Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2016, plaintiff Stephanie Hargrove filed suit against defendants-respondents San Bernardino Convalescent Operations, Inc., dba Legacy Post-Acute Rehabilitation Center (Hargrove’s former employer; SBCO), Indio Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Inc. (another skilled nursing facility where Hargrove was never employed; INRC), and Legacy Healthcare, Inc. (managerial and support services corp.; Legacy) under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Approximately four years later, in 2020, Hargrove died. Her attorneys requested leave to file an amended pleading to substitute movant-appellant Makiya Cornell in place of Hargrove to prosecute the PAGA claims; however, on October 6, 2020, the trial court denied the request, dismissed the action, and stated that Cornell “is free to file her own claim and her own causes of action.” On appeal, Cornell contends that she had standing to appeal the trial court’s order denying her request to substitute herself in place of Hargrove as an order effectively denying a motion to intervene. Alternatively, Cornell argued the Court of Appeal could treat her appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. Assuming the Court concluded Cornell had standing to appeal, she argued the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit her to amend Hargrove’s complaint to substitute Cornell as the representative plaintiff such that her PAGA claim related back to the original complaint. The Court of Appeal concluded Cornell did not have standing to appeal the judgment. The Court treated the order denying to motion to amend as an order denying an implicit motion to intervene, and concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. View "Hargrove v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Inland Empire Health Plan (IEHP) was a health care service plan subject to the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975 (Knox-Keene Act). It contracted with certain medical groups and providers to provide medical care at reduced costs to eligible beneficiaries of the California Medical Assistance Program (Medi-Cal or Medicaid) who were enrolled with IEHP. Plaintiffs-appellants Allied Anesthesia Medical Group, Inc., and Upland Anesthesia Medical Group were groups of doctors who provided anesthesia services to IEHP’s enrollees for elective, nonemergency surgeries. Plaintiffs had no provider contract with IEHP; however, they had exclusive agreements with the hospitals. Plaintiffs were paid at the Medi-Cal fee schedule rate. In this case, plaintiffs claimed IEHP should have paid them at the reasonable and customary value rate for their services instead of the Medi-Cal fee schedule rate, and requested a declaratory judgment based solely upon the Knox-Keene Act and the Claims Settlement Practices regulation. IHEP demurred on several grounds, including: (1) the cause of action for breach of implied-in-fact contract fails to sufficiently plead “mutual assent” and “legal consideration”; and (2) the cause of action for breach of contract (third party beneficiary) failed to allege how plaintiffs were the express, intended third party beneficiaries of any contract between IEHP and the California Department of Health Care Services. The trial court agreed with IEHP, sustained its demurrer without leave to amend, and entered judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, maintaining IEHP was obligated to pay them the reasonable and customary value rate for their services to IEHP’s enrollees. To this the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Allied Anesthesia Medical Group v. Inland Empire Health Plan" on Justia Law

G.V. (Father) appealed a juvenile court’s judgment terminating his parental rights as to his newborn daughter (E.V.) and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. He argued the court and the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to adequately inquire into the child’s Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 SSA conceded there were two errors with respect to duties under ICWA, but they were harmless. Alternatively, SSA moved the Court of Appeal to receive additional new evidence (that was not previously presented to the juvenile court) that allegedly rendered the appeal moot, or at least demonstrated any inquiry errors as to ICWA had to be deemed harmless. The Court denied the motion, and found that under In re A.R., 77 Cal.App.5th 197 (2022), all cases where the ICWA inquiry rules were not followed mandated reversal. Judgment was conditionally reversed and the matter remanded for compliance with ICWA. View "In re E.V." on Justia Law

