Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant M.B., mother of minor L.J., appealed the termination of her parental rights which freed L.J. for adoption. Mother contended the juvenile court erred by: (1) denying her request to admit self-made recordings of her visits with the minor to support her argument that the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (c)(1)(B)(i) beneficial parental relationship exception applied and to impeach the evidence of the visits; and (2) finding the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply to prevent the termination of parental rights. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that the juvenile court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record and the court did not abuse its discretion in finding no detriment to termination of parental rights. View "In re L.J." on Justia Law

Unhappy with a Virginia court’s order regarding the custody of his minor daughter, appellant Paul Fishbein sought to modify that order only one month later in California family court. When the California court found it lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to do so, Fishbein appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the California court was correct: the Virginia court that entered the governing child custody order had initial home state jurisdiction, and it never lost that jurisdiction. View "Segal v. Fishbein" on Justia Law

An insured’s general liability insurer defended under a reservation of rights, and paid out its $2 million policy limits to settle the lawsuit. The insured’s workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurer denied coverage and did not participate in the defense or settlement. This lawsuit followed, with the general liability insurer suing the workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurer for equitable contribution. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the general liability insurer, awarding roughly half the cost of defense and indemnity. The Court of Appeals reversed: an equitable contribution claim only lies if the two insurers share the same level of liability on the same risk as to the same insured. In this case, the general liability insurer is not entitled to equitable contribution because it did not insure the same risk as the workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurer. View "California Capital Ins. Co. v. Employers Compensation Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In August 2020, police went to a motel room to investigate child abuse. Three children were present: K.H. (an eight-year-old boy), A.H. (a five-year-old girl), and P.A. (an 18-month-old girl). The boy had visible bruises on his face and arms; the older girl had multiple bruises on her legs. Police arrested S.A. (“Mother”), and A.A. (“Husband” and father of the younger girl), who had brought the three children from Texas to California about three weeks prior. At that time, A.H. (“Father” of the two older children) was incarcerated in Texas for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The children were taken into protective custody. The next day, Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a dependency petition, and the juvenile court took “emergency jurisdiction . . . pursuant to UCCJEA.” About a week later, the court phoned a Texas state court judge who “cede[d] jurisdiction to the state of California.” SSA placed the children in foster care with Dana C. (“Caregiver”). Mother pleaded guilty to two counts of child abuse, served a 120-day jail sentence, and returned to Texas. Husband’s disposition and whereabouts were unknown. Father was no longer incarcerated and lived in Texas. In March 2021, the juvenile court sustained the dependency petition, declaring the children to be dependents of the court. Six months later, Mother moved to transfer the matter to Texas. In July 2022, the juvenile court again spoke to a Texas judge and found the state continued to decline to exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Father appealed, contending the California juvenile court never had subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and all the juvenile court’s orders had to be reversed. The Court of Appeal denied the parents' requests, finding substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's ruling. View "A.H. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Some of the practices that have made California's Central Valley an "agricultural powerhouse" have also adversely impacted the region’s water quality and environmental health. Respondents State Water Resources Control Board (State Water Board) and Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board (Central Valley Water Board) are responsible for regulating waste discharges from irrigated agricultural operations in the Central Valley. The State Water Board adopted order WQ 2018-0002 (Order) in February 2018. Environmental Law Foundation (Foundation), Monterey Coastkeeper (Coastkeeper), and Protectores del Agua Subterranea (Protectores) (collectively, appellants) brought petitions for writs of mandate challenging various aspects of the Order. The trial court consolidated the cases and granted a motion for leave to intervene by the East San Joaquin Water Quality Coalition (Coalition) and others (cumulatively, the Coalition). Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court denied the petitions. Appellants appealed, advancing numerous claims of error. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the judgments. View "Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

Dr. Heidari and Dr. Moradi owned a dental practice. Heidari sued Moradi for breach of contract. Moradi filed a cross-complaint, claiming that Heidari fraudulently misappropriated over $1.7 million. Moradi’s counsel, Kamarei, brought in Heidari’s wife, Padideh. Padideh sued Moradi and his attorney for malicious prosecution after the dismissal of Moradi’s cross-complaint. Moradi and Kamarei asserted the unclean-hands defense based on Padideh’s alleged misconduct in the underlying action—testifying falsely at her deposition.A jury determined that Padideh “ha[d] unclean hands,” barring her recovery. The court of appeal affirmed. A defendant asserting unclean hands in a malicious prosecution action need not demonstrate that absent the misconduct, they would have prevailed in the underlying action. But the misconduct “must relate directly to the transaction concerning which the [malicious-prosecution] complaint is made. It must infect the cause of action involved and affect the equitable relations between the litigants." There was substantial evidence that Padideh showed a lack of candor or even lied in her deposition in the underlying action, and that this had a direct effect on Kamarei and Moradi’s litigation decisions in that action, which was the precipitating action for this malicious prosecution suit. View "Padideh v. Moradi" on Justia Law

