Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This is an appeal from a family court’s self-described sua sponte sanctions order under Family Code section 271.1 The family court judge ordered Appellants (Mother) and her attorney, to each pay $10,000 to Respondent (Father) and partly justified the sanctions on its finding that Appellants unjustifiably accused the judge of being biased (or appearing to be biased).   The Second Appellate District considered whether the sanctions order represents an abuse of the family court’s discretion and reversed the family court’s order. The court explained that as to the attorney, the family court’s sanctions award is obviously wrong: Section 271 permits imposing sanctions only on a party, not a party’s attorney, and the sanctions award against the attorney is, therefore, improper. As against Mother, the sanctions award is an error, too, even if a marginally less obvious one. There is a question as to whether section 271 even authorizes a family court to issue sanctions on its own motion, but the court explained it need not decide that issue because the conduct relied on by the family court to impose sanctions here, even considered in the aggregate, does not rise to the level of meriting sanctions. The family court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. View "Featherstone v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Bishop’s School (the School) terminated Chad Bishop’s (Bishop) employment as a teacher after it became aware of a text exchange between Bishop and a former student. Bishop filed a lawsuit asserting a breach of contract claim against the School and defamation claims against the School and Ron Kim, the Head of the School, based on the termination letter they sent to Bishop and a statement Kim made that was published in the student newspaper. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the first amended complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) as well as a demurrer. The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the defamation claims but denied it as to the contract claim against the School. The court also overruled the School’s demurrer to the contract claim. Bishop appealed the anti-SLAPP ruling. On cross-appeal, the School challenged the court’s order denying anti-SLAPP protection for the contract claim. The School also sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court to sustain its demurrer to the contract claim. After review, the Court of appeal concluded: (1) defendants did not meet their burden to show that Bishop’s allegations regarding the termination letter, which supported the defamation claim, or the termination itself, which supported the contract claim, involved protected activity; (2) defendants met their burden to show that Kim’s statement was protected activity, and Bishop failed to show that the defamation claim as based on that activity had minimal merit; and (3) without having filed a writ petition, there was no basis for the School to seek writ relief from the court’s order overruling its demurrer ruling on the contract claim. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order and remanded the matter with directions. View "Bishop v. The Bishop's School" on Justia Law

Plaintiff City of Rocklin (City) filed an action against defendants Legacy Family Adventures-Rocklin, LLC, (LFA) and David Busch asserting 12 causes of action related to their joint undertaking involving the construction and operation of a theme park, Quarry Park Adventures. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike the first four causes of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The parties did not actively dispute that the speech at issue in those causes of action was commercial speech, to which section 425.16 did not apply. Instead, the primary issue the parties litigated was whether the speech concerning the theme park qualified under the “artistic work” exception to the commercial speech exemption. In opposing defendants’ special motion to strike, the City requested attorney fees, asserting the motion was frivolous. The trial court denied defendants’ special motion to strike, and, concluding the motion was indeed frivolous, granted the City’s request for attorney fees. Defendants appealed the fees order, arguing: (1) their special motion to strike was not frivolous because, even if the Court of Appeal concluded a theme park was not an artistic work, reasonable attorneys could differ on the matter; (2) the trial court erred in failing to follow the mandatory procedures set forth section 128.5 in sanctioning them; and (3) certain rulings and the “arbitrary rotation of trial judges” deprived them of their due process rights. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed and remanded for a determination and award of the City's attorney fees on this appeal. View "City of Rocklin v. Legacy Family Adventures etc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff pursued a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004 against Defendants Premier Valley, Inc. (doing business as Century 21 MM) and Century 21 Real Estate LLC, to enforce civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the operative complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff appealed. The appeal involved issues of statutory interpretation with regard to the following question: What is the applicable test or governing standard for determining whether a real estate salesperson is an “employee” or an “independent contractor” for purposes of the Labor Code’s wage and hour provisions? The resolution of this question turned on interpreting recently enacted Labor Code section 2778, subdivision (c)(1), and other provisions incorporated therein.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court concluded that the applicable test for the purpose at hand is the test set forth in Unemployment Insurance Code sections 650 and 13004.1, as incorporated in Business and Professions Code section 10032, subdivision (b), which is itself incorporated in Labor Code section 2778, subdivision (c)(1). The trial court reached the same conclusion and applied the correct test in ruling on the Defendants’ demurrer.   The court held that under Labor Code Section 2778(c)(1), Plaintiff is an Independent Contractor as a matter of law. Further, the court held that Labor Code Section 2778(c)(1) is constitutional. Finally, the court found that Plaintiff’s separate employment agreement for his sales manager position is not relevant for purposes of his representative PAGA cause of action. View "Whitlach v. Premier Valley, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Sharlene Allen was a former employee of the San Diego Convention Center Corporation (SDCCC). After SDCCC terminated Allen, she filed a class action lawsuit against SDCCC alleging various violations of the California Labor Code. The trial court largely sustained SDCCC’s demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that the corporation was exempt from liability as a government entity. The court, however, left intact one claim for untimely payment of final wages under Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 203,1 and derivative claims under the Unfair Competition Law and the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Allen then moved for class certification for her surviving causes of action. The trial court denied the motion based on Allen’s concession that her claim for untimely final payment was not viable because it was derivative of the other claims dismissed at the demurrer stage. Allen appealed the denial of the motion for class certification, which she claimed was the "death knell" of her class claims and thus, the lawsuit. She argued the trial court’s ruling on the demurrer was incorrect because SDCCC did not establish as a matter of law that it was exempt from liability. In response, SDCCC argued Allen’s appeal should have been dismissed as taken from a nonappealable order. Alternatively, SDCCC contended the trial court’s order sustaining its demurrer was correct, and the subsequent denial of class certification should be affirmed. The Court of Appeal rejected SDCCC’s assertion that the order was not appealable. However, the Court agreed that class certification was properly denied by the trial court and affirmed the order. View "Allen v. San Diego Convention Center Corp., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue was whether hearsay evidence could be admissible at a hearing on a gun violence restraining order (GVRO) under California Penal Code section 18175. The Court of Appeal held that hearsay evidence was admissible at a GVRO hearing as it is in a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) and civil harassment restraining order (CHRO). The Court further concluded that the evidence submitted to the trial court was sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that appellant Geoffrey S. posed a significant danger of causing personal injury by gun violence. Because the Court rejected Geoffrey’s other claims, the Court affirmed the one-year GVRO issued against him. View "San Diego Police Department v. Geoffrey S." on Justia Law

