Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Sharon Curcio, formerly a teacher with the Fontana Unified School District (the district), learned her personnel file included derogatory statements about her. When the district refused to allow Curcio to obtain or review those statements, she sought assistance from her union, the Fontana Teachers Association (FTA), and from the California Teachers Association (CTA). When the union didn't help, Curcio initiated proceedings before the Public Employees Relations Board (the board), claiming FTA and CTA breached their duties of fair representation and engaged in unfair practices in violation of the Educational Employment Relations Act (the Act). When the board decided not to issue a complaint, Curcio filed this lawsuit and appealed when the superior court sustained FTA and CTA’s demurrer, without leave to amend, to Curcio’s second amended petition for writ of mandate. The demurrer was grounded on FTA and CTA’s claims that the board had the exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether Curcio had or had not stated an unfair practice and, therefore, the superior court lacked jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Curcio v. Fontana Teachers Assn. CTA/NEA" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal granted MTA's petition for writ of mandate arising from a special proceeding it filed on March 8, 2021, to quash a search warrant. The court concluded, and counsel for respondent conceded, that a magistrate's decision to authorize a search warrant does not constitute a decision on a contested fact issue relating to the merits under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The court explained that an application for a search warrant is an ex parte procedure and not a hearing for purposes of section 170.6; the relevant hearing is accordingly the hearing on the motion challenging the warrant; and MTA's challenge was timely filed prior to that hearing and should have been granted. View "L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The underlying litigation stems from a former employment relationship between appellant and respondent. In this action, after significant discovery, respondent voluntarily dismissed its misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action. Appellant then moved for an award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 3426.4, which the trial court denied. Appellant appealed and respondent moved to dismiss the appeal.The Court of Appeal dismissed appellant's appeal from the order denying appellant's motion for attorney's fees under section 3426.4. The court concluded that appellant has not articulated any policy reason why the collateral order rule under Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 119, and other cases should be extended to permit an interlocutory appeal of an order denying an award of attorney fees during the time the bulk of the litigation is ongoing in the trial court. Furthermore, plaintiff's second theory of liability under Meehan v. Hopps (1955) 45 Cal.2d 213, 215-217, and Muller v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical Center (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 887, fails because the order before the court is not "truly collateral" under Muller and an order disqualifying counsel as in Meehan is distinguishable here. The court explained that, at its core, this is a lawsuit about the claimed destruction and conversion of corporate documents, a claim common to the trade secret cause of action and all the others. Therefore, whether some or all of the documents were truly trade secrets is likely not dispositive of the remaining claims, and thus the order denying attorney fees cannot be said to be collateral. Finally, the court declined to treat the notice of appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus and denied respondent's request for sanctions. View "Dr. V. Productions, Inc., v. Rey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Santiago Medina appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of his putative joint employer, defendant Equilon Enterprises, LLC (Shell), which was a Shell Oil Company subsidiary doing business as Shell Oil Products US. Shell owned gas stations and operated them through contracts with separate companies called MSO operators, one of which employed plaintiff as a gas station cashier and manager. Plaintiff sued the MSO operator and Shell, alleging violations of the California Labor Code, arguing that Shell was his joint employer, based upon Shell’s strict control over the operations of its gas stations. Relying on two prior published decisions of sister courts of appeal involving similar claims, Shell moved for summary judgment, arguing Shell was not plaintiff’s employer as a matter of law. The trial court concluded it was bound by these prior decisions and granted the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed, however, finding that the facts presented by plaintiff in this case, particularly with respect to the degree of Shell’s control over the MSO operators and gas station employees like plaintiff, differed meaningfully from the facts set forth in the two prior opinions. "In addition to these factual distinctions, we also disagree with the analysis of our sister courts on the application of the relevant tests for joint employer status to Shell’s operation. We conclude the undisputed facts presented in Shell’s motion show Shell both indirectly controlled plaintiff’s wages and working conditions and suffered or permitted plaintiff to work at Shell’s stations, either of which is enough to make Shell plaintiff’s joint employer." View "Medina v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal challenged the validity of a possessory interest tax imposed by the County of Riverside, California (the county) upon lessees of federally owned land set aside for the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians (Agua Caliente tribe) or its members. A subset of the more than 450 plaintiffs in this appeal also challenged the validity of voter-approved taxes funding the Desert Water Agency, Coachella Valley Water District, Palm Springs Unified School District, Palo Verde School District, and Desert Community College District. A small minority of the plaintiffs claimed to hold a possessory interest in land set aside for the Colorado River Indian tribe (CRIT), but they argued the challenged taxes were invalid for the same reasons asserted by the other plaintiffs. A trial court upheld the validity of the challenged taxes and plaintiffs’ appeal, arguing the challenged taxes were preempted by federal law. The question of whether the county could impose a possessory interest tax on lessees of land set aside for the Agua Caliente tribe or its members was the subject of repeated litigation in both federal and state courts, and the validity of the county’s possessory interest tax in this context has been repeatedly upheld. During the pendency of this appeal, the Court of Appeal issued its decision in Herpel v. County of Riverside, 45 Cal.App.5th 96 (2020), again upholding the validity of the county’s possessory interest tax under almost identical circumstances as those presented here. Although plaintiffs claim that the Herpel decision was not controlling because it did not consider many of the arguments presented here, the Court concluded the facts and arguments presented in this case did not materially differ from those already considered in Herpel, and plaintiffs did not present any persuasive reason for the Court to depart from that recent decision. View "Albrecht v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that trial courts have inherent authority to ensure that Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) claims will be manageable at trial, and to strike such claims if they cannot be managed. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Staples, alleging a representative claim under PAGA on behalf of himself and 345 other current and former Staples General Managers (GMs) in California. Plaintiff sought almost $36 million in civil penalties for alleged Labor Code violations, all premised on the theory that Staples had misclassified its GMs as exempt executives.In the published portion of the opinion, the court drew on established principles of the trial courts' inherent authority to manage litigation, including ensuring the manageability of representative claims, and concluded that: (1) trial courts have inherent authority to ensure that PAGA claims can be fairly and efficiently tried and, if necessary, may strike claims that cannot be rendered manageable; (2) as a matter of due process, defendants are entitled to a fair opportunity to litigate available affirmative defenses, and a trial court's manageability assessment should account for them; and (3) given the state of the record and plaintiff's lack of cooperation with the trial court's manageability inquiry, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking his PAGA claim as unmanageable. View "Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC" on Justia Law

