Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Legislature's 2012 amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section 631 provide that a civil litigant may waive their constitutional right to a jury trial by failing to timely deposit jury fees in advance of trial, and the trial court's decision on whether there has been such a waiver is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order determining that waiver occurred in this case. After the trial court ruled that TriCoast waived its right to a jury trial by failing to timely post jury fees and denied TriCoast's oral motion for relief from the waiver, the matter proceeded to a bench trial at which plaintiff prevailed. The court concluded that TriCoast failed to overcome the presumption that the trial court's decision is correct and failed to sustain its burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion. View "TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra" on Justia Law

Cassell has owned the Hermosa Beach residential property since 1972; it has one bathroom, which has a two-step stairway leading up to a platform with a commode. The stairway did not have a handrail. Mazza rented the property from Cassell for 18 years. Mazza’s sister, Kaney visited Mazza many times, staying for as long as two weeks, without any mishaps. In September 2014, the light to the bathroom stopped working. Kaney used the stairs, fell, and suffered injuries.Kaney sued, claiming premises liability and negligence. The trial court granted Mazza summary judgment, concluding that as a matter of law, a plaintiff is precluded from proving causation in a slip and fall case if there were no witnesses to the fall and she remembers only being on stairs and then waking up in pain but does not remember the fall itself. The court of appeal reversed. Though Kaney cannot remember falling on Cassell’s stairs, the circumstantial evidence would permit a trier of fact to make a reasonable and probable inference that the condition of the stairs, including the absence of a handrail, was a substantial factor in the fall. View "Kaney v. Mazza" on Justia Law

BACTES Imaging Solutions, LLC ("BACTES") contracted with health care providers to respond to pre-litigation requests from attorneys seeking access to their clients’ medical records. One option available to the attorney, among others, was to hire and pay BACTES to provide photocopies of the records. Spencer S. Busby, APLC ("Busby") was the class representative for a class of 9,691 attorneys who hired BACTES to provide photocopies of their clients’ medical records. Busby sued BACTES, claiming it charged photocopying rates exceeding the rates permitted by the California Evidence Code section 1158. After a bench trial, the trial court found BACTES acted as an agent of the health care providers when it responded to the attorneys’ requests for medical records; however, it found BACTES acted as an agent of the requesting attorneys when it photocopied the medical records and provided them to the attorneys. Because BACTES did not act as an agent of the health care providers when it provided the photocopied records to the attorneys, the court found BACTES did not violate section 1158. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Spencer S. Busby, APLC v. BACTES Imaging Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

J&A, a tenant of real party in interest, TTP, filed suit alleging that TTP failed to honor its right of first refusal when TTP entered an agreement to sell property to a third party, Adventure Church. J&A initiated legal action in the Fresno County Superior Court and filed a notice of pendency of action, commonly known as a lis pendens, to provide notice to interested parties of the litigation; TTP moved to expunge the lis pendens; and the trial court granted the motion. J&A then petitioned for writ of mandate challenging the trial court's ruling.The Court of Appeal granted the writ of mandate, concluding that the order expunging the lis pendens was flawed in several respects. The court found that the trial court's ruling expunging the lis pendens was based on erroneous legal rulings and factual findings not supported by substantial evidence. In this case, J&A has shown the probable validity of its real property claims and is entitled to the continued recordation of the lis pendens pending the outcome of litigation. The court ordered and entered a new order denying the motion to expunge the lis pendens. The court also concluded that J&A, as the prevailing party on the motion to expunge and in the writ proceeding, is entitled to recover its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38. The court also directed the trial court to hold further proceedings to calculate and award those attorney's fees and costs. View "J&A Mash & Barrel, LLC v. Superior Court of Fresno County" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's order denying attorney fees following her settlement of an action with Westlake Services under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The court concluded that plaintiff's appeal is from a nonappealable order, and plaintiff's appeal does not fall within the scope of the collateral order doctrine.The court concluded that the trial court's order concerning fees, costs and prejudgment interest was neither a judgment rendered but not yet entered within the meaning of California Rule of Court 8.104(d)(1) nor an intended ruling subsequently finalized in a judgment or order of dismissal as contemplated by rule 8.104(d)(2). Furthermore, the notice of appeal falls far outside the limited scope of the mandatory provision of rule 8.104(d)(1) and the court's discretion under rule 8.104(d)(2) to treat as appealable an otherwise nonappealable order. Even if the court had discretion to save the appeal, the court would decline to exercise it. Finally, plaintiff's appeal of the order does not fall within the scope of the collateral order doctrine where she contends that the order directs the payment of costs and prejudgment interest but did not attempt to appeal the portion of the trial court's order awarding costs and prejudgment interest. View "Sanchez v. Westlake Services, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, real parties in interest applied to the City of Santa Cruz to construct a 40-unit development on a parcel of land located at 1930 Ocean Street Extension. Following an initial mitigated negative declaration and years of litigation surrounding the impact of the nearby crematory at Santa Cruz Memorial Park, in 2016, the real parties in interest renewed their interest in moving forward with their project. As required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the project applicant and the City of Santa Cruz prepared and circulated the initial study, the draft environmental impact report (EIR), the partially recirculated draft EIR, and the final EIR. Following a public hearing, the city council adopted a resolution to certify the EIR and to adopt Alternative 3, a 32-unit housing project. The Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association (OSENA) filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging the City of Santa Cruz and its city council violated CEQA and the Santa Cruz Municipal Code in approving the project. The trial court concluded the City had complied with CEQA, but it determined the City violated the municipal code, and it issued a limited writ prohibiting the City from allowing the project to proceed unless and until it followed the municipal code and the court was satisfied with its compliance. Following entry of judgment, OSENA appealed, arguing the court erred by concluding the City complied with CEQA’s requirements. OSENA contended the City violated CEQA by: (1) insufficiently addressing potentially significant biological impacts and mitigation measures in the initial study rather than in the EIR directly; (2) establishing improperly narrow and unreasonable objectives so that alternative options could not be considered meaningfully; and (3) failing to address cumulative impacts adequately. The City cross-appealed, contending the court incorrectly concluded it violated the municipal code by granting a planned development permit without also requiring the project applicant to comply with the slope modifications regulations After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City, and affirmed that portion of the trial court's order and judgment concluding it complied with CEQA. The Court reversed the portion of the order and judgment concluding the City violated its municipal code. View "Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood etc. v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law

