Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

April Mancini owned the Jah Healing Kemetic Temple of the Divine Church, Inc. (the Church), whose adherents consume cannabis blessed by Church pastors as “sacrament.” The County of San Bernardino (the County) determined that the Church routinely sold cannabis products in violation of a County ordinance prohibiting commercial cannabis activity on unincorporated County land. The trial court found that the Church was operating an illegal cannabis dispensary and issued a permanent injunction against Mancini and the Church, among other relief. Mancini and the Church appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "County of Santa Barbara v. Mancini" on Justia Law

The People of the State of California (People), appealed the denial of the motion for victim restitution, i.e., attorney fees and costs after Respondent was convicted by plea of felony driving with a .08 blood alcohol level or higher causing bodily injury. the denial of the motion for victim restitution, i.e., attorney fees and costs, after Respondent was convicted by plea of felony driving with a .08 blood alcohol level or higher causing bodily injury release of liability signed by the victim in the civil case discharged respondent’s obligation to pay restitution in the criminal case.The Second Appellate District agreed with the People and reversed. Here, the People presented evidence that the injured driver received a civil settlement of $235,000. Of the settlement, $61,574.44 was paid to the driver’s attorney as a contingency fee of 25 percent plus costs. Respondent did not present any witnesses or evidence in opposition. Instead, he argued the signed releases by the victims meant they “ha[d] received full and complete compensation,” and the contingency fee was “not a true amount of attorney’s fees.” However, “[a] crime victim who seeks redress for his injuries in a civil suit can expect to pay counsel with a contingency fee.” Because the People established that the driver paid her attorney a contingency fee of 25 percent, the burden shifted to Respondent to refute this showing. Respondent contends the trial court’s denial of fees was an “implied finding”. But an implied finding of fact must be supported by substantial evidence. View "P. v. Nonaka" on Justia Law