Jeffrey "Jeff" Ashby appealed a trial court’s decision to renew a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued against him to protect his ex-wife Michelle Ashby. He claimed the court erred because the DVRO was not supported by substantial evidence and the court abused its discretion by failing to independently review relevant evidence relating to more current events. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded there was no abuse of discretion and Jeff forfeited his substantial evidence challenge by failing to set forth all the relevant and material evidence supporting the trial court’s decision. View "Ashby v. Ashby" on Justia Law

Barbara Green (Barbara) filed this wrongful death action after her son Jeffrey Green (Green) jumped from the roof of drug rehabilitation treatment facility Anaheim Lighthouse (Lighthouse), and ended his life. Lighthouse appealed the judgment following a jury verdict in Barbara’s favor. Specifically, it claimed the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury Green’s suicide was a superseding cause of harm and on premises liability. It also claimed the judgment should have been reversed because the court improperly allowed opinion testimony by an undisclosed rebuttal expert. After review, the Court of Appeal found no error and affirmed the judgment. View "Green v. Healthcare Services" on Justia Law

For 28 years, the employees managed the Kazalis's motel. They were paid salaries and annual bonuses. In 2017, the Kazalis terminated the employees and paid their salaries, but not the 2017 bonuses, despite conceding that they were owed. The employees filed suit. The Kazalis made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to pay $300,000 in “settlement of all claims ... costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees, interest, and any other damages.“ After that offer expired, the Kazalis sent Wasito and Soenjoto checks for $75,876.90 for the 2017 bonuses including interest and penalties. The employees accepted the checks.The case proceeded to trial. A jury ruled in favor of the employees and awarded about $1200. The Kazalis sought post-offer costs under section 998 because the employees failed to obtain a better result at trial. The court found section 988's cost-shifting provisions violated Labor Code 206.5 by withholding undisputed compensation while attempting to settle all claims. The court awarded costs plus $66,700 in attorney fees, finding that the employees were the “prevailing party” (Lab. Code, 218.5) because they “were paid substantially more . . . after filing the case.” The court of appeal affirmed. The cost-shifting provision of section 998 did not apply. Labor Code sections 206 and 206.5 preclude a section 998 offer that resolves disputed wage claims if there are undisputed wages due at the time of the offer. View "Wasito v. Kazali" on Justia Law

Rozanova, self-represented, sued her neighbors, the respondents, in 2019. Rozanova had previously asserted claims involving the same property in 2013. The respondents unsuccessfully moved to have Rozanova declared a vexatious litigant and to require her to post bond or dismiss the action. The trial court later granted their motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding the action was “barred by res judicata/collateral estoppel and the statute of limitation.”Respondents filed a memorandum of costs, seeking $2,905.69 from Rozanova: $1,080 in filing and motion fees, $90 in court reporter fees, $1,253.04 for preparing photocopies of exhibits, and $482.65 in electronic filing or service fees. Among her objections, Rozanova claimed that recovery for photocopies “is limited to trial exhibits” under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(13). The trial court reduced the amount for electronic filing and service fees and approved an award of $2,743.04. The court found the motions to declare Rozanova a vexatious litigant and for an order restricting discovery “were made in good faith.” The court of appeal affirmed. The costs are recoverable outside the context of trial under section 1033.5(a)(13), View "Rozanova v. Uribe" on Justia Law