Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Freedom Foundation filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief under the California Public Records Act (PRA) to compel the Department of Human Resources (CalHR) to disclose records regarding collective bargaining units and state employees. The trial court denied the petition and complaint. In seeking extraordinary relief, Freedom Foundation argued: (1) the collective bargaining exemption under Government Code section 6254 (p)(1) was limited to information that revealed an agency’s deliberative processes; and (2) CalHR was obligated to search the database maintained by the State Controller’s Office for responsive documents. “To justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.” Freedom Foundation failed to persuade the Court of Appeal that the California Legislature could not have intended the Government Code provision to apply as the trial court explained. Because the Court rejected Freedom Foundation’s construction of the collective bargaining exemption, it also found Freedom Foundation's assertion that CalHR should have produced redacted records that revealed only the “aggregate information” it sought unpersuasive. "At a minimum, the evidence demonstrated, even if other information could be redacted from the document over which CalHR asserted the collective bargaining privilege, disclosing the information requested by Freedom Foundation would reveal CalHR’s research and evaluations conducted pursuant to the Dills Act. As such, the court did not err in concluding CalHR was not required to produce this document at all." View "Freedom Foundation v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioners Geoff Cole and Admiral’s Experience, Inc. sought a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to calendar their timely motion for summary judgment for a hearing before the start of trial. The Court of Appeal notified the parties it was considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., 36 Cal.3d 171(1984)), and read and considered the informal response and request for judicial notice from real party in interest Matt Zeiner (Zeiner). Petitioners also field a reply brief, which Zeiner requested to strike. In 2018, a dispute arose between petitioners and Zeiner after a trailer petitioners rented from Zeiner was destroyed. In January 2019, Zeiner initiated the underlying lawsuit against petitioners seeking to recover for the loss of the trailer. The Court of Appeal granted the request for judicial notice, denied Zeiner’s request to strike the reply brief, and concluded that petitioners were entitled to peremptory writ relief. The Court published its decision to provide guidance on the deadline for filing a summary judgment motion that is served electronically. View "Cole v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Golden acted as a real estate broker for a rental property owned by Banerjee's company, Arkesh. Golden found a five-year tenant. Arkesh contracted to pay a commission if the tenant bought the property. . The tenant purchased the property for $4,850,000. Golden demanded that First American (as escrow holder for the sale) hold the commission ($145,500) and an outstanding lease fee ($5,994.95). The commission remained unpaid.Golden sued, alleging breach of contract against Arkesh and Banerjee, and promissory estoppel against First American. Golden served the summons and complaint through substituted service; although Banjerjee’s name was listed at a gated community in Dublin, on seven occasions, the process server was unable to gain access. On an eighth attempt, the documents were served to a “co-resident” who indicated Banerjee was not home and a copy was also mailed to Banerjee at that address. Defaults were entered against the defendants. First American then cross-complained against the defendants for indemnity and contribution; Banerjee was personally served. Golden assigned its claims to First American, which obtained a default judgment.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of a motion to set aside the default judgment, rejecting arguments that the service of the original summons and complaint was improper and that the default judgment should be set aside for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Banerjee was personally served with the cross-complaint two months after the default was entered on the complaint but waited more than two years before moving to set aside the default. View "First American Title Insurance Co. v. Banerjee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Chris LaBarbera hired Richard Knight dba Knight Construction (Knight) to remodel a house pursuant to a contract that provided Knight would defend and indemnify LaBarbera for all claims arising out of the work. Knight obtained a general liability insurance policy from defendant-respondent Security National Insurance Company (Security National) that covered damages Knight was obligated to pay due to bodily injury to a third party. As relevant here, the policy also covered Knight’s “liability for damages . . . [a]ssumed in a contract or agreement that is an ‘insured contract.’ ” Security National acknowledged the indemnity provision in Knight’s contract with LaBarbera was an “insured contract” within the meaning of the policy. The policy also provided, “If we defend an insured [i.e., Knight] against a suit and an indemnitee of the insured [i.e., LaBarbera] is also named as a party to the suit, we will defend that indemnitee” if certain conditions were met. During the remodeling work, a subcontractor suffered catastrophic injuries, and sued both LaBarbera and Knight. LaBarbera’s liability insurer (plaintiff-appellant Lloyd's of London Underwriters) defended him in that lawsuit, and Security National defended Knight. LaBarbera also tendered his defense to Knight and to Security National, but they either ignored or rejected the tender. After settling the underlying lawsuit for $465,000, LaBarbera and Underwriters sued Knight and Security National, seeking to recover the full $465,000 settlement amount and over $100,000 in expenses and attorney fees incurred defending LaBarbera in that lawsuit. Security National moved for summary judgment on the ground that all claims against it were barred because the undisputed facts established it did not have an obligation to defend or indemnify LaBarbera. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Security National. LaBarbera and Underwriters appealed, but the Court of Appeal affirmed, adopting different reasoning than the trial court. The Court agreed with Security National that the indemnitee defense clause in Knight’s general liability insurance policy did not bestow third party beneficiary rights on the indemnitee, LaBarbera, who benefitted only incidentally from the clause. Because LaBarbera was not a third party beneficiary under Knight’s policy, he was precluded from bringing a direct action against Security National. View "LaBarbera, et al. v. Security Nat. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Jenkinses bought a one-bedroom home, built in 1909, with a small accessory cottage in San Anselmo. Following conversations with an architect, contractors, and the Town Planning Director, they sought permits to demolish the existing structures and build a new home with a detached studio. The Planning Commission approved the project. The Jenkinses nevertheless worked with neighbors to accommodate their concerns and submitted revised plans, which were also approved. Four individuals unsuccessfully appealed to the Town Council. Attorney Brandt-Hawley filed a mandamus petition on behalf of an unincorporated association and an individual, alleging violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), although the appeal did not include any CEQA claim and CEQA has a categorical exemption for single-family homes, and “violation of the Town Municipal Code,” without citation.The trial judge denied the petition, criticizing aspects of Brandt-Hawley’s briefing and advocacy. Petitioners appealed, then offered to dismiss the appeal for a waiver of fees and costs. The Jenkinses rejected the offer. On the day the opening brief was due, Brandt-Hawley dismissed the appeal. The Jenkinses sued Brandt-Hawley for malicious prosecution. The court denied Brandt-Hawley’s special anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike. The court of appeal affirmed. The Jenkinses met their burden under step two of the anti-SLAPP procedure demonstrating a probability of success on their complaint. View "Jenkins v. Brandt-Hawley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Robert Parsons worked for Defendant-respondent Estenson Logistics, LLC (Estenson) , and Estenson paid its employees weekly. Estenson’s pay period ran from Sunday through the following Saturday. It paid its employees on the second Monday after the end of the pay period, which was nine calendar days after the end of the pay period. If Monday was a holiday, it paid its employees on Tuesday, which was 10 calendar days after the end of the pay period. California Labor Code section 204(d) provided that wages for employees who are paid weekly were deemed timely if paid “not more than seven calendar days following the close of the payroll period.” What happens if the seventh calendar day falls on a Saturday? Parsons argued the wages had to be paid on that Saturday. Estenson argued the wages could be paid the following Monday, because Code of Civil Procedure section 12a provided that weekends were holidays, and further provided, “If the last day for the performance of any act provided or required by law to be performed within a specified period of time is a holiday, then that period is hereby extended to and including the next day that is not a holiday.” The trial court agreed with Estenson, and granted summary judgment in its favor on a wage and hour claim brought by Parsons. To this, the Court of Appeal also agreed, and thus affirmed. View "Parsons v. Estenson Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

Valley Hospital admitted Ann as a resident to recover from hip surgery. Weeks later, Valley discharged Ann to an assisted living facility, where she died five days later. This suit alleges that Ann, unable due to dementia to communicate her needs, lost 40 pounds and became severely dehydrated at Valley, resulting in acute renal failure and that Valley, billing Medicare until her eligibility expired, "dumped" her at a non-medical facility, "misrepresenting to the family and facility that [Ann] was stable and healthy enough” for the transfer.Valley submitted an arbitration agreement that John had signed on Ann’s behalf. The agreement stated that residents were not required to sign as a condition of admission. The court sent the suit to arbitration. The plaintiffs paid their portion of the arbitration filing fee. Valley did not timely pay the balance. More than 30 days after the deadline, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, the plaintiffs moved to vacate the stay of litigation and to withdraw from arbitration. Valley paid its fees that day. The court of appeal affirmed an order permitting the resumption of litigation. The statute provides that a business pursuing arbitration under a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is in material breach of that agreement—thereby waiving its right to arbitrate—if it fails to timely pay its share of arbitration fees; it does not require an arbitrator’s determination of default and it is not limited to only to mandatory pre-dispute agreements. View "Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc." on Justia Law