Iris, incorporated in 1999, went public in 2007. In 2019, the SEC revoked the registration of Iris’s securities. Since its incorporation, Chin has been chairman of Iris’s three-member board of directors, its president, secretary, CEO, CFO, and majority shareholder. Chin’s sister was also a board member. Farnum was a board member, 2003-2014, and owned eight percent of Iris’s stock. In 2014, Farnum requested inspection of corporate minutes, documents relating to the acquisition of Iris’s subsidiary, and cash flow statements, then, in his capacity as a board member and shareholder, sought a writ of mandate. Before the hearing on Farnum’s petition, Farnum was voted off Iris’s board. The court denied Farnum’s petition (Corporations Code 1602) because Farnum no longer had standing to inspect corporate records due to his ejection from the board, and his request was “overbroad and lack[ed] a statement of purpose reasonably related to his interests as a shareholder.”Weeks later, Farnum served 31 inspection requests on Iris and subsequently filed another mandamus petition. The superior court denied the petition and Farnum’s associated request for attorney fees. On remand with respect to certain records, Farnum sought reimbursement of his expenses in enforcing his rights as a shareholder ($91,000). The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the request. Farnum scored “only a partial victory” given the scope of what he sought; there was no showing that on the whole, Iris acted without justification in refusing Farnum’s inspection demands. View "Farnum v. Iris Biotechnologies Inc." on Justia Law

The Teachers taught within the Salinas District before retiring and becoming members of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) Defined Benefit (DB) Program. Part of Teachers’ compensation was reported by the District as being deferred to Teachers’ respective DB accounts for their postretirement benefits. The Teachers challenged reductions that CalSTRS had made and continued to make to their monthly retirement benefits after determining that the District had erred in its reporting to CalSTRS; those errors resulted in the overstatement of Teachers’ monthly benefits. In 2019, the court of appeal held that CalSTRS’s claims were not time-barred, applying the continuous accrual theory. The court remanded for consideration of the defenses of equitable estoppel and laches. On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of Teachers and directed that CalSTRS refrain from reducing Teachers’ monthly pension benefits or from seeking recovery of claimed overpayments.The court of appeal reversed. While equitable estoppel may be asserted in a proper case against a governmental entity, it “may not be invoked to directly contravene statutory limitations.” Applying equitable estoppel required CalSTRS to continue to miscalculate Teachers’ monthly pension benefits in contravention of the Education Code. Laches was unavailable to defeat the claims of law at issue and may not be asserted to negate the prior determination. View "Blaser v. California State Teachers' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Bernell Beco filed suit against his former employer, defendant Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (Fast Auto) alleging 14 causes of action relating to the termination of his employment. Plaintiff alleged causes of action under with), including claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), numerous wage and hour violations under the Labor Code, wrongful termination, unfair competition, and additional tort claims. Fast Auto moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Beco had signed a valid arbitration agreement at the time he was hired. The trial court found the agreement unconscionable to the extent that severance would not cure the defects and declined to enforce it. After its review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the agreement was unconscionable, and further rejected Fast Auto’s argument that the arbitrator, not the court, should have decided the issue of unconscionability. Additionally, because the agreement included numerous substantively unconscionable provisions, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to sever them. View "Beco v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Thai and defendant Newton Tran were partners in Richmond City Center, LP et al. (Richmond). Plaintiff agreed to sell defendant his 20.5 percent interest in Richmond. The parties signed a sales agreement in April 2019, in which plaintiff assigned defendant his interest in Richmond. A few months after the sales agreement was executed, plaintiff filed the underlying lawsuit against defendant, generally complaining that defendant still owed a portion of the purchase price, and asserted breach of contract and fraud claims. Defendant filed a cross-complaint against plaintiff, seeking declaratory relief, reformation, and rescission. Plaintiff issued two subpoenas: (1) a Deposition Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Production of Documents to Ha Mach, Richmond’s property manager; and (2) a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Tien Van, Richmond’s accountant. Both subpoenas sought Richmond’s consumer records, so plaintiff served Richmond with a notice to consumer for each subpoena per California Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3. Richmond served objections to each subpoena. Neither Mach nor Van produced any records due to Richmond’s objections. Nearly two months after Richmond served the objections, plaintiff filed motions to compel Mach and Van to comply with the subpoenas and produce the requested records under section 2025.480. Plaintiff also requested sanctions against Richmond and its attorneys. Defendant opposed the motions, but Richmond did not. The trial court granted the motions and awarded plaintiff $1,245 in sanctions against Richmond and its attorneys. Richmond appealed, arguing: (1) plaintiff’s motions to compel were brought under the wrong section of the Code of Civil Procedure and were untimely; and (2) even if the motions were timely, sanctions were improper because it did not oppose the motions. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first argument and found the trial court erred by granting the motions: after the twenty-day deadline expires, the subpoenaing party cannot move to enforce the subpoena over the objection through a motion to compel under section 2025.480, which has a 60-day deadline. View "Thai v. Richmond City Center, L.P." on Justia Law