Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's order denying attorney fees following her settlement of an action with Westlake Services under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The court concluded that plaintiff's appeal is from a nonappealable order, and plaintiff's appeal does not fall within the scope of the collateral order doctrine.The court concluded that the trial court's order concerning fees, costs and prejudgment interest was neither a judgment rendered but not yet entered within the meaning of California Rule of Court 8.104(d)(1) nor an intended ruling subsequently finalized in a judgment or order of dismissal as contemplated by rule 8.104(d)(2). Furthermore, the notice of appeal falls far outside the limited scope of the mandatory provision of rule 8.104(d)(1) and the court's discretion under rule 8.104(d)(2) to treat as appealable an otherwise nonappealable order. Even if the court had discretion to save the appeal, the court would decline to exercise it. Finally, plaintiff's appeal of the order does not fall within the scope of the collateral order doctrine where she contends that the order directs the payment of costs and prejudgment interest but did not attempt to appeal the portion of the trial court's order awarding costs and prejudgment interest. View "Sanchez v. Westlake Services, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, real parties in interest applied to the City of Santa Cruz to construct a 40-unit development on a parcel of land located at 1930 Ocean Street Extension. Following an initial mitigated negative declaration and years of litigation surrounding the impact of the nearby crematory at Santa Cruz Memorial Park, in 2016, the real parties in interest renewed their interest in moving forward with their project. As required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the project applicant and the City of Santa Cruz prepared and circulated the initial study, the draft environmental impact report (EIR), the partially recirculated draft EIR, and the final EIR. Following a public hearing, the city council adopted a resolution to certify the EIR and to adopt Alternative 3, a 32-unit housing project. The Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association (OSENA) filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging the City of Santa Cruz and its city council violated CEQA and the Santa Cruz Municipal Code in approving the project. The trial court concluded the City had complied with CEQA, but it determined the City violated the municipal code, and it issued a limited writ prohibiting the City from allowing the project to proceed unless and until it followed the municipal code and the court was satisfied with its compliance. Following entry of judgment, OSENA appealed, arguing the court erred by concluding the City complied with CEQA’s requirements. OSENA contended the City violated CEQA by: (1) insufficiently addressing potentially significant biological impacts and mitigation measures in the initial study rather than in the EIR directly; (2) establishing improperly narrow and unreasonable objectives so that alternative options could not be considered meaningfully; and (3) failing to address cumulative impacts adequately. The City cross-appealed, contending the court incorrectly concluded it violated the municipal code by granting a planned development permit without also requiring the project applicant to comply with the slope modifications regulations After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City, and affirmed that portion of the trial court's order and judgment concluding it complied with CEQA. The Court reversed the portion of the order and judgment concluding the City violated its municipal code. View "Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood etc. v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law

Trackside was a proposed mixed-use building project in the City of Davis, California, between the Downtown Core and Old East Davis, an older neighborhood. After the city council approved Trackside, plaintiff Old East Davis Neighborhood Association (“the Association”) petitioned for a writ of mandate, and the trial court found insufficient evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning documents. The court specifically cited the lack of evidence that Trackside served as a “transition” from the Downtown Core to Old East Davis. On appeal, defendants City of Davis and City Council, along with real party in interest Trackside Center, LLC (“the City” and “Trackside”) challenged that ruling, contending the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating consistency with planning documents, and that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning requirements and guidelines. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the City’s approval, and the Association’s contentions on cross-appeal lacked merit. The Court therefore reversed the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. View "Old East Davis Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Davis" on Justia Law

Isaak, an 84-year-old retired farmer, was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2020 and suffers physical and mental impairments. He is wheelchair-bound and receiving palliative care. Several parties have sued the manufacturers of Paraquat alleging that the pesticide caused their Parkinson’s disease and successfully petitioned the Judicial Council to form a Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding (JCCP) in 2019. By March 2021, discovery was underway in the JCCP.Isaak filed a products liability lawsuit in May 2021. The case was coordinated with the JCCP. Isaak sought trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36; a party to a civil action is entitled to trial preference where the person is over 70 years of age and the court finds that the party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole and that the party’s health is such that preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation. Defendants argued that the law governing coordinated proceedings conflicted with, and took precedence over, section 36. The trial court denied Isaak’s motion but approved a special procedure for seeking preference that it found would balance the interests of parties for whom a preference might be warranted with the need to streamline coordinated proceedings. The court of appeal upheld the ruling. Section 36 does not supersede California Rules of Court, 3.504, which governs coordinated proceedings. View "Isaak v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Catlin sued Danko, alleging that Catlin settled one of the claims against its insured in a wrongful death lawsuit (Boolen case). Under the settlement, Catlin paid $180,000 to Danko's trust account )plaintiffs’ counsel in the Boolen case). Catlin then mistakenly paid the same amount again to the same account. The Boolen case went to trial on other claims, eventually resulting in a defense verdict. Catlin discovered its payment error and requested the return of the mistaken overpayment, but Danko declined, citing a release of future claims as part of the pretrial settlement.Responding to Catlin’s subsequent suit, Danko filed “anti-SLAPP” (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, asking the court to strike complaint and stating they would later request attorney fees under section 425.16(c). Catlin voluntarily dismissed its complaint. The Danko Appellants asked Judge Fineman to rule on the anti-SLAPP motions as a “predicate” for going forward with their fee motions. She declined. Danko never filed a fees motion. The judgment of dismissal was entered. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court had jurisdiction and had a duty to rule on the merits of the anti-SLAPP motions, despite the absence of any pending fee request. View "Catlin Insurance Co. v. Danko Meredith Law Firm" on Justia Law

