Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Juan A., a teenager and dependent of the juvenile court, was removed from parental custody and placed in long-term foster care after the court found he was not adoptable and no one was willing to be his legal guardian. The court terminated family reunification services but did not terminate parental rights. Juan attended many hearings during his dependency case but was not present at the status review hearing that is the subject of this appeal. At that hearing, the court denied Juan’s trial counsel’s request for a brief continuance to allow Juan to be present, which was found to be an error as Juan had a right to be present under Welfare and Institutions Code section 349.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County declared Juan a dependent of the court in January 2020, removed him from parental custody, and ordered family reunification services for his mother. In August 2021, the court terminated these services. At a section 366.26 review hearing in June 2023, the court decided not to terminate parental rights, finding Juan not adoptable and no potential legal guardians available. The court ordered Juan to remain in foster care with permanent placement services. In March 2024, the court denied a continuance request for Juan to attend the permanency planning review hearing, found his placement appropriate, and scheduled the next review hearing for September 2024.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that the juvenile court erred in denying the continuance request, as Juan had a statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court held that this error prejudiced Juan, as his presence could have allowed him to request additional services to improve his academic performance and employment prospects. The appellate court reversed the orders issued at the March 28, 2024 hearing and remanded the case for a new status review hearing in accordance with section 349. View "In re Juan A." on Justia Law

Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) challenging the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested multiple extensions and accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, citing his disability. The trial court granted six such requests over eight months but denied a seventh request for further extensions and relief from procedural obligations.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG appealed, arguing that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request deprived them of a fair opportunity to litigate the issue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that granting another extension would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which would not deny them access to judicial services. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection" on Justia Law

The case involves Ofek Rachel, Ltd. and M.M.N. Yad David, USA Ltd. (judgment creditors) who obtained a 2016 judgment from an Israeli court against Suki Ben Zion (Zion). They then filed a lawsuit in New York state court to enforce the Israeli judgment, resulting in a 2017 judgment against Zion for $5.5 million. Despite claiming to have no assets, Zion was living lavishly, with his expenses being paid by his friend Chaim Cohen (Cohen). The judgment creditors served a document subpoena on Cohen for his American Express statements, which Cohen initially quashed due to procedural defects. A second subpoena led to a court order compelling Cohen to comply, but Cohen's responses were heavily redacted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the judgment creditors' motion to compel Cohen to provide unredacted statements. When Cohen failed to comply, the judgment creditors filed a motion to hold him in contempt. The trial court found Cohen guilty on multiple counts of contempt and imposed a $3,000 fine, along with ordering Cohen to pay $185,095.20 in attorney’s fees and $8,964.71 in costs.Cohen appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, challenging the trial court's authority to impose attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1218. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that section 1218 allows for the imposition of attorney’s fees against a person who violates a court order in post-judgment enforcement proceedings, even if that person was not a party to the underlying litigation. The court reasoned that the statutory language, legislative intent, and consistency with other post-judgment enforcement remedies supported this interpretation. View "Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion" on Justia Law

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim for being untimely, as it was not presented within six months of accrual. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which was also denied. He then filed a petition for relief in the trial court, arguing that his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misled by three attorneys who advised him that the one-year period applied.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to justify filing a late claim.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and was subject to the six-month claims period under section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

In April 2013, Michael Riste applied for a bail bond for his son, Michael Peterson, and signed an Indemnity Agreement and a Premium Agreement with Bad Boys Bail Bonds (Bail Agent). The agreements required Riste to pay a $10,000 premium in installments. Peterson signed identical documents after his release. The Bail Agent executed a $100,000 bail bond on behalf of The North River Insurance Company (Surety), ensuring Peterson's appearance at future court proceedings. Peterson failed to appear, leading to the forfeiture of the bail bond and a summary judgment against the Surety in October 2015.Two panels of the California Court of Appeal previously affirmed the denial of motions by the Surety and Bail Agent to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. In October 2020, a class action cross-claim in Caldwell v. BBBB Bonding Corp. argued that the Bail Agent's premium financing agreements were subject to Civil Code section 1799.91 and were unenforceable without proper notice to cosigners. The trial court and the Court of Appeal agreed, enjoining the Bail Agent from enforcing such agreements without the requisite notice.In September 2022, the Surety and Bail Agent filed a third motion to set aside the summary judgment, citing Caldwell and arguing that the premium was part of the consideration for the bail bond, making the bond void. The trial court denied the motion, and the Surety and Bail Agent appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's order. The court held that the bail bond was not void because the consideration for the bail bond was Peterson's release from custody, not the premium financing agreement. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction over the bond and properly denied the motion to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. View "People v. North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Marlon Quesada, a deputy sheriff with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, was not promoted to sergeant despite taking the sergeant's examination in 2017 and 2019, scoring in band two and band one, respectively. Quesada had a mixed employment record, including two suspensions for misconduct and a 2015 investigation that was terminated due to a statute of limitations. Quesada claimed the Department improperly considered this time-barred investigation during the promotion process, which he argued was illegal.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Quesada's petition for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department to promote him and provide back pay and other damages. The trial court rejected Quesada's argument for a burden-shifting approach, similar to that used in discrimination cases, and found that Quesada did not establish that the Department's decision was illegal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the standard approach to civil litigation applies, where the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the elements of their claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The court declined to adopt a burden-shifting approach, noting that Quesada's case did not involve discrimination based on race or membership in a historically oppressed group. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the Department's decision, including Quesada's mediocre performance evaluations and past misconduct. The court concluded that Quesada's policy arguments did not justify a departure from the standard legal approach. View "Quesada v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Bettie Blauser filed an appeal referencing a purported judgment of dismissal, which was actually an unsigned minute order from the final day of a jury trial. The minute order indicated that the court granted a motion for nonsuit regarding the First Amended Complaint and dismissed the First Amended Cross-Complaint without prejudice upon the cross-complainant's request.The Superior Court of Orange County issued the minute order, but it was not labeled as a judgment nor did it purport to enter judgment. The court invited the parties to brief the appealability of the order, raising concerns that the order was not appealable. The appellant was also invited to obtain a judgment of dismissal from the trial court to proceed with the appeal. However, the appellant filed a notice of entry of judgment or order, attaching the same minute order with the trial court's signature and the phrase "it is so ordered" added.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and determined that the signed minute order was still not an appealable judgment. The court emphasized that an appealable order or judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. The court cited the case Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale, which highlighted the necessity of a document identified as a "judgment" to trigger an appeal. The court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, allowing the appellant to file a notice of appeal from the judgment once it is properly entered by the trial court. The court urged trial courts to enter separate, signed documents clearly labeled as judgments or orders of dismissal to avoid confusion and ensure clarity for parties and attorneys. View "Blauser v. Dubin" on Justia Law

