Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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As a vacation destination, the City of Palm Springs (City) has expressly allowed the short-term rental of a single-family dwelling, subject to various conditions designed to protect the interests of neighboring residents (as well as the City’s own interest in collecting transient occupancy taxes, a/k/a hotel taxes). In 2017, the City amended its short term rental ordinances, making specific findings that the amended ordinances were consistent with the City's Zoning Code. Meanwhile, Protect Our Neighborhoods (Protect), a membership organization opposed to short-term rentals, filed this action claiming among other things, that the 2017 version of the short-term rental ordinance (Ordinance) violated the City’s Zoning Code. The trial court disagreed and upheld the Ordinance. Protect appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Protect Our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

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In 2018, plaintiff-appellant Monica Mayes was struck in the face by a foul ball while attending an intercollegiate baseball game between two private universities, Marymount University (Marymount) and defendant-respondent La Sierra University (La Sierra). Mayes suffered skull fractures and brain damage, among other injuries. When struck by the foul ball, Mayes was seated in a grassy area along the third-base line, behind the dugout, which extended eight feet above the ground, and there was no protective netting above the dugout. Mayes sued La Sierra for her injuries, alleging a single cause of action for negligence for its failure to: (1) install protective netting over the dugouts; (2) provide a sufficient number of screened seats for spectators; (3) warn spectators that the only available screened seats were in the area behind home plate; and (4) exercise crowd control in order to remove distractions in the area along the third-base line that diverted spectators’ attention from the playing field. La Sierra moved for summary judgment, claiming that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, observing that the case was “a textbook primary assumption of the risk case.” To this, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding La Sierra did not meet its burden of showing that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. In addition, Mayes showed there were triable issues of material fact concerning whether La Sierra was negligent for the reasons she alleged in her complaint. View "Mayes v. La Sierra Univ." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Jason Cirrincione appealed an order denying class certification in a wage-and-hour action he filed against his former employer, defendant American Scissor Lift, Inc. (ASL). On appeal to the Court of Appeal, plaintiff argued reversal was required for a number reasons, including that the trial court’s ruling rested upon improper merits determinations and incorrect assumptions. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of class certification. View "Cirrincione v. American Scissor Lift" on Justia Law

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This case involved the purchase and leaseback of a vacant hotel and restaurant. Buyers-plaintiffs claimed the sellers-defendants surreptitiously substituted altered versions of the lease and financing instruments containing terms extremely adverse to the buyers, and which they alleged were neither bargained for nor agreed to. Acting under the misapprehension that plaintiffs’ theory was promissory fraud, the superior court sustained a demurrer brought by defendants Inn Lending LLC (Inn Lending) and Rajesh Patel on the grounds that “[i]nsufficient facts” were alleged showing they “made promises” upon which plaintiffs relied. The court also determined that related causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and financial elder abuse also failed. "Fraud in the execution is distinct from promissory fraud, which involves false representations that induce one to enter into a contract containing agreed- upon terms." The Court of Appeal found the allegations made in this case were "quite literally, a textbook cause of action for fraud in the execution," and reversed the superior court's judgment. View "Munoz v. PL Hotel Group, LLC" on Justia Law

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JustAnswer LLC (JustAnswer) appealed an order denying its petition to compel arbitration. Tina Sellers and Erin O’Grady (together, Plaintiffs) used the JustAnswer website to submit a single question to an “expert” for what they believed would be a one-time fee of $5, but JustAnswer automatically enrolled them in a costlier monthly membership. After discovering additional charges to their credit cards, Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against JustAnswer, alleging it routinely enrolled online consumers like them in automatic renewal membership programs without providing “clear and conspicuous” disclosures and obtaining their “affirmative consent” as mandated by the California Automatic Renewal Law. Seeking to avoid the class action litigation, JustAnswer filed a petition to compel individual arbitration, claiming Plaintiffs agreed to their “Terms of Service,” which included a class action waiver and a binding arbitration clause, when they entered their payment information on the website and clicked a button that read, “Start my trial.” In a case of first impression under California law, the Court of Appeal considered whether, and under what circumstances, a “sign-in wrap” agreement was valid and enforceable. The Court concluded the notices on the “Start my trial” screens of the JustAnswer website were not sufficiently conspicuous to bind Plaintiffs, because they were less conspicuous than the statutory notice requirements, and they were not sufficiently conspicuous under other criteria courts have considered in determining whether a hyperlinked notice to terms of services was sufficient to put a user on inquiry notice of an arbitration agreement. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s order denying JustAnswer’s petition to compel arbitration. View "Sellers v. JustAnswer LLC" on Justia Law