The court appointed a guardian ad litem for two minor trust beneficiaries. A few years later, but before the beneficiaries reached 18, they sought the removal of the guardian ad litem. The guardian responded by filing a motion to disqualify the beneficiaries' attorney, which the trial court granted. The beneficiaries appealed.By the time the case reached the Second Appellate District, the beneficiaries had reached the age of majority. Thus, The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court's order disqualifying the counsel of two trust beneficiaries, finding that the issue was moot. The court explained that there is no longer statutory authority permitting the appointment of a guardian ad litem because the beneficiaries are no longer minors. View "Chui v. Chui" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff R. Kemp was convicted, released from prison, and placed on parole. In 2020, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) offered Kemp a job in Sacramento. Defendant Accurate Background LLC (Accurate) provided a background report to Amazon revealing Kemp’s criminal conviction. Amazon then withdrew its job offer. Because Kemp’s 2011 conviction predated the 2020 report by more than seven years, he filed a complaint alleging Accurate: (1) violated the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA); (2) violated the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA); and (3) derivatively violated the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Accurate filed a demurrer: Kemp’s parole ended in 2014, which predated the 2020 report by less than seven years. Accurate argued under the ICRAA and the CCRAA, “the term ‘parole’ refers to the end of the parole period,” thus barring liability. Alternatively, Accurate argued the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) preempted the state ICRAA, and therefore Kemp’s ICRAA claim was barred as a matter of law. The trial court overruled Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the plain meaning of ‘from the date of . . . parole’ refers to the start date of conditional release.” The court sustained Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the FCRA preempts the ICRAA claim.” Accurate and Kemp both filed petitions for extraordinary writ relief to the Court of Appeal. The Court held the phrase "from the date of parole" referred to the start date of parole, and the FCRA did not preempt Kemp’s ICRAA claim. Thus, the appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order, which partially sustained Accurate’s demurrer, and to issue a new order overruling the demurrer in its entirety. View "Kemp v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

John MM. Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, C.M. (Doe’s mother), and B.S. (Doe’s father) (collectively real parties in interest), sued petitioner Victor Valley Union High School District (the district) for negligence and other causes of action arising from an alleged sexual assault on Doe while he was a high school student. During discovery, real parties in interest learned video that captured some of the events surrounding the alleged sexual assault had been erased. Real parties in interest moved the superior court for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary and issue sanctions against the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. The trial court concluded the erasure of the video was the result of negligence, and not intentional wrongdoing, and denied the request for terminating sanctions. However, the court granted the request for evidentiary, issue, and monetary sanctions because it concluded that, even before the lawsuit was filed, the district should have reasonably anticipated the alleged sexual assault would result in litigation and, therefore, the district was under a duty to preserve all relevant evidence including the video. On appeal in the Court of Appeal's original jurisdiction, the district argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled the district had the duty to preserve the video before it was erased and, therefore, that the district was not shielded from sanctions by the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f). After considering real parties in interest's opposition to the petition and the district's reply, the Court of Appeal found the extant record did not support the trial court’s ruling that, at the time the video was erased, the district was on notice that litigation about Doe’s alleged sexual assault was reasonably foreseeable. The Court granted the district's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its sanctions order and reconsider its ruling. View "Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law