Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Maria Carachure suffered serious injuries when she was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Celia Acosta Scott. Plaintiff filed suit, and a jury found the action was barred because of a “‘binding and enforceable settlement.’” On appeal, plaintiff contended the trial court erred in granting partial nonsuit on the issue of plaintiff’s consent to settle and acted in excess of its power by approving the settlement on her behalf. She further contended the trial court erred in striking the allegations and prayer for punitive damages. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected plaintiff’s contentions and affirmed. View "Carachure v. Scott" on Justia Law

A plaintiff obtained a witness' declaration to support her opposition to the defendants’ summary judgment motion. At the witness’ deposition, she disavowed the declaration, testified as to her lack of knowledge of the relevant matter, and explained that she signed the declaration due to pressure from plaintiff’s counsel. The trial court nevertheless denied the summary judgment motion on the ground that the declaration, considered in isolation, created a triable issue of fact precluding summary judgment. The Court of Appeal held that the declaration should not have been considered in isolation to determine whether there was a foundation in personal knowledge for its contents, but rather any evidence in the record could and should have been considered. Furthermore, the Court found the record here "compels the conclusion" that the witness’ repudiated statement lacked foundation in personal knowledge. The trial court therefore erred in denying summary judgment. View "Forest Lawn Memorial-Park Assn. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Mother and her children traveled and lived in a van. Mother has mental health problems and is severely delusional. Mother physically abused the children, who did not attend school. Both Montana’s child protective services agency and Washington state child protective services became involved with the family in 2019-2020. As of June 2020, the family was in San Bernardino County, when someone referred them to that county’s child protective services agency. During a subsequent incident, police placed Mother under a psychiatric hold. Mother had no family in California but owned property in southern California. After the six-month review order, Mother challenged the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, asserting that Montana, not California, had jurisdiction.The court of appeal affirmed. California has significant connections to establish jurisdiction under Family Code section 3421(a)(2) and substantial evidence is available in California concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships. When the proceedings began, Mother’s stated intent was to continue traveling within California; her land ownership and litigation in the state also demonstrate her connections to California. View "In re Ari S." on Justia Law

Following a preliminary hearing, petitioner Dr. Sanjoy Banerjee was charged in an information with two counts of presenting a false or fraudulent health care claim to an insurer (a form of insurance fraud, counts 1-2), and three counts of perjury (counts 3-5). The superior court denied Banerjee’s motion to dismiss the information as unsupported by reasonable or probable cause. Banerjee petitioned for a writ of prohibition to direct the superior court to vacate its order denying his Penal Code section 995 motion and to issue an order setting aside the information. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause and an order staying further proceedings on the information, pending the Court's resolution of the merits of Banerjee’s petition. The State filed a return, and Banerjee filed a traverse. The State argued the evidence supported a strong suspicion that Banerjee committed two counts of insurance fraud and three counts of perjury, based on his violations of Labor Code section 139.3(a) between 2014 and 2016. During that period, Banerjee billed a workers’ compensation insurer for services he rendered to patients through his professional corporation and through two other legal entities he owned and controlled. The insurance fraud charges are based on Banerjee’s 2014-2016 billings to the insurer through the two other entities. The perjury charges were based on three instances in which Banerjee signed doctor’s reports, certifying under penalty of perjury that he had not violated “section 139.3.” Banerjee argued: (1) the evidence showed he did not violate the statute's referral prohibition; (2) even if he did not comply with section 139.3(e), the “physician’s office” exception to the referral prohibition applied to all of his referrals to his two other legal entities; and (3) the patient disclosure requirement of section 139.3(e), the referral prohibition of section 139.3(a), and the physician’s office exception to the referral prohibition were unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Banerjee did not violate section 139.3(a) by referring his patients to his two other legal entities; and (2) the evidence supported a strong suspicion that Banerjee specifically intended to present false and fraudulent claims for health care benefits, in violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(6), by billing the workers’ compensation insurer substantially higher amounts through his two other legal entities than he previously and customarily billed the insurer for the same services he formerly rendered through his professional corporation and his former group practice. Thus, the Court granted the writ as to the perjury charges but denied it as to the insurance fraud charges. View "Banerjee v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a severely disabled child who suffered catastrophic injuries during her birth in 2015, filed suit against various medical providers for professional negligence. In 2019, the actions were settled for $3 million. DHCS, through its director, then asserted a lien on plaintiff's settlement to recover what DHCS paid for plaintiff's medical care through the state's Medi-Cal program. The trial court denied the lien, concluding that it was prohibited by the "anti-lien" provision of the federal Medicaid Act.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in denying DHCS's lien. The court concluded that, while the anti-lien provision of the Medicaid Act generally prohibits liens against the property of Medicaid beneficiaries, other provisions of the Act carve out exceptions for settlements or judgments recovered from third-party tortfeasors, to the extent such settlements or judgments are attributable to payments made by the state for the beneficiaries' medical care. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine what portion of the settlement properly is subject to DHCS's lien. View "L.Q. v. California Hospital Medical Center" on Justia Law