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Pursuant to Government Code, section 945.5, before a suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity, the plaintiff must timely present a written claim to the public entity. In this case, plaintiff failed to timely present her personal injury claim to Ventura County within the six-month statutory period and failed to timely apply for leave to present a late claim within the one-year statutory period.The Court of Appeal denied the petition for review, concluding that plaintiff forfeited her contention that the trial judge should have disqualified herself. Plaintiff's other contention involves an issue of first impression concerning the meaning of Executive Order N-35-20, issued by Governor Newsom on March 21, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court concluded that the plain meaning of the unambiguous executive order requires the court to hold that the 60 day extension applies only to the six-month period for presenting a timely claim. In this case, plaintiff did not timely apply for leave to present a late claim within the unextended one-year statutory period, and thus the trial court did not err by denying her petition for relief. View "Coble v. Ventura County Health Care Agency" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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Chaganti sought a writ of error. While his appeal of a civil judgment was pending, he discovered evidence, which was not in existence at the time of the judgment, that the superior court judge who had summarily adjudicated his claims owned stock worth between $10,000 and $100,000 in AT&T. The defendants in Chaganti’s civil action, Cricket and New Cingular, are wholly owned subsidiaries of AT&T. Chaganti argued that the judge was disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure 170.1, which provides: “A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following are true: ... The judge has a financial interest in the subject matter in a proceeding or in a party to the proceeding.” Financial interest means ownership of more than a one percent legal or equitable interest in a party, or a legal or equitable interest in a party of a fair market value in excess of $1,500.The action concerned a commercial lease; the named lessee was “AT&T Wireless PCS.” Rent was paid by checks from “AT&T.” The defendants were represented by “an Assistant Vice President and Senior Legal Counsel employed in the AT&T Legal Dept.” The court of appeal ordered the superior court to vacate the judgment, rejecting AT&T’s arguments that it was not a “party” to the proceeding and that Chaganti was precluded from obtaining a writ of error because he did not exercise due diligence in discovering the judge’s AT&T stock ownership. View "Chaganti v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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Park sued his former attorneys for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with Park’s plan to purchase cardroom casinos. Park alleged that in 2003-2012, the defendants represented Park’s gaming businesses before the California Gambling Control Commission and the Bureau of Gambling Control. The attorney-client relationship ended with a dispute about monthly billing rates. Thereafter, the defendants allegedly thwarted Park’s efforts to secure ownership interests in the two cardroom casinos by using Park’s confidential information, assisting his competitors, and making disparaging remarks about Park to regulators and others.Park issued third-party subpoenas duces tecum to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and to Deputy Attorney General Torngren, who represents the Bureau of Gambling Control, requesting communications and documents pertaining to Park and the casinos. The DOJ reportedly reviewed several hundred thousand electronic documents but produced fewer than a hundred. During the production, the trial court ordered Park to pay $32,836.25 to defray the “undue burden or expense” of the DOJ’s compliance with Park’s subpoena. When the production was complete, the court ordered Park to pay the DOJ an additional $111,618.75. The court of appeal affirmed. The court properly exercised its discretion under the Electronic Discovery Act in the Code of Civil Procedure, section 1985.8(l). View "Park v. Law Offices of Tracey Buck-Walsh" on Justia Law

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Cesar was shot and killed in 2016. Murder charges were filed against Santacruz, Cervantes, Alcantar, and Duran. Vallejo (Duran’s mother) was charged as an accessory after the fact. Judge Colin dismissed that charge against Vallejo in the interest of justice under Penal Code 1385 on February 20, 2020. Judge Colin later recused himself at the request of the prosecution. The case was assigned to Judge Clark, who found Judge Colin’s recusal to have been a concession to retroactive disqualification, and on June 22, 2020, granted the prosecution’s motion to set aside as void all rulings of Judge Colin dating back to January 9, including the February 20 dismissal, thereby reinstating the accessory count against Vallejo.The court of appeal vacated Judge Clark’s ruling, noting that whether the February 20 dismissal was an appropriate exercise of discretion was not before the court. Judge Colin’s order dismissing the charge against Vallejo was a final order terminating the trial court’s authority over her case. The prosecution had a clear remedy to address the trial court’s alleged bias or appearance of bias underlying the dismissal—an appeal under Penal Code 1238,(a)(8), but elected not to appeal. Judge Clark was without jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal. View "Vallejo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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Scott filed suit in Alameda County Superior Court, alleging that Scott was involved in three separate automobile accidents in 2017 and could not determine which accident caused her injuries: a San Mateo County accident involving Jobs, an Alameda County accident involving Forni, and a Contra Costa County accident, involving Aquino, who was working for Pacific Auto. None of the defendants resided in Alameda County. The defendants filed answers and cross-complaints. Jobs, Aquino, and Pacific alleged an affirmative defense of improper venue. Scott settled with the Forni defendants. The court issued a good faith settlement determination and dismissed the Forni defendants.The remaining defendants unsuccessfully moved to transfer venue to Santa Clara County, where Aquino and Pacific reside (Code of Civil Procedure 397). The court found they had waived their challenge. The court of appeal denied their petition for relief. The superior court clerk’s service of a document containing both the order denying the motion to change venue and a declaration of service satisfied the requirements for written notice under section 1013a, thereby commencing the period for filing the petition under section 400. Petitioners’ failure to file their petition by the end of that period rendered their petition untimely, whether or not the real party in interest should have also given notice of the order under section 1019.5. View "Aquino v. Superior Court" on Justia Law