Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (Surety) provided a $30,000 bail bond for a criminal defendant who failed to appear in court as required, triggering the court to declare a forfeiture of the bond. When Surety failed to vacate the forfeiture within the statutorily specified “appearance period,” the court entered summary judgment against Surety in the amount of the bond. Surety argued on appeal that the trial court prematurely entered summary judgment because an emergency rule adopted by the Judicial Council in response to the COVID 19 pandemic (Emergency rule 9), which tolled “the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action,” also tolled the appearance period for vacating forfeitures of bail bonds. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Financial Casualty & Surety" on Justia Law

Appellants, Soncino (Celine’s brother), Celine, and Yoram (Celine’s husband) created for-profit organizations, that provided music enrichment and formed a nonprofit organization to contract with public entities. The for-profit organizations provided services, which the nonprofit paid for. The siblings sued Yoram and the businesses, alleging Yoram had misappropriated property belonging to the businesses. The complaint was joined to Celine's and Yoram's divorce proceedings. The parties filed a “Confidential Protective Order,” which prevented Celine from disclosing information and documents she obtained from Yoram’s desk and the marital residence without Yoram's knowledge.The court concluded that Soncino was a partner in the businesses and that the appellants used the business funds for personal expenses. The dissolution was finalized. The Attorney General subsequently filed a complaint against the family businesses and appellants and moved to unseal court records in the dissolution, alleging comingling of charitable funds and using those assets for personal expenses. Ultimately, the family court ordered that records from the dissolution and Soncino v. Tamir be unsealed, and the protective orders lifted.After holding that the family court had the authority to rule on the motion, that the Attorney General is entitled to seek the records on behalf of the public, and that the appellants failed to identify a privacy interest that outweighs the public right to access, the court of appeal reversed and remanded. The family court failed to assess whether the documents at issue were used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication, and erred in setting aside the protective orders. View "Marriage of Tamir" on Justia Law

The City of San Diego (City) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for the “Serra Mesa Community Plan [SMCP] Amendment Roadway Connection Project” (Project) and approved an amendment to the SMCP and the City’s General Plan to reflect the proposed roadway. Save Civita Because Sudberry Won’t (“Save Civita”) filed a combined petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (Petition/Complaint) against the City, challenging the City’s certification of the EIR and approval of the Project. Save Civita contended that the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), the Planning and Zoning Law, and the public’s due-process and fair-hearing rights. The trial court denied the Petition/Complaint in its entirety and entered a judgment in favor of the City. On appeal, Save Civita raised four claims related to the City’s certification of the EIR for the Project: (1) the City violated CEQA Guidelines section 15088.5, subdivision (g) in failing to summarize revisions made in the Project’s recirculated draft EIR (RE-DEIR); (2) the Project’s final EIR (FEIR) was deficient because it failed to adequately analyze, as an alternative to the Project, a proposal to amend the MVCP to remove the planned road from that community plan; (3) the FEIR is deficient because it failed to adequately analyze the Project’s traffic impacts; and (4) the FEIR failed to adequately discuss the Project’s inconsistency with the General Plan’s goal of creating pedestrian-friendly communities. In addition to its EIR / CEQA claims, Save Civita maintains that the Project will have a deleterious effect on the pedestrian-friendly Civita community and that the City therefore violated the Planning and Zoning law in concluding that the Project is consistent with the City’s General Plan. Finally, Save Civita maintains that the City acted in a quasi-adjudicatory capacity in certifying the FEIR and approving the Project and that a City Council member violated the public’s procedural due process rights by improperly advocating for the Project prior to its approval. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the City in its entirety. View "Save Civita Because Sudberry Won't v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Awana Ring was approximately 80 years old when her daughter Vickie Atiyeh died in November 2015. In her will, Atiyeh left a house to Ring. Roy Scott Robb (Scott Robb) and Zachary Robb were a son and an adult grandson of Ring, and father and son to one another. The Robbs were both named as defendants in this action, but were not party to this appeal. Defendants-respondents here were Richard Harmon and the corporation TSG Financial Corp. (TSG); Ring alleged that TSG was Harmon's alter ego. According to Ring, the Robbs, working together with respondents, used probate proceedings as a means to extract equity from the house to use for their own purposes. Scott Robb, in particular, in accordance with a plan designed through discussions with Harmon, caused a probate proceeding to be initiated regarding Atiyeh’s estate, orchestrated Ring’s appointment as personal representative of the estate, and then had Ring use that authority to enter into a loan to the estate secured by the house, with respondents serving as broker and lender. In addition to the loan having predatory terms, some of the loan funds were used to pay fees to respondents, and some were disbursed to an estate account, but then withdrawn by the Robbs for their own purposes. The Court of Appeal addressed whether a person who was both personal representative of a probate estate and a beneficiary of that estate, could maintain in her individual capacity, a claim for financial elder abuse (or any other claims) based on allegations that she was manipulated into taking actions as personal representative that damaged her interests as a beneficiary. The trial court ruled that she could not, sustaining the respondents’ demurrer on the view that the claims had to be brought in the person’s capacity as the personal representative. The Court of Appeal found plaintiff's financial elder abuse claim was adequately pleaded, therefore, reversing the trial court's judgment. View "Ring v. Harmon" on Justia Law

A political consultant designed two campaign mailers that were distributed to voters in a local city council election. The mailers included statements about a local real estate developer and his litigation history with the city, and linked the developer to certain candidates. The developer sued the political consultant for libel based on allegedly false statements about him in the mailers, and the political consultant in turn filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that although the complaint arose from protected conduct, the developer demonstrated a probability of prevailing. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Edward v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) filed an Insurance Fraud Protection Act (IFPA) action alleging defendants Sonny Rubin, M.D., Sonny Rubin, M.D., Inc., and Newport Institute of Minimally Invasive Surgery (collectively, defendants) fraudulently billed insurers for various services performed in connection with epidural steroid injections. A month prior, however, another insurer, Allstate, filed a separate IFPA lawsuit against the same defendants, alleging they were perpetrating a similar fraud on Allstate. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to State Farm’s complaint under the IFPA’s first-to-file rule, finding it alleged the same fraud as Allstate’s complaint. State Farm appealed, arguing its complaint alleged a distinct fraud. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the demurrer was incorrectly sustained, but for another reason. The Court found the trial court and both parties only focused on whether the two complaints alleged the same fraudulent scheme, but in this matter of first impression, the Court found the IFPA’s first-to-file rule required an additional inquiry. "Courts must also review the specific insurer-victims underlying each complaint’s request for penalties. If each complaint seeks penalties for false insurance claims relating to different groups of insurer-victims, the first-to-file rule does not apply. A subsequent complaint is only barred under the first-to-file rule if the prior complaint alleges the same fraud and seeks penalties arising from the false claims, submitted to the same insurer-victims." Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "California ex rel. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Rubin" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the application of rules calculated to reduce the administrative burden posed by public records requests for electronic records made by petitioner Dean Getz to real party in interest the County of El Dorado (the County), under the California Public Records Act (the Act). Concerned about the management of a homeowners association of which he was a member, Getz sought records regarding the County’s contacts with the homeowners association and a development company. Because they were electronic records, the County was able to quickly locate e-mails potentially responsive to the request. But believing he had not obtained all the information available, Getz expanded the scope of the request to include all e-mails from January 2013 to August 1, 2018, between four e-mail domain names associated with the development company and its representatives and any department of the County. The County complained about the volume of e-mails responsive to the request, and speculated many of the documents were not likely to relate to the conduct of official business, and thus would not be “public” records, and indeed might fall within various exemptions from disclosure. The trial court agreed with the County that the request was overbroad and unduly burdensome. The Court of Appeal concluded it could reasonably be assumed that records in the custody of a public agency were public records; a claim to the contrary had to be made by the agency and be supported by substantial evidence. Further, the burden to assert and establish exemption