Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

National Western Life Insurance Company (NWL) appealed after a jury found the company liable for negligence and elder abuse arising from an NWL annuity sold to plaintiff-appellant Barney Williams by Victor Pantaleoni. In 2016, Williams contacted Pantaleoni to revise a living trust after the death of Williams’ wife, but Pantaleoni sold him a $100,000 NWL annuity. When Williams returned the annuity to NWL during a 30-day “free look” period, Pantaleoni wrote a letter over Williams’ signature for NWL to reissue a new annuity. In 2017, when Williams cancelled the second annuity, NWL charged a $14,949.91 surrender penalty. The jury awarded Williams damages against NWL, including punitive damages totaling almost $3 million. In a prior opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed judgment, concluding that Pantaleoni was an independent agent who sold annuities for multiple insurance companies and had no authority to bind NWL. Williams petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, which transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal to consider the agency relationship in light of Insurance Code sections 32, 101, 1662, 1704 and 1704.5, and O’Riordan v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Company, 36 Cal.4th 281, 288 (2005). After the appellate court issued its opinion on transfer from the California Supreme Court, both Williams and NWL filed petitions for rehearing on various grounds. Upon consideration of those petitions, the Court of Appeal “remain[ed] confident” its prior opinion was correct and reissued that opinion with minor modifications. The Court affirmed the judgment finding NWL liable for negligence and financial elder abuse. However, punitive damages assessed against NWL were reversed. View "Williams v. National Western Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Amato sold a house at a price that he contended was much less than the property was worth. He sued the broker who listed the property for him, defendant-respondent Steve Downs, as well as the broker’s employer, defendant-respondent Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company (Coldwell Banker). On the day of trial, the court found that Amato had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to comply with a local pretrial procedural rule. It then denied Amato’s request that a different judge hear the case due to the trial judge’s involvement in pretrial settlement negotiations. After Amato presented his evidence, the court granted a motion for judgment in favor of Downs and Coldwell Banker on all of Amato’s claims. On appeal, Amato argued he was erroneously deprived of his right to a jury trial. Furthermore, the judge should have recused himself as trier of fact, one of Amato's witnesses was dismissed before the witness finished testifying, and defendants' motion should not have been granted. After review, the Court of Appeal found the trial court indeed erred in deeming Amato to have waived jury trial despite his violations of the local rules. Judgment was reversed on this ground, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Amato v. Downs" on Justia Law

Seventeen retired city employees who receive retiree health benefits through CalPERS under the city’s Medical After Retirement (MAR) plan filed suit. Five were union members before their retirement. The memorandums of understanding (MOU) and other benefits documents applicable to each of the bargaining units state: “ The City shall pay the PERS required Minimum Employer Contribution (MEC) per month on behalf of each active and retired employee who participates in the City’s health insurance plans.” The city pays the MEC to CalPERS and then deducts that amount from the retiree’s premium reimbursement owed under the MAR plan.Plaintiffs alleged the practice amounted to improper use of their MAR benefits, resulted in improper reductions of benefits, and violated Government Code section 228923 and the applicable MOUs. The city argued the complaint was barred by issue preclusion based on a 2017 administrative proceeding between the city and the union, following a union grievance. The trial court dismissed, based upon issue preclusion, stating: “[T]he emphasis is not on a concept of identity of parties but on the practical situation.” The court of appeal reversed, citing due process requirements. There is no basis for concluding that the plaintiffs should reasonably have expected to be bound by, or were even aware of, the union’s grievance proceeding. The city has not demonstrated that the claims are barred for failure to allege exhaustion of administrative procedures. View "Bullock v. City of Antioch" on Justia Law

EBO filed suit after unsuccessfully seeking to lease a space in a building owned by the Taylor LLC, including derivative claims brought by EBO on behalf of Taylor, alleging that the denial of the lease caused Taylor to suffer economic injury. The defendants argued that EBO lacked standing under Corporations Code section 17709.02 to pursue them because during the litigation it relinquished its interest in and was no longer a member of the Taylor LLC. The court determined that it nonetheless had statutory discretion to allow EBO to maintain the derivative claims.The court of appeal vacated. Section 17709.02 requires a party to maintain continuous membership in a limited liability company to represent it derivatively, just as section 800 requires a party to maintain continuous ownership in a corporation to represent it derivatively. The statutory discretion conferred on trial courts under section 17709.02(a)(1), to permit “[a]ny member [of an LLC] who does not meet these requirements” to maintain a derivative suit does not permit courts to excuse a former member from the continuous membership requirement. While equitable considerations may warrant exceptions to the continuous membership requirement, no such considerations were presented here. View "Sirott v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against a Hilton hotel after she was allegedly hit by a shuttle operated by Hilton. Although Hilton denied liability, mid-trial the parties settled for $85,000. The trial court confirmed Plaintiff's desire to accept the agreement on the record. Through different counsel, Plaintiff later filed a motion to rescind the settlement agreement, claiming counsel forced her to accept the agreement. According to Plaintiff, counsel stated that if she did not accept the settlement "he would not be coming back to trial tomorrow."The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion and the Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Hilton was not involved in any potential duress, but was unaware of counsel's refusal to resume proceedings if Plaintiff did not accept the agreement. The court explained the contract was not voidable because Hilton acted in good faith and lacked knowledge of any potential duress. View "Fettig v. Hilton Garden Inns Management LLC" on Justia Law

