Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A reverse validation action was brought by petitioners Bonnie Wolstoncroft, William Unkel, and Michael Wilkes against the County of Yolo (County) to challenge the County’s plan to continue water service to 95 residences within the North Davis Meadows County Service Area (County Service Area) by replacing two aging groundwater wells with the City of Davis’s (City) water supply. Under this plan, North Davis Meadows residents would pay substantially higher water rates to pay for the project. The County considered the increased water rates to be property-related fees and noticed a Proposition 218 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996)) hearing. More than five months after the County adopted its resolution, but before the deadline contemplated by the parties’ tolling agreement, petitioners filed their action in superior court. The trial court rejected petitioners’ argument that the increased levy constituted an assessment for which majority approval was required by Proposition 218. The trial court also rejected petitioners’ contentions that the County wrongfully rejected protest votes it claimed not to have received or received in an untimely manner. After review of petitioners' arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined that the levy constituted a property-related fee under Proposition 218. "The fact that maintaining adequate water supply requires switching water sources does not turn the fee into an assessment. Thus, the County properly employed the majority protest procedure under article XIII D, section 6." Further, the Court concluded that even if the trial court erred in denying petitioners’ motion to augment the record with declarations regarding two mailed protest votes, petitioners’ evidence would not prove timely compliance with the protest procedure. Without the protest votes for which only evidence of mailing was tendered, the protest lacked a majority. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "Wolstoncroft v. County of Yolo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Wendy McKenzie was injured by a falling tree branch while jogging in Lower Bidwell Park, a municipal park owned by the City of Chico, California. She and her husband, Leslie McKenzie, real parties in interest, sued the City for personal injuries. The City sought a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of its motion for summary judgment and to grant the motion, arguing the trial court, in denying the motion, failed to recognize the City was immune from liability for injuries caused by a natural condition of unimproved public property, under Government Code section 831.2. The Court of Appeal concurred with the City and issued the requested writ. View "City of Chico v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs represent a certified class of current and former employees of Westamerica Bank who allege that Westamerica violated the Labor Code. The parties agreed that the parties would depose 30 class members as part of a pilot study to determine how many additional depositions are needed for a valid random sample of the class generally. Over Westamerica’s objection, the trial court ordered that the parties share the deposition costs equally.The court of appeal dismissed an appeal. The order is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. To be appealable, a collateral order must finally determine an issue collateral to the litigation and require the payment of money or performance of an act. Here, the matter is not final. Whether Westamerica ultimately pays for these depositions remains an open question. Because Westamerica’s liability for deposition costs has not been finally determined, and any error in the interim order may prove harmless, the issue is not ripe for appellate review. The court summarily rejected Westamerica’s request to treat the appeal as a petition for an extraordinary writ. View "Reddish v. Westamerica Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Olson appealed a trial court’s denial of her motion for preliminary injunction. Olson sought to enjoin defendant Hornbrook Community Services District (district) from having its employee, defendant Clint Dingman, perform “certain water-related duties (such as adding Chlorine to the [district’s] water, operating the Chlorination equipment, and doing water testing), or being paid to do so.” Olson asserted Dingman was required to be certified by the State Water Resources Control Board (board) under the operator certification program (program) as both a water treatment plant operator and a water distribution system operator to perform such duties and, because he was not certified as such, the district and Dingman (collectively defendants) violated several provisions of the Health and Safety Code. She further claimed “Dingman’s illegal operation of the [district’s] facilities ha[s] resulted in toxic and offensive water, resulting in public and private nuisances, and waste of taxpayer funds.” The trial court denied the preliminary injunction motion because Olson failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits, the injunction would not maintain the status quo, and the balance of hardships tipped in favor of Dingman. Olson appealed, arguing largely that the trial court erred in its decision. The Court of Appeal did not reach the merits of Olson’s arguments because the Court concluded judicial abstention was appropriate under the facts of this case. The preliminary injunction Olson sought would have required the court to assume the functions of the board. The Court thus affirmed the order denying her preliminary injunction motion. View "Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging a tort claim arising out of injuries suffered in California and retained a Virginia-based law firm with Virginia-licensed lawyers to represent her in negotiating a settlement with the pertinent federal agency's lawyers in Arizona. At issue is whether California may exert specific jurisdiction over the firm and its lawyers if plaintiff sues them for malpractice.The Court of Appeal concluded that California may not exert jurisdiction over the law firm and its lawyers because the law firm and its lawyers did nothing to purposefully avail themselves of the benefits of doing business in California, and the allegedly bad advice underlying the malpractice lawsuit was not sufficiently related to the firm's and its lawyers' contacts with California. Because plaintiff did not carry her burden of establishing either of the first two requirements of specific jurisdiction, the court had no occasion to determine whether California's exertion of jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order quashing service of summons on these defendants and dismissing plaintiff's malpractice suit. View "Jacqueline B. v. Rawls Law Group, PC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ryan Holman sued the County of Butte, California, the County of Butte Health and Human Services Department (Health and Human Services), and the County of Butte Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff’s Office) (collectively County) for negligence under a theory Health and Human Services and the Sheriff’s Office failed to perform mandatory duties under Government Code section 815.6 related to the investigation and reporting of allegations of child abuse perpetrated against plaintiff by his parents. The County demurred, contending plaintiff’s allegations were time barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The question before the trial court was, and on appeal was whether the discovery was available to plaintiff to excuse his filing of his complaint after the statute of limitation had expired. The trial court agreed with the County that the discovery rule was unavailable when section 338(a) was the applicable statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal reversed: “The problem with the County’s argument is that, whether diligent or not, plaintiff brought his claim within three years of the triggering event, thus falling within the statute of limitations when the discovery rule is applied. The discovery rule postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. Once the cause of action accrues, the injured party still has the statute of limitations period to investigate the parameters of his or her claim. Because plaintiff filed his action within three years from when he had reason to know of his causes of action, his suit is timely.” View "Holman v. County of Butte" on Justia Law