After its collective bargaining agreement with Macy’s expired, the parties were unable to agree on a new agreement. Local 39 called a strike and began picketing at Macy’s store. Macy’s filed suit, alleging that Local 39 had engaged in continuing and escalating unlawful misconduct at the store and sought injunctions preventing Local 39 from picketing at the store’s entrances, blocking ingress or egress, disturbing the public, threatening public safety, or damaging property. Macy’s also asked for damages.Local 39 filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, motion, arguing that the complaint alleged acts in furtherance of its right to free speech on a public issue and that Macy’s could not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits because the complaint did not satisfy Labor Code section 1138’s heightened standard of proof for claims arising out of labor disputes. The trial court granted Local 39’s motion in part. The court of appeal held that the trial court should have granted its first anti-SLAPP motion in full and ordered the entire complaint stricken. A labor organization cannot be held responsible or liable for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, "except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of those acts.” Macy’s did not provide such proof. View "International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 39 v. Macy's, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, Poway Unified School District (the District) constructed a new elementary school. The $82 million project was funded primarily by special tax bonds paid for by homeowners in local communities. Approximately four years later, following the passage of Proposition 51, the District received reimbursement funds from the State of California ($27,672,923). The District allocated a small portion to retire local bonds but used a larger amount toward new high priority outlay expenditures. Two homeowners, Albert Bates and Bridget Denihan, disagreed with the District’s fund allocation decision and filed a petition for a writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court denied all relief and entered a judgment in the District’s favor. On appeal, the Homeowners contended California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 1859.90.5 and Education Code section 17070.631 required the District to allocate all newly acquired “State Funds” toward retiring the local bonds, unless it could prove there was a savings during construction (but there was none). The Court of Appeal concluded the Homeowners’ arguments had merit, and reversed the judgment. View "Bates v. Poway Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Appellant is a severely disabled child whose congenital abnormalities went undetected during his mother’s pregnancy until after viability. Appellant sued various medical providers for wrongful life, settling with one in 2018. The California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) asserted a lien on Appellant's settlement to recover what DHCS paid for Appellant's care. The trial court awarded DHCS the full amount of the lien and Appellant appealed.The Second Appellate District reversed. Although the court rejected Appellant's claim that the DHCS lien is preempted by federal law and that there is no substantial evidence that Appellant's settlement included payments for past medical expenses, the Second Appellate District found that the trial court erred by failing to distinguish between past medical expenses and other damages. View "Daniel C. v. White Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Roseville Lodge No. 1293, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc. (the Lodge) hired Charlie Gelatini to move an automated teller machine (ATM) on its premises. Plaintiff and appellant Ricky Lee Miller, Jr., worked for Gelatini and was the person who performed the work. Miller was injured on the job when he fell from a scaffold, and he sought to hold the Lodge and its bartender John Dickinson liable for his injuries. Citing the Privette doctrine, the Lodge and Dickinson argued they were not liable, and they moved for summary judgment. Miller argued triable issues of fact existed over whether an exception applieed. The trial court granted the motion, and Miller appealed. Because the alleged hazard in this case was not concealed and was reasonably ascertainable to Gelatini (and Miller), the concealed hazardous condition exception to the Privette doctrine did not apply. Instead, the Privette presumption remained unrebutted, and the Lodge delegated to Gelatini any duty it had to protect Miller from hazards associated with using a wheeled scaffold. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Miller v. Roseville Lodge No. 1293" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed claims for discrimination and retaliation against her former employer, defendant and real party in interest Centinela Skilled Nursing & Wellness Centre West, LLC. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to stay litigation and compel the parties to proceed in arbitration. When Defendant failed to pay its arbitration fees by a statutory deadline, Plaintiff moved the trial court to lift the stay of litigation and allow her to proceed in court. The trial court denied the motion, and Plaintiff filed the instant petition for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reverse that denial.   The Second Appellate District granted the petition for writ of mandate. The court directed g the trial court to (1) vacate its order denying Plaintiff’s motion under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.97 and 1281.99; (2) enter an order lifting the stay of litigation and allowing Plaintiff to bring her claims in court; and (3) conduct further proceedings on Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions under section 1281.99.   The court agreed with Plaintiff that, based on the plain language as well as the legislative history of section 1281.97, the Legislature intended courts to apply the statute’s payment deadline strictly. Thus, under section 1281.97, subdivision (a)(1), Defendant was in material breach of the arbitration agreement even though, as the trial court found, the delay in payment was inadvertent, brief, and did not prejudice Plaintiff. Further, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that the FAA preempts section 1281.97. View "Espinoza v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Rodriguez sued Parivar under California’s labor laws, alleging that Parivar misclassified her as an exempt employee, while she “spent the majority of her time performing the exact same duties as non-exempt employees” at Parivar's restaurant. As an affirmative defense, Parivar argued that under wage order 5-2001’s “executive exemption” Rodriguez was exempt from overtime, meal period, and rest period requirements. A jury rejected Parivar’s executive exemption defense; finding, by a 9-3 vote, Parivar failed to prove that, as the special verdict question put it, “Rodriguez performed exempt duties more than half of the time.” The jury found that Rodriguez was owed $26,786.54 in overtime pay. The court awarded $11,570.21 in prejudgment interest and $932,842.63 in attorney fees and litigation costs.The court of appeal reversed. The narrow framing of the special verdict question effectively barred Parivar from proving its executive exemption defense, allowing the jury to find liability without addressing Parivar’s realistic expectations for how Rodriguez should have allocated her time. Given the 9-3 vote that Parivar did not prove Rodriguez spent more than half of her time performing exempt duties and given the heavily-contested question of whether she spent that time performing duties that meet the test of the executive exemption, it is reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a result more favorable to Parivar absent the special verdict error. View "Rodriguez v. Parivar, Inc." on Justia Law

Tarrar operated “a utility consultant business” in Contra Costa County. Associated issued Tarrar a comprehensive commercial liability and property insurance policy to “pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property,” and in particular to “pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain due to the necessary suspension of your operations during the period of restoration." The suspension must be caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property at the described premises. The loss or damage must be caused by or result from a Covered Cause of Loss.Based on the 2020 “shelter-in-place orders,” Tarrar made an unsuccessful claim for “business income loss.” The trial court dismissed Tarrar’s subsequent suit without leave to amend. While several California courts of appeal have resolved this issue against the insureds, one court held for the insured on the basis it had pled the element missing from earlier cases: it “adequately alleged direct physical loss or damage.” While Tarrar’s complaint did not allege the necessary “direct physical loss of or damage to property,” Tarrar should be permitted to amend. A plaintiff need not even request leave to amend an original complaint. Unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion. View "Tarrar Enterprises, Inc. v. Associated Indemnity Corp." on Justia Law

Respondent Neumiller & Beardslee filed a renewal request for a 2008 judgment and identified Estate Administrator Audrey Douglas as the judgment debtor without stating she was named in her role as the administrator of an estate as set forth in the original judgment. When it discovered this, respondent filed a motion to correct the error. The trial court granted that motion and corrected the judgment nunc pro tunc. Appellant Joanna Douglas-Dorsey, who was a beneficiary of the estate argued on appeal the trial court erred in correcting that error because it was not a clerical error. Remembering the “law respects form less than substance” the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Estate of Douglas" on Justia Law