Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pappas sued Dr. Chang for malpractice. During mediation, they agreed that Chang would pay Pappas $100,000. Both parties and their counsel signed a settlement agreement, which provided that Pappas “will execute a release of all claims ... in a more comprehensive settlement agreement ... to include a provision for mutual confidentiality as to the facts ... the terms and amount of this agreement.” The parties unsuccessfully negotiated the “more comprehensive settlement agreement” and “provision for mutual confidentiality” for months. Pappas discharged her attorney and, representing herself, advised Chang’s attorney that she would only comply with a confidentiality provision if she received $525,000, then sued Chang for breach of contract.The trial court ruled against Pappas “because she has not signed a ‘more comprehensive settlement agreement’ and release which includes a provision for mutual confidentiality.” In consolidated appeals, the court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that a confidentiality provision would be against public policy and violate the Business and Professions Code. The court also rejected Chang’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of her attorney fees as costs of proof at trial (Code Civ. Proc., 2033.420) based on its finding that Pappas’s denial of two requests for admission was based on a good faith belief she would prevail at trial and that the requests went to the ultimate issue. View "Pappas v. Chang" on Justia Law

LGCY is a Utah limited liability company formed in Delaware and headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah. The real party in interest is a California resident who worked for LGCY as a sales representative and later a sales manager. After the real party in interest and six other LGCY executives and managers left LGCY and formed a competing company, LGCY filed suit in Utah state court against all seven individuals. Instead of joining the cross-complaint, the real party in interest filed a complaint in Fresno County Superior Court alleging virtually identical claims as those of his codefendants in their Utah cross-complaint.The Court of Appeal concluded that California Labor Code section 925 provides an exception to California's compulsory cross-complaint statute (Code Civ. Proc., section 426.30) such that an employee who comes within section 925's purview may file a complaint in California alleging claims that are related to the causes of action their employer has filed against them in a pending action in a sister state. The court also concluded that the Clause does not compel a state court (here, California) to extend credit to and apply the sister state's compulsory cross-complaint statute. In this case, LGCY has not demonstrated that the Fresno County Superior Court erred in overruling its demurrer, and the court therefore denied its petition for writ of mandate. View "LGCY Power, LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Mark Shenefield filed a request for order (RFO) seeking joint legal and physical custody of the child he shared with Jennifer Shenefield. In his declaration, Mark quoted from and referenced the contents of a confidential, court-ordered psychological evaluation undertaken during Jennifer’s previous marital dissolution. Mark’s attorney Karolyn Kovtun filed the paperwork. Jennifer opposed Mark’s request and sought sanctions for violations of Family Code sections 3111(d) and 3025.5, for unwarranted disclosure of the confidential custody evaluation. The trial court ordered the sanctions issue be heard at trial. Jennifer’s trial brief detailed her arguments for why the court should impose sanctions on both Mark and Kovtun. Mark did not file a trial brief. Following trial, the court issued sanctions against Mark in the amount of $10,000 and Kovtun in the amount of $15,000. Kovtun challenged the sanctions, filing a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d). A different court heard Kovtun’s request to vacate the sanctions imposed against her and denied the request. On appeal, Kovtun argued the court improperly sanctioned her because: (1) attorneys could not be sanctioned under section 3111; (2) the notice she received did not comply with due process standards; (3) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her; (4) the court failed to enforce the safe harbor provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7; and (5) the court improperly admitted and relied on a transcript of a meeting between Kovtun, Mark, and Jennifer. The Court found Kovtun’s arguments meritless, and affirmed the sanctions. View "Shenefield v. Shenefield" on Justia Law

After years of litigation over royalties and rights related to musical compositions, the trial court determined that Currency is entitled to the royalties and the rights to one set of musical compositions, that it has a security interest in the other musical compositions, and that Structured has no rights.Currency appealed from the denial of its motion to recover the attorney fees it incurred litigating consolidated appeals resolved in 2019. Structured appealed from the denial of its motion for sanctions (Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.1) in which it argued that Currency’s motion for attorney fees was frivolous.The court of appeal affirmed. The law of the case doctrine barred Currency’s motion. A party is not entitled to section 128.7 sanctions unless the target of the motion has had 21 days to withdraw the allegedly offending paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial. When calculating the earliest possible day that a motion for sanctions can be filed, the day the motion was served is excluded and the last day is included. The trial court properly denied Structured's motion for sanctions because it resolved the attorney fees motion on the 21st day after service of the motion for sanctions, the last day of the safe harbor period. View "Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Structured Asset Sales LLC" on Justia Law