In 2017, a scene depicting an armed robbery of a jewelry store was filmed in New Orleans for the CBS television show, NCIS: New Orleans. No permits were obtained for the filming and police were not informed. A neighbor, thinking the robbery was real, called 911. The plaintiffs, all Louisiana residents, were arrested by responding officers and later released. They sought to recover damages in California from CBS, based upon fraudulent representations and/or omissions that were made to them in Louisiana, and that caused them harm in Louisana.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Code of Civil Procedure section 361 provides that “[w]hen a cause of action has arisen in another State, . . . and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this State.” The one-year Louisiana statute of limitations expired before the filing of the action. The court rejected arguments that the causes of action arose in California because the fraud committed in Louisiana allegedly was ratified by CBS’s conduct in California. The plaintiffs cannot state a valid claim for unjust enrichment. View "LeBrun v. CBS Studios Inc." on Justia Law

After her husband Benny Wall (decedent) died, petitioner Cindy Wall (wife) petitioned the probate court to determine that a home, titled in decedent’s name, was community property. Decedent’s children, objectors Timothy Wall and Tamara Nimmo (the children) unsuccessfully objected. On appeal, the children contended the trial court erred: (1) in determining the Family Code section 760 community property presumption prevailed over the Evidence Code section 662 form of title presumption; (2) in failing to consider tracing evidence rebutting the community property presumption; (3) in determining the Family Code section 721 undue influence presumption prevailed over the Evidence Code section 662 form of title presumption; and (4) by applying the undue influence presumption where there was no showing of unfair advantage. Though the Court of Appeal concluded the first two contentions had merit, it affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Estate of Wall" on Justia Law

Finato sued her former attorneys, asserting malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The defendants argued that all of the alleged conduct took place in connection with judicial proceedings and was protected under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,1 the antiSLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. The court of appeal affirmed the striking of two causes of action under antiSLAPP.On remand, the defendants moved for judgment on the remaining allegations, claiming they were time-barred. The court granted the motion with leave to amend to clarify when certain events took place. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC). Defendants filed a second anti-SLAPP motion arguing that eight paragraphs in the FAC repleaded allegations analogous to allegations struck in the first appeal. The court denied the motion. To the extent the allegations were precluded by the first appeal, the court concluded that the challenge should have been brought as an ordinary motion to strike material not in conformity with an earlier court order, not as an anti-SLAPP motion. The court held that seven challenged paragraphs did not implicate protected conduct under the reasoning of the first appeal.The court of appeal reversed in part. A second anti-SLAPP motion was a proper procedural vehicle to challenge an amended pleading renewing allegations previously stricken under section 425.16. The court affirmed that the other seven challenged paragraphs do not arise from protected conduct. View "Finato v. Keith A. Fink & Associates" on Justia Law

Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (MCWE) appealed an order denying its special motion to strike, made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute), which was directed to three affirmative defenses for setoff pleaded by Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC (NHOM) in its answer to MCWE’s cross-complaint. The appeal presented two issues: (1) could a special motion to strike under section 425.16 (b) be directed to an affirmative defense pleaded in an answer; and (2) did an affirmative defense for setoff constitute a cause of action or claim for relief subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike.The Court of Appeal answered the questions presented: (1) no - an anti-SLAPP motion could not be directed to an affirmative defense; and (2) also no - an affirmative defense for setoff cannot constitute a cause of action or claim for relief subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. Only a “cause of action” asserted by a plaintiff, cross-complainant, or petitioner could be the subject of an anti-SLAPP motion. "A cause of action seeks relief. An affirmative defense cannot seek relief and is not asserted by a plaintiff, a cross-complainant, or a petitioner." Further, the Court held setoff, as an affirmative defense, could not give rise to affirmative relief. "California Supreme Court authority holds that the affirmative defense of setoff may only be used defensively and does not permit recovery of the damages sought to be set off against the opposing party’s recovery." View "Morris Cerullo World Evangelism v. Newport Harbor Offices etc." on Justia Law