification. View "Santa Clara Valley Water District v. Century Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

In October 2016, the mother filed a request to reinstate joint legal and physical custody of her minor daughter, after a lengthy period in which the father exercised sole legal and physical custody based on a child welfare referral that, according to the mother, had recently been “overturned.” The parents had a long-running custody battle. In May 2019, she was ordered to share in the expense of a court-ordered child custody evaluator who was appointed under Evidence Code section 730. The payment order was entered over the mother’s continuing objection that she cannot afford to pay any of the evaluator’s fees. She argued that, given her financial condition, the court erred when it reallocated a portion of that expense to her after the fact.The court of appeal remanded, In allocating the costs of a court-appointed child custody evaluator, the court must consider the parties’ ability to pay, whether the child custody evaluator is appointed by the court under Evidence Code section 730 or the more specific provisions of the Family Code (sections 3111-3112). The record does not indicate that the trial court considered all of the mother’s expenses before ordering her to contribute to the costs. View "Peterson v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In 2002, plaintiffs M.D. Doe, A.J. Doe, and S. Doe (together, plaintiffs) sued defendant Marysville Joint Unified School District (the District) and at least one District employee, alleging their school counselor sexually abused them. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the District after finding that plaintiffs failed to timely file a government claim before filing their complaint. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review. In 2019, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 to extend the statute of limitations for victims bringing childhood claims of sexual assault. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed this action against the District and certain individuals predicated on the same set of facts as their 2002 suit. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer without leave to amend as to plaintiffs, finding that the prior dismissal was res judicata, and that allowing section 340.1 to reopen a final judgment would run afoul of constitutional separation of powers principles. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial court erred because their prior claims were not “litigated to finality” within the meaning of section 340.1 and could therefore be revived, and because dismissing plaintiffs’ claims violated equal protection. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed an order granting plaintiffs' motion to compel compliance with prior discovery orders and imposing monetary and issue sanctions. The trial court imposed 11 potentially case-dispositive issue sanctions and $37,575 in monetary sanctions against defendants for having “repeatedly disregarded their obligations in Discovery” and having “repeatedly fought the Court Orders that tell them they must comply.” The court-appointed discovery referee, who recommended those sanctions, commented that in his almost 20 years of service as a neutral, mediator, arbitrator, and referee he had never seen “such blatant disregard of discovery and discovery orders.” In their notice of appeal, defendants asserted their appeal included both the monetary sanctions and the issue sanctions. The Court of Appeal found the order imposing monetary sanctions was directly appealable under California Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(11) and (12). However, the order imposing issue sanctions was not directly appealable. The issue sanctions were not inextricably intertwined with the monetary sanctions. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal regarding issue sanctions. The Court also found defendants failed to establish the trial court should have found they acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances made the imposition of monetary sanctions unjust. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the award of monetary sanctions and dismissed the appeal in all other respects. View "Deck v. Developers Investment Co., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue here was the 2015 “public health goal” (PHG) defendant Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) set for the contaminant perchlorate, a chemical found in rocket fuel. After OEHHA set the PHG for perchlorate at 1 part per billion (ppb), plaintiff California Manufacturers & Technology Association (CMTA) filed a petition for a writ of mandate ordering OEHHA to withdraw the PHG. The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, CMTA argued: (1) OEHHA violated the statutory mandate in arriving at the PHG; and (2) the PHG was void based on the common law conflict of interest doctrine because its author, Dr. Craig Steinmaus, had a conflict of interest. The Court of Appeal concluded OEHHA complied with the statutory requirements under Health & Safety Code section 116365 (c)(1)(A), and that the common law conflict of interest doctrine did not apply here. View "California Manufacturers etc. v. Off. of Environmental Health etc." on Justia Law