Allison Littlefield filed a verified petition against her brothers, Scott and David Littlefield, and her aunt, Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust. The petition sought their removal as co-trustees, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and the Trust, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Allison claimed that the appellants misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, restricted her use of the Ranch, and failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who allegedly harassed Allison and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike the petition under California's anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the appellants failed to show that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that the petition was based on protected activity. The court noted that the appellants' motion failed to identify specific allegations of protected activity and improperly sought to strike the entire petition or all causes of action without distinguishing between protected and unprotected conduct.However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. The court held that any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion was totally devoid of merit, as it did not demonstrate that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

The case involves the San Diego City Attorney filing a complaint against Experian Data Corp. for violating the unfair competition law (UCL) by failing to promptly notify consumers of a data breach as required by Civil Code section 1798.82(a). The City Attorney sought civil penalties and injunctive relief. The UCL claim is subject to a four-year statute of limitations, and the key issue is whether the discovery rule can delay the accrual of this non-fraud civil enforcement action.The Superior Court of Orange County initially overruled Experian's demurrer, which argued the complaint was time-barred. The court found the complaint did not show on its face that the UCL claim accrued before March 6, 2014. However, the court later granted Experian's motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to civil penalties, concluding the discovery rule did not apply to the UCL claim because it was a non-fraud claim and an enforcement action seeking civil penalties. The court also denied the City Attorney's motion for reconsideration and motion to file a Third Amended Complaint.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the discovery rule can apply to delay the accrual of the UCL claim. The court found that the nature of the claim, the enforcement action seeking civil penalties, and the involvement of a governmental entity did not preclude the application of the discovery rule. The court noted that the discovery rule has been applied to various types of claims, including those involving civil penalties and enforcement actions by governmental entities.The appellate court reversed the trial court's orders granting Experian's motion in limine and denying reconsideration. The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the application of the discovery rule and determine when the UCL claim accrued based on the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant actors. The trial court was also directed to reconsider the City Attorney's request to file a Third Amended Complaint. View "People v. Experian Data Corp." on Justia Law

The Comedy Store, a stand-up comedy venue in Los Angeles, was forced to close for over a year due to COVID-19 restrictions. In July 2021, the Store hired Moss Adams LLP, an accounting firm, to help apply for a Shuttered Venue Operator Grant from the U.S. Small Business Administration. The parties signed an agreement that included a Washington choice of law provision and a forum selection clause mandating disputes be resolved in Washington state courts, along with a predispute jury trial waiver. The Store alleged Moss Adams failed to inform it of the grant program's impending expiration, causing it to miss the application deadline and lose an $8.5 million grant.The Store initially filed a complaint in the United States District Court in Los Angeles, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Store then refiled in the Los Angeles Superior Court, asserting claims including gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Moss Adams moved to dismiss or stay the action based on the forum selection clause. The trial court granted the motion, contingent on Moss Adams stipulating that the Store could exercise its right to a jury trial in Washington. Moss Adams provided such a stipulation, and the trial court signed an order affirming the Store's right to a jury trial in Washington.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred by not properly applying the reversed burden of proof, which required Moss Adams to show that litigating in Washington would not diminish the Store's unwaivable right to a jury trial. The appellate court concluded that Moss Adams did not meet this burden, as Washington courts have enforced predispute jury waivers, and the stipulation offered by Moss Adams was not a binding modification of the agreement. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded with instructions to deny Moss Adams's motion to dismiss or stay the action. View "The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP" on Justia Law