from disclosure was on the agency, "which would be well advised to segregate privileged documents from others." The petition was granted in part and respondent court was ordered to vacate that portion of its order denying Getz’s request under the Act for production of e-mails to and from four enumerated e-mail domains and order the County to produce the text of e-mails and any attachments on the County’s index of 42,852 responsive e-mails. View "Getz v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (collectively, "Gunther") in this case were flight attendants who alleged their employer, Alaska Airlines, Inc. (Alaska), failed to provide California Labor Code section 226(a)-compliant wage statements. They sought penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that section 226(a) applied to the flight attendants because their employment was based in California and Alaska’s wage statements did not comply with section 226(a). The court found Alaska liable for over $25 million in heightened penalties under section 226.3 of PAGA. In a postjudgment order, the court awarded Gunther attorney’s fees. Notwithstanding the implications of Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 9 Cal.5th 732 (2020, "Ward I"), Alaska contended that section 226(a) could not be applied to the flight attendants because it was preempted by federal law. Alaska also raised multiple challenges to PAGA penalties, including that the trial court erred in awarding heightened penalties under section 226.3 of PAGA. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected Alaska’s argument that application of section 226 was preempted by federal law and affirmed the trial court’s determination that the flight attendants in this case were entitled to section 226(a)-compliant wage statements. The Court also concluded, however, that the trial court erred in awarding heightened penalties under section 226.3 because the plain language of the statute provided that heightened penalties applied only where the employer failed to provide wage statements or failed to keep required records, which was not the situation here. The Court found reversal of the penalty award did not require vacation of the attorney’s fees award. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected Alaska’s defenses to the application of section 226(a). View "Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Moniz managed a staffing firm's (Adecco’s) relationship with Google. Correa was assigned to work at Google. Moniz and Correa sued Adecco to recover civil penalties for alleged violations of the Labor Code. Under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), an employee aggrieved by alleged Labor Code violations may act as an agent of the Labor Workforce and Development Agency (LWDA) to bring an action to recover civil penalties. If an aggrieved employee settles such an action, the court must review and approve the settlement; civil penalties are distributed 75 percent to the LWDA and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees.Moniz settled her case first. The court approved the settlement. Correa challenged the settlement process and approval, including the manner in which the court treated Correa's and LWDA's objections to the settlement, the standard used by the court to approve the settlement, numerous alleged legal deficiencies, and the trial court’s ruling denying her attorney fees and an incentive payment. The court of appeal reversed. While the court applied an appropriate standard of review by inquiring whether the settlement was “fair, adequate, and reasonable” as well as meaningful and consistent with the purposes of PAGA, it is not possible to infer from the record that the trial court assessed the fairness of the settlement’s allocation of civil penalties between the affected aggrieved employees or whether such allocation comports with PAGA. View "Moniz v. Adecco USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased Berkeley property intending to demolish an existing structure and build a new residence. Richards, a licensed contractor, demolished the structure but did not build the new house. Plaintiffs sued Richards alleging breach of oral contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel. Richards propounded requests for admission (RFAs) asking the plaintiffs to admit the parties did not enter into an oral contract and did not have a meeting of the minds. Plaintiffs denied the RFAs.The trial court denied Richards’s motion for summary judgment finding triable issues of material fact. After the close of evidence, Richards unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict. The jury returned a defense verdict, concluding that Richards did not make a promise with clear and unambiguous terms. Richards moved for attorney fees and costs (Code of Civil Procedure 2033.420), arguing that the plaintiffs had no reasonable basis to deny the RFAs and “failed to realistically evaluate their claims and perform a reasonable investigation.” The court awarded Richards $239,170.86 in attorney fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed. the trial court was well-positioned to evaluate the reasonableness issue as it presided over the case from start to finish. Neither the denial of summary judgment nor the denial of a directed verdict precluded the award. View "Spahn v. Richards" on Justia Law