Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) allows employees to bring a civil action for penalties against their employer on behalf of themselves and other current and former “aggrieved” employees for Labor Code-related violations. La Face, a cashier at a Ralphs, brought a PAGA action, alleging that Ralphs violated an Industrial Welfare Commission order that required employers to provide seating when the nature of the work reasonably permitted the use of seats, or, for a job where standing was required, to provide seating for employee use when their use did not interfere with an employee’s duties.The trial court held that PAGA actions were equitable in nature and not triable to a jury and that Ralphs had not violated the order. The court of appeal affirmed, first holding that there is no right to a jury trial in a PAGA action. PAGA is an administrative enforcement hybrid. If tried to a jury, the parties would gain a jury trial right not otherwise available to either the agency or employers. Many violations would be based on rights that did not exist at common law. The court noted that even when lulls occurred in a Ralphs cashier’s primary duties, the cashiers were still required to move while fulfilling other tasks. View "LaFace v. Ralphs Grocery Co." on Justia Law

Kirk, an actress, using a pseudonym, entered into a confidential settlement agreement in August 2017 with four entertainment industry executives, who used fictitious names in the agreement and documents filed in the superior court. The agreement contained an arbitration clause. The executives filed a demand for arbitration in June 2020, asserting breach of contract, interference with contract, and civil extortion. The executives obtained from an emergency arbitrator a preliminary injunction prohibiting the actress, her fiance, and two others from disclosing confidential information as that term is defined in the settlement agreement, including any disclosures in court documents, and from initiating any lawsuit against the executives in violation of the arbitration provisions in the settlement agreement.Kirk and her fiance filed a petition in superior court to vacate the preliminary injunction. Because the emergency arbitrator’s ruling was not an “award” under Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.4,1 the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeal dismissed their appeal as taken from a non-appealable order. An arbitrator's interim rulings are not reviewable until the final award is entered; no appeal is available from a court's dismissal of a petition to vacate such an interim ruling. View "Kirk v. Ratner" on Justia Law

After slipping and falling in the crosswalk of a Safeway parking lot, which was wet due to rain, Paige sued Safeway for negligence and premises liability. She asserted that Safeway failed to exercise due care in the manner it restriped the crosswalk several weeks before her fall by not adopting measures that would have made the crosswalk more slip-resistant. The jury returned a verdict for Safeway.On appeal, Paige argued the trial court erroneously prohibited her from cross-examining Safeway’s liability expert about standards promulgated by the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) with respect to safe walking surfaces. Paige contends that Evidence Code Section 721(b)(3) makes clear that an adverse expert may be cross-examined about a publication established as reliable authority, such as the ASTM standards, regardless of the expert’s consideration or reliance on the publication in forming his opinions. The court of appeal affirmed. While the trial court erroneously prohibited Paige from using the ASTM standard during her cross-examination of Safeway’s expert based on the expert’s lack of consideration or reliance on it, the error was harmless. View "Paige v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