Vanndrya Srouy graduated from Crawford High School (Crawford) in the San Diego Unified School District (the District). While a student at Crawford, he was a member of its varsity football team. After Srouy graduated, he found himself named as a co-defendant in a lawsuit filed by a football referee, John Herlich, who claimed to have been injured when Srouy blocked an opponent, who fell into Herlich, during a school football game. The District (as co-defendant) rejected Srouy’s tender of his defense in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy then filed underlying lawsuit against the District, claiming the District violated a mandatory duty to defend him in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy alleged this duty arose under the free school guarantee and the equal protection clause of the California Constitution; title 5, section 350 of the California Code of Regulations; and/or Education Code section 44808. The trial court granted the District’s demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Srouy’s operative complaint. "Although Srouy’s plight evokes our sympathy," the Court of Appeals found its ability to respond was "constrained by the law, and the allegations of this case do not afford a judicial solution. We leave it to the Legislature to determine whether the needs of student athletes in Srouy’s position are sufficiently addressed by current law, and if not, to craft an appropriate solution." Judgment was affirmed. View "Srouy v. San Diego Unified School District" on Justia Law

In a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between Som, her husband, Joshua, and Joshua's mother, Sharon, the trial court ruled in favor of Sharon. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended Sharon's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. The court reversed the judgment on the claims for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. The court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about Som's financial circumstances in 2009 and did not deprive Som of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly.The court of appeal subsequently modified its opinion to read: the judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Sharon is reversed with directions to enter a new judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Joshua, per the July 29, 2010 deed and the July 18, 2011 deed. The judgment is also reversed as to the causes of action for slander of title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) entered into a contract with the City of Holtville (City) to detain noncitizens at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility (Facility). The City did not own the Facility, so the City subcontracted its detention responsibilities to the Facility’s owner. The owner did not operate the facility, so the owner subcontracted its responsibilities (with ICE’s approval) to a private operator, real party in interest Management & Training Corporation (Operator). Petitioner Anna Von Herrmann served the Operator with a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request regarding the Facility. Operator refused to comply, reasoning it was not subject to the CPRA because it did not have a contract directly with the City, and, thus, the Facility was not one that “detains a noncitizen pursuant to a contract with a city.” Alternatively, Operator contended several CPRA exemptions applied. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the trial court compelling Operator to comply with the CPRA request, but the court agreed with Operator’s interpretation of California Civil Code section 1670.9(c) and denied the petition without reaching Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court construed section 1670.9(c) too narrowly as applying the CPRA only to an entity that contracts directly with a city to detain noncitizens. "[T]he structure of section 1670.9 as a whole, indicate the Legislature intended for the CPRA to apply to immigration detention facilities on a facility-wide basis rather than an entity-specific basis." The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the petition and to enter a new order granting it, subject to resolution of Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. View "Von Herrmann v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal was whether a watermaster appointed by the trial court to implement and administer a water rights decree had the right to appeal the trial court’s orders interpreting the decree on the grounds the watermaster disagrees with the trial court’s interpretation and the orders would increase the watermaster’s administrative burdens and costs. The Court of Appeal concluded the watermaster did not have the right to appeal because the watermaster was not aggrieved by the trial court’s interpretation of the water users’ rights under the decree. View "Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Company" on Justia Law

In a lawsuit against his former clients and their new attorneys, attorney Pech alleged that the new attorneys interfered with his fee agreement by advising the clients not to file a complaint that Pech drafted. The new attorneys moved to strike all of Pech’s claims against them under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation” statute). Pech argued the anti-SLAPP motion should have been denied because the new attorneys failed to identify specific allegations of protected conduct to be stricken and the new attorneys’ interference with the fee agreement was not a protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, or if it was protected, he established a probability of prevailing on the merits.The trial court granted the motion in part, striking the claim for interference with contract. The court of appeal affirmed. The new attorneys identified the conduct supporting the claim for interference with contract that they asserted was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute: advice about proposed litigation against a third party, including the clients’ rights and obligations under a fee agreement with another attorney. Pech did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, because his claim is barred by the litigation privilege contained in Civil Code section 47(b). View "Pech v. Doniger" on Justia Law