Daniel Schafer, a teacher at a high school in the Anderson Union High School District (District), had a sexual relationship on school premises with one of his students, plaintiff Jane Doe. Doe sued the District, principal Carol Germano, and superintendent Tim Azevedo for negligent hiring and negligent supervision. The trial court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the District, finding that there was no evidence the District knew or should have known that Schafer posed a risk of harm to students. On appeal, Doe contended the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because the District had a duty to supervise and monitor Schafer and Doe, and whether the District breached its duty to Doe was a question of fact for the jury to decide. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that on the trial court record, the District did not have a duty to review alarm data and video recordings in order to constantly monitor all teachers, students, and campus visitors, nor did it have such a duty specifically with regard to Schafer and Doe. View "Doe v. Anderson Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed that BevMo's policy, requiring the presence of two persons in any store while open, regularly requires employees to forgo off-duty, uninterrupted meal and rest periods, or, alternatively, premium pay for non-compliant meal and rest periods. In their Contra Costa County representative suit under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code 2698), the plaintiffs gave notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency. More than a year before that suit, Paez had filed a PAGA representative action against BevMo in Los Angeles, concerning the two-person policy. While their petition for judicial coordination (Code Civ. Proc. 404) with the Los Angeles PAGA suit was pending, the Contra Costa trial court stayed the suit.After the petition for coordination was denied, the court denied a motion to lift the stay, concluding that the stay was warranted under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. The court of appeal denied a petition of mandamus relief. The trial court did not err in applying the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule to this dispute. If that rule is mandatory, PAGA does not clearly abrogate the rule; if the court had discretion to weigh policy concerns in deciding whether to apply the rule, the court did not abuse its discretion. View "Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

San Francisco brought civil actions, alleging the defendants are street-level drug dealers whose drug-dealing activities in the Tenderloin neighborhood create a public nuisance (Civ. Code, 3479, 3480) and violate the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200, UCL). The city sought preliminary injunctions that would prohibit the defendants from entering a 50-block exclusion zone. Defendants acknowledged the Tenderloin area is “facing a drug-related health crisis.”The trial court denied the motions, finding that a stay-away order—as opposed to an injunction prohibiting certain conduct—is not an authorized remedy under either statute, and that even assuming stay-away orders are available statutory remedies, the specific injunctive relief requested would be constitutionally impermissible in these cases. The court determined that excluding defendants from such a large area in the center of San Francisco implicated the constitutional right to intrastate travel and the city failed to establish that its proposed remedy was sufficiently tailored to minimally infringe upon the protected interests at stake. The court of appeal affirmed. While a stay-away order could be a potential remedy for a public nuisance or unfair business practice in an appropriate case, the city failed to show that the proposed stay-away orders are sufficiently tailored to pass constitutional muster based on the evidentiary record. View "People v. Padilla-Martel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Nicole Leshane, Steve Garner, Justin Prasad, Isaac Saldana, and Maurice West sued defendants Tracy VW, Inc. and RJ Gill Ventures, Inc. alleging several Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of themselves as defendants’ former employees, on behalf of others similarly situated, and on behalf of the state pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. After defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint alleging violations of the Labor Code solely as representatives of the state under the Private Attorneys General Act. Defendants continued to seek arbitration of plaintiffs’ individual claims and dismissal of their class-wide claims pursuant to the arbitration agreements each plaintiff signed. The trial court denied defendants’ petition to compel arbitration finding plaintiffs’ claim under the Private Attorneys General Act was not subject to arbitration citing Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014). Defendants appealed the trial court’s order. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Leshane v. Tracy VW, Inc." on Justia Law

This action stemmed from the San Bernardino County registrar of voters (ROV) initially miscalculating the number of signatures needed in support of plaintiffs and real parties in interest’s (RPI) initiative petition to repeal a special tax associated with a fire protection zone. The ROV told RPI the incorrect number, resulting in RPI incurring unnecessary costs in obtaining far more signatures than were required. Defendants and Petitioners County of San Bernadino and its ROV, Bob Page, (collectively, the County) petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the respondent trial court to vacate its order overruling the County’s demurrer and to enter an order sustaining the without leave to amend. The County contended that, when RPI requested the County to inform it of the number of signatures required for its initiative petition, the County did not owe RPI any statutory or constitutional duty to provide the information when requested. The County further argues it was immune from liability for communicating to RPI the incorrect number under Government Code sections 818.8 and 822.2. The Court of Appeal agreed that under Government Code sections 815 and 815.6, the County was not subject to liability because there was no breach of any statutory or constitutional duty. "[E]ven if the County owed RPI such a duty, the County was immune from liability under Government Code sections 818.8 and 822.2." The Court therefore concluded the trial court erred in overruling the County’s demurrer. View "County of San Bernardino v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law