On August 28, 2017, while the plaintiffs were being transported in an ambulance operated by AMR employees, the ambulance collided with another vehicle. The plaintiffs’ suit, filed on November 8, 2018, and alleging motor vehicle negligence and medical malpractice, was rejected on summary judgment based upon the one-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for professional negligence by health care providers under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) (Code Civil Procedure 340.5).The court of appeal affirmed. MICRA applies when ambulance passengers are injured during a collision. The limitations period was not extended under section 364(d) because the plaintiffs sent AMR a notice of intent to sue on August 23, 2018. The plaintiffs’ prior March 2018 letter to AMR’s third-party claims administrator constituted a section 364(a) notice of intent to sue. The March letter listed the plaintiffs’ names, AMR as the insured, the date of the accident, and the claim number. It detailed the injuries, treatment, and other damages sustained by each plaintiff and referenced the enclosed supporting documentation. It concluded with settlement demands for each plaintiff and requested a response within 15 days. View "Lopez v. American Medical Response West" on Justia Law

A patient filed a complaint concerning Dr. Dore, a Board-certified psychiatrist. The Board discovered suspected irregularities in Dore's prescription of controlled substances. Dore declined to answer questions. The Board served her with an investigative subpoena seeking medical records supporting the prescription of the controlled substances to a family member and with investigative interrogatories requesting information about the family member's treatment and employment with Dore. Dore refused to produce the records and objected to the interrogatories. Her family member objected to the subpoena.The Board sought an order compelling compliance and provided reports from the Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (CURES) database. A Board-certified psychiatrist opined it was necessary to obtain the family member’s medical records to evaluate whether Dore complied with the standard of care, noting an AMA ethics opinion counseling physicians against treating family members except in emergencies. Dore's expert, a psychiatrist and licensed California attorney, disagreed with the assertion that prescribing controlled substances to family members presumptively violates the standard of care. The family member explained his reason for seeking treatment from Dore, identifying the medications she prescribed, and describing the treatment she provided.The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, which ordered compliance, impliedly concluding the Board established good cause to justify the production of the family member’s private medical information. The Board had a compelling interest in investigating Dore’s allegedly improper conduct. View "Kirchmeyer v. Helios Psychiatry Inc." on Justia Law

This writ proceeding involves a statutory challenge for cause filed against a trial court judge presiding over a wrongful termination lawsuit. The parties are Plaintiff and his former employer, Defendant Bassett Unified School District. Following a multimillion-dollar jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff, the trial judge in this action, Honorable Stephanie Bowick, received a text message from another judge on the court, Honorable Rupert Byrdsong. According to Judge Bowick, Judge Byrdsong had previously informed Judge Bowick that attorneys from his former firm were trying the case. Pointing to Judge Byrdsong’s apparent support for Plaintiff and the resulting verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, the school district sought Judge Bowick’s disqualification, asserting that a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. The disqualification motion was assigned to Orange County Superior Court Judge Maria D. Hernandez. The assigned judge denied the disqualification motion. Defendant sought review by petition for writ of mandate   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court held that the disqualification motion was properly denied. The court reasoned that there is no adverse inference arising from Judge Bowick’s final ruling on the evidentiary issue. Further, the court found that the facts Judge Bowick disclosed do not require disqualification. Moreover, the court wrote, the timing of Judge Bowick’s disclosure does not suggest an appearance of bias. View "Bassett Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Government Code 65913.4 provides for streamlined, ministerial approval of affordable housing projects meeting specified requirements. Berkeley denied Ruegg’s application for ministerial approval of a mixed-use development under section 65913.4. Ruegg alleged violations of both section 65913.4 and the Housing Accountability Act (HAA, section 65589.5). The trial court found Berkeley was not required to approve the proposed project under section 65913.4 and denied Ruegg’s petition without reaching the HAA issues. The court of appeal, without addressing the HAA, directed the trial court to grant the writ petition.On remand, the trial court reasoned that it could not avoid ruling on the HAA issues. With respect to the section 65913.4 claim the court ordered Berkeley to issue the permits; it set a briefing schedule and hearing date concerning the HAA issues. The court of appeal declined to prohibit that hearing. Berkeley issued the permit. After a hearing, the trial court found that the disapproval of the application violated the HAA and that Ruegg was entitled to the “albeit duplicative” injunctive relief. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to address the HAA issue, which was not forfeited nor rendered moot by the prior order. View "Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law