Plaintiff C. Achay was a student on a high school track team, which usually practiced after school until 5:30 p.m. One day practice ended early, so Achay and her friend walked to Starbucks and returned about 45 minutes later. On the way back to the open campus, they encountered a stranger who Achay thought was “suspicious.” Someone identified him as A. Meer, a former student who was “kind of weird.” Achay retrieved her schoolbooks from the girls’ locker room, which was to be locked at 6:00 p.m. While Achay was walking from the girls’ locker room to the school parking lot she was stabbed by Meer, suffering serious injuries. Achay sued defendant Huntington Beach Union High School District (the District) for negligence. The District moved for summary judgment on the grounds of duty and causation. The trial court granted the motion, finding the District owed Achay no duty of care because at the time of the stabbing, she “was no longer on campus during school hours during a school-related activity.” To this the Court of Appeal disagreed: at the time of the stabbing, Achay was on campus to retrieve her books from an open locker room after her track practice and another sports team was still practicing nearby. “Achay’s brief departure from school is a red herring.” Alternatively, the trial court stated it “cannot assume that more security would have prevented the incident from occurring.” But the Court found that was “plainly a triable issue of material fact: whether the District used reasonable security measures to protect Achay from an arguably preventable injury at the hands of Meer.” Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s order, which granted the District’s motion for summary judgment. View "Achay v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

Acting pro se, plaintiff-appellant Timothy Simms wanted to bring a medical malpractice lawsuit against defendant-respondent Bear Valley Community Healthcare District (Bear Valley). He appealed a judgment denying his petition under Government Code section 946.6, in which he sought relief from the requirement in the California Government Claims Act that he timely present a claim to Bear Valley before bringing a suit for damages. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, finding that Simms did not require relief from the claim presentation requirement because he in fact submitted a timely claim, and the trial court erred by ruling he had not done so. Although Simms’s claim was deficient in certain respects, its submission triggered a statutory duty for Bear Valley to notify Simms of the defects, and the failure to notify him waived any defense as to the claim’s sufficiency. As such, Simms should have been permitted to file a complaint. View "Simms v. Bear Valley Community Heathcare Dist." on Justia Law

Ryan Lawhon alleged he was severely injured when an 18650 lithium-ion battery he bought from a San Diego vape shop suddenly exploded in his pants pocket. In addition to the vape shop and vape distributor, he sued LG Chem Ltd. (LG Chem), the South Korean manufacturer of lithium-ion batteries for negligence and product liability. The trial court denied LG Chem’s motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding the court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over LG Chem comported with federal due process. LG Chem petitioned the California Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to quash. The Court issued the writ: LG Chem sold 18650 batteries as industrial component products to original equipment manufacturers and battery packers who sell to original equipment manufacturers. It did not design, manufacture, distribute, advertise or sell the batteries for sale to or use by individual consumers as standalone, replaceable batteries. It had no connection to the vape shop or the vape distributor responsible for selling the defective battery that injured Lawhon. Its activities in California consisted of sales of 18650 batteries to three California companies in the electric vehicle industry for use in electric vehicles. The question presented was whether Lawhon’s personal injury claims arose from or related to those sales, to which the Court concluded they did not. Thus, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to quash, and to enter a new order granting the motion. View "LG Chem, Ltd. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2015, John and Jane were students at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB). On September 7, they went to a party together and then had a sexual encounter. The next day, a dispute arose about whether the encounter was consensual. Jane filed a police report, which led to an investigation but no criminal charges. Jane filed a complaint with UCSB’s Title IX and Sexual Harassment Policy Compliance Office, 20 U.S.C. 1681. An investigator opined that John sexually assaulted Jane and recommended that John be suspended for three years. A Review Committee denied John’s appeal.John sought judicial review; his petition named only the University; Jane is described as a “[n]on-party.” The trial court granted John’s petition, finding that John was not afforded procedural due process during the University’s investigation. Jane moved to vacate the order on the ground that she did not receive notice of or an opportunity to participate in, the writ proceeding. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Jane’s motion. While Jane’s interests were affected by the mandate proceeding, such that she may have been a real party in interest or a necessary party, she has not established that she was an indispensable party. Nor has she established that the absence of even an indispensable party is grounds to void a judgment. View "Doe v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