Two months after Covert filed a lawsuit for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, FCA (an automaker) served Covert with a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 for $51,000, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Covert filed objections to that offer. Covert with a second section 998 offer, 15 months later, for $145,000 with identical terms. A jury awarded Covert $48,416 in damages and penalties.On appeal, FCA argued both of its section 998 offers were valid, and because the jury awarded Covert less than the amount of either offer, the trial court erred in awarding Covert attorneys’ fees and costs and denying FCA its costs.The court of appeal agreed that both offers were valid; the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider whether the first offer was made in good faith. Covert did not meet his burden to show the second offer was not in good faith. If the trial court finds the first offer was made in good faith, it shall award FCA its costs reasonably incurred after the first offer was served and deny Covert his attorneys’ fees and costs. If the court finds the first offer was not made in good faith, it shall award Covert his attorneys’ fees and costs reasonably incurred before the date the second offer was served and award FCA its costs, including expert witness fees, reasonably incurred thereafter. View "Covert v. FCA USA, LLC" on Justia Law

ACIC filed suit against Hernandez in January 2008. ACIC's Proof of Service described personal service by a registered process server on Hernandez on December 9, 2008, at a Palm Springs address. Hernandez filed no answer. Default judgment ($65,703.02) was entered in May 2009. Ten years later, on ACIC’s application, the court ordered the judgment renewed in the amount of $130,501.96. ACIC served Hernandez with notice by mail on April 19, 2019. The envelope was returned to ACIC on May 1, marked “Not Known Unable to Forward.” ACIC claims the application for renewal of judgment had been removed from the envelope, indicating Hernandez had removed it before sending the envelope back as undeliverable. Hernandez initially agreed in a sworn declaration that he received the application for renewal of judgment. He later changed attorneys and repudiated that declaration, claiming he never received any notice or application. Hernandez says he first learned of the existence of the lawsuit when a telemarketer contacted him about judgment negotiation services in October 2019.The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied Hernandez’s motion to vacate. The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court was in a position to consider the credibility of Hernandez in asserting that he was not served, and the paralegal who disputed Hernandez’s claim that he never received the notices. View "American Contractors Indemnity Co. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

In 2017 and 2018, the California Legislature enacted two statutes, Government Code sections 17581.96 and 17581.97, in part to fulfill the state’s obligation to reimburse school districts under article XIII B, section 6 of the state constitution. Both statutes provided one-time funding to school districts in a certain year, either in fiscal year 2017-2018 or 2018-2019, and both stated that the provided funds “shall first satisfy any outstanding” amounts owed to the school districts under article XIII B, section 6. Appellants were nine school districts that objected to these two statutes in a suit against the State and the State Controller. In their view, article XIII B, section 6 prohibited the state from reimbursing school districts in the manner that sections 17581.96 and 17581.97 allowed. The trial court, however, disagreed, finding no merit to Appellants’ claim. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

As a vacation destination, the City of Palm Springs (City) has expressly allowed the short-term rental of a single-family dwelling, subject to various conditions designed to protect the interests of neighboring residents (as well as the City’s own interest in collecting transient occupancy taxes, a/k/a hotel taxes). In 2017, the City amended its short term rental ordinances, making specific findings that the amended ordinances were consistent with the City's Zoning Code. Meanwhile, Protect Our Neighborhoods (Protect), a membership organization opposed to short-term rentals, filed this action claiming among other things, that the 2017 version of the short-term rental ordinance (Ordinance) violated the City’s Zoning Code. The trial court disagreed and upheld the Ordinance. Protect appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Protect Our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

In 2018, plaintiff-appellant Monica Mayes was struck in the face by a foul ball while attending an intercollegiate baseball game between two private universities, Marymount University (Marymount) and defendant-respondent La Sierra University (La Sierra). Mayes suffered skull fractures and brain damage, among other injuries. When struck by the foul ball, Mayes was seated in a grassy area along the third-base line, behind the dugout, which extended eight feet above the ground, and there was no protective netting above the dugout. Mayes sued La Sierra for her injuries, alleging a single cause of action for negligence for its failure to: (1) install protective netting over the dugouts; (2) provide a sufficient number of screened seats for spectators; (3) warn spectators that the only available screened seats were in the area behind home plate; and (4) exercise crowd control in order to remove distractions in the area along the third-base line that diverted spectators’ attention from the playing field. La Sierra moved for summary judgment, claiming that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, observing that the case was “a textbook primary assumption of the risk case.” To this, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding La Sierra did not meet its burden of showing that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. In addition, Mayes showed there were triable issues of material fact concerning whether La Sierra was negligent for the reasons she alleged in her complaint. View "Mayes v. La Sierra Univ." on Justia Law