Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, respondent Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Kaiser). The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment. The court explained that as part of a round of employee layoffs, Kaiser planned, at least tentatively, to terminate Plaintiff before Plaintiff became disabled. Kaiser’s plan to terminate Plaintiff before she became disabled, by itself, was not discrimination against Plaintiff because of a disability. But Kaiser did not complete its layoff plans—or, a reasonable jury could find, make its final determination to terminate Plaintiff—until after Plaintiff had become disabled. On the record here, there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Kaiser’s ultimate decision to terminate Plaintiff was motivated, at least in substantial part, by concerns Kaiser had about Plaintiff’s disability. That allows Plaintiff’s complaint to survive summary judgment. View "Lin v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

This appeal from summary judgment in favor of Sequoia Insurance Company (Sequoia) was one of thousands of cases nationwide involving a claim for business interruption coverage arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic. The outcome here turned on whether there was evidence creating a triable issue that the insured, Best Rest Motel, Inc. (Best Rest), sustained lost business income “due to the necessary ‘suspension’ ” of its operations “caused by direct physical loss of or damage” to the insured property. Best Rest contended its case fell directly within the exception discussed by the Court of Appeal in Inns-by-the-Sea v. California Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Cal.App.5th 688 (2021). Though the Court found Inns might undermine, if not entirely foreclose Best Rest’s case, the Court limited its holding by positing in dicta a “hypothetical scenario” where “an invisible airborne agent would cause a policyholder to suspend operations because of direct physical damage to property.” Here, the Court determined Best Rest's argument failed because the record contained no evidence creating a triable issue that the hotel “could have otherwise been operating” but for the presence of COVID-19 on the premises. Best Rest’s own evidence established the exact opposite was true: its vice president and operating partner testified that the phones were “ringing off the hook[ ]” with cancellations—not because of COVID-19 in the hotel, but because of government shut down orders and travel restrictions that shuttered tourism. Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment in the insurance company's favor because there was no evidence creating a triable issue that COVID-19 in the hotel caused the claimed lost income. View "Best Rest Motel, Inc. v. Sequoia Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The last clause of section 248.5 (e) of California’s Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014 (the Act) (Labor Code, § 245 et seq.) was the focus of this appeal. Plaintiff Ana Wood filed a Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA) action against her former employer Kaiser Foundation Hospitals seeking penalties for alleged violations of the Act. The trial court sustained Kaiser’s demurrer without leave to amend, determining that a PAGA action was one brought “on behalf of the public” and since it sought only civil penalties, was prohibited by section 248.5 (e). After its independent review, the Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion: the statute’s text and history provided compelling evidence that the phrase “on behalf of the public as provided under applicable state law” in section 248.5 (e) was intended to refer to actions prosecuted under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL)—not PAGA. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was reversed. View "Wood v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

The City of Palm Springs closed off one of its downtown streets to all vehicular traffic for a period of three years to allow a tourism organization to install and display a large statue of Marilyn Monroe in the middle of the street. A citizens’ group called the Committee to Relocate Marilyn ("the Committee") petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate challenging the street closure, alleging the City did not have the statutory authority to close the street. Additionally, the Committee alleged the City erroneously declared the street closure categorically exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City demurred to the petition for writ of administrative mandate, arguing it had the authority to close the street for three years under Vehicle Code section 21101(e), and its local equivalent, Palm Springs Municipal Code section 12.80.010. The City claimed the street closure was temporary, and therefore permissible. Further, the City argued the CEQA cause of action was untimely. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the City. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Committee pleaded allegations sufficient to establish: (1) the City exceeded its authority under the Vehicle Code and Municipal Code; and (2) the timeliness of its CEQA cause of action. After the notice of exemption was filed, the City abandoned its plan to vacate vehicular access to the street and elected to close the street instead. Because the City materially changed the project after it filed its notice of exemption, and it did not afford the public an opportunity to consider the revised project or its environmental effects, the notice of exemption did not trigger a 35-day statute of limitations. Instead, the CEQA cause of action was subject to a default statute of limitations of 180 days, measured from the date the Committee knew or should have known about the changed project. The Court determined the Committee timely filed its CEQA cause of action. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the judgment of dismissal, vacated the demurrer ruling, and instructed the trial court to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to these three causes of action. View "Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

This case concerned the statute of limitations in the California Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. One of these protections was described in Government Code section 3304 (d)(1): a public agency cannot discipline a peace officer “for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct” unless the agency completes its investigation and notifies the officer of its proposed discipline “within one year of the public agency’s discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct.” Under the interpretation offered by appellant Luis Garcia, section 3304(d)(1)’s one-year limitations period begins to run on all acts of misconduct once the agency initiates an investigation into any one of these acts. But under the second interpretation, offered by Garcia’s employer, the limitations period begins to run on an act of misconduct only once the agency discovers that particular act. The Court of Appeal determined the latter interpretation was the correct one: Section 3304(d)(1)’s text was "clear" that the limitations period for an act of misconduct begins to run on the date the agency discovers the misconduct, not the date it initiates an investigation into unrelated misconduct. Under this rule, as under similar discovery rules, each act of misconduct must be considered separately in determining the date the agency discovered the misconduct. Because the trial court here interpreted section 3304(d)(1) consistent with the Court of Appeal's interpretation, the judgment was affirmed. View "Garcia v. State Dept. of Developmental Services" on Justia Law