A family who owned and operated a medical practice ("Defendants") suffered $25,000 in damages when a pipe in an adjacent office started leaking. The family hired a lawyer ("Plaintiff") to help them compel the neighboring office owner to pay for the damages. When the neighboring office owner refused to pay, Plaintiff recommended they sue. Two of the three family members agreed, but Plaintiff listed all three parties as plaintiffs. Over the course of the litigation, Defendants paid Plaintiff nearly $68,000 in legal fees. Defendants asked Plaintiff to cease all nonessential work on the case while another family member, a barred attorney, attempted to resolve the matter. Plaintiff refused to allow Defendants' family member to help until she formally substituted in and then settled the case.Plaintiff sued Defendants for breach of contract. Defendants cross-claimed that Plaintiff breached his fiduciary duties, committed malpractice and failed to execute a written fee agreement. Plaintiff then filed his own cross-complaint naming Defendants and their family member-lawyer and Defendants filed this SLAPP action to strike portions of Plaintiff's cross-complaint.The trial court granted the family-member lawyer's motion but denied Defendants' motions. On appeal, the Second Appellate District reversed the trial court's denial of the Defendant's SLAPP motions and remanded for the court to determine whether Plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the causes of action against each individual Defendant. View "Bowen v. Lin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rick Fowler sought a writ of mandate against defendant Golden Pacific Bancorp, Inc. (Bancorp), to enforce his statutory rights as a director and majority shareholder to inspect corporate books and records. Bancorp opposed the petition, arguing that the trial court should limit Fowler’s inspection rights because he was involved in ongoing litigation with Bancorp and could use the information to undermine Bancorp’s position in the lawsuit. The trial court granted Fowler’s writ petition. Bancorp appealed. After the Court of Appeal issued an oral argument waiver notice, Bancorp moved to dismiss the appeal as moot, citing that because Bancorp had been acquired by Social Finance, Inc., Fowler was no longer a Bancorp board member, and therefore it was impossible for the Court to grant effective relief. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal found Fowler was indeed no longer a member of Bancorp’s board of directors and therefore had no director’s inspection rights. Nevertheless, exercising discretion, the Court reached the merits of the case because it presented an issue of substantial and continuing public interest: whether a director’s “absolute” right of inspection under California Corporations Code section 1602 could be curtailed because the director and corporation were involved in litigation and there was a possibility the documents could be used to harm the corporation. “[T]he mere possibility that information could be used adversely to the corporation is not by itself sufficient to defeat a director’s inspection rights. Rather, any exception to the general rule favoring unfettered access must be limited to extreme cases, where enforcing an ‘absolute’ right of inspection would produce an absurd result, such as when the evidence establishes the director’s clear intent to use the information to breach fiduciary duties or otherwise commit a tort against the corporation.” The Court declined to reach the other question referenced in the parties’ briefs concerning Fowler’s inspection rights as a shareholder, because that issue was not resolved by the trial court and the record was insufficiently developed for a determination of whether it was moot. The case was remanded for the trial court to consider whether that issue was moot and, if not, to resolve any remaining disputes in the first instance. View "Fowler v. Golden Pacific Bancorp." on Justia Law

The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welfare & Institutions Code 5000e) authorizes one-year conservatorships over individuals who are “gravely disabled” by a mental health disorder or chronic alcoholism. Persons subject to the Act are entitled to a court or jury trial on whether they are gravely disabled, and must be personally advised of this right by the court. If no demand has been made, the court must hold a timely “hearing on the conservatorship petition,” and the proposed conservatee subsequently has up to five days to demand a trial by court or jury.The trial court held a hearing on March 2, 2022, and established a conservatorship over K.R. Before that hearing neither K.R. nor her counsel demanded a court or jury trial, nor was K.R. ever personally advised by the court of her right to a jury trial. K.R.’s counsel subsequently, unsuccessfully, demanded a jury trial. . The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in denying K.R.’s timely jury trial demand, rejecting the public conservator's argument that the March 2 proceeding was actually a bench trial and that K.R. forfeited or waived her jury trial right by participating. Section 5350(d)(1) draws a distinction between a “hearing” and a “trial” on a conservatorship petition and offers no option to a trial court to conduct a bench trial absent a demand by the proposed conservatee. View "K.R. v. Superior Court of Napa County" on Justia Law