Three drivers for the rideshare company, Lyft, each filed separate representative actions against Lyft under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code 2698), alleging that Lyft misclassified its California drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, thereby violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Following mediation in 2019, one driver, Turrieta, and Lyft reached a settlement. After Turrieta moved for court approval of the settlement, the other drivers sought to intervene and object to the settlement, arguing that Lyft had engaged in a “reverse auction” by settling with Turrieta for an unreasonably low amount and that the settlement contained other provisions that were unlawful and inconsistent with PAGA’s purpose. The trial court found that they lacked standing and approved the settlement.The court of appeal affirmed. The status of the other drivers as PAGA plaintiffs in separate actions does not confer standing to move to vacate the judgment or challenge the judgment on appeal. While they may appeal from the court’s implicit order denying them intervention, there was no error in that denial. View "Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants Sergeant Richard Knox and Sheriff’s Deputy Jeff Garrett, of the Tehama County Sheriff’s Department (Department), confronted plaintiff Michael Murchison on his rural property, while Knox and Garrett were trying to secure a rifle they had spotted. Plaintiff brought multiple claims against Knox, Garrett, Sheriff Dave Hencratt, and Tehama County, including federal law claims of unlawful search and excessive force, and state law claims of battery by a peace officer, assault, and interference with his constitutional rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion. The trial court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion in its entirety. On appeal, plaintiff contended there were triable issues of fact as to two of his claims under title 42 United States Code section 1983: whether Knox and Garrett committed an unexcused warrantless search that proximately caused his injuries; and whether they used excessive force in detaining him. He also claimed the trial court erred in granting of summary judgment as to his state law claims for violation of his constitutional rights, battery by a peace officer, and assault. The Court of Appeal reversed with directions to the trial court to vacate its ruling on summary judgment and enter a new order denying the motion as to the following causes of action as to Knox and Garrett: (1) the first cause of action under section 1983 based on unlawful search and excessive force; (2) the second cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 52.1; (3) the fourth cause of action alleging battery by a peace officer; and (4) the fifth cause of action for assault. View "Murchison v. County of Tehama" on Justia Law

In this writ proceeding, petitioner Quinn Li challenged the continued vitality of the "Chamberlain rule" (Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com., 69 Cal.App.3d (1977)) claiming the California Supreme Court’s recent Conservatorship of O.B., 9 Cal.5th 989 (2020) decision impliedly abrogated Chamberlain’s long-standing interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 (c). The Chamberlain rule held that the weight of the evidence phrase in subdivision (c) of section 1094.5 is synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. O.B. held that an appellate court applying the substantial evidence standard of review must account for the standard of proof required in the underlying proceeding when determining whether a finding is supported by the evidence. The Court of Appeal disagreed with petitioner’s implied abrogation argument but concluded, in sum, that a trial court reviewing an administrative agency’s findings under the independent judgment standard of review in section 1094.5 must, like under the substantial evidence standard of review, account for the standard of proof required and applied in the underlying proceeding. "We recognize this conclusion breaks with over four decades of established law. ... however, after closely reexamining the statutory construction employed by the Chamberlain and Ettinger courts, it is clear there is no basis for the interpretation that the weight of the evidence phrase in section 1094.5 is synonymous with preponderance of the evidence." Despite the significance of its conclusion on this important question of law, the Court denied petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate because he failed to raise any argument demonstrating the correct application of the standard of review would have resulted in a different outcome in the trial court. "Prejudicial error must be proven; it is not presumed." View "Li v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

After the Tribe refused to pay Findleton for construction work and rental services provided for a casino it was building and infrastructure for the reservation, Findleton invoked the ADR provisions of the agreements. The Tribe refused to mediate. Findleton filed a petition, seeking to compel mediation and arbitration.The court of appeal held the Tribe had expressly waived its sovereign immunity. The trial court entered an order compelling mediation and arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the firm chosen by the Tribe. The Tribe nonetheless refused to mediate, threatened to disparage AAA if it proceeded, and persuaded a recently-established tribal court to issue an injunction. AAA then declined to mediate the dispute.The superior court awarded Findleton attorney fees and costs and imposed monetary sanctions—none of which the Tribe has paid. It issued writs of execution and orders to appear for examination. The Tribe’s representatives repeatedly refused to answer questions about casino assets, impeded the examination by filling the room with tribal members who engaged in a vocal demonstration, and transferred casino assets to a corporate entity—the superior court found a fraudulent transfer.The Tribe sought to appeal the orders. The court of appeal dismissed the appeals, citing the disentitlement doctrine based on the Tribe’s flagrant, repeated, and continuous violation of court orders. View "Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians" on Justia Law

This action concerned a piece of property in Rancho Mirage. At one time, the owners of record were Val Janelunas and his father, Joseph Janelunas, as joint tenants; however, Joseph died, leaving Val as sole owner. Thereafter, Val died. Plaintiff Douglas Humphrey asserted a claim to the property; he filed this action to quiet title to it, and he filed a lis pendens. He served process by publication. None of the named defendants (including Val Janelunas’s heirs) responded. At Humphrey’s request, the trial court entered their default. Thereafter, Peter Bewley became the administrator of Val Janelunas’s estate. He filed a motion to intervene, so he could move to expunge the lis pendens. In response, Humphrey withdrew the lis pendens; the trial court then denied the motion to intervene as moot. Bewley proceeded to sell the property. Humphrey filed a request for a prove-up hearing and a default judgment, to which Bewley objectied. The trial court, on its own motion, quashed the service by publication and vacated the default. Humphrey appealed, contending: (1) service by publication was proper, therefore the trial court erred in quashing service, vacating the default and failing to hold a prove-up hearing; (2) the trial court should not have quashed service as to Val Janelunas’ heirs because Bewley made a general appearance; and (3) the trial court erred in setting aside the default on its own motion because Bewley’s request to have to set aside was untimely. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held the trial court’s order granting the motion to quash was appealable, and in such an appeal the Court could also review its order vacating the default. The Court also held Humphrey did not properly effect service by publication because the notices that he published specified the property only by assessor’s parcel number (APN) and not by either legal description or street address. However, the Court held Bewley made a general appearance. Accordingly, the trial court erred by quashing service on Bewley, but not by quashing service on other parties who had not appeared nor by vacating the default. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected all other contentions raised. View "Humphrey v. Bewley" on Justia Law