Trackside was a proposed mixed-use building project in the City of Davis, California, between the Downtown Core and Old East Davis, an older neighborhood. After the city council approved Trackside, plaintiff Old East Davis Neighborhood Association (“the Association”) petitioned for a writ of mandate, and the trial court found insufficient evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning documents. The court specifically cited the lack of evidence that Trackside served as a “transition” from the Downtown Core to Old East Davis. On appeal, defendants City of Davis and City Council, along with real party in interest Trackside Center, LLC (“the City” and “Trackside”) challenged that ruling, contending the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating consistency with planning documents, and that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning requirements and guidelines. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the City’s approval, and the Association’s contentions on cross-appeal lacked merit. The Court therefore reversed the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. View "Old East Davis Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Davis" on Justia Law

Isaak, an 84-year-old retired farmer, was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2020 and suffers physical and mental impairments. He is wheelchair-bound and receiving palliative care. Several parties have sued the manufacturers of Paraquat alleging that the pesticide caused their Parkinson’s disease and successfully petitioned the Judicial Council to form a Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding (JCCP) in 2019. By March 2021, discovery was underway in the JCCP.Isaak filed a products liability lawsuit in May 2021. The case was coordinated with the JCCP. Isaak sought trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36; a party to a civil action is entitled to trial preference where the person is over 70 years of age and the court finds that the party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole and that the party’s health is such that preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation. Defendants argued that the law governing coordinated proceedings conflicted with, and took precedence over, section 36. The trial court denied Isaak’s motion but approved a special procedure for seeking preference that it found would balance the interests of parties for whom a preference might be warranted with the need to streamline coordinated proceedings. The court of appeal upheld the ruling. Section 36 does not supersede California Rules of Court, 3.504, which governs coordinated proceedings. View "Isaak v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Catlin sued Danko, alleging that Catlin settled one of the claims against its insured in a wrongful death lawsuit (Boolen case). Under the settlement, Catlin paid $180,000 to Danko's trust account )plaintiffs’ counsel in the Boolen case). Catlin then mistakenly paid the same amount again to the same account. The Boolen case went to trial on other claims, eventually resulting in a defense verdict. Catlin discovered its payment error and requested the return of the mistaken overpayment, but Danko declined, citing a release of future claims as part of the pretrial settlement.Responding to Catlin’s subsequent suit, Danko filed “anti-SLAPP” (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, asking the court to strike complaint and stating they would later request attorney fees under section 425.16(c). Catlin voluntarily dismissed its complaint. The Danko Appellants asked Judge Fineman to rule on the anti-SLAPP motions as a “predicate” for going forward with their fee motions. She declined. Danko never filed a fees motion. The judgment of dismissal was entered. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court had jurisdiction and had a duty to rule on the merits of the anti-SLAPP motions, despite the absence of any pending fee request. View "Catlin Insurance Co. v. Danko Meredith Law Firm" on Justia Law

Two months after Covert filed a lawsuit for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, FCA (an automaker) served Covert with a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 for $51,000, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Covert filed objections to that offer. Covert with a second section 998 offer, 15 months later, for $145,000 with identical terms. A jury awarded Covert $48,416 in damages and penalties.On appeal, FCA argued both of its section 998 offers were valid, and because the jury awarded Covert less than the amount of either offer, the trial court erred in awarding Covert attorneys’ fees and costs and denying FCA its costs.The court of appeal agreed that both offers were valid; the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider whether the first offer was made in good faith. Covert did not meet his burden to show the second offer was not in good faith. If the trial court finds the first offer was made in good faith, it shall award FCA its costs reasonably incurred after the first offer was served and deny Covert his attorneys’ fees and costs. If the court finds the first offer was not made in good faith, it shall award Covert his attorneys’ fees and costs reasonably incurred before the date the second offer was served and award FCA its costs, including expert witness fees, reasonably incurred thereafter. View "Covert v. FCA USA, LLC" on Justia Law