In October 2004, plaintiff Shelby Anderson (individually, plaintiff) and his wife, plaintiff Tammy Anderson (Tammy), bought a Ford Super Duty F-250 6.0 liter diesel pickup truck containing an engine sourced from nonparty ITEC, also known as Navistar (Navistar). Plaintiff chose the Ford for its power, towing capacity, and other qualities as represented by defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford) in brochures and advertisements and by Ford dealership sales agents. Plaintiff began experiencing issues with the truck during his second year of ownership. After numerous attempts to have the vehicle repaired so it could perform the functions for which they purchased it, plaintiffs effectively gave up, rendering the truck a “driveway ornament.” After opting out as putative members of a class action involving the 6.0 liter diesel engine, plaintiffs sued Ford. The jury found in favor of plaintiffs on their causes of action pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (popularly known as the “lemon law”), the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and their fraud in the inducement–concealment cause of action. The jury awarded plaintiffs $47,715.60 in actual damages, which was the original purchase price of the truck, $30,000 in statutory civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, and $150,000 in punitive damages. The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees in the amount of $643,615. Ford appealed, but finding no reversible error in the judgment and damages awards, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Anderson v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code 2698 (PAGA)) authorizes “aggrieved employees” to file lawsuits on behalf of the state seeking civil penalties for Labor Code violations, and allocates 75 percent of the recovered penalties to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25 percent to all employees affected by the violation. Before filing suit, the PAGA plaintiff must submit notices of the alleged violations to LWDA and the employer.The first aggrieved employee submitted a notice of alleged Labor Code violations by his employer to the LWDA and subsequently filed a complaint. That employee later sought to amend his complaint to substitute in as the named plaintiff another aggrieved employee who had worked for the same employer. The superior court granted the employer summary judgment, concluding that the amended PAGA complaint cannot relate back to the original PAGA complaint where the second employee submitted his PAGA notice after the original complaint was filed, reasoning that allowing relation back grants the employee “more time to recover civil penalties than the LWDA itself would have.”The court of appeal reversed. Relation back would not grant the LWDA or any aggrieved employees the potential for any more than they had under the original complaint; if relation back does not apply, UBS avoids exposure to potential liability for civil penalties over some period of time. View "Hutcheson v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The California Personnel Board (Board) sustained a complaint brought by Vickie Mabry-Height, M.D., against the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) alleging discrimination based on age, race, and gender in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The Board concluded that Dr. Mabry-Height established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination based on certain conduct, and the Department failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination by offering evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for this conduct. The Department petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandamus seeking an order setting aside the Board’s decision. The petition was denied, and judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Mabry-Height. The Department appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's action against Ghazale Brothers and Central Freight for failure to bring the action to trial within the period required by Code of Civil Procedure, section 583.310. The court concluded that because Emergency Rule 10(a) is not a statute but an administrative rule, it did not extend plaintiff's deadline pursuant to statute and did not trigger section 583.350's extra six-month period. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the case based on plaintiff's failure to establish a statutory extension, excuse, or exception. In this case, plaintiff failed to even argue that the trial court committed error and the arguments in her brief are undeveloped, lack sufficient citations to authority and to the record, and fail to allege any trial court error. Consequently, the court considered them forfeited. View "Ables v. A. Ghazale Brothers, Inc." on Justia Law

Before a creditor with a money judgment may force the sale of a debtor's dwelling to satisfy that judgment, the creditor must, in addition to other procedures, obtain a court order authorizing the sale. To obtain that court order, the creditor must file an application that includes, among other things, a statement of the amount of any liens or encumbrances on the dwelling.The Court of Appeal held that this requires the creditor to list liens on the property for unpaid real property taxes, even though those liens need not be recorded because they come into being by operation of law. In this case, the trial court properly denied the creditor's application as deficient, because the creditor's application did not list the delinquent property taxes against the debtor's dwelling and went so far as to represent, under oath, that "there are no actual or purported liens or encumbrances" on the property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the creditor's application as deficient. View "Meyer v. Sheh" on Justia Law

Panterra GP, a licensed general contractor, sued the defendants, seeking more than $2,609,666 for work it allegedly performed on a construction project. The contract between the parties mistakenly referred to Panterra Development, an entity that is not a licensed contractor. Panterra GP, the general partner in Panterra Development, actually performed the remodeling work at issue. The Bakersfield permit applications, building permits, and certificate of occupancy correctly referred to Panterra GP as the contractor. The action was dismissed without leave to amend, based on Business and Professions Code section 7031(a); the court stated that a party may not rely on equitable principles to reform a contract in order to overcome the failure of the party identified in the construction contract as the contractor to have a valid contractor’s license as required by the statute.The court of appeal vacated. Section 7031(a) has no applicability to claims asserted by Panterra GP because it was licensed as a contractor at all relevant times. The defendants tried to argue, before trial, that Panterra Development was the true contractor, but that contention was untenable at the pleadings stage. Courts may not turn a demurrer into a contested evidentiary matter by determining the “proper interpretation” of the evidence. View "Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Treasure Andrews sued the Metropolitan Transit System, San Diego Transit Corporation, and Janalee St. Clair (collectively, MTS) after she was injured on an MTS bus driven by St. Clair. MTS moved for summary judgment on the ground that Andrews’s complaint was barred by the statute of limitations because Andrews filed suit more than six months after MTS mailed a notice of rejection of Andrews’s claim for damages. Andrews opposed, arguing among other things that MTS’s notice of rejection was defective because it did not include the full warning required by statute, and the two-year statute of limitations therefore applied. The trial court found that Andrews’s complaint was untimely, granted the motion, and entered judgment against Andrews. On appeal, Andrews again contended the notice of rejection was defective. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed: the notice did not comply with the statute and was therefore insufficient to trigger the six-month statute of limitations in Government Code section 945.6 (a)(1). Instead, Andrews had two years from the accrual of her cause of action to file suit. Thus, the Court determined the trial court erred by finding that the six-month limitations period applied, and reversed judgment on that basis. View "Andrews v. Metropolitan Transit System" on Justia Law