After the Arcadia City Council approved J.W.’s application to expand the first story of her single-family home and add a second story (“the project”), Arcadians for Environmental Preservation (AEP), a grassroots organization led by J.W.’s next-door neighbor, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the City’s decision. AEP’s petition primarily alleged the city council had erred in finding the project categorically exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and CEQA’s implementing guidelines. The superior court denied the petition, ruling as a threshold matter that AEP had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that AEP failed to exhaust its administrative remedies on the question of whether the project fell within the scope of the class 1 exemption. Further, the court found that AEP’s general objections to project approval did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Moreover, the court wrote that AEP has not demonstrated the City failed to proceed in a manner required by law when it impliedly found no exception to the exemption applied. Finally, the court held that AEP has not demonstrated the City erred in concluding the cumulative effects exception did not apply. View "Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of Arcadia" on Justia Law

Defendants Churchwell White LLP, a law firm, and two of its attorneys, Barbara Brenner and Robin Baral (collectively Churchwell) represented a corporation in an action to quiet title to water rights. In the quiet title action, Churchwell sued the City of Weed (City) and the plaintiffs here, Water for Citizens of Weed California, its members, and other citizens of the City (collectively Citizens). The trial court in that action granted Citizens’s special motion to strike the complaint (an anti-SLAPP motion). Citizens then filed this action against Churchwell, alleging malicious prosecution for naming them in the quiet title action. Churchwell, in turn, filed its own anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted, concluding Citizens did not establish a probability of prevailing on their claim. The court determined Citizens did not show that Churchwell lacked probable cause or acted out of malice in naming them in the quiet title action. Citizens appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the grant of Churchwell’s motion. View "Water for Citizens of Weed Cal. v. Churchwell White LLP" on Justia Law

Valero alleged that Dellard was a care custodian who provided in-home services to a dependent adult, Barton. Valero also provided such services to Barton. The two worked different shifts. Valero alleged that Dellard, a mandatory reporter under the elder-abuse laws, made a knowingly false report to law enforcement that she had seen Valero try to kill Barton by smothering him with a pillow. Dellard allegedly later coerced Barton to confirm the false report. Valero was arrested and charged with attempted murder, and spent 28 days in custody. The criminal charges against Valero were later dismissed.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of Valero’s complaint for malicious prosecution. Welfare and Institutions Code 15634(a) provides absolute immunity from civil and criminal liability to mandatory reporters under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. The legislative purpose was to serve and facilitate the policy goals of the Act—by increasing the reporting of elder abuse and minimizing the chilling disincentives to that reporting, including the fear of getting sued. The carve-out for knowingly false reports urged by Valero is not dictated by the statutory language and is counter to these legislative policy goals. The court rejected Valero’s effort to couch Dellard’s alleged post-reporting coercion of Barton as later conduct outside the broad contours of immunity for acts of reporting. View "Valero v. Spread Your Wings, LLC" on Justia Law

Tribal lending entities (TLEs) retained the LLCs to manage their online lending programs. In 2017, the relationships began to deteriorate. The LLCs and their managing members, the Koettings, allegedly persuaded customers to continue borrowing from new lenders controlled by the Koettings. The TLEs terminated the agreements and claimed breach of contractual and fiduciary duties, fraud, theft, failure to safeguard customer data, and failure to transfer revenue owed. The LLCs also accused the TLEs of breaching the agreements. An arbitrator ruled against the LLCs and the Koettings.The court of appeal reversed in part because the TLEs failed to demonstrate that the Koettings clearly consented to the arbitrator’s determination of whether they as nonsignatories were bound by the arbitration agreement in the contracts between the TLEs and the LLCs. JPV (successor to the TLEs) unsuccessfully moved to amend the judgment to add the Koettings as judgment debtors on an alter ego theory.JPV argued the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding the collateral estoppel effect of the arbitrator’s findings underlying the judgment against the LLCs and failing to consider all circumstances relevant to the alter ego inquiry, including the arbitral findings that the LLCs wrongfully diverted the TLEs’ customers and business opportunities to other entities controlled by the Koettings. The court of appeal vacated. The trial court made erroneous legal assumptions and misunderstood the proper scope of its discretion. View "JPV I L.P. v. Koetting" on Justia Law

The prosecution filed a complaint alleging that a defendant committed a lewd or lascivious act on a child by force, violence, duress, menace, and fear. The North River Insurance Company and its bail agent (collectively, North River) posted a $100,000 bond to release the defendant. The trial court declared the bond forfeited when the defendant did not appear for a hearing on February 22, 2018. North River moved to vacate the forfeiture and to exonerate the bond under section 1305, subdivision (d) or (g). In the alternative, it moved to toll time under section 1305, subdivision (e) or (h). On July 10, 2019, the court entered a judgment of $100,000 against North River. North River appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained it decided a similar case against a surety in People v. Tingcungco (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 249 (Tingcungco). The court reasoned that North River’s position is contrary to the language and legislative history of Penal Code section 1305, subdivisions (g) and (h). North River posted a bail bond on a defendant who fled California. North River chased him but found him too late to get the prosecution’s decision on extradition, which is a necessary part of the statutory process. To save itself now, North River maintains legislative purpose should override, or guide, the interpretation of the words of this statute. However, the court wrote, rescuing anyone who may have pledged assets as security for the bond is not an issue before the court. View "P. v. The North River Insurance